

THEOLOGY – HEART OF THE TRUTH

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LECTURE I

INTRODUCTORY.

I. I will define the study upon which we are about to enter.

II. Notice some requisite personal qualifications for this study.

III. Some advantages to be derived from the study of Systematic Theology.

IV. Some things to be avoided.

I. DEFINE THE STUDY UPON WHICH WE ARE ABOUT TO ENTER.

1. Theology is the science of God and of divine things. It teaches the existence, natural and moral attributes, laws, government, and whatever may be known of God, and of our relations, duties, and responsibilities to him and to the universe. In its most comprehensive sense it embraces all knowledge.

2. It may be, and generally is, divided into natural and revealed theology. This distinction does not imply that natural theology is not revealed, but that it is not revealed by inspiration. Natural theology is that which derives its evidence from the works of God, or from nature, as it is often but erroneously expressed. Revealed theology is that which derives its doctrines and evidence from the Bible.

3. Theology is again subdivided into didactic, polemic, and pastoral. Didactic is the systematic statement of theological doctrines with their evidences, both of natural and revealed religion. Polemic is controversial, and consists in the defence of the disputed doctrines of theology. Pastoral relates to the relations, duties, and responsibilities of pastors. It teaches the just application of the principles of the government of God, to the pastoral relation and office, and covers the whole ground of the relation of a pastor to his people and of the people to their pastor; of his responsibility to them and to God in the instruction he gives them, and their duties to him and to God in respect to the manner in which they receive his instruction as an ambassador of God.

II. SOME OF THE REQUISITE PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR THIS STUDY.

1. We do not naturally understand the language of one with whose state of mind we have no sympathy. A selfish being will hardly understand the language of a benevolent one, but would naturally interpret his language as intended to express what he himself would mean by such language.

There is scarcely any of the language of true benevolence which is not very naturally misunderstood by a selfish mind. Therefore it is indispensable to a just interpretation of the works and words of God that we should be in sympathy with his state of mind. And it is quite natural for persons in the same state of mind, devoted to the same end and inclining to purpose that end by the same means, to understand each other's language. They naturally express themselves alike and use very much the same forms of expression, whether literal, metaphysical, or figurative, to express their ideas. Hence the first and indispensable qualification for the study of theology is sympathy with God, devoted to the same end to which he is devoted, and a heart set upon promoting it by means of holiness.

2. True candor and uprightness of mind, a likeness to God in this respect, is an indispensable qualification for the successful pursuit of this study. An unfair mind can never understand theology. In this state of mind one cannot know God. It is so utterly out of adjustment with God's state of mind as naturally and inevitably to misapprehend him. But a mind that is upright and candid, willing to do and consequently to know the truth of God as it is, will come to this study prepared to enter into it, to obey the truth, to be taught of God, and will therefore easily apprehend all that is intelligible to minds of our finite capacity.

3. An earnest desire to know God that we may honor and obey him, that we may commune with him and be like him, that we may rightly represent him to others and win them to sympathy with him, is essential to a successful study of theology. If this desire be strong it will make us diligent students, it will naturally lead to the use of all the appropriate means of obtaining this knowledge, it will beget an earnest struggle after all that may be known of God, and a mind in this state will naturally acquire theological truth with great facility.

4. A right state of mind in regard to those around us is indispensable to the study of theology. A state of mind that is grieved and offended with their sins, yet having at the same time such intense love and compassion for them as to beget the most earnest desire to rescue them from their sins, to save their souls and adjust them in the will of God.

This state of mind in regard to them will lead us to study about God that we may instruct and enlighten them, that we may reprove their sins and win them to Christ. Without this abhorrence of their sins and love for their souls, we cannot understand God's abhorrence of, and love and compassion for them. To understand what God

proposes respecting them and their sins, we must be of his mind.

5. A willingness to make any personal sacrifice to glorify God and save the souls of men is an important qualification for the study of theology. If we make our own ease and comfort practically superior to the cause of God and the worth of souls, our faith must be very weak, and our hearts cannot be in such a state as to appreciate the great things of theology. We need to be in a state in which we count not our lives to be dear unto us if called to lay them down for God, and to sympathize with the apostle when he said, "I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord." I would not advise any young man to study theology with the design of preaching the gospel, or with the expectation of really understanding it, unless he is prepared in heart to make any personal sacrifice in favor of the cause of God.

6. Another qualification of great importance is a sense of our ignorance, the natural darkness of our minds, and dependence upon divine teaching. We need to understand in the outset that spiritual things need to be spiritually revealed to us. Sin has greatly darkened our minds, and although without special divine illumination we know enough through reason and conscience to bring us under condemnation for disobedience, yet without the supernatural illumination of the Holy Spirit we shall never so understand or know God as to win our hearts to him, or to enable us to win the hearts of others.

It is not enough that we should read the Bible and understand it historically as we would other matters of history. It is not enough that we should be able to state catechetically or didactically its doctrines. We need a spiritual apprehension of them; we need to be taught inwardly as really as the inspired writers; and as a condition of understanding theology in any influential sense, we need divine inspiration. I do not mean that we need to be taught truths that are not declared in the Word or published in the works of God, but that we need that these things should be shown to us inwardly and spiritually -- that the works of God may be spiritually apprehended and the Word of God spiritually interpreted and applied. Or, as I said before, we need to be inspired by the same Spirit with which the writers themselves were inspired, to have them shown inwardly to us as they were to them.

7. Another condition of successful study of theology is a willingness to practice as fast as we learn. If we do not yield our minds up to practice the truth we shall soon fail to understand it. The Spirit will be grieved, we shall fall

into confusion and darkness, and nothing can give us a clear apprehension of the truth if we persist in refusing to obey it.

8. A fixed purpose to know and to do the whole truth is another condition of the successful pursuit of this study. If there are some points on which we are committed and opinionated, if we have some theory to maintain, some preconceived opinion or prejudice to indulge, we shall almost certainly be deceived. I have sometimes met with young men who came to the study of theology, assuming that on certain points they were settled. It would be seen that a want of candor pervaded their whole mind and course of study. But I have yet to see the first instance in which such a mind has made thorough progress in theological study. There is that want of candor that fills the mind with darkness, rendering it impossible to obtain the true knowledge of God and of divine things.

9. A state of mind that so deeply appreciates the value and infinite importance of divine truth, that it will not be diverted and practically lay an undue stress upon other things and upon the knowledge of other truths. A young man who comes to the study of theology needs to have a mind absorbed with the surpassing greatness and value of his theme. If he can willing turn aside and be diverted by pleasure or business, by gossip or light reading, if he is disposed to attend to a multitude of other things at the same time, he can never thoroughly comprehend the great questions of theology. He must truly and practically value them above all price. A young man who is in a state of mind to spend much time in light reading, in keeping himself informed of all the newspaper gossip of the day, who can lightly make journies[sic.] of pleasure and turn aside from the great inquiry after God, who fills his mind and hands with trifling subjects, is in no state of mind to be taught of God.

10. Another important qualification for this study is such humility as shall make you willing to expose your ignorance. In commencing this study it is to be assumed by you and by others that you are not informed, that you are not a theologian, but that you need teaching. You take the attitude of students. Of course, your need of teaching is presupposed. Be not then afraid of exposing your ignorance; do not assume to know what you do not know; do not suppose that you may be expected to know beforehand the subjects that are given you for study; come out freely, ask questions, and give yourselves up to study, assuming that you have everything to learn upon the subject.

11. The love of study, and the love of this study in particular, is an indispensable condition to your understanding theology. If this study is a task to you, you had better let it alone. If you do not love God well enough to have an intense desire to know all that can be known about him, you are in no state of mind to study theology. You need to be so interested in him as to hunger and thirst intensely for more and more knowledge of him. If this be not your state of mind, if you are disposed to go no farther than the rules of the seminary require, if there is not that within you that prompts you to study from love to God, and of the knowledge of God, you will never make theologians. If you can lightly come in without having studied your lesson, can suffer some trifling thing to divert your mind and cause your to fail in recitation, you are in no state of mind to pursue a study like this. On the contrary you need to be in the state of mind expressed in the second chapter of Proverbs, "My son if thou wilt receive my words, and hide my commandments with thee; so that thou incline thine ear to wisdom, and apply thine heart to understanding; yea, if thou criest after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding; if thou seekest her as silver and searchest for her as for hid treasures; then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord and find the knowledge of God. For the Lord giveth wisdom; out of his mouth cometh knowledge and understanding. He layeth up sound wisdom for the righteous; he is a buckler to them that walk uprightly. He keepeth the paths of judgment, and preserveth the way of his saints. Then shalt thou understand righteousness, and judgment, and equity; yea, every good path" (Prov. 2:1-9).

12. A sound education is another important condition of understanding theology. By sound education I do not mean that it is indispensable that you understand the original languages in which the Scriptures are written, though this is important and of great value when those languages can be thoroughly known as to enable the student to criticise and thoroughly comprehend the original. Yet without this critical knowledge you may obtain a good theological education. There are now so many helps to an understanding of the original Scriptures, so many criticising and marginal readings, so many commentaries and helps to interpretation so far as the theology and literature of the Bible is concerned, that great classical learning is not indispensable. If you have time and opportunity you will surely avail yourselves of a knowledge of the original languages if you truly [value?] the Bible. But if you have no such time or opportunity, you may still so well understand your

Bible as to be able to give sound instruction to the multitudes that may wait upon your ministry.

But by sound education is intended so much knowledge of mental, natural, and moral philosophy as will place you in a position to understand the laws and government of God, to appreciate in some measure his works; so much knowledge of history, of geography, and of learning in general that your hearers shall perceive that you are an intelligent man; so that when you speak of government, they shall see that you understand something of the science of its different departments and functions, that you do not confound in your illustrations the judgment of the court with the verdict of the jury, the summings up of evidence with the pleadings that make up the issues. You need to understand something of the laws of evidence to be able to define what evidence is, what kinds of evidence are essential to prove certain truths, and what degree of evidence constitutes proof. You need to understand so much of psychology as to distinguish between the rational and understanding conceptions, to know what truths are first truths, what truths are merely self-evident, what truths need proof, and when they are proven. In short, to come to the study of theology you need so much previous education that you may understand the grammatical construction of language, the force and meaning of words, how to state a proposition, how to state a syllogism, how to frame and how to appreciate an argument. In a word, you need to be generally intelligent and instructed in the learning to be obtained in schools, or from books. It is of great importance that what learning you have should be sound; that your views in mental philosophy should be really true; that you should not come to this study committed to the doctrine of the necessity of the will's actions, ignoring the great truths, the admission and knowledge of which are essential to an understanding of the principal terms to be used in the pursuit of this study.

13. Industrious habits are of the last importance. Mental indolence will be a thorough preventative of your ever being theologians. Your state of mind must lead you to be industrious, and render it natural for you to fill up your time and to lay yourself out in securing information upon this subject. An indolent ministry can never be an instructive ministry; an indolent student will not be taught of the Spirit of God; an indolent spirit may expect to remain in darkness.

14. Patience and perseverance in investigation are essential. Many of the questions to be examined require to be persistently investigated. We do not arrive at the mastery of them at once. They involve difficulties; they

are questions deep and high, and of difficult comprehension to minds in our circumstances. They were designed of God to create a necessity of earnest effort, for patient and industrious investigation. We need it for our own development and discipline; and the development we obtain from patient and persevering investigation is often as valuable to us as the truth which at last we obtain. We gain intellectual vigor, and moral vigor, by exercise. God does not condescend to give us the truth without our study; but he aids and stimulates our efforts, meaning to give us truth only as we reach for it as for hid treasures. By this means we grow intellectually and spiritually.

In teaching theology, it is no part of my design merely to lecture to you, and help you to truth without your own efforts. This would do you little good, nay, it might greatly injure you. I would merely help you to study, help you when you endeavor to help yourselves; suggest to stimulate and guide your efforts rather than dispense with them. I have no sympathy with, or confidence in, that mode of theological instruction that merely reads lectures to young men. They may as well find their theology in books --and better -- and remain at home and study. When you come here to study, we design to give you the question to be investigated, and as far as possible to throw you upon your own resources, upon your reading and reflection and study to find out the truth; to make you lead off and give us your views, and then to make such suggestions as to stimulate and guide your investigations to a right result, not lecturing you at all, until you have surveyed the subject and as far as possible settled your own convictions. Then after suggesting and helping you to study for yourselves, we sum up and try to state the whole question, and if possible throw additional light upon it. Thus we endeavor to make you theologians by aiding your efforts, instead of dispensing with them. We do not mean that you should merely hear and remember, but that you should investigate and make up your minds whether right or wrong; that you should have the full value of all that we can say to guide you, said in the proper place and suggested in a manner that shall give the fullest scope to your own investigations and lay as much of the burden of finding out these truths upon you as is consistent with your coming to a thorough knowledge of them. It is for your sakes that we do this. To have you come here and listen to our lectures, take notes, and go away and live upon our thoughts instead of thinking for yourselves -- why this will be your ruin!

You need to make yourselves acquainted with the laws of evidence so as to understand upon whom the burden of proof lies in the settlement of all these questions, that

you may not assume that which needs to be proved, nor take the burden of proof when the onus (or burden of proof) truly lies upon your antagonist. You need also to be able to give correct definitions, and to define your terms with perspicuity, and have so much knowledge and good sense as to state your propositions clearly, and then proceed to prove what you have stated, and not to state one proposition and then prove another, nor rest your cause till you have made out your case.

15. You need a correct knowledge of the laws of Biblical interpretation. Without this knowledge you will misunderstand your Bible, and mislead your hearers, unless in fact they are more able to teach you than you are to teach them. Many of the multitude of opinions which claim to be supported by the Bible would vanish from the world if men agreed in respect to the correct rules of Biblical interpretation.

16. Lastly, it is of great importance that you understand the limits of human research and investigation. If you forget that you are finite, if you suppose yourselves able to grapple with and comprehend all truth, you will probably fall into the disbelief of all truth. If you insist that you will not believe what you cannot comprehend, if you stand upon the proposition that your line can be stretched out and measure infinity and eternity, that you can sit in judgment upon God and the high policy of his government, and bring all these great questions within the mold of your own understanding and your own logic, you will find yourself baffled, confounded, and unable to proceed with any comfort in your investigations. Know therefore in the outset that there are limits to all human investigation and comprehension; that we can affirm that many things are without being able to state how and why they are, or even to conceive how they can be possible. (Numbers added to above -- Gordon Olson).

LECTURE CONTINUED --

III. SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM THE STUDY OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

1. A constantly increasing sense of our own ignorance. Before we commence this study we are not aware of the vast field before us, and how little we know of what is to be known. The more we survey the field the more it amplifies and extends on every side. The more we attempt to solve its problems the more we are astonished at the extent of our natural ignorance and darkness. As we pursue the subject we perceive that there is ample room for an eternity of study, and that our utmost attainment here can only be as the A B C of what may be known and is finally to be known of God. Nevertheless, we may satisfy ourselves on many fundamental questions, and obtain all the knowledge

that is essential to our highest usefulness and happiness in this world. It is no matter of discouragement to us as we pursue this study that it is so vast and indeed illimitable, but rather a matter of encouragement that so delightful a theme is expanded to infinity, and that we shall have enough to learn to occupy our attention and powers as long as we exist. But an increasing sense of the fact that we are in the A B C of our theological knowledge, while it does not tend to discourage, does greatly tend to humble us and make us modest.

2. Another advantage to be desired from the study of systematic theology is growth in personal holiness. The study of theology is most highly calculated to produce this result.

3. It also tends to beget the habit of rapid, correct, and consecutive thinking. To systematize our thoughts on this subject is of the greatest importance to us. God has created us in a position and places us in relations that make it indispensable for us to think closely, correctly, consecutively, and often to review our positions, and thus in the highest degree to cultivate our intellectual powers. A thorough course of theological study will render subsequent preparations for the pulpit naturally and relatively easy and safe.

4. It tends to beget system in thinking and in communicating thought. Ministers who have not made theology a study, find it difficult to communicate thought in that systematic and logical order that is easily intelligible to any congregation. Their propositions are disconnected, often inconsistent with each other, and hence embarrassing to a congregation. But a thorough study of theology tends to rid one of unintelligible manner of stating truth.

5. The study of theology leads us to perceive the necessity of exactness in the statement of our positions, and the doctrines of Christianity. To a theologian the manner in which a preacher defines his positions and states the doctrine which he proposes to inculcate, will reveal at once his attainments as a theologian. It will be seen whether he has thought accurately, extensively, and is really acquainted with the system of doctrines peculiarly Christian.

6. The study of theology is essential to facility on the part of the preacher in proving the doctrines of Christianity.

7. This study tends to prevent those inconsistencies of statement that so often embarrass a congregation. It is not uncommon to hear preachers make statements that are seen by thinkers in the congregation to be totally inconsistent with each other. The students in his

congregation can easily perceive that he is himself no student; and in the very outset they come to have little confidence in what he has to say. He does not understand himself. He has not thought enough to perceive that his various positions and statements are inconsistent with each other. A thorough study of theology is therefore of the greatest importance to the one who would attempt to state and establish and proclaim the doctrines of Christianity.

8. This study tends to a settled state of mind in regard to religious truth. When these questions are not settled by discussion and thought, and scientifically digested in the mind, we are constantly liable to be unsettled, to be thrown into perplexity and doubt in regard to them. Satan is ever busy to unsettle us, and will be sure to make those suggestions that will embarrass us, unless we so familiarize ourselves with the subject as to know what answers to make to any suggestions with which he may assail us.

9. The study of theology gives us that ability to teach without which the minister in the active duties of his calling will either neglect study, or will be obliged to study so hard as soon to break himself down. If he is prepared to enter the ministry by having digested and systematized the truths of Christianity, he can in sermonizing apply these doctrines consistently and with an ease that will not require of him that amount of mental labor that is unendurable.

IV. SOME THINGS TO BE AVOIDED.

1. We should by all means avoid tempting God by demanding an impossible or unreasonable kind of evidence. Some students have approached this subject and determined in the beginning to take absolutely nothing for granted. They have not considered what kind of evidence is within our reach, what kind or degree of evidence is reasonable to expect; they have therefore demanded that every truth shall be demonstrated, or seen with intuitive certainty. In settling some questions, we first enquire what proof of its truth, considering the nature of the question and our circumstances, we may expect to find, what kind and degree of evidence ought to be satisfactory; and if such kind and degree of evidence is found to be within our reach, we should rest satisfied, and not tempt God by refusing to receive a truth upon a reasonable kind and degree of testimony.

2. A caviling state of mind should by all means be avoided. It is this state of mind that leads to the rejection of reasonable evidence, and in a state of probation it is not reasonable to expect that every truth which we need to receive will be established by irresistible evidence. If it be established by evidence that will convince a fair

mind and produce conviction where there is candor, it is all that we have a right to expect.

To force conviction upon a moral agent in a state of probation may not be wise or even consistent with such a state. The truths of theology may plainly be expected to be revealed with such a degree of evidence that a mind in search after truth can find out all that it needs to know; but still many things will be left in such a position that a perverse mind will find itself able to resist and avoid conviction.

Many of the truths of theology, as we shall see, are first truths, truths which everybody assumes and knows to be true. Others are merely self-evident in such a sense as that their truth is readily seen when they are once stated in intelligible language. Others are truths of demonstration; others still are truths of experience; others still are truths of history. We shall find that the system is based on a solid foundation, and that at every step there is a kind and degree of evidence that ought to satisfy a rational mind, and that will satisfy an honest inquirer. Nevertheless, a cavilling, perverse state of mind can resist it all; and even the first truths of reason may be and often have been denied; and the foundation thus falling away, through this denial a universal skepticism has been the result.

3. Another thing to be avoided is, in the course of our discussions the defending of erroneous positions merely for the sake of argument. It is sometimes seen that this results in the ultimate belief of all that which was at first asserted and defended with a knowledge that it was false; and merely for the sake of argument. The feelings became enlisted, pride stimulated, and in the heat of debate the judgment became warped, and ultimately the defender of error comes to believe his own lie.

4. Beware of committing yourself to an opinion. We are very liable to do this without being aware of it. There is a natural pride of consistency in many minds, that exposes them much in this direction. With some, once a thing is asserted it must be maintained; once having advanced an opinion they seem to be blind to every argument and fact that would disprove it. It is amazing to see how difficult it is to convince some minds on any subject upon which they have committed themselves to an opinion. Some young men have been here who seemed to be unable to yield an opinion. No argument or even demonstration could shake them. They seemed not to know what it meant to yield a point to which they were committed. The will has much more influence in forming our opinions than we are aware of -- and in sustaining them when they are formed. The will commands the attention; it allows the attention to

perceive and weigh arguments; it in a great measure controls the judgment; it selects and arranges those considerations that can support an opinion, and refuses the consideration of those that would overthrow it. Hence it is of the last importance that we should be on our guard against committing ourselves to an opinion until we have given it a thorough consideration. Especially is this true in respect to questions upon which it is plain that good and great men have differed. Some truths are too plain to admit of doubt. To them we may commit ourselves -- and indeed we cannot avoid committing ourselves to them so far as opinion is concerned. But where there are two sides to a question, when there is room for doubt and debate and argument, then this should be our motto, "Hear both sides and then judge."

5. Avoid calling in question first truths. These truths can in no way be proven, as we shall see, except by the perfection of their chronological antecedent. If we attempt to prove them by logic we shall often find it impossible. Who by logic can prove that time or space exists? Who by logic can prove that every event must have a cause? These truths cannot be proved for the reason that they are too evident to need any proof. There is nothing more simple and evident that can be laid down as premises from which they are to be deduced. They lie at the foundation of all reasoning, and are in themselves the major premises upon which we construct our syllogisms.

If these truths are called in question, if proof is demanded of them, if you attempt to prove them and fail, as you most certainly will, it may lead you into universal doubt. Suppose you call in question your own existence and demand proof of it -- you cannot prove it; and if as a condition of your believing it you must be able to prove it by any logical process, you must disbelieve it and settle down into universal skepticism.

6. Avoid impatience at the ignorance or stupidity of your classmates. Regard yourselves as a band of brothers and as soldiers of Jesus Christ; consider yourselves as all interested to make the most of each other that can be made for the cause of God; be interested to develop and instruct each other that everyone may be the best soldier possible. Be not selfish, and willing to rush on and leave any one behind. Remember, if you go to the charge you need the whole strength of the army; and if you refuse to bear with patience the drill necessary to instruct and fit for service those that apprehend truth more slowly than you do, you will weaken the course which you are committed to support. Bear one another's burdens, therefore, and so fulfill the law of Christ. Endeavor with calmness and patience and

perseverance to secure in every member of the class a thorough understanding of every position that is taken.

7. Avoid an ambition to excel them in study and argument. An ambitious student is detestable. I mean one who manifests a selfish ambition; manifests a disposition to be a leader, to overshadow his class, and a pride when he thinks he rises above them and excels them as a student. Some students will even pride themselves in getting into a controversy with their teacher, and manifest a most unchristian deportment not to be instructed, but to overcome their teacher in argument. With some this seems to be a point, to get the reputation of teaching their teacher. If your teacher is in error, there is an unambitious method of leading him to see it, and striving, not for mastery, but with a manifest searching for the truth.

You are not requested to rest satisfied without thorough investigation, and where you have not reason to be satisfied. And it is generally easy to see whether dissatisfaction is owing to the absence of sufficient evidence or to an ambition to excel in controversy.

8. Avoid therefore a disputatious spirit. This will ruin your piety, darken you mind, and make you a fool while you esteem yourself to be wise. Discussion is indispensable; and after many years experience I am fully satisfied that theological teachers and students need thorough discussion in settling the great questions of theology. Discussion should be thorough, and not cut short till reasonable time has been given for a thorough examination of all the questions to be settled. The utmost liberty should be given for the expression of opinion, the asking of questions, the statement of objections, and the array of arguments pro and con, till the positions are probed and searched to their foundations. This is our habit. This we regard as indispensable. This after many years of experience I am satisfied is the only method of settling theological truth. But it exposes to temptation in this direction, there is danger of getting into a disputatious spirit and of becoming proud of our powers of argument and discrimination, and of getting into a state in which we cannot hear an opinion expressed, even in common conversation, without immediately calling it in question, and manifesting a disposition to battle every one with whom we come in contact. This is an unhappy and a most disgusting state of mind.

Study therefore to be modest in questioning the opinions of others. Do not consider yourselves as under an obligation to oppose every opinion with which you do not accord. Be not disputatious in spirit or manner, but always take the attitude of candor as a sincere inquirer

after truth. The Socratic method of inquiring, rather than affirming, is the safest and the most influential way of debating any question.

9. Avoid the use of weak and inconclusive arguments. A strong point is often rendered weak in the estimation of the hearers by attempting to support it by weak and inconclusive arguments. Let your strong points be strongly stated, established by the best arguments which the nature of the case admits; and when you have produced your strong and conclusive arguments, introduce no weak and inconclusive ones, lest you betray the very truths you intend to establish.

10. Avoid an involved method of stating your propositions. Try to state them with the utmost perspicuity, and as laconically (concisely) as possible; and leave no room for query in regard to what you mean by your main propositions.

11. Avoid stating more than you can prove. State what you mean and what you intend to prove and then stop. If you gratuitously state, or even attempt more than you are called upon to prove, it will only embarrass you and your congregation. Consider your positions, what is essential to your purpose; state that, prove that, and there rest your cause. As preachers you will need to avoid an error not unfrequently fallen into by young advocates at the bar. They will sometimes call their witnesses, produce their evidence, but fall short of really proving that which in their pleadings they have affirmed. They do not legally make out their case. This they do not perceive, and therefore inform the court that they rest their case, supposing that they have now thrown the burden of reply upon their opponent. But the court and their antagonist will perceive that they have not made out their case. The opposing counsel will move the court to dismiss the case on this account -- that the party has not produced legal evidence of the truth of his position. Hereupon the court will dismiss the case. Who has not often listened to sermons that amounted to precisely the same thing? When the preacher rested his cause, it was open to a motion to dismiss the case for want of sufficient proof. The congregation might adjourn with the understanding that the question remained unsettled. Now avoid leaving your propositions until they are fully supported by evidence and argument. See that you carry the convictions of the people. Place the subject in such a light that you know that they must see that the evidence and argument are conclusive; then rest your position and make such use of them in the application as are required by the end you have in view.

REMARKS.

1. The study of theology demands much prayer. "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord save by the Holy Ghost," and the teaching of the Holy Spirit is promised in answer to prayer. The soul needs to be kept in an anointed state, to walk in the light of God's countenance. The study of theology demands that we should become pupils of the Holy Ghost.

2. Remember the condition on which Christ has promised to be our teacher: "Except a man forsake all that he hath," says Christ, "he cannot be my disciple." To be a disciple of Christ is to be his pupil; to be his pupil is of course to have him as our teacher; and we can have him, as he informs us, only on the condition that we renounce our selfishness. Self must be abandoned, and our whole being devoted to his service and glory; then we are in a state to be instructed by him, and then he has wise reasons for instructing us.

3. Take care that you keep your hearts with all diligence, and that your hearts keep pace with your intellectual improvement. If you do not make a self-application of the truth as fast as you learn it, if you do not obey it, it will ultimately blind instead of enlighten you. You must live up to your convictions, or the study of theology will greatly and fatally harden you. Therefore be careful that you grieve not, resist not, quench not the Holy Spirit. Study on your knees. Go to God with every position that is established, and pray him to write the truth in your heart; and rest not till it be adopted by you as your own, as a truth to influence you, to have dominion over you; and as these truths are developed in your intellect one after the other, and established, let it be settled that in the midst of them, and in conformity with them, you are to live and move and have your being.

If you do this the study of theology will make you a mellow, anointed, devoted, useful man of God; if you do it not, you will become hardened and reprobate. And of all the reprobate minds in existence, they seem to be the most hardened who have studied theology and gone through the course of theology without receiving the truth into their hearts. Every truth that lodges in the head and does not take possession of the heart, is to the student "the savor of death unto death." As you value your own souls, therefore, as you value your influence, as you value the cause of God, let it be settled that with much prayer and the utmost honesty and effort you will make every truth of theology your own, not only in the sense of mastering it with your intellect, but of embracing and obeying it in your heart.

LECTURE II.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND SENSE.

Study implies a student; knowledge implies a knowing faculty. The study of theology implies the existence of students capable of the knowledge of God.

I. DO WE KNOW ANYTHING?

Answer, yes; we know ourselves. Should anyone say, I doubt this; I enquire, Do you know that you doubt it? Should he reply, I doubt that I doubt it; I enquire again, Do you know that you doubt that you doubt it? Should he reply, No, I do not know anything; I enquire again, Do you know that you do not know anything? Should he say, No, I only guess that I do not know anything; I enquire again, Do you know that you thus guess? Should he reply, It only seems as if I thus guess; I enquire, Do you know that so it seems? Should he reply, No, this seeming is nothing; I enquire again, Do you know that this seeming is nothing? Should he reply, No, but only so it seems; I reply, Then you are sure that so it seems; and if you are sure of this, or if you are sure that you are not sure of this, it amounts to the same thing. We know something -- we know ourselves; it is impossible to doubt this.

II. HOW DO WE KNOW OURSELVES?

I answer, in consciousness. That is, we are directly aware of ourselves in what we call consciousness. But what is consciousness? The word has been used ambiguously. Some times as the general faculty of knowledge; in this sense Sir William Hamilton often used it. Sometimes it is used as a function of the general faculty of knowledge, that function by which we know ourselves. Sometimes it is spoken of as self-knowledge. It is common to use the term as signifying either that particular function of the intellect by the use of which we know ourselves, or the knowledge of ourselves given by this function. More generally the term is used in this last sense, to signify self-knowledge; but often the faculty by which we obtain this knowledge is called by the same name by which we designate the knowledge itself. The connection in which the term is used will in general show the sense in which it is used. If we speak of the intuitions of consciousness, of course we speak of it as a function or faculty of self-knowledge; if we speak of self-knowledge as a consciousness, then it is plain that by consciousness we mean the knowledge of self.

I say then, IN CONSCIOUSNESS WE KNOW OURSELVES. Of this knowledge I remark:

1. That it is intuitive knowledge; that is, a knowledge obtained by a direct beholding of ourselves in the exercise of our various faculties.

2. I remark of this knowledge, or of consciousness, that it is a certain knowledge, knowledge of the highest possible kind, a knowledge that cannot be doubted. To call its validity in question is to question the validity of all knowledge, which we have seen, is nonsense.

III. WHAT DO WE KNOW OF OURSELVES IN CONSCIOUSNESS?

1. We know our existence. This is not an inference; "Cogito ergo sum," is a mere sophism. If I am not directly aware of my existence, how do I know that I think; and from the consciousness of mere thought, what right have I to infer that I think, or that I exist at all. There is no premise from which this can be inferred. The mere consciousness of thought affords not the least evidence that I am the thinking substance, or that I exist. And why should I say, I think? The very language implies that I know that I am, in knowing that I think. The very conception of thinking includes the assumption that I am. In consciousness, then, I know my own existence. (Cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I exist)

2. In consciousness I know that I have three distinct faculties: The faculty of knowledge; the faculty or susceptibility of feeling; the faculty or power of willing, choosing, acting. I know in the exercise of these different faculties or susceptibilities, that I possess them. I know, for instance, that I know; and in this knowledge I know that I am and that I have a faculty of knowledge, because I am conscious of using it. I know that I feel; and in the exercise of feeling I know that I possess the susceptibility or faculty of feeling. I know that I will, choose; and in willing and choosing I know that I possess and use the power or faculty of willing and choosing. This knowledge, this feeling, this willing, I know to be my own; and it is impossible for me to doubt either the exercise or the existence of the faculties thus exercised.

3. In consciousness I know all of myself that is knowable by me of myself.

4. In consciousness I know myself as distinct from that which is not myself; and in the very conception of myself as self I know that that exists which is not myself. Of this I am in some way as certain as that I exist myself. Indeed the conception of self implies the conception of not self. Self can be defined only as we discriminate between that which is self and that which is not self. I am, then, in consciousness directly aware of myself,

which implies that I am also aware of that which is not myself.

Because of his peculiar definition of consciousness, Sir William Hamilton insists that this awareness of that which is not myself is strictly a consciousness. It is true that we are conscious of knowing that there is a not self; but is not this knowledge an intuition of the faculty of perception and distinct from consciousness but known in consciousness? It is sufficient to say that whether this as a knowledge of the not self, is a direct intuition of consciousness, or is an intuition of the perception faculty, which intuition is given to us in consciousness -- certain it is that we have this knowledge, which we can no more doubt than we can doubt the knowledge of ourselves.

5. In consciousness we know that the intellect has various functions; some of which are: Consciousness, sense, reason, conscience, memory, imagination, etc. Of consciousness I shall say no more at present, as it has been, for our present purpose sufficiently defined. Of sense, reason, and conscience, more things need in this place to be said.

IV. WHAT IS MEANT BY SENSE?

Sense is that function of the intellect by which we directly intuit the material world, including our own bodies and all material objects. It has been common to regard sense as that function of the intellect that intuits sensation. Sensation is an impression in the sensibility made either by some material object, or by some thought or action of the mind.

Sensation is a feeling. I once received the common idea that sense perception was merely a perception of the sensation, a feeling in the sensibility; but I do not now so regard it. Philosophers who have regarded sense as merely giving sensation have found it impossible to find any valid proof of the existence of an outward cause of sensation. They have said truly, that sensation being a feeling of the mind has in it none of the qualities that we attribute to bodies, and consequently that from the sensation we cannot infer the qualities of body or the existence of those outward things which we suppose have created the sensation.

This difficulty has stumbled many philosophers, and they have admitted that there was no valid reason for believing in the existence of the material universe. But other philosophers (as Sir William Hamilton) maintain that sense does not give us sensation, but that we are directly aware of sensation in consciousness -- that we are directly conscious of the feeling in the sensibility which we call sensation, and do not know it by a sense of perception. This class of philosophers maintain that

by sense we directly perceive the primary qualities, at least, of material bodies.

The sensationalists object to this, that it is impossible to conceive how sense can directly perceive the qualities of external bodies. But to this it is justly replied, it is also impossible to conceive how sense could give us sensation.

We know not how it is that we are directly aware of ourselves, or how it is that we directly intuit anything in consciousness, sense, or reason. How an impression upon the sensibility should be irresistibly known to me, I cannot tell. The fact I know; the how I do not know. So it is with all our knowledge. Certain it is that we do not get the existence and qualities of external objects as an inference from sensation. We actually know that we do not thus get it -- that we have the knowledge not as an inference from premises. That we do not get it logically we know just as we know our existence.

For example, in knowing the material world around me I know that I do not get at it in this way: Phenomena imply substance; substance is as its phenomena are. Here are the phenomena; these phenomena imply substance, and this substance must be as the phenomena are; therefore such are the material substances around me. Now who is not aware in consciousness that this is not the way in which one gets a knowledge of his surroundings?

Who, for example, ever looked at an object and reasoned in that way, or could conceive himself as getting a knowledge of that object by such a process of reasoning? No, we are directly aware that we perceive it. Certain qualities of it are revealed to us irresistibly and directly. The object stands face to face with the perceptive faculty; and its primary qualities are as surely known to us as our own existence, and precisely in the same way, only through the use of another intuitive function of the intellect.

In consciousness I directly know my own existence; in consciousness I know also that I directly perceive the existence of other things. The faculty that directly perceives material objects I call sense. It would be out of place here to enter into an inquiry with regard to the particular attributes or qualities of the outward world that are given in sense. This inquiry is in place in a treatise in psychology, but it is unessential to our present course of study. For the present it is enough for us to know that by the function of sense we know with certainty the existence of the material universe.

Of this function, then, in conclusion, let me remark, first, that it is an intuitive function of the intellect, [and] gets all knowledges by a direct beholding. From the very nature

of its perceptions, its testimony is to be received as valid. Nay, it is impossible to doubt the validity of its revelations. Let philosophers deny as they will the existence of the outward world; they know it still, and give as constant evidence to themselves and everybody else that they know it as other men do.

It should here be remarked that intuitive knowledge is always irresistible knowledge, by whatever function of the intellect the intuition is given. In intuitive knowledge the object known and the knowing faculty stand face to face. Such is the nature of the objects of intuitive knowledge, and such the nature of the faculty of intuition, that standing face to face we cannot help knowing these objects. They are directly beheld, and known with irresistible certainty.

It should also here be said, that in consciousness we are aware of sense perceptions and of all that passes within us; so that with whatever function of the intellect knowledge is obtained, in consciousness we have the report of all these knowledges. The same is true of our feeling, willing, imagining, remembering, dreaming, and whatever passes within us. (Roman numerals and outline added -- Gordon Olson).

LECTURE III.

REASON.

Locke's philosophy of the human understanding logically resulted in atheism. He maintained that all knowledge is founded on, or derived from, sensation, or from sense. Now it is plain that sense can give material facts but not principles and laws. Hence, legitimately no inference whatever could be drawn from the facts of sense or sensation. It could not be inferred that there was any cause whatever of these sensations, for sensation knows nothing of cause. If no faculty of the human mind gave the idea of cause and effect, and the law of causality, all that could be known by us would simply be the material acts that occur. It would be impossible for us to refer them to any law or cause whatever. Therefore, the inquiry after cause, upon the principles of Locke's philosophy, was entirely impertinent.

The logical consequences of this theory were gradually perceived by philosophers, and those of a skeptical tendency seemed very willing to admit the soundness of his philosophy, and to triumph in its logical consequences. As was logically necessary, it finally

brought forth its fruits in the atheism of David Hume and his school. Hume simply upon trust [assumed] the Christian philosophy of his time, and pushed it to its logical consequences. This result led Kant, a German philosopher, to call attention to the existence and province of an a priori function of the intelligence, to wit, the pure reason, as this function is given in consciousness. He asserted, and philosophers now generally admit, that we are conscious of a faculty that directly intuits laws and principles, as consciousness intuits our inward experiences.

I. WHAT WE MEAN BY THE REASON, AS DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLECT.

1. I have said that it is the a priori function of the intellect as distinct from, and opposed to, the logical function, or the a posteriori function of the intellect. The a posteriori function of the intellect gets its conclusions or knowledges from reasoning, or from induction; this, the a priori function, gets its knowledge from a direct beholding or intuition.

2. The pure reason gives or is concerned with ideas, as opposed to concrete existences. Reason gives ideas and their mutual relations, as opposed to the mutual relations of things and beings. The reason gives laws and principles as sense and consciousness give facts or phenomena. Reason gives certainties as opposed to hypotheses; reason gives the necessary as opposed to the contingent; reason gives the unconditional as opposed to the conditioned; reason gives the infinite as opposed to the finite; reason gives the perfect as opposed to the imperfect; reason gives the ideal as opposed to the real; reason gives the axiomatic as opposed to the logical. Reason does not prove but affirms; reason does not suppose but knows; it does not deduce but postulates; it does not give the exceptional but the universal; it does not give plurality but unity; it gives truths of certain knowledge as opposed to opinion or belief.

3. Its knowledges are all universal and irresistible, as opposed to those truths that can be really doubted. In the course of study that is before you, it is of great importance that you should continually keep in mind the distinction between the rational function of the intellect and some other functions of this faculty; because, whatever is directly intuited by this faculty is to be taken as a truth of certain knowledge. By this I do not mean that the same is not true of consciousness and sense within their respective spheres; for they also are intuitive functions of the intellect. But whatever is given by this faculty is to be distinguished from whatever is given by

the understanding, the judgment, the imagination, or memory. Its truths are peculiar in their kind, being self-evident, necessary, and universal, they are therefore truths of irresistible knowledge. No one of them can need to be proved, because it is a truth of direct and certain knowledge. I will now proceed to notice two classes of truth given by this function: First what are commonly denominated first truths of reason.

II. FIRST TRUTHS OF REASON HAVE THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS.

1. They are self-evident; that is, they are truths of intuition, perceived by a direct beholding of them. They need no proof because they are irresistibly seen to be true in their own light. They stand face to face with the intuitive faculty. Such is the nature of this function of the intellect and the nature of these truths, that the mind cannot help knowing them. It knows by a certain, direct, and irresistible knowledge, as when you open your eyes with your face toward the sun you cannot avoid the sensation of vision, nor that perception of sense that directly beholds the sun. So the reason, in the presence of its objects, that is, of those truths adapted to its nature, cannot avoid beholding them. All the truths of the reason have this characteristic; but at present I speak of first truths as being universally self-evident.

2. Another characteristic of first truths is, they are necessary as opposed to contingent truths. The reason does not merely perceive that they are so, but that they must be so. The reason does not merely affirm that they are true, but that their opposite is impossible and absurd.

3. A third characteristic of first truths is that they are universal as opposed to the exceptional or general. That is, there are no exceptions to these truths. The reason affirms not only that they are true and that there is no exception to them, but also that there can be no exception to them -- not only that they are but that they must be universally true.

4. First truths are truths of certain knowledge, as opposed to opinion, speculation, belief, or even demonstration. Truths of demonstration are affirmed by the reason to be certain, provided there is no mistake in the premises; but as mistake in the premises is in many cases possible, they are not certain in the sense in which first truths are certain. These truths are not deduced from premises in which there may be mistake; but being truths of direct intuition they are truths of certain knowledge in the highest sense. We do not merely believe them, or opine them, or demonstrate them, we know them by a direct certainty.

5. First truths of reason have this characteristic, which, in fact, distinguishes them from all other truths; they are truths of universal knowledge, the denial of them always and necessarily involves a contradiction. That is, all beings in whom reason is developed do actually assume and practically acknowledge their truth, even though they may never have made them an object of attention, or even have been aware that such truths are known by them. They may never have been thought of in the form of a proposition, and yet they are known, assumed, and always acted upon. In specifying some of these we shall see that they have these characteristics.

III. EXAMPLES OF SOME FIRST TRUTHS OF REASON.

1. The existence of space is a first truth of reason. It is a truth known and assumed by every rational being. We find it impossible to doubt the existence of space, even if we suppose the non-existence of everything else. This is a universal knowledge, and has all the characteristics that have been specified as belonging to the first truths of reason.

2. The existence of time is also a first truth of reason. All rational beings know that time exists. Although in consciousness we find that we can conceive of the non-existence of all things in time, yet time will remain; to conceive its non-existence we find in consciousness to be impossible.

3. The truth that every effect must have a cause is a first truth of reason. I do not mean that it is a first truth of reason that there is any effect, or that there is any cause in existence; but that effect and cause imply each other, that no effect can exist without a cause, and that no cause can exist without an effect. The law, then, that every effect must have a cause is a first truth of reason, everywhere assumed.

4. That every event must be an effect, and have a cause, is a first truth of reason. An event is something that comes to pass. That whatever change occurs, or whatever comes to pass, must have had a cause is a truth that cannot be doubted. It is not a contingent but a necessary and universal truth, and one that must be universally assumed and is therefore a first truth of reason.

5. That a series of causes and effects cannot be infinite, is a first truth. Every effect is a unit. Infinity cannot be made up of parts or units.

6. That time and space are infinite, is a first truth of reason. That either time or space should have limits is inconceivable and impossible. This is and must be universally assumed.

7. Another first truth of reason is that the will of a moral agent must be free. A moral agent is a responsible agent. A responsible agent is truly an agent, an actor, a self-acting being, one who originates and directs his own activity. A moral agent is one who acts under the responsibility of moral obligation. Moral obligation, strictly, respects acts of will, choices, and volitions. Now the reason directly affirms that moral obligation to will, implies power to will in accordance with obligation, or the contrary. That a moral agent must be free -- not in the Edwardsean sense, able to execute his volitions, for this he may not have power to do; but free in the sense of being able to will as moral law requires him to will, or will in an opposite direction at his sovereign discretion. This ability is liberty of will. The reason directly intuits and affirms that this liberty of will is an indispensable condition of moral agency, and that this is a necessary and universal truth. It is a truth also known to, and affirmed by, all moral agents; and no being could conceive of moral obligation to will unless he assumed the ability to will.

These are only some of the first truths of reason, given as specimens. It will be seen that they consist in ideas, laws, and principles, as distinct from concrete realities or proper beings.

IV. HOW THESE TRUTHS ARE DEVELOPED IN THE REASON.

I next proceed to notice the condition upon which these truths are developed in the reason. They are necessarily known to all rational intelligences. The inquiry at present is how they came to be thus known, or the conditions upon which they are thus known.

1. The first condition upon which they are known is the existence of this function of the intellect, as distinct from the other functions of the intellect. The sense, like the reason, is an intuitive function of the intellect; and so is consciousness. But sense gives only the material; consciousness gives the facts of our existence and mental acts and states; but reason gives not these, but pure abstractions. This is the peculiarity of this function. Reason gives the logical antecedents of sense perceptions. Sense gives the chronological antecedents of rational conceptions.

2. A second condition is a fact given, as a sense perception. Sense perceives an object possessing the qualities of extension, form, solidity, whereupon the rational idea of space is developed. This perception is the chronological antecedent, and the necessary condition of the development of the idea of body and the affirmation that space exists. The ideas of body and space must be simultaneously developed; for they

cannot be thought or defined except as they are distinguished from each other, body and space. The existence of body is not affirmed by the reason; but the perception of body develops the conception of space and the affirmation that it really exists. Sense gives the existence of that which the reason affirms bodiness, or of that which the reason calls body, without affirming anything of its actual existence. But of space it not only has the conception of what it is, but also affirms that it is. The idea being once developed, the actual existence of space is affirmed by us as a necessary truth. The idea always lies in the mind as a first truth, whether thought of or not. It is always there, assumed and acted upon by a necessity of our nature.

3. How we come by the first truth, time is. This truth may be developed either by some conscious succession in our inward states, thoughts, or feelings, or by the sense perception of the succession of outward events. The consciousness or the perception of succession develops the rational ideas of succession and time. These must be developed simultaneously, as a succession is seen by the reason to imply time, and time to imply the possibility of succession. The consciousness or the perception of succeeding events, within or without us, is the chronological antecedent of the development of these rational ideas. The ideas do not develop each other, but are developed upon the occurrence of conscious[ness] or sense perceptions.

The rational idea of succession is not an affirmation that events do exist in succession, but that succession implies time. The idea of succession is simply that of relation in time. But the rational conception of the existence of time, as a first truth of reason is not only an idea of what time is, but that it is, and must be. The rational idea of succession is not that succession is, but what succession must be, if it is.

Time, then, given as a first truth of reason, is that time is and must be whether anything else is or not. It is not that the rational conception of time is that of flux, or flow, or any movement or succession in it; but that it is a unit, duration, that in which succession exists, or may exist. The rational conception of time, then, is simply that of duration as necessarily existent, as having neither beginning nor end nor parts, but as infinite and a unity. Both space and time, as first truths, are given as absolute, that is, unconditional truths -- their existence depending on no conditions. Hence, did we suppose that nothing else existed, we affirm that time and space must exist.

4. How we attain to a knowledge of the law of cause and effect as a first truth of reason. Either by the

spontaneous exercise of our own causality, our consciousness or sense gives some occurrence or event, whereupon the reason instantly affirms that this event had a cause; and that this event had a cause because every event must have a cause, or must be an effect.

Locke in his philosophy could not consistently arrive at this; there being in his estimation no a priori faculty to affirm that an event must be an effect, and that an effect implied a cause, and that events imply causes or cause; he could not conclude that there was any necessary connection between events. Brown assumed Locke's philosophy, and hence consistently denied that there is any cause or effect in the proper sense of these terms. Cause and effect, with him, meant nothing more than precedent and subsequent events -- not antecedent and consequent, but merely antecedent and subsequent. Hamilton denied all causality. This, on the principles of Locke's philosophy, is consistent. But the pure reason irresistibly intuits the law of causality. It affirms that no effect can exist without a cause, and that no cause can exist without an effect -- that they mutually imply each other.

Hence the ideas of cause and effect are both rational ideas, simultaneously developed upon the perception or consciousness of an event. This perception or consciousness, let it be remembered, is the chronological antecedent of the development of both of these ideas. The law of causality is not a first truth of reason, in the sense that reason affirms that cause and effect do really exist, but in the sense that if one exists the other must, that they mutually imply each other, and that this truth is necessary and universal. In this form it is strictly a first truth of reason, universally known and practically assumed -- as well by Locke, Krouse, and Hamilton, as by others.

5. That the will of a moral agent must be free I have said is also a first truth of reason. This truth is developed in the mind by the perception of that of which we affirm oughtness, or obligation, or duty. Something comes before the mind that demands the action of the will. Some outward act is performed, or some inward choice or volition to be put forth or declined. The moral function of the reason thereupon affirms obligation; and in affirming obligation it assumes ability to choose or act in the required direction. The assumption of the freedom of the will no doubt lies back of this, as from our earliest infancy we assume the freedom of our will in constantly asserting it and manifesting it in our actions. So also we assume that every event is an effect, and that every effect must have a cause. This we do in the exercise of our own causality, or in the actions of our wills put forth

to produce effects. These assumptions are clearly made by us previous to the development of the rational conception of the freedom of the will, of cause and effect.

The first truth about which we are now inquiring, that the will of a moral agent must be free, is a rational conception added to that instinctive knowledge which from the beginning we possess, that we have a will and are able to use it at discretion. The first truth that the will of a moral agent must be free, is developed by the reason's directly beholding that which demands the will's action, and in the presence of which the moral function of the reason affirms obligation. In the affirming of obligation by the moral function of the reason, the natural function of the reason affirms not merely that my will is free as a condition of the obligation, but this is a universal truth, that obligation implies liberty of will in the sense of power to act in either direction in the presence of obligation, and therefore that freedom of will is essential to moral agency, and that the will of every moral agent must in this sense be free.

V. DIVISION OF FIRST TRUTHS OF REASON.

The first truths of reason are strictly of two kinds. First, they are ideas of necessary existences, or what Cousin calls necessary ideas. The idea of a necessary existence is an idea which we necessarily conceive as having an archetype, the non-existence of which we cannot conceive possible. Such are the ideas of time and space. These we necessarily regard as having archetypes, or that which is represented by their ideas. Duration and space we necessarily conceive must exist; and in this sense we call these ideas necessary ideas, or more properly ideas of necessary existence.

The other class of first truths, that is, truths of necessary and universal knowledge, are not ideas of necessary existences, but ideas which under our circumstances we necessarily have. Such, for example, that a whole is equal to all its parts, and that all the parts of anything are equal to the whole; that every effect implies a cause and every cause an effect; that a moral agent must be a free agent; that a moral agent must have moral character; that a moral agent must be under moral law; ideas of right and wrong. These are some of the first truths which are given in reason as ideas which we necessarily have, but of which we do not necessarily affirm that they have any archetype.

VI. SECOND CLASS OF TRUTHS OF REASON.

1. It is common to speak of self-evident truths of reason. But it should be remembered that reason is an intuitive function of the intellect, and therefore that all its truths are necessarily self-evident. They are all developed by a

direct beholding or intuition, by which it is intended that they are seen to be true in the light of their own evidence, and therefore are self-evident truths. The reason knows no other than self-evident truths; therefore to speak of self-evident truths of reason is not to designate any particular class of truths given by this faculty, for this is the universal characteristic of all the truths given by it.

But the second class of rational intuitions or truths, to which I call attention, are not truths of universal knowledge in the sense that they are necessarily recognized or known to, or assumed by, all rational beings whose reason is developed. But nevertheless they are truths of rational intuition; although in many cases where the reason is in some degree developed many of these truths are not already intuited or known. Such are, for example, the truths of mathematics, mathematical relations and proportions, the laws and principles of science -- indeed, all the laws, principles, and postulates of all the exact sciences. These laws, axioms, postulates, and principles are all given by the reason when they are apprehended, are directly intuited as being self-evident in their own nature. Whenever they are apprehended the mind calls for no proof of them, because they are seen to be necessarily true. Although they are not truths necessarily known to all whose reason is developed, yet they have the attributes of necessity and universality; that is, they are seen not only to be true, but necessarily and universally true from their own nature. Such, for example, as, "Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other." All the propositions of Euclid contain truths of direct intuition; that is, in these propositions the major premise is a postulate. The minor may be a fact, or it may be another postulate.

But in mathematical reasoning, as a general thing, the whole process is a rational one; because the relations are ideal or abstract relations, not the relations of things but of ideas. Hence, properly speaking, the science of mathematics is to a very great extent made up of rational intuitions. These are not first truths in the sense that they are universally known, but in the sense that they are necessary and universal truths, discovered by the direct intuitions of reason.

VII. HOW THIS CLASS OF TRUTHS (SECOND CLASS) IS DEVELOPED IN THE REASON

1. Not empirically. We do not, for example, and cannot prove by mere measurement that a whole is equal to all its parts; or that all the parts whatever of anything are equal to the whole. And could we in any particular case show that the whole is equal to the parts or the parts to

the whole, this would not give us a universal truth. It would be illogical to conclude that because it was so in a particular case it must be so in every case. It is the reason alone that gives this truth in the form of a universal and necessary truth. The chronological antecedent of the development of this, as a universal and necessary truth, might be the fact that we perceive in a given case that a whole is equal to all its parts, or that all its parts are equal to the whole. But it is plain that no experiment upon isolated facts or cases could logically give truths necessary and universal. These truths, then, are not given empirically in the sense that we logically infer them from any experiment. Experience may be the chronological antecedent of their development; but they are never a logical inference from experiment.

2. These truths are not obtained a posteriori. This of course is implied in their being truths of intuition. But some may suppose that a truth obtained by syllogistic reasoning is after all really given by intuition; and that therefore a truth obtained by a course of reasoning or a posteriori argument, might be said to be intuitively obtained. But whatever may be said of a truth arrived at by induction, the class of truths of which we have been speaking are not of this kind. They are not conclusions from premises, but are rather themselves postulated as premises. In other words, they are a priori truths given in the reason, not as conclusions from any other truth, but as postulates or axioms, universal and necessary in their own nature. They are, then, developed as a priori truths, principles, and laws, sustaining such a relation to the reason as not to be inferred from other truths but affirmed as first principles.

3. Again, these truths are developed by teaching -- not in the sense of proving them to be true, but in the sense of stating them in such a manner and in such connections, as to render them intelligible and place them face to face with the reason. The teacher of mathematics, for example, is employed, not in proving these truths, but in so presenting them to the mind that the terms of the proposition in which they are stated are rendered intelligible, and thus they are placed directly before the intuitive gaze of the reason.

4. These truths are developed by study, in the sense of giving the attention of the mind to them. Not study in the sense of demonstration, but in the sense of meditation.

5. Again, these truths are developed in intellectual culture, in the sense of developing them in their necessary order. The reason seems to be capable of indefinite development; and all self-evident truths are not seen by it at once, but we learn from consciousness

that there is a natural and necessary order for their development. A student of mathematics, for example, will not at once receive the statement of all the axioms that belong to that science; much less of the mathematical truths, proportions, and relations that in the course of development are seen to be self-evident. The human reason is not omniscient; it gets its truths by intuitions, but by successive steps, and rises from the recognition of the first truths of reason into the region of other necessary and universal truths, doubtless in endless progress of development.

VIII. REMARKS.

1. The truths of reason need no proof, because they cannot be doubted.

2. This last class of rational intuitions are not like first truths, truths of universal knowledge, but only truths that must be known in the order of their development, because when the conditions are fulfilled they are seen to be true in their own light and from their own nature, necessarily and universally true.

3. We should not assume that all the self-evident truths of reason are of course at present self-evident to all minds. Many may not yet have attained to that stage of development in which the statement of them would be understood, or in which they can even be conceived by the reason. A child, for example, that already has the first truths of reason, the ideas of time, space, that every effect implies a cause, etc., may nevertheless not have attained that degree of development in which it could understand the terms in which many axioms and postulates of science are stated. In all steps of intellectual development we shall find that as the reason advances, the field of self-evident truths is enlarged, the number of these truths multiplied. Innumerable truths would be self-evident to a Newton or a LaPlace, that could not so much as be conceived of by children and youth.

4. Again, we may not suppose that many truths may not be self-evident to others which are not so to us. On the one hand we have no right to suppose that all minds, whatever their degree of development, will intuit all the truths that we intuit as necessary and universal truths; nor on the other hand make our own degree of development the limit of intuitive knowledge, and assume that what we do not know is not knowable, what we do not intuit is not a truth of intuition. The reason of this difference is not that reason in its laws, modes of activity and affirmations is not identical in all; but it is a question of development, of progress, there being no end to the progress of development. The first truths of reason are developed through the instrumentality of

sense perceptions at the very dawn of reason. No one probably can remember when he had not these truths, or did not make these assumptions; when he had not the ideas of time, space, cause and effect, and the law of causality. But we can all remember how gradually our reason has come to the apprehension or intuition of many necessary and universal truths.

5. Again, it is important in teaching or studying for us to inquire to what category any given truth belongs. Is it a first truth? Then everybody knows it. We may well assume it, and assume that those around us know it. Although they may not have thought of it, still they know and assume it; and we may safely proceed with them upon the assumption that this truth is in their minds as a certain and irresistible knowledge. But if it is not a first truth, but a truth belonging to the class which we have just considered, a necessary and universal truth but not a truth universally known, we need, if teaching, to proceed to fulfill the conditions of its development.

6. Again, we need to consider the natural place or connection in the order of development which such a truth sustains to the reason. It is a familiar fact to us all that after considering a matter well, many truths are seen by us to be self-evident, as necessary and universal truths, which at first we did not see to be so. This is a constant experience in the study of the exact sciences. By this I do not mean that these truths did not appear to us to belong to this class, to be self-evident and universal, when we really apprehend them; but that the apprehension of them required study, consideration, and the fixing the attention upon them.

With respect to truths of reason, then, it should be said, that to develop first truths of reason, objects should be presented to sense perceptions that will serve as chronological antecedents to spring them into development in the reason. Let sense perceive body, and anything be said or done that shall spring the idea of its being body, and with this idea is naturally also sprung the idea of space. So, call attention to the fact of succession in a manner that shall spring the idea of events being separated in time, and it forces into development the rational apprehension and affirmation of the existence of duration. In a modified sense of the term this may be called the proving of first truths of reason; but only in the sense that you fulfill the conditions of their development, and not in the sense that you present an argument, or logical formula, or proof, or evidence according to the common acceptation of these terms.

Of the other class of truths of reason, I would say that it often happens that they may be proved in this sense, by

the *reductio ad absurdum* -- that the denial of them involves a contradiction or an absurdity. Truths of reason, sense, or consciousness, can seldom be proved by any process of argument, for the reason that there is no truth more certain in the light of which they may be established or from which they may be inferred. And it is often dangerous to volunteer an attempt to prove these truths, because a failure to prove them might lead to their being called in question, when in fact the reason why they cannot be proved is because they are in themselves certain in the highest sense of certainty, and nothing is more certain as premises from which they can be deduced. They are not truths of deduction, because they are the major premises of syllogistic reasonings. To attempt, therefore, to prove them is to overlook their nature and their relations to the intellect, and consequently virtually to represent them as doubtful or as needing proof; whereas it should be understood that all truths of intuition, whether of consciousness, of sense, or of reason, are not only too certain to need proof, but so certain that they cannot be proved, except as I have said, by the *reductio ad absurdum*.

I make these remarks, because in the course of study upon which we are entering, it is important that we should understand what we are to prove, and what we are to take for granted as needing no proof -- that when any truth lies in our course of study that is plainly a truth of intuition, its truthfulness cannot rationally be called in question.

IX. TRUTHS OF CONSCIENCE.

I have already said that conscience is a function of the reason, or is reason applied to moral objects. The truth of this is evident because conscience is plainly concerned with ideas, qualities, laws, principles, and relations -- with the abstract, the necessary, the universal. I call that conscience, that upon certain conditions being fulfilled, affirms moral obligation; that postulates the great rule of moral action; that affirms the law of universal benevolence as an authoritative rule in conformity with which all moral agents ought to act. The conception or affirmation of this rule as a rule of duty, as implying and enforcing obligation, is given by the moral function of the reason.

The ideas, then, given by conscience are such as these: Moral law subjectively affirmed or imposed by the conscience, moral obligation or oughtness; the ideas of right and wrong, of moral character, vice, virtue, desert, justice, injustice; the ideas of moral attributes, qualities and relations; the idea of God as a moral governor; the idea of God's moral attributes as distinct from his natural attributes, which are given by the natural function of the

reason. Reason applied to natural objects gives God as a first cause and as infinite in all his natural attributes. Conscience, or the reason applied to moral objects, gives the moral attributes of God, and his relation to his creatures, not as cause, but as governor, or as having rightful authority. The natural function of the reason gives God as naturally infinite and perfect, while the conscience gives him as morally infinite and perfect. Conscience gives the idea of virtue in its universal form as the moral quality of disinterested benevolence; and it gives all the moral qualities or attributes of disinterested benevolence as virtues. It gives the idea of justice, mercy, veracity; in short, the idea of virtue and vice in every form in which virtue and vice can exist. The quality virtue or vice, as affirmed of any action or state of mind, is given by the conscience, is perceived and affirmed by that function of the reason.

Feelings arising in the sensibility as a consequence of the intuitions of conscience are strictly no part of conscience; but only a result of its affirmations and intuitions; although in popular language we often speak, and the inspired writers appear to speak, of conscience as including these states of the sensibility. But speaking as philosophers in the light of conscience, we regard the conscience as purely an intellectual function, as belonging to the pure reason, and as strictly consisting in reason applied to moral questions.

X. HOW THE IDEAS OF CONSCIENCE ARE DEVELOPED.

It has been common for skeptics to suppose that conscience is altogether a matter of education, and that morality, or our ideas of morals, are mere prejudices, the result of education and a superstitious tendency. But it should be observed that had we not a conscience that necessarily gave us these ideas, men could never be educated in morals, or have any prejudices upon that subject. Were not the ideas of moral right and wrong irresistibly given as first moral truths, children could never be taught that anything was right or wrong, except in the physical sense of these terms. It is in vain to tell a mere animal that a thing is right or wrong. It has not the idea; consequently, if you could make it understand language, to say that this or that particular thing or act is morally right or wrong would be totally unintelligible. Not having the abstract idea of moral law, nothing can be compared with it, or brought into its light so as to be conceived of as right or wrong. The mind must have a law, and a moral law, in its intuitive conceptions or affirmations, as the condition of having any conception of moral right or wrong in the life. The rule can never be given by teaching. But the rule once in the mind, we can teach children or others what particular acts come under

it as being in accordance with or opposed to it. But moral education is a sheer absurdity, unless there is a moral nature or conscience that postulates moral law and obligation as necessary and universal truths; and that, too, antecedent to all possible teaching as to what is and is not morally right or wrong in the life.

The ideas of conscience, then, are by no means prejudices of education; it is impossible that they should be. They are irresistible intuitions of our very nature, and lie developed in the moral reason or conscience as laws and principles, in the light of which education on moral subjects, as touching the activities of life, is possible.

But how, then, are the ideas of conscience developed? Instrumentally, no doubt, they are developed by some experience. We experience pleasure or pain. This experience of pleasure or pain is the condition of developing in the reason the rational conception of the good or valuable, that which is valuable to being for its own sake, and the evil, or that which is naturally evil on its own account to a moral being. Happiness is affirmed to be intrinsically valuable, or a good; misery as intrinsically an evil. The ideas of natural good and evil develop in the conscience the affirmation that the good ought to be chosen for its own sake, and that the evil ought never to be chosen for its own sake, and only as a condition of good; and these affirmations are developed in the universal form as necessary and universal truths, or in the form of moral law -- that the good of universal being ought to be chosen by moral agents for its own sake, and that misery ought to be universally avoided, except as a condition of good. The law is also extended naturally to the lives of all moral agents; and the conscience postulates irresistibly that all moral agents ought to devote themselves to the promotion of the highest good of universal being, and consequently to avoid as far as possible the introduction of misery. This affirmation of conscience is made upon condition of the intuitive perception of a moral relation existing between the choice and the good of being -- that such is the nature of good and such the nature of choice, that it is morally fit that the good should be chosen for its own sake. Upon the perception by the conscience of this moral relation between choice and its object, the affirmation is developed that it is right to choose, or in other words, that choice ought to terminate on the good, and that we and all moral agents ought to choose the good and therein refuse the evil.

The perception, then, of that which is naturally good, to wit, the blessedness or happiness of being, develops in the conscience the conception of the morally good, or of virtue. Natural good being perceived by the natural reason, or happiness being affirmed by the natural

reason to be a good in itself, conscience thereupon affirms that moral good or virtue consists in the disinterested choice of natural good or happiness. Thus the idea of moral good is developed in the conscience by the intuition of natural good in the intrinsically valuable to being by natural reason.

The condition, then, of the development of the ideas of conscience, is the experience of pleasure or happiness. In an animal, this experience does not suggest the idea of the intrinsically valuable, and consequently of moral law and obligation to choose it; but in rational beings, the experience of happiness and its opposite at a very early age develops the idea of the good or valuable whereupon the moral nature simultaneously affirms moral law, moral obligation, right, wrong, virtue, vice, good and ill desert. It is not so much my object in this place to state the exact order which these truths are developed in the conscience, as the condition of their development. It will be observed that in the development of these ideas of conscience we assume necessarily and irresistibly our moral agency, the freedom of our will, the existence and rightful authority of God, his moral perfections, and that he requires of us conformity to this law which conscience imposes on us in his name.

So it should be remembered that obligation is always invoked in the name of God; and we cannot resist the conviction that he requires of us that which our conscience affirms that we ought to do. If we consider the matter as revealed in consciousness, we shall perceive that obligation in us implies two parties, one under obligation and one to whom obligation is due; that we do not affirm moral obligation to ourselves nor to society, but to God as our rightful lawgiver. Hence the Psalmist affirms that he had sinned against God only. We cannot possibly regard this obligation as imposed by society, or by any other being than God. The will of no being but God can be moral law. We cannot conceive of moral obligation, then, in any other light than as an obligation to God; and in affirming this obligation we necessarily assume his existence, his moral attributes, relations, and his moral perfections, as conditions of our obligation to obey him. (Roman numerals added -- Gordon Olson).

LECTURE IV.

THE UNDERSTANDING, JUDGMENT, AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

In further remarking upon the revelations given in consciousness, I call attention again to THE UNDERSTANDING as a function of the intellect. This faculty is concerned with the physical as distinct from the metaphysical, or with things in distinction from ideas. It combines, as has been before said, the intuitions of sense and of the other intellectual functions, and forms notions of things. It is concerned with the concrete and contingent, the finite, facts, and events. I have observed that much confusion arises from confounding the intuitions of reason with UNDERSTANDING conceptions. For example, in the UNDERSTANDING conception of God, the attributes of infinity and perfection are dropped; of God as the absolute or unconditioned, the infinite and perfect, the UNDERSTANDING has no conception, these being attributes incognizable by this faculty. It can have a conception of God as a concrete existence, indefinitely great, and of all his attributes as realities, but of no one of them can it conceive the attribute of infinity, except in the Lockean sense of finding no limit. But this is only the indefinite. In UNDERSTANDING conceptions, therefore, of God, I plainly perceive in consciousness that I refer to God my UNDERSTANDING conception of myself, only I conceive of him as being indefinitely greater than myself. I find that with my UNDERSTANDING I cannot but conceive of God as being an agent, and a moral agent like myself. I conceive of him as a personality, as having will, intellect, and sensibility. I conceive of him with my UNDERSTANDING as an affectionate Father, as a lawgiver, judge -- in short, with my UNDERSTANDING I conceive of God in a manner that brings him into relation to me that is approachable and endearing. But if with my UNDERSTANDING I attempt to conceive of God's eternity or infinity, I find a seeming contradiction between my UNDERSTANDING and my RATIONAL conception. So of everything that is infinite.

My UNDERSTANDING conception of time is that of constant flux or succession of moments; my RATIONAL conception is that of an infinite unit, or duration as a unit. This is real time. It is absolute duration. Now my UNDERSTANDING conception of God is a very different one from my RATIONAL one in regard to his eternity. With my UNDERSTANDING I cannot conceive of an existence above the conditions of time and space. Everything given by the UNDERSTANDING is necessarily given under these conditions. Consequently my UNDERSTANDING conception of him is not as the self-existent and eternal Being, but simply as an agent

living on through time as we do, of whom may be predicated, here and there, time, past, present, and future. From the very nature of the UNDERSTANDING it can conceive of God only under these limitations. But my RATIONAL conception of God is that, in some respects, he differs infinitely from this my UNDERSTANDING notion or conception of him. Then, the reason supplies what is inadequate in the UNDERSTANDING conception.

The RATIONAL conception is, of God the unconditioned, and of course as above conditions of time and space. The RATIONAL conception gives him as the infinite Being; consequently, that in respect to him there can be no here or there. With respect to all other beings there can be, and must be, place; but to the infinite Being, so far as his own existence is concerned, there can be no place in the sense of here or there; for here implies there, and the term here has no meaning unless there is a there, and there unless there is a here. These are terms of distinction that cannot belong to God. Of all other beings he can say here and there; but of himself there is neither here nor there, for this would contradict his infinity or omnipresence.

Now I find in my consciousness that in this respect my UNDERSTANDING and my reason differ entirely in their conceptions of God. The same is true of time as it respects God. Being absolute, or above the condition of time, or which is the same thing, being self-existent, he can sustain no such relations to time as finite beings must. So far as his infinite being is concerned, there can be neither past, present, nor future; for present as distinguished from past or future implies the past and the future. But my RATIONAL conception of God is that he is above conditions of time. Indeed, to call this in question is deny that he is self-existent, and to say that he never can exist. But this entirely baffles my UNDERSTANDING conception of him. My UNDERSTANDING cannot possibly conceive of him as being in such a sense above the conditions of time and place that it is not strictly proper to predicate of him both time and place. Hence we speak of him as everywhere, as here and there. This is common language both in the Bible and in all that we say of him. We also speak of him as sustaining relations to time such as we sustain. Especially in this -- we speak of all time as being present to him.

Such language is inevitable as expressing our UNDERSTANDING conceptions of God, and these conceptions are not delusions in an injurious sense. And yet they fall infinitely short of expressing the RATIONAL conception that we have of God. Our

UNDERSTANDING conception of God is that he fills all things; and the UNDERSTANDING is even overwhelmed by the magnitude of the universe, and gets its most exalted conception of his greatness by conceiving of him as being everywhere and as pervading the whole universe. But the RATIONAL conception of God is that he is infinitely above and beyond all limits and measurements, infinitely above all ages, time, cycles, and our UNDERSTANDING conceptions of time. Care should therefore always be taken to discriminate between the RATIONAL conceptions of God and the UNDERSTANDING conception of him. The RATIONAL conception gives the idea of his being a substance possessing certain attributes; and that of infinity and perfection, absoluteness and incomprehensibility are attributes of his. The reason must necessarily conceive of him as a unity; the UNDERSTANDING may conceive of him as a three-fold personality.

Again, I must add a few remarks concerning THE JUDGMENT as a function of the intellect. This faculty is concerned with evidence and proof. It is the faculty largely concerned in logical processes of thought. In consciousness I find that it is a passive function of the intellect, in the sense that when certain conditions are fulfilled, its decisions are inevitable. And yet, in regard to these conditions, I find in consciousness that the acts of my will have very much to do with directing the decisions of my judgment. I find in consciousness that by willing I direct attention either to or away from the proper sources of evidence in any case to be decided; and the bias of my will I find has often a decided influence in the view taken by the judgment of what is or is not true. By consciousness I find that I often pre-judge a case in consequence of the unfair attitude of my will -- that often I am unwilling to be convinced of certain truths or facts; or on the other hand am very desirous of being convinced that certain things are true. In this case I perceive in consciousness that I cannot trust my opinions or the decisions of my judgment where my will is in a committed attitude; and I often discover that I have been deceived by the committed and uncandid position of my will. I find also in my consciousness that my conscience holds me responsible in many cases for the decisions of my judgment as well as for the actions of my life. It forbids me to judge censoriously or unfairly of my neighbor. It condemns me for prejudice universally; and conscience I perceive will hold me responsible, not only for the decisions of my judgment in all cases of doubt, but for my acts, whether in accordance with my judgment or not.

Conscience, I perceive, will not allow me to deceive myself in the decisions of my judgment, and then take refuge under these delusions to justify myself. In consciousness I perceive that conscience will justify my conduct only as I am conscious of judging and acting in a perfectly benevolent state of mind. In consciousness I find that I am as severely censured by conscience for prejudice against my neighbor as I am for any injury that I might outwardly inflict upon him. Nay, so far as my own conscience is concerned, I perceive that to think ill of my neighbor is often to do him the greatest injury of which I am capable. His character is dear to himself and to God. Nothing in the outward life can be so valuable, and no injustice to him can be so great as in my judgment unreasonably to rob him of his character. Christ in his teaching strongly reprobates prejudice, and insists that all our judgments shall be formed in strictest charity. In the looseness of men's thoughts it often appears as if their ideas of morality were confined very much to their outward actions and relations, and as if they deemed it a greater crime to defraud a man in a business transaction than to judge his character uncharitably. But by attending to the voice of conscience as revealed in consciousness, we shall see that prejudice against a man, that allowing ourselves to form censorious judgments, is a far greater injustice to him than the mere defrauding him of money; and that publishing a censorious judgment and uttering a slander of a neighbor is one of the greatest of earthly crimes against him. Indeed, there is almost nothing in which we more frequently sin than in the use of this intellectual function, the judgment; and it is amazing to see to what extent sins of this character, though of the deepest dye, are overlooked in our estimate of our moral condition.

But I must pass in the next place to some additional remarks upon THE WILL, as this faculty and its activities are revealed in consciousness. By the will is intended that power or faculty of the mind by which I act. And here it is requisite to say, that by power or faculty is not intended a member, as we speak of the body as divided into parts and members; but by faculty is intended a property of the mind, a capacity, or that of which the mind is capable or susceptible. It has been said that the mind is to be regarded as a unit possessing a variety of capacities and susceptibilities. By the will is intended the mind's innate power of choice. It is the will in which particular[ly] personality resides. By this power we are made agents, that is, self-active beings. By this power, in connection with the intellect and sensibility, we are made moral agents, or morally responsible actors. By this power we are self-determining in regard to our own activity, and sovereigns of our own actions. We mean by

the freedom of the will precisely this: That we direct and decide our own choices entirely above and beyond the law of necessity. When I choose I find that I am universally conscious that I elect, prefer one course to the other, or one object to the other; and that in the identical circumstances in which I choose I am able in every instance to choose the opposite of what in fact I do choose. Herein, and nowhere else, I perceive the liberty of my will to reside.

Some have defined the freedom of the will to consist in our ability to execute our volitions, or to do as we will. But herein is no liberty. I am conscious that it is the law of necessity by which the actions of my will and the actions of my muscles are connected. My muscles cannot neglect or refuse to move under the decisions of my will. If in any case they do not obey my will, it is because this law of connection is for the time suspended. But it is absurd to define human liberty as consisting in the ability, power, or opportunity to execute my choices, or to do in conformity with my willing. I cannot but execute my volitions unless some obstacle is opposed to their execution that overcomes the power of my will. The willing is the doing inwardly; and this inward doing must express itself in outward doing by a necessary law. I cannot act otherwise than as I will. Of all this I am conscious.

I know, then, by certain knowledge that I am an agent, a free, self-active being; and I know this with a certainty that cannot be shaken by logic or sophistry. I find that I cannot but assume my own liberty of will in every instance of affirmed obligation. Indeed, I find it impossible to conceive of an obligation to act, only as I have power thus to will and choose to act. And I find that I cannot conceive of obligation, of praise or blame, where but one kind of action is possible. If there is no other way, but so or so I must act, and it is impossible for me to act in any other direction or way, I cannot conceive myself as morally responsible in such a case.

In considering the question I perceive that my reason affirms that this liberty of will is essential to moral agency; that forced action is not responsible action; and that any action of will determined by a law of necessity cannot be moral action. I am conscious of affirming that where liberty of will ends and necessity begins, there moral agency ends; and that moral agency implies the power to resist any degree of motive presented as an inducement to act. If at any point the considerations presented could force the will, that forced act is not the act of a moral agent. Moral agency ceased where force commenced.

In consciousness I also perceive that as a moral agent my liberty is regarded even by God as sacred; he does not, and will not invade it. He knocks at the door of my heart; but he does not break in. He pleads, commands, and reasons; but he does not force. He will not invade the sanctuary of my liberty, nor allow it to be done by any creature in the universe. In this respect I conceive myself as bearing his image. I cannot but so regard myself. I am a free moral agent as he is; and this image in me he respects as his own image. This image with him is sacred; he will never invade the sanctuary which he himself has created, of my own personal liberty. He will present considerations to induce me to imitate him in action; but to force me to act like himself is naturally impossible and involves a contradiction; for forced action would not be like his action, his action being always free.

I find myself, therefore, necessarily conceiving of him as holding me responsible for the actions of my will; but never controlling these actions by any law of necessity or force. By consciousness I find that I affirm that this must be true of all moral agents, and that this liberty of will is necessarily implied in the very conception of a moral agent. Thus I know myself; and this knowledge is so intuitive and irresistible that I can no more doubt my moral agency and moral responsibility in respect to the actions of my will than I can doubt of my own existence.

Again, by the use of the faculty of will I am conscious of being a cause, of causing the acts of will directly, and then indirectly actions of my body; and through the body of causing changes in the material universe around me. By the actions of my will I am also conscious of exhibiting my ideas to others, and of being instrumental in influencing the minds around me; and by influencing their minds I influence their bodies; and by influencing their bodies I produce many changes in the material universe with which I and they stand connected. I am conscious in willing, of being a proper cause. I say, in willing I cause my acts of will directly, and whatever else I cause, I cause by an act of my will. In willing, I act. I cause these actions of will, and am myself a proper cause. Proper cause must be me[?]. Acts of will are not properly cause, for they are caused by the responsible agent. They are only instrumental causes, as are the hands or other faculties of body or mind. I act; in acting I am a cause, that is, my acts are effects. In consciousness I perceive that I am a cause, and I also perceive that reason affirms God to be a cause, and to be a first cause, and that in the most strict and proper sense a cause.

In consciousness I learn that the freedom of the will does not imply power to abstain from all action or choice

in the presence of objects of choice; but in the power of preference, choosing the one or the other in a sovereign manner. I further learn in consciousness that I cannot choose without an object of choice; and that objects of choice are merely conditions upon which it is possible to choose. But that objects of choice do not necessitate or compel choice in the direction of the object. Without some object I cannot choose at all. But in the presence of any object I can choose one way or the other; I can prefer the existence or non-existence of the object in a sovereign manner.

I perceive, then, in consciousness, that what are generally termed motives are the conditions of action, but never the causes of action. The object is that without which I cannot choose at all; but in the presence of the object I may choose it or refuse it. Again, I learn in consciousness that the object of choice is something in which I can conceive there is some intrinsic or relative value. I perceive that it is contrary to my nature, for example, to choose evil either moral or natural, that is, sin or misery for its own sake. To choose anything for its own sake is to choose it for that which is intrinsic, and on its own account. But I can see nothing in sin, nothing in misery that is not intrinsically abhorrent to my own being; therefore I find that it is not to me an object of ultimate choice -- I cannot choose it for its own sake. By consciousness I find that I remain indifferent to any object present to my mind in which I perceive nothing valuable or injurious, intrinsically or relatively, to any being in the universe. In such a case no matter what the object might be, I am necessarily as indifferent, so far as choice is concerned, as to a mathematical point. It is to me, and can be to me, no object demanding or even admitting of choice. I cannot prefer its existence or its non-existence, for I can conceive no possible reason for this preference. The preference in such a case would be an act of the will without an object, which is a natural impossibility.

The freedom of the will, then, does not imply the power to abstain from all choice in the presence of a real object of choice; nor does it consist in the power to choose without an object of choice; nor in the power to discriminate between the objects of choice where the mind can perceive no reason for discrimination. If the mind can perceive no difference in any respect between one object and another, neither in respect to what is intrinsic or relative in the object, the will cannot prefer the one to the other; for this is a contradiction, it would be a choice having no object. If two objects be presented to the mind, one of which I am to choose, if these objects are in all respects precisely similar in my estimation, I can choose the one and be indifferent to

the other, but I cannot prefer the one to the other; for this again would imply a preference without an object, or any conceivable reason for the preference.

Again, in consciousness I learn that certain things are abhorrent to my whole nature, so far as their intrinsic nature and character are concerned; and as such they are not objects of choice. I can refuse them, but choose them for their own sake I cannot. And again, I perceive that other things commend themselves to my nature in the sense of being objects of desire. I can desire them on their own account, that is, for what they are in themselves; or, I can desire them on account of their relations to other desirable things. And I perceive, that to be an object of choice, a thing, as I have already said, must appear to me to be of some relative, or of some intrinsic value. If it be an object either intrinsically or relatively valuable, or the opposite, either intrinsically or relatively evil, the will can act, and must act, in the presence of it. If it be regarded as intrinsically evil, the will cannot choose it for its own sake, but necessarily rejects it. And where there is such a necessary rejection, this rejection is not a moral act. I learn by circumstances that what I regard as intrinsically evil, such as sin or misery, can only be chosen as relatively an object of desire. I can desire the infliction of pain upon another either in accordance with my ideas of justice, or to gratify a feeling of resentment. But the thing that I wish here particularly to insist upon is, that the freedom of the will does not imply the ability to choose things that are to us no objects of choice, in the sense that they in any respect commend themselves either to the intellect or to the sensibility; that no state of the sensibility can desire, and no function of the intellect can affirm, that in any respect they are a good. In consciousness I learn that my will sustains such a relation to my intellect on the one hand, and to my sensibility on the other, that from each of these departments of my mind I receive the motives that are conditions of my will's actions.

It appears to me that philosophers have greatly erred in maintaining that the will never acts except in obedience to desire. I am conscious that this is not true; and that I often act in opposition to all conscious desire. It has been common for philosophers to maintain that no presentations merely through the intellect excite the will's activity, or supply the conditions of its action; but that the will universally is dependent upon the excitement in the sensibility of some appetite, feeling or desire; and that whenever it acts it always obeys some desire. Now to this I object, first, that in my own case I am conscious that it is not true; that the moral law as given by my conscience is to me a rule of action; that it

supplies the condition of the will's activity that I cannot but act in its presence whether there is desire or no desire, or whatever the desire may be. The law itself as subjectively revealed in my intellect actually necessitates action one way or the other, and my liberty consists in acting in accordance with or in opposition to this affirmed subjective law. This I as really know as I know my own existence. But secondly, I object to the doctrine in question, that if the will acts in obedience to desire, its actions are either sinful, or they have no moral character at all. Universally, feeling, desire, emotion, and all the states of the sensibility are blind. They are never the law or rule of action. The will ought never to act in conformity with them except as the law of the intelligence dictates that course of action; and in that case the virtue consists in its obeying the dictates of the intelligence, or the law, and not in its obeying the blind desire, which is never law. Indeed, herein is the distinction between saints and sinners; sinners obey their desires and saints their convictions. In other words, sinners follow the impulses of their sensibility, and to gratify them is their adopted law; but saints obey conscience, or the law of God as postulated by the conscience. I am conscious of this in my own case; and that when I act in accordance with the convictions of my conscience, I often at the same time act in opposition to the feelings of my sensibility. Indeed, in precisely this consists the Christian warfare -- in resisting the emotional and sensitive parts of our nature and not indulging the desires, appetites, and propensities, but in obeying the law of God as postulated and given in the conscience.

I regard the theory that the will never acts except in obedience to desire as eminently false and dangerous, contrary to consciousness, and contrary to any sound view of moral obligation or moral action. In consciousness I find the distinction plainly marked that my conscience or reason is the law-giving faculty, the decisions of which I am bound to obey, consulting the desires of the sensibility no farther than this consulting and gratifying of the sensibility is dictated and required by the conscience.

I perceive that Bishop Butler in his sermons affirms that virtue consists in obeying certain desires. He says that we have constitutionally the desire of our own good and happiness and the desire for the happiness of others. We have private desires and public desires; that is, desires for private good and desires for public good; that virtue consists in the gratification of these public desires; and he regards it virtuous thus to choose because the desire itself is virtuous. He thinks that the nature of the desire gives character to the choice to gratify it, or

makes it virtuous to act in conformity with it. But I do not so read the convictions of my own mind. Constitutional desire is never virtuous or vicious. Desire as distinct from willing, or choice, or volition, has, and can have, no moral character. The desires for the public good are passive; and this Bishop Butler holds, if I understand him. They can therefore in no proper sense be virtuous or vicious desires; and to obey them is not virtue, or to disobey them is not vice. To choose the public good for its intrinsic value is virtue; but to choose it for its intrinsic value as affirmed by the reason is not to choose it because it is desired. To refuse the public good is sin, because we intuitively affirm that it ought to be chosen for its own sake and not to be refused. But the sin does not lie in denying the desire, but in refusing to obey the law of God as postulated in the conscience. It is true that the conscience could not affirm obligation to choose the public good except upon the condition that it is regarded as a good, and that experience of pleasure or pain in the sensibility is the chronological antecedent and the condition of our having the idea of the good or the valuable.

Our desire, therefore, may be the condition of our affirming moral obligation in the sense that they are the condition of developing the idea of the valuable, and therefore the idea of the obligation to choose the valuable for its own sake. But in reading my own consciousness I cannot perceive that the conditions of my will's actions are the excitement of desire, and that virtue or vice consists in acting either in conformity with or against desire apart from the law of my intelligence or conscience. I suppose that animals act purely under the influence of the sensibility. They have no other rule of action. We are under moral law, moral law as given by conscience; and whatever the states of the sensibility are, we affirm ourselves bound to obey the rule of life revealed in the conscience.

In my own case I am sure that conscience requires me to act simply in view of the motive as presented in the law; that in the presence of that motive, whether I have desires or not, I am bound to act, and must act, and I do act one way or the other, and am held responsible accordingly. I am conscious that it often happens that desire and feeling are in accordance with the rule of duty. In such cases it is a comfort and a pleasure to decide and act in accordance with the rule of duty as given in conscience, and the performance of duty becomes a pleasure; but it is neither the pleasure nor the pain that results from obeying God or the law of my conscience. It is neither the gratification nor the denial of my desires that is the rule of my duty. This rule I receive from my intellect. My sensibility is to be consulted in my

moral activity only as its emotions, desires and states are in accordance with the dictates of my conscience; or in other words, only as my conscience commands me to deny or refuse their indulgence.

A recent writer professes to believe in the freedom of the will; and yet his definition of what constitutes freedom of the will is so equivocal that I cannot understand why he should regard himself as believing in the freedom of the will in any proper sense. [Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will, by Joseph Haven, D.D., Prof. of Systematic Theology in the Theological Seminary, Chicago, Ill., and Late Prof. of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College; page 515; first edition, 1857.] His definition of freedom of the will is in substance, the power to will as we please. But it may be asked, what does this mean? What does this writer mean by "please?" Does he mean to use the word "please" or "pleasure" here in the sense of a voluntary state of mind? Is it willing or choice? If so, then the power to will as we please is simply the power to will as we will. But have we power to will as we do not will? To say that we have power to will as we really do will is nothing to the purpose. Or, does he mean in this case that we have power to will otherwise than we do will? Does he mean to say that we will as we do will by our own power; or that our pleasure, or some state of mind which he calls pleasure, necessitates the act of willing or choice? If by his definition he means simply that we have power to will as we in fact do will, this is nothing to the purpose, unless he also adds and holds that in the very identical case and under the identical circumstances we have power to will the opposite of what we do really will.

Secondly, Or, by "please" does he mean that we have power to will as we desire? If this is what he means, I ask, Have we power to will against desire? and against the strongest desire? If we have not power to will any otherwise than as we desire, and in accordance with the strongest desire, then is not our will free. But does he mean that any degree of desire is sufficient as a condition of our having power to will? That we have power to will against the strongest desire and in accordance with the weakest desire? But that desire is really an essential condition of our power to will? If this is his meaning, I would inquire whether the known command of God can impose obligation to will unless it creates desire in the sensibility in accordance with it? If desire is an essential condition of the power to will, it must be an essential condition of obligation to will; and in no case can we be under obligation until a desire is created in the sensibility in the direction of the thing required. But would this writer maintain that a plain

command of God could impose no obligation unless it created a corresponding desire in the sensibility? Would this writer maintain that the direct affirmation of conscience imposes no obligation until it creates desire in the sensibility? Now if this doctrine be true, that desire is an indispensable condition of obligation, conscience cannot affirm obligation until after the desire really exists. If there is in fact no ability to will till desire in the sensibility is awakened by a necessary law -- for desire we certainly know to be passive and not free -- it then follows that the will is not free to act except in obedience to desires that are created by a law of necessity. When desire is awakened by necessity, I would ask this writer, does he mean to say that in every instance the will can act not only as we please or desire, but contrary to our desire or our pleasure? For this is the real question.

To be free, the will must have power in every case of moral obligation to act one way or the other in a sovereign manner. It must have power to act either in the presence of conviction or the perception of obligation, whatever the desire may be, or whether there be any desire or not; or it must be unable so to choose. If it is unable so to choose, it is not free. But if able so to choose simply under the perception of obligation, and without reference to desire or against desire, then it is free, otherwise it is not.

But again, ability to choose in a required direction must be a condition of obligation to choose in that direction. If the will has not power, then, to choose against desire, however strong that desire may be, there can be no obligation to choose against that desire; and obligation must invariably be as the desire is. If we are unable to will against the strongest desire, we can be under no obligation to will against that desire.

Again, if we always of necessity act in accordance with the strongest desire, then it follows either that there is no obligation, because the will is not free; or that we always do our duty, for obligation and ability must always be co-incident. But again, does this writer mean by the word "please" that which we affirm to be right or useful? Does he mean to say that we have power to choose as we see or as we feel that we ought to choose? If this is what he means, then I would ask, if we have power at the same time and under the identical circumstances to choose as we see and feel that we ought not to choose? If not, the will is not free.

Again, does this writer mean that we have power to will according to the sense of what is upon the whole most agreeable? This is Edwards' view. He maintains that we have power to will according to the sense of the most agreeable; or more strictly, that we cannot help so

willing. And strictly, he maintained that this sense of the most agreeable and the choice or willing are identical. With Edwards, this sense of the most agreeable, which is identical with the choice itself, is necessitated by the presence of certain motives. Now is this what this writer means? Is he Edwardsean? This he does not profess. But is not his definition, after all, identical in its real meaning with that of Edwards?

But if this writer means by please or pleasure that we have power to choose that which is most pleasing to us, what does he mean by its being most pleasing? Does he or does he not mean, that which upon the whole seems most agreeable to us? If this is so, does he mean that we have power to choose the opposite of that which seems most agreeable to us? Do we by necessity choose that which is most agreeable? If so, this is not freedom of the will.

But again, I wish to ask, Is this pleasing or pleasure, according to which he says we have power to will, a state of the sensibility, and therefore passive? Or is it a voluntary state, and therefore an act of the will? If it is a voluntary state, it is identical with choice, and comes to this -- that we have power to choose as we do choose. But if this is all, this is not freedom of will. But if this being pleased or pleasure is a state of the sensibility, then the question returns, Have we power to will in opposition to it? Again, if we have power to will only as we please, and by please is intended a state of the sensibility, and this state of the sensibility being passive is produced by a law of necessity, how is the will free? It is not. Indeed, if I understand this writer, his view of the freedom of the will amounts to nothing. He has by no means discussed the real question of freedom of the will. He has by no means stated it, nor does he by any means hold it.

Edwards professed to hold the freedom of the will, but gave such a definition of what constitutes freedom of the will as not at all to discuss the real question. His idea of freedom of will is power or ability to do as we please; or, in other words, to execute our pleasure, or to act in accordance with our sense of the most agreeable, which sense of the most agreeable is identical with willing or volition. Now with him pure opportunity or ability to do as we will is liberty of will. But this is no liberty of will, for we cannot do otherwise than as we will. Edwards denied that we could originate in a sovereign manner our own volitions or actions of will. With him, this sense of the most agreeable, which is identical with volition, is necessitated by the objective motive. With him we are only free to do, but not free to will. That is, we are free to do, with him, when we are able to execute our volitions; but our volitions themselves are necessitated. But this is

only freedom in the outward act, and not in the act of the will at all. But it was the freedom of the will that he professed to discuss, when in fact by his definition he evaded the whole inquiry. According to him there is no real freedom in any case, even in the outward act; for he did not pretend that our outward acts were not necessitated by the actions of our will. It is therefore absurd to maintain that freedom can belong to the mere acts of the body, which acts, as plainly revealed to us in consciousness, are necessitated by the will. With Edwards, then, man is not an agent in any proper sense of the term. An agent must be a self-determiner; otherwise he is a mere instrument or machine, determined not by a power within himself but by something presented to him as a motive of action. He denied and even ridiculed the idea of self-determination in man or in any other being, even in God himself. I say ridiculed, because by his mode of reasoning he represented the idea of self-determination as really ridiculous, and yet maintained the freedom of the will. This is absurd and preposterous.

Now what does this recent writer, Professor Haven, mean by asserting that we have power to will as we please? Perhaps I do not understand him. But if I do understand him, his definition of freedom of the will is radically defective, and he does not maintain the freedom of the will.

But the freedom of the will is a necessary knowledge, assumed by us as the radical[rational?] condition of affirming our obligation. In every instance of affirming obligation the condition of this affirmation is the assumption or knowledge, or if you please, the consciousness, that we have power to will or choose as we affirm the obligation to choose. First, I appeal to consciousness -- that we are directly conscious of assuming in every case of affirmed obligation that we can will in accordance with the obligation or in opposition to it in the identical circumstances in which we affirm the obligation. Secondly, in every instance of affirmed obligation we are conscious that this knowledge of our ability to will in accordance with obligation is a condition of our affirming the obligation; and that but for the assumption of our ability we could not conceive it possible that we should be under any such obligation. This is certainly an ultimate fact in consciousness, and not to be set aside by logic. No truth of consciousness, no affirmation of the pure reason or intuition of any intuitive faculty is ever to be invalidated by any logical process. Intuitive knowledge is the most certain of all knowledge, and lies at the foundation of all knowledge. Our reasonings are often fallacious because of the errors to which the judgment is

liable; our intuitions cannot deceive us. Therefore, the freedom of the will rests upon the same basis with the knowledge of our existence. We are just as certain that we are under moral obligation as we are that we exist. We are as certain that moral obligation respects acts of will as that we exist. We are as certain that the will is free, or that we have power to will in accordance with obligation or in opposition to it, as we are that we are under obligation, or that we exist at all.

But why blink, or why evade the real question of the freedom of the will? Why call the will free, to conceive the possibility of obligation, and yet so to define the freedom as to leave the question a mere mockery to a moral agent. It is undeniable that moral obligation is obligation to choose the highest good of universal being as an end, and to put forth those volitions that are possible to us and in our estimation useful to secure that end. Now this obligation implies the power to put forth these acts of will. Why then not march up at once to the definition of freedom of will -- that it consists in the power to choose or refuse in every case of moral obligation?

But again, what is essential to obligation? Is obligation created by the perception of that object which we affirm we ought to choose? For example, is obligation to benevolence affirmed simply in view of the intrinsic value of the good of universal being? Or must there be a desire existing for this good as the condition of the obligation? Must both the perception of the intrinsic value of the good exist, and also desire in the sensibility in the same direction, as conditions of moral obligation? If both the perception and the desire must exist as the conditions of our power to choose the good of being, then the obligation cannot exist simply in view of the intrinsic and infinite value of the good. But desire must exist; and if desire fails to exist, however clear the perception of the intrinsic value of the good, obligation is not affirmed. Obligation does not exist because power does not exist to will in that direction. In this case the conscience must wait when the good is discovered, however clearly it is perceived, until desire awakes in the sensibility, before it can affirm the obligation to choose.

But will anyone seriously pretend that either God or conscience must wait before affirming obligation till desire for the object which we ought to choose is awakened? Who does not know the contrary? How long shall philosophers hold that ability to choose is conditioned upon awakened desire; and yet maintain, or seem to maintain, that obligation exists even in opposition to desire, or whether desire exists or not?

LECTURE V.**IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.****I. ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS.**

1. We have seen that in consciousness man knows his own existence. He knows himself as a spiritual being inhabiting a material body; that is, he is aware of possessing and exercising the attributes or powers of a spirit as distinct from the attributes or qualities of a material body. Consciousness directly gives his spirituality, and sense gives to consciousness the intuitive knowledge of our bodies. I think, I feel, I will; these are not acts or qualities of matter. Matter has extension, form, solidity, impenetrability, inertia; but these are not properties or qualities of mind. Spirit has not extension, solidity, inertia. Spirit is not a space-filling substance. This we know to be true, for God is a Spirit and is omnipresent; and if spirit were a space-filling substance, the existence of God would be incompatible with the existence of anything else.

I am conscious as a spirit of using my body as its instrument, but I am conscious that my body is not myself, my thinking, willing substance. I am sure by sense that I have a body, and by consciousness I am sure that I have a mind.

2. In consciousness I am aware that I am an agent, and not a mere instrument. I act from myself, that is, my mind is self-active; and my body has no power of action only as I move by the self-activity of my mind. In consciousness I know that as a mind I am a cause; not merely in the sense of a secondary cause, or in the sense of transmitting by a law of necessity an impulse which I receive by the same law. I know that as mind I am sovereign in my activity, and that I do not belong to the chain of material causes and effects that comprise the material universe around me. As a mind I am conscious of being apart from this chain of material cause and effect, above it, and that I have power in a great many ways to act upon it and modify the order in which these causes and effects would otherwise flow.

3. In consciousness I know myself as a free agent. I not only have the power of self-activity, that is, do not merely act from myself and of myself; but I act in one direction or another at my sovereign discretion -- the manner in which I shall act being determined by myself, and by no agency in the universe but my own.

4. In consciousness I know myself to be an intelligent agent. That is, I reason, judge, and act in view of all considerations which are present to my mind. In other words, I am aware in consciousness that I assign to myself reasons for my actions, and act upon the condition of their presence to my intellect.

5. In consciousness I know myself as a moral agent. I have a conscience; I am under moral government and moral law, perform moral actions and have a moral character. All this I know by direct consciousness. My existence, then, as such a being, is a fact of consciousness. The question at present is not how I came to exist; the fact that I do exist is the question immediately before us. We have seen it to be a first truth of reason that every event must have a cause, that is, of a cause, an adequate cause. Now it follows that whatever exists will continue to exist forever, unless by some adequate cause it is annihilated. All existences are therefore naturally immortal in the sense that when existence is once given, they will continue to exist forever unless they are annihilated.

Some have maintained that nothing exists in such a sense that it would continue to exist for a moment if not continued in existence by a divine upholding. But pray what can be intended by this? Suppose the divine upholding to be withdrawn -- is it intended that all existences except God have in themselves the law of self-annihilation? That were God to withdraw his support they would by a law of their own nature annihilate themselves? Surely this is gratuitous, and even absurd. To say that anything can annihilate itself is certainly a contradiction. What then does the assertion mean, that nothing save God continues to exist except by a divine upholding? Is it intended that if God withdraws himself from the existences that make up the universe, they will sink into annihilation of themselves? But how can this be? If there are real existences in the universe that are not God, if they are ever annihilated, it must be by some positive influence adequate to such a result.

I do not see why the philosophy that everything exists only as it is divinely held up into existence does not amount to pantheism. It seems to me equivalent to maintaining that all existences are only forms and modes of divine existence; and that if you abstract that which is divine from all existences there is nothing left. To claim, then, for the soul of man immortality in the sense of endless existence, is to claim for it no more than justly be claimed for all real existences, unless they are by divine power annihilated.

6. If anyone affirms that the soul of man is not immortal, the burden of proof is upon him. Certainly it is immortal in its nature, that is, it has a real existence and cannot pass out of existence without being annihilated by some power out of and above itself; and so far as we can see, by some power equivalent to that which gave it being. If then it be contended that the soul of man is mortal, it must be proven that an adequate power will be exerted to annihilate it. The burden of proof upon the question of

the soul's immortality does not belong to Christians but to those who deny its immortality. It does exist; it must continue to exist unless annihilated.

It will not be contended that any being but God can annihilate it -- will God annihilate it? Is there any proof that he ever does annihilate a soul? Of course, in this part of our inquiry we are not consulting the Scriptures, for the question of their divine authority has not yet been mooted by us in this course of study. We inquire, therefore, on principles of science and in the light of natural reason. What reason is there for supposing that the soul of man will ever be annihilated? Certainly the dissolution of the body affords no reason to believe that the soul is annihilated. The body is not annihilated, but only changes its form. Indeed we know not that anything that has had an existence ever has been or ever will be annihilated. Material bodies we know to be perpetually changing their form, because they are perpetually changing the particles of which they are composed. Personal identity cannot strictly, we know, be affirmed of our bodies for any two moments of our lives. All the particles of organized being are in a state of perpetual flux. This is a fact of science. But this is not true of our spiritual nature. Our spiritual nature is not an organized substance. It is spirit, not composed of particles, not a space-filling substance; and the changes in the body we know do not interfere with the personal identity of the soul.

7. The mortality of the body is admitted, and adequate causes to change its form are known to exist. But this is by no means true of the mind. I know it has been affirmed that the mind is after all material, and that thought, volition, and feeling, are only results of refined cerebral organization. But has this ever been proved? It is mere assertion. And do those who make such assertions expect them to be received? The soul as known to us possesses none of the qualities of matter; it is therefore gratuitous and even absurd to affirm its materiality. To say that when the body is dissolved, the mind disappears, is only to prove that the body is the organ of the mind's manifestation in this state of existence; and of this we are conscious. Of course, when the material body decays, the mind has lost the medium by which it communicated with other minds inhabiting material bodies; and this is all that is implied in the fact that the mind ceases to manifest itself when the body is decayed. It is by means of our bodies that we reveal ourselves to those that inhabit bodies like ourselves. When our bodies are dissolved, the medium of this revelation has ceased to exist, and consequently the mind inhabiting the body has no longer power to

manifest itself to those that are in bodies. We know of no such medium.

II. MORAL ARGUMENT.

1. We have just said that we are conscious of a moral nature, or conscience; that we possess the attributes of moral agents and are subjects of moral government; that moral law is revealed in our own consciousness, affirmed by our own conscience as an authoritative rule of action; and that moral obligation is imposed on us in the name of God. The first truth, accountability, implies this that conscience legislates for God.

2. We also know in consciousness that we irresistibly affirm and assume the goodness of God, that he possesses every attribute of moral goodness. This renders it impossible to believe that the present is a state of rewards and punishments; that is, a state in which moral agents are dealt with precisely according to their good or ill desert. In other words, this is not a state in which God manifests his entire justice, except in our irresistible convictions, certainly not in his administration. It is easy for us to see that this state of existence must be a state of trial or probation; and that of course the manifestation of strict justice on the part of God in dispensing rewards and punishments for every act as we proceed in life, would be out of place, this being, from the very nature of a state of probation, reserved till this state of trial is ended.

We have seen that conscience points to a future state of retribution; it enforces obligation in the name of God. It always assumes that retribution is reserved till the hour of probation is ended.

3. We are aware in consciousness that our nature demands a state of moral order under the government of God as the ultimate condition of his commending himself to the universe of intelligent creatures. By moral order, I mean a state of things in which law will either be universally obeyed, or in which rewards and punishments will be in accordance with character. This state of things does not exist here. We irresistibly look forward to a future state in which moral order will be perfect.

4. If such a state is never to exist, it cannot be that God is just. Indeed, it is a contradiction to say that the Ruler of the universe is just and yet that a state of moral order will never exist under his government. An unjust God is no God. If then there be not a future state of existence, if the human soul be not immortal, there can be no God.

But should it be insisted that men are dealt with in this world according to their characters; I reply, that those who assert this know better. It is a matter of direct consciousness that we ourselves are not dealt with in

this world with the severity that we deserve. And who does not know that men pass out of this world in the very act of committing the greatest crimes.

5. If the soul does not exist in a future state, our moral nature or conscience necessarily deceives us.

6. If the soul is not immortal, our moral nature is a great curse to us. It forces convictions upon us that distress and mock us.

7. If the soul is not immortal, our moral nature compels us to become atheists. For who can believe that there is a God of infinite moral perfection unless he admits that there must be a future state in which moral order will exist.

8. The moral nature of man has forced the race to assume the immortality of the soul; and this assumption has existed in despite of the fear of future punishment necessarily consequent upon this conviction. All men have known themselves to be sinners; all men have regarded God as just; all men have feared punishment; all men have dreaded to meet God; they have feared to die, because they have assumed that "after death is the judgment." Now the fact that men have assumed and everywhere believed in the immortality of the soul, and in the justice of God, while they have known themselves to be sinners, is proof conclusive that the immortality of the soul is a dictate of our nature, and a conviction so irresistible that it cannot be disbelieved, although mankind are so interested to disbelieve it. We find in consciousness that as a general thing men disbelieve what they greatly dread; but here is a truth or fact of universal belief that exists in spite of the terror inspired by the admission.

Now what is implied in the supposition that the doctrine of immortality is not true? Why that human nature in itself is a delusion; that it forces delusions upon the whole race; and that that peculiarity of our nature that distinguishes us from the animal creation, to wit, our reason and conscience, is the greatest curse to us, inspiring us with anticipations, with hopes and fears, and pressing us with the most exciting considerations conceivable, in which, after all, there is no truth. It is plain that the assumption of immortality is natural to man and irresistible.

III. THE BIBLE ARGUMENT.

In this place it is impertinent to quote the Bible upon this subject in a course of scientific instruction, because its divine authority has not been established by us. Nevertheless, it is not out of place to notice some instances in which it is evident that the writers of the Bible assume the immortality of the soul. It has been denied that the writers especially of the Old Testament,

held any such doctrine. Observe, the question now directly before us is not whether these writers were inspired; but did they believe in the immortality of the soul? Or, in other words, did they believe that the soul exists in a future state, or in a state separate from the body? Let us attend to some intimations that we find in the Old Testament.

In Deut. 18:9-12, we have a law against necromancy, that is against consulting the dead, that is departed spirits. Now from this law it is evident that the idea was at that time universal among the Jews that the soul existed after the body was dead.

Again, before the New Testament times the Jews became divided into two great sects, the Pharisees and Sadducees. This however was in their later history, that is, it was a division that existed among them at the time of the appearance of our Savior. Now it is well known that the Pharisees held the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and that Jesus held it also. I mention not this in this place as authority, but as a fact.

Again, the doctrine of Hades, or the fact that spirits existed after the death of the body and went to a place called Hades, is as evident on the face of the Old Testament Scriptures as almost any other truth found there. For example, the following texts imply it: Gen. 5:22-24, respecting the translation of Enoch. Enoch was removed from this world, it is true, in his body; but was represented as immortal, that is, as existing in a future state. Whether he continued to inhabit his fleshly body after his translation we are not informed; but from things in the New Testament we infer that his body became spiritual and immortal after his translation.

Again, in Gen. 37:35, Jacob speaks of going to his son Joseph whom he supposed to be dead; from which it is evident that he assumed that his son existed though separated from the body. See also the following passages: Gen. 15:15; 25:8; 35:29; Num. 20:24; Exod. 3:6 (compare with Mt. 22:23); Ps. 17:15; 49:15,16,26; Is. 26:19; Dan. 12:2; Eccl. 12:7. The phrase so often used, "gathered to his fathers," and like expressions, show that the Jewish mind was in possession of the idea of a future state of existence.

Indeed, the Old Testament in a great multitude of places, in a great variety of forms, indicates the existence of this idea in their minds; and that the immortality of the soul was assumed both by the inspired writers and by those for whose benefit they wrote. The New Testament completes the revelation. I think that no one will doubt that the New Testament writers expressly teach the immortality of the human soul, especially the immortality of the righteous.

IV. OBJECTIONS.

1. It has been objected that the soul is not naturally immortal. To this a sufficient answer has been given.
2. It has been objected that the Bible speaks of God as alone having immortality. Answer: This is meant only to assert that God is exempt from death as no man is.
3. It has been objected that the Bible declares that the wicked will be annihilated. Answer: Its language does not imply annihilation, but only ruin.
4. It has been objected, that it would be cruel to let the wicked exist and suffer eternally. Answer: This objection assumes that they do not deserve it, for admitting that they deserve it, it is certainly not cruel to treat them according to their deserts. Again, this objection assumes that there is no benevolent reason for permitting the wicked to suffer forever. Both these assumptions can be shown to be false.

Thus much for the question of immortality in this place. Again I say, I have only introduced some hints from the Bible, not as authority, but because it has been affirmed that the Jews as a nation had not anciently the idea of the immortality of the soul. An examination of the question historically will show, that the doctrine of the soul's immortality has been the doctrine of the race. It has been believed as far back as history goes, and as far as tradition throws any light upon the convictions of men.

LECTURE VI.

EVIDENCE.

Before entering upon the question of the divine existence, I must remark: First, upon the importance of a correct and thorough knowledge of the laws of evidence; secondly, I must show what is evidence, and what is proof, and the difference between them; thirdly, I must inquire into the sources of evidence in a course of theological study; fourthly, must notice the kinds and degrees of evidence to be expected; fifthly, show when objections are not and when they are fatal; sixthly, how objections are to be disposed of; seventhly, on whom lies the burden of proof; and lastly; where proof or argument must begin.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF A CORRECT AND THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE.

1. Without a correct knowledge of this subject our speculations will be at random.
2. The ridiculous credulity of some, and the no less ridiculous incredulity of others, are owing to the ignorance or disregard of the fundamental laws of evidence. Examples: Mormonism is ridiculous credulity, founded in utter ignorance, or a disregard of the first principles of evidence in relation to the kind and degree of testimony demanded to establish anything that claims to be a revelation from God. On the other hand, every form of religious skepticism is ridiculous incredulity, founded in ignorance or the disregard of the fundamental laws of evidence, as carefully shown.

II. WHAT IS EVIDENCE AND WHAT IS PROOF, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM.

1. Evidence is that which elucidates and enables the mind to apprehend truth.
2. Proof is that degree of evidence that warrants or demands belief, that does or ought to produce conviction.
3. Every degree of evidence is not proof. Every degree of light upon a subject is evidence; but that only is proof which under the circumstances can give reasonable satisfaction, while it supplies the condition of rational conviction.

III. SOURCE OF EVIDENCE IN A COURSE OF THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY.

This must depend upon the nature of the thing to be proved.

1. Consciousness may be appealed to upon questions that are within its reach, but not on other questions.
2. Sense may be appealed to on questions within the reach of sense, but not on others.
3. The existence of God may be proved, not by an appeal to the Bible as his Word, for this would be to assume his existence and his veracity, which were absurd. The existence of God must therefore be proved either a priori, by our irresistible convictions antecedently to all reasoning; or a posteriori, as an inference from his works; or in both ways.
4. The divine authority of the Bible, or of any book or thing that claims to be a revelation from God, demands some kind of evidence that none but God can give. Miracles are one of the most natural and impressive kinds; prophecy is another; the nature of the proffered revelation, its adaptedness to our nature and wants is another. These are only noticed here as kinds of evidence essential to the proof of such a question.

5. Appeals may be made to any historical fact, or thing external; or to anything internal, that is, in the Bible itself that might be reasonably expected if the revelation in question were really from God.

6. In theological inquiries, as the universe is a revelation of God, we may legitimately wander into every department of nature, science, and grace for testimony upon theological subjects.

7. The different questions must however draw their evidence from different departments of revelation: Some from the irresistible convictions of our own minds; some from his works without us; some from his providence; others from his Word; and still others from all these together.

IV. KINDS AND DEGREES OF EVIDENCE TO BE EXPECTED.

1. In relations to kinds of evidence, I observe, no impossible or unreasonable kind is to be expected. For example, the evidence of sense is not to be demanded or expected, when the thing to be proved is not an object, or within the reach of sense. The existence of God, for example, is not given by sense, for the sense gives only the material and not the spiritual. It is absurd, therefore, for skeptics to demand the evidence of sense that God exists.

2. It is a sound rule, that the best evidence, in kind, shall be adduced that the nature of the case admits. For instance, oral testimony is not admissible where written testimony may be had to the same point. Of course, oral traditions are not to be received, where there is written history to the same point; but oral testimony is admissible in the absence of written, as then it is the best that the nature of the case admits.

3. So oral traditions may be received to establish points of antiquity in the absence of contemporary history.

4. Any book claiming to be a revelation from God, should in some way, bear his own seal, as a kind of evidence possible and demanded by the nature of the subject. The claim should be supported by evidence external and internal that make out a proof, or fulfill the conditions of rational conviction.

5. As to degree, evidence to be proof need not always amount to a demonstration, as this would be inconsistent with the nature of the case, and with a state of probation under a moral government.

6. We are not in general to expect such a degree of evidence as to preclude the possibility of cavil or evasion, and for the same reasons. On some questions we may reasonably expect to find evidence of an irresistible character; but in general it is important for us

to remember that on all the important subjects of life we frequently find ourselves under the necessity of being governed simply by a preponderance of evidence -- that we are in fact shut up to this often in questions of life and death. Now what we find to be true as a matter of fact in our daily experience, we should remember may reasonably be expected on questions of theology. We shall find evidence on all practical and important subjects that ought to produce conviction, that will satisfy an upright mind; but yet on many subjects not enough to preclude all cavil or evasion. On subjects of fundamental importance, we may expect to find evidence both in kind and degree that shall put those questions beyond all reasonable doubt.

7. In regard to the divine existence, it is reasonable to expect such evidence in both kind and degree as shall gain the general assent of mankind to the fact that God exists. Such evidence certainly does exist, and this conviction has been the conviction of the race.

8. We may expect that the evidence will be more or less latent, patent, direct, inferential, incidental, full, and unanswerable, according to its relative importance in the system of divine truth.

V. WHEN OBJECTIONS ARE NOT, AND WHEN THEY ARE FATAL.

1. They are not fatal when they are not well-established by proof.

2. When the truth of the objection may consist with the truth of the proposition, that it is intended to overthrow.

3. When the truth of the affirmative proposition is conclusively established by testimony, although we may be unable to discover the consistency of the proposition with the objection. Therefore,

4. An objection is not always fatal because it is unanswerable. We may not be able to answer an objection, and yet we may have positive proof that that is true against which the objection is raised. In this case the objection is not fatal.

5. An objection is fatal, when it is an unquestionable reality, and plainly incompatible with the truth of the proposition against which it lies.

6. It is fatal when the higher probability is in its favor. That is, it is fatal in the sense that it changes the burden of proof. When the higher probability is in favor of the objection, the burden of proof then falls upon the one who would sustain the proposition against which the objection lies. If he establishes the higher probability the onus is again changed, and the judgment ought always to decide in favor of the higher probability.

7. An objection is fatal when it is established by a higher kind or degree of evidence than the proposition to which it is opposed. For example, consciousness, sense, and reason present the highest kinds and degree of testimony. An objection fairly founded in and supported by an intuition of sense, consciousness, or reason, will set aside other testimony, because, as we have seen, knowledge thus obtained is intuitive, and more certain in its nature than that received from testimony of any other kind.

8. An objection is always fatal when it proves that the proposition against which it lies involves a palpable absurdity or contradiction.

VI. HOW OBJECTIONS ARE TO BE DISPOSED OF.

1. This depends upon their nature. If mere cavils without reason or proof, they are not properly objections, and may remain unnoticed.

2. So if they appear reasonable if they were proved, and yet are without sufficient proof, we are not gratuitously to take the burden of proof.

3. We are not bound to explain how the objection is consistent with the proposition against which it is alleged, but simply that if a fact, it may be consistent with it.

4. No objection is competent to set aside first truths, such as that a whole is equal to all its parts, that time and space exist, that every effect must have a cause, that a moral agent must be a free, self-active agent, etc. These are truths of irresistible and universal knowledge, and no testimony whatever is to be received as invalidating them.

5. No objection can set aside the direct testimony of consciousness, nor of sense or reason, where this testimony is unequivocally given.

6. Nor can any testimony set aside the unambiguous testimony of God. It is a first truth of reason that God is veracious; nobody can believe that he will lie. We necessarily assume his moral perfection; hence the testimony of God when rightly interpreted is conclusive upon any subject, and no human being can doubt this.

There is always a fallacy in whatever is inconsistent with first or self-evident truths, the affirmation of the pure reason, the intuitions of sense or consciousness, or with the testimony of God. Certain truths we are under necessity of receiving as valid by the laws of our own intelligence. Whatever objection is made to these must involve a fallacy, and cannot be received as valid.

VII. WHERE LIES THE BURDEN OF PROOF?

1. Always on him who takes the affirmative, unless the thing affirmed is sufficiently manifest without proof.

2. The burden of proof lies with the affirmative until the evidence fairly amounts to proof in the sense of demanding belief in the absence of opposing testimony.

3. When the affirmative evidence amounts to proof in this sense, the onus is upon him who takes the negative. His business is not to prove a negative, but to counteract the proof upon the positive side of the question, to render it null, or to present so much opposing proof as will annihilate the ground of rational conviction.

4. Every kind and degree of evidence that may as well consist with the negative as with the affirmative to be proved, leaves the onus unchanged.

5. When the evidence, or argument, or an objection proves too much, as well as when it proves too little, it leaves the onus unchanged.

6. If an objection needs proof, the onus lies upon the objector.

VIII. WHERE PROOF OR ARGUMENT MUST BEGIN.

1. Proof or argument must commence where uncertainty commences; or rather where the conditions of rational belief are wanting.

2. All argument and proof take for granted such truths as need no proof, but are either axioms, self-evident truths, or such as are either admitted, or are sufficiently apparent. (Roman numerals and some headings added, some numbers changed on both sections, Lecture VI divided -- Gordon Olson).

LECTURE VII.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Theology is the science of God and of divine things. The knowledge of God is possible only upon condition that he reveals himself to his creatures.

I. SEVERAL WAYS IN WHICH GOD MAY REVEAL HIMSELF TO RATIONAL BEINGS.

1. Rational beings may bear his image in such a sense as irresistibly to recognize him as possessing a nature like their own. They may of necessity transfer their conception of themselves in kind, that is, so far as the attributes of their own nature are conceived, to God; and conceive of him by a necessary law as being a rational being like themselves.

In this case it is plain that he might reveal himself directly to their intuitive perceptions, so that they would recognize his existence, his presence, and the nature of his attributes: and that this revelation might be so direct as to make them certain of his existence, presence, and attributes. I do not mean by this that he could give finite creatures a comprehension of his infinity, for this were a contradiction; but I mean that the fact of his existence might be intuitively perceived, and the infinity of his nature might be irresistibly affirmed.

2. This intuitive, or face to face revelation, might be made either to the moral function of the reason, that is, the conscience, or to the natural function of the reason. If made to the moral function of the reason, he would of course be known as the supreme and rightful Ruler; if to the natural function of the reason, he would be apprehended as a first cause, infinite and perfect.

3. Again, he might reveal himself in consciousness. This is an intuitive function, and reveals us to ourselves, and whatever can be properly brought within the field of our own experience. Sense must reveal to consciousness the outward world; but whatever should unify itself with our thinking, willing, and feeling, may be directly given to us in consciousness. We may be as conscious of such an embrace, and fellowship, and presence, as of our own existence.

For example, a revelation made directly to our intelligence by God might be a matter of consciousness; that is, we might not only know ourselves to be instructed, but be conscious of the source from which the instruction came. So, if peace, joy, hope, pervade our inward being, we may be aware of the source from which it comes -- that is, such knowledge is possible.

4. Again, he may reveal himself to our logical faculty in such a sense, that from premises irresistibly postulated by the reason, his existence may be capable of demonstration.

5. Again, he may reveal himself in his works, through sense, in such a way as to render it natural to assume his existence; and indeed as to render it logically necessary to admit it.

6. Again, he may administer such a providence over the universe as will clearly reveal his existence to rational and reasoning beings.

7. Or again, he might reveal himself through the medium of a written revelation, in this sense: that he might produce a book in a manner and of such a character as naturally to conduct us to the conclusion that no being but God could produce such a book.

TWO REVELATIONS. -- We have in fact two revelations of God; the one his works, the other his Word. His Word, the second revelation, assumes the existence and the knowledge of the first. Every attentive reader of the Bible has observed that it assumes that we already know the existence of God, and that we have an idea of his natural attributes and of his moral character; and therefore that we irresistibly assume that he is good, and that we are his subjects and ought to obey him. It never argues these questions; it does not assert them. It opens with the announcement that God made the heavens and the earth; and that he made man, and how and when he made him. Here the existence of God is taken for granted, and it is assumed that we know his existence.

Again, the second revelation, or his Word, is valid only as the first is valid, inasmuch as the second assumes the existence and validity of the first. If these assumptions have no foundation, if God has not in fact revealed himself in his works, then what we call his Word cannot be known to be his Word; and the second revelation, even if it were a revelation, would be invalid, inasmuch as its fundamental assumptions are invalid.

Again, the fundamental lessons taught in the first revelation must be learned as a condition of rationally receiving and of rightly interpreting the second. For example, being ourselves in the likeness of God, we are of ourselves a book of divine revelation. The attributes and laws of our nature are such that to understand what the Bible says of God we must to a certain extent understand ourselves, and rightly interpret the revelations which God has made to us in our nature and in the universe with which we are surrounded. Unless we recognize our moral nature, its postulates, its irresistible convictions, the law it imposes upon us, and the necessary ideas of right and wrong, we cannot understand what the Bible means. The Bible assumes that the moral law is in its essence and substance a necessary dictate of our nature; and that we have the ideas of right and wrong, and of what right and wrong in their essence are. It is only as we understand and rightly interpret the fundamental lessons given in our nature and in external nature, that we can rightly understand and interpret the Bible. Hence, they reject the Bible who fail rightly to interpret nature, understanding nature to include our own existence and attributes.

Again, they and they only fundamentally misinterpret the Bible who misinterpret nature, using the term in the sense last mentioned. I have said that the first revelation is made mostly in the laws and attributes of our own nature. From our own nature we can learn more of God, if it be rightly interpreted, than from the whole material

universe. Our nature and attributes we learn directly in consciousness; hence a correct mental philosophy or psychology is indispensable to a correct interpretation of the Word of God. The first book of revelation of which we speak teaches what is generally called natural theology. It is plainly necessary that God should be revealed to us to a certain extent as the condition of any rational inquiry into the question whether the Bible be a revelation from him.

But again, suppose his existence be admitted, we must have the conviction or knowledge of his natural and moral attributes as a condition first, of settling the question whether the Bible is a revelation from him; and secondly, if it is a revelation from him, whether it is to be implicitly received. For example, unless we know his natural attributes, as his omniscience, we might suppose him mistaken in any revelation he might make, and should not feel ourselves bound, or even at liberty, to receive as unquestionable truth whatever he might say, even did we assume that it was well-intended. Again, unless we assume his omnipotence, his omnipresence, and his natural immutability, we could not be assured that he was able to do that which he wished and promised to do; or that he might not be absent on occasions when we had the promise of his aid.

Again, if we did not assume his moral attributes, we could not trust him, although we were aware of his natural attributes. His claiming to be good would not prove him to be so unless we had other evidence than merely that of his word. I do not mean to deny that we are so created as naturally and irresistibly to assume that God is to be trusted, and therefore that we do not need any other evidence than his assertion to demand our implicit confidence; but this is so just because, and only because, we are so created as necessarily to assume it. In other words, we are so created as necessarily to assume his goodness, and the existence and infinity of all his moral attributes. It is the knowledge of these obtained from the first book of revelation that makes it obligatory, or even consistent for us, to receive the second as a universally true and infallible revelation from God.

I proceed now to give that definition of God which is revealed to us in his first book of revelation; that is, to postulate what God is as known to us in the irresistible convictions of our minds, as these minds exist with our surroundings in the universe.

II. WHAT GOD IS AS KNOWN TO US IN THE IRRESISTIBLE CONVICTIONS OF OUR MINDS.

1. Such are the laws of our minds that no being can be recognized by us as the true God, a greater and better than whom can be conceived as existing or possible. When we think of God, I believe it is the universal conviction of all who have the conception of him as the self-existent, infinite God, that no greater, wiser, or better being can possibly be conceived by us; and further, that our highest and best conception of him, though just in the main, are nevertheless very inadequate; that he must, after all, be far beyond the compass of our thought, except in the sense that we affirm that he must be unlimited in all his attributes.

2. Our highest possible conception of Being is the nearest the true idea or conception of God, and just, so far as it goes.

3. Hence again, our highest possible description or definition of a Being, is the best definition of God that is possible to us. I believe it will be generally admitted that we could not conceive any being to be the true and living God of whom finiteness and imperfection were predicable. We have the idea or conception of a Being whose existence and attributes are unlimited and perfect in every respect; we define this Being to be the infinite and perfect Being; we can, we do, and must recognize this Being as God; and a greater and better we can have no idea or conception of as possible. And as I said, a finite and imperfect being we cannot conceive to be the true God. By God, then, we mean the infinite and perfect Being.

Hence, we may define God to be the infinite and perfect Being. Or, we may add to this, God the infinite and perfect First Cause. Or, we may add to this, God the infinite and perfect First Cause and Moral Governor of the universe. Or, we may vary the definition, and define him thus: God the First Cause of all finite existences, infinite and perfect. Or, God the Creator and Supreme Ruler of the universe, infinite and perfect. If we search for him by the argument a posteriori, and define his existence as a First Cause, we may then legitimately inquire what is implied in his being a First Cause, and thereby arrive at the attributes of infinity and perfection. Or, if we arrive at his existence through conscience as a Moral Governor, we may then properly inquire what is implied in his sustaining this relation, and thereby arrive at his infinity and perfection.

The methods of arriving at the fact of the divine existence are two: the a priori and the a posteriori. By the a priori method we directly assume or intuit the fact that he exists; affirm it as a first principle truth anterior to all logical reasonings. By the method a posteriori we reason from effect to Cause; seizing upon the events of

the universe we infer his existence as a First Cause. Before entering directly upon the discussion of the question of God's existence, we must define the principle terms to be used.

III. PRINCIPAL TERMS TO BE USED IN DISCUSSION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE.

1. **ABSURDITY** -- An absurdity is any proposition or statement that is contradictory to known truth. A proposition may be absurd when it is self-contradictory; or, it is absurd if it contradicts any truth of reason, for these truths, it will be observed, are intuitive and therefore certainly known. The absurd, then, is the contradictory, that which is inconsistent either with itself or with some known truth. That may be absurd which contradicts the intuitions of sense, as well as that which contradicts the intuitions of reason; for, as we have seen, sense is an intuitive faculty and its testimony is valid. Whatever, therefore, contradicts the plain and unequivocal revelations of sense is absurd. Again, that is absurd which contradicts consciousness. Consciousness is also intuitive; all its revelations are valid; and any proposition that plainly contradicts consciousness must involve an absurdity.

2. **MYSTERY** -- A mystery is that which is incomprehensible; that which cannot be explained by us or referred to any known law or cause. The mysterious is that which is beyond or above the comprehension of our faculties in such a sense that although it may be a fact, it is a fact unexplicable by us. The absurd is contrary to reason, the mysterious is simply beyond reason; the absurd is that which we affirm cannot be so, the mysterious is that which may be, though we may not be able to explain or even conceive how it can be. The mysterious may be true. The absurd cannot be. In theology many things are above our comprehension, as the object of our study is the infinite. Therefore, mystery is to be expected. But in theology there can be no absurdity.

3. **POWER** -- Power is the capacity or ability to be a cause or to produce effect.

4. **CAUSE** -- This term is used in various senses, of which the following are the principal ones:

(1) Cause proper is an efficient; it is power in efficient or productive action. Cause implies an effect and is the efficient reason of the effect. It creates or produces. This is cause in its proper sense. Cause in this sense, as we shall soon see, must be intelligent, free, sovereign, efficient. Cause in this sense is called efficient cause.

(2) Instrumental cause. Cause in this sense is not of itself an efficient. It is not a power in itself, but only transmits an efficient power. It acts only as it is acted

upon. It is neither free, sovereign, nor intelligent. Cause in this sense is an instrument and not an agent. To this category belong all the causes that are instrumentally producing the changes in the realm of unconscious matter. Cause in this sense is under the law of blind necessity. It acts as it is forced to act. I speak not now of the changes produced in the world of matter by the action of free agents, but of changes occurring under laws of necessity.

(3) Occasional cause. Occasional cause is only a motive or reason, that upon occasion of its being presented, induces a free intelligent being to act, or to become a cause in producing an effect. Cause in this sense is not an efficient. It does not compel or produce action. It is merely an instrument to act, and is as the terms denote only an occasion on which a true and proper cause acts, or a free intelligent being or power becomes a cause.

(4) Final cause. By final cause is intended the end or reason in view, and for the sake of which an intelligent being acts or becomes a cause. It is that reason that induces action, for example, the end God had in view, or the reason that induced him to cause the universe. His final end has been by necessitarian philosophers improperly called the final cause of his work of creation.

(5) Efficient cause. But to return to the consideration of efficient cause, of cause in its proper sense. Cause in this sense must be a power in itself. It is uncaused cause, as distinguished from caused or instrumental cause.

(a) It must be intelligent, as it acts upon occasion of the perception of some motive or reason for action. It must be free. It originates its own actions and is not caused to act.

(b) It must be a free agent. An agent is one who acts, and in the proper sense of the term, one who originates his own acts and is properly the author of them. A being who acts and is forced to act under a law of necessity is not capable of being a cause, in the proper sense of the term. He can be only an instrumental cause.

(c) Efficient cause must be sovereign. It must act upon occasion of some inducement, but never under a law of compulsion. It cannot be absolute in the sense of unconditional, for it acts upon occasion or condition of some perceived inducement, but it is sovereign in determining or acting in one direction or manner or another.

(d) Proper cause is not mere antecedence. It is production. Cause or causation is a mystery. There is no accounting for the self-originated acts of a free sovereign power. Such acts have no cause out of the

power itself. Hence we cannot tell why an efficient cause is what it is or why the power acts as it does, and not otherwise. We may be able to tell the reasons which were the occasion of the act, but why this occasion rather than another has induced action we cannot tell. It is a mystery.

Cause and effect imply each other. Both must belong to time and neither can be eternal. A being may exist who has power to be a cause, who has never exerted that power for want of the proper occasion. The being may have existed from eternity. But from eternity he could not have been a cause. Exerting this power in an act must be an event and belong to time. But I must define event.

(6) Event. It is something that comes to pass.

(a) It may be the beginning of some existence or being.

(b) Or it may be some change in something already existent.

(c) All change is an event.

(d) Events occur in time, and cannot from their definition be eternal.

IV. SOME SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS OF REASON.

I now proceed to postulate several self-evident truths of reason. Some of them are first truths, as they have been defined. Others are self-evident and are directly intuited by the pure reason, and must therefore be accepted as infallible truth. We have seen that cause in the most proper sense of the term, that is, efficient cause, is power in efficient action. That efficient cause must be intelligent, free, sovereign. We have also seen that an event is something that occurs, comes to pass, or take place in time. It is a change somewhere and in something. Or, it may be the beginning of something that before had no existence. As it occurs, begins, takes place, it must occur in time, and cannot be eternal. An event cannot be self-existent and eternal, for this is absurd and contradicts the true definition of an event.

1. My first postulate is that every event must have an efficient or an adequate cause. The efficient may act through or by means of an instrumental cause, or through a series of instrumental causes; but whenever there is an event, there must be a self-acting power in efficient action producing the effect immediately, or through instrumental cause or causes.

2. My second postulate is that neither cause nor effect can be eternal. This is self-evident from the definition of cause and effect. God existed from eternity with power to become a cause. When infinite wisdom called for an act of causality, he became a cause. But both the act and effect belong to time, and are not from eternity.

3. I postulate that a power acting as cause from eternity under a law of necessity is a contradiction. It is no cause if necessitated to act; it is a cause only in a secondary sense. It is therefore impossible that the material universe should have existed from eternity under a law of necessary change. In other words, it is a contradiction to say that the material universe has existed in a state of eternal change; for every change is an event, something comes to pass, and it is a contradiction to say that that which comes to pass is eternal. That which is eternal never began to be, it is therefore no event.

4. Again, if a necessary cause were possible, a self-existent and necessary cause must be an eternal cause, and is therefore a contradiction. A being may have existed who is free and who became a cause by acting in time; but neither a self-existing and necessary, or a self-existent and free cause can be an eternal cause.

5. Again, an eternal series, therefore, of causes and events is a contradiction; because all causation and events must occur, and therefore come to pass in time.

6. Again, a self-existent being must be an unconditioned, and therefore the absolute, immutable, and infinite being. If self-existent his existence cannot be conditioned; if unconditioned in his existence he must be immutable; and if immutable he must be infinite in his being.

7. Again, a self-existent being must be absolutely perfect in every respect in which he really exists; that is, in all the attributes that inhere in his necessary existence. The term perfect is used in two senses -- the relatively perfect and the absolutely perfect. By relatively perfect we mean that which is complete in its place or relations, in its adaptedness to its end. By the absolutely perfect we mean that to which nothing can be added. A self-existent being is a necessarily existent being, and exists just as it does with all its inherent properties or attributes, not one of which is capable of increase or of change; therefore, all the attributes of a self-existent being must be infinite.

8. Again, matter cannot be eternal. Whatever is eternal is self-existent. If it be eternal it never came to pass; its existence was never an event; it never had a cause. Again, whatever is self-existent is immutable. This we have seen in the last proposition above. If self-existent it exists just as it does in all its attributes from a necessity of its own nature -- that is, it is eternally impossible that it should not have existed, and so existed. If the material universe existed from eternity, it existed in a quiescent state or in a state of change, from a law inherent in itself. If in a quiescent state, it was immutable in that state and could never have changed; but it does

change, and therefore it is not eternal. But if it existed in a state of change and under a law of necessary change, then cause and effect must have been eternal, which is a contradiction.

Again, if matter were self-existent, it must be eternal, absolute, immutable, infinite. That is, if it be self-existent, it is eternally existent; it must be absolute because its existence has no conditions. It must be immutable because self-existent; for self-existence is necessary existence; it must be infinite because immutable, self-existent and eternal. But matter can be neither; this is plain from the preceding proposition. Again, if matter were self-existent, the order in the material universe must have been necessary, unchangeable, and eternal. But an eternal order is a contradiction, if by order is meant order of events; for events, as we have seen, cannot be eternal.

Again, it is a contradiction because it implies an infinite series of causes and events. But this again is a contradiction; because every event and every cause must belong to time, and cannot be eternal, as we have seen. Again, if matter were self-existent and eternal, neither God nor man could change it in any respect. But we know that we can change the order of events in the material universe, and produce many changes of form and order, which show clearly that the material universe does not exist and act under a law of necessity. For if it did exist and act under a law of eternal necessity, then no supernatural influence could possibly exist that could vary its order. And it is also true, as we have seen, that a self-existent universe, acting under a law of eternal change, is a contradiction, as it implies an eternal series of dependent events; whereas every event, from its definition, must occur in time.

9. A cause must be a free agent exerting his power in action. A cause is a mystery only. But a cause, as we have seen, cannot be an eternal cause. A free being may be an eternal power, as is the case with God; but an eternal cause or power in an eternally-productive action, is a contradiction. It involves no contradiction to speak of a free being self-existent and eternal, who originates his own action and becomes a cause in time; but the supposition of an eternal necessity in nature is not a mere mystery, it is a contradiction, as in that case cause and effect must have been eternal.

10. Again, as we have seen, a cause must be a free agent. We have seen that an agent is an actor. An agent exerting his power in producing actions, is a free, and hence a proper, cause. Again, I am conscious of being a free cause. I am a moral agent and therefore free; I act myself in producing effects. In these actions I

am cause; I know myself to be a cause, and a free cause, by being directly conscious of it. Hence I know that I am a supernatural being; in the actions of my will I am not subject to the law of cause and effect; the volitions of my will are causes. Of this I am conscious.

11. Again, we know that matter is not in any case a cause, in the highest sense of the term. It may transmit an influence which it receives; but all that we can know is, that in nature events succeed each other, under a law of necessity. The power cannot reside in matter itself; matter can be only an instrumental cause. An influence may be transmitted from the great First Cause through this chain of material causes, but we have seen that proper causes must be intelligent and free.

But in consciousness we know ourselves as proper causes; that the power by which we become cause is our own; and that we exert it at discretion, and under a law, not of necessity, but of moral responsibility. No intuitive faculty of ours can give us any other cause than that of free power in action; and this cause is directly given in consciousness.

V. ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The proposition to be proved is the existence of God, first as a First Cause of all finite existences. The method of proof in this case must be a posteriori. But although the method must be a posteriori, it must have an a priori foundation; in other words, we must use two postulates of the reason as the foundation of our argument. The method, therefore, in this case, although called a posteriori, is strictly a combination of the a priori and a posteriori.

Foundation postulate: (1) Every event must have a cause. (2) An eternal series of dependent events is a contradiction. Syllogism -- major premise: A series of dependent events implies a First Cause. Minor premise: The universe is a series of dependent events. Conclusion: There must be a First Cause.

1. Proposition: The First Cause must be infinite and perfect. Syllogism -- major premise: Whatever is self-existent must be immutable, infinite, and perfect in all its attributes. This we have seen among the postulates of the pure reason. Minor premise: The First Cause must be self-existent, and therefore immutable, infinite, and perfect in all its attributes. Conclusion: God is, and is the First Cause, and therefore infinite and perfect.

2. Proposition: A first cause must be a free cause. Syllogism -- major premise: A first cause is an uncaused cause. Minor premise: None but a free cause can be uncaused. Conclusion: Therefore, the first cause must be free.

VI. ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR.

This, as in proving the existence of God as a First Cause, is to prove his existence in a certain relation. Having proved his existence in certain relations, it is then proper to inquire what attributes are implied as belonging to his nature, and his character. These may be ascertained by an intuitive perception of what is implied in his existence in these relations.

1. God is a moral governor, infinite and perfect. In a former lecture the existence of conscience, as revealed in consciousness, came under consideration. This faculty, as we there saw, and as we are at present aware in consciousness, postulates an authoritative rule of moral action with sanctions. That is, this faculty affirms our obligation to be universally benevolent, and affirms this obligation in the name of God as the moral governor to whom we affirm our accountability. The moral nature of conscience, or in other words the reason in its moral application, is so related to God that it necessarily knows and assumes his existence. Within ourselves we are conscious of subjective moral law in the form of an authoritative rule of action. We are conscious of being amenable to an Author of this law, whom we cannot avoid conceiving to be the Author of our nature. We cannot resist the assumption that this Being has a claim upon our love and obedience; and it is to him that we necessarily regard ourselves as being amenable. In this our moral nature directly assumes and a priori intuits his existence as the Author of our nature, and of the law within us which we necessarily impose upon ourselves.

2. Again, in postulating obligation to universally submit to, obey, and trust him, our conscience or moral nature irresistibly assumes his infinity and perfection, both natural and moral. Did we not necessarily conceive of him as naturally perfect, we might suppose that he might err, and therefore as not worthy of universal confidence and obedience, however well he might intend. If we did not assume his moral infinity and perfection, we could not conceive ourselves under universal obligation to obey, submit to, and trust him. But our conscience or moral nature does unequivocally affirm our obligation to obey him implicitly and universally, to trust him implicitly and universally, and universally to submit to all his dealings. This affirmation being an ultimate fact of consciousness, is conclusive of his existence and perfections.

3. Again, we are aware in consciousness that conscience as truly postulates and assumes the existence of God as consciousness does our own

existence. In other words, we are directly conscious of our own existence, and we are directly conscious that conscience assumes the existence of God. The one of these functions is as reliable as the other; they are both intuitive functions. Conscience gives the existence of God as a direct intuition or assumption in postulating our obligation to love and trust him; conscience gives our own existence directly in our internal exercises. So that in postulating the existence of God and my obligation to him by my conscience, I am aware of my own existence in this assumption of my conscience; and thus these two existences, my own and the existence of God, are simultaneously revealed to me -- my own directly by consciousness and God's directly by my conscience or moral nature. Both existences are thus revealed to me in consciousness; my own directly by consciousness, and God's indirectly through my conscience.

It is in this way, beyond all doubt, that mankind in general first come to the knowledge of the existence of God. It is not by reasoning, but by the a priori intuitions of conscience. He is not first known as a First Cause by the reason and logical faculty co-operating in the demonstration. As a First Cause he is known a posteriori; as a Moral Governor a priori. And indeed, it is impossible that as a Moral Governor he should be known in any other way. As Moral Governor he reveals himself to moral agents by revealing to their intuitive perceptions their obligation to him. Their obligation to him is not an inference from his existence and their relations to him as Creator. For were it admitted that he existed and that he were our Creator, it would not follow that we are under obligation to obey him, unless he be worthy of obedience. But how are we to learn that he is worthy of obedience? This we cannot get at by reasoning as a condition of our moral obligation to obey him.

We know ourselves to have been moral agents antecedent to all reasoning on the subject of the character of God. Every moral agent knows that he assumed from the very beginning of his moral agency his obligation to obey God, and his amendability to him, anterior to all reasoning as it respects the moral character of God, or even of his existence. God's existence, therefore, and moral character, are directly and intuitively revealed to the moral nature of every moral agent; and it is this intuitive revelation of his existence and character that is the condition of moral obligation to him. Now who does not know that he had the ideas of right and wrong, of moral obligation, of praise or blame-worthiness, before he had ever reasoned either concerning the existence or the attributes of God.

The existence of God, then, as a Moral Governor, is a fact revealed in the conscience, and consequently consciousness, of every moral agent. So true is this that men find it impossible to rid themselves of the idea of his existence in affirming their obligation and amendability to him.

4. Again, no moral agent under the pressure of conscience or standing in the presence of affirmed obligation, ever did or can doubt the existence of God and his amendability to him. It is an absurdity and a contradiction to say that, in the presence of postulated obligation and accountability to God by the conscience, the existence of God should really be doubted.

5. Again, the existence of God is only doubted when by improper methods an attempt is made to prove that he exists; or under the influence of some temptation that diverts the attention for the time being from the authoritative voice of God.

6. Again, the idea of future retribution as it lies in the universal conscience is an assumption of the existence of God. We necessarily conceive of God as just; all sinners are necessarily aware that they have disobeyed him. Now the conception of his moral perfection, and the consciousness that we have disobeyed him, lead to the irresistible assumption of the fact of a future retribution. This assumption of course includes the assumption of God's existence.

7. Again, it is generally agreed that man has a religious nature, that is, a nature that demands religion. Even atheists admit that man is by nature a superstitious being, which implies that by nature they assume the existence of God, of moral obligation, etc. Now, whether our nature be assumed to be a religious nature or a superstitious nature, it really amounts to the same thing. We have a nature that craves or demands the existence of God, that affirms his existence and our amendability to him. Call this a natural superstition, or a natural assumption, that God exists and claims our obedience -- call it what you will, the fact remains that by nature we assume and know the existence of God; and that this assumption is natural, not as a logical deduction, but as an intuitive knowledge. Again, if conscience did not give God as an irresistible conviction, or an intuitive knowledge, guilt and selfishness would reject the fact. But the fact cannot be rejected just because the knowledge is intuitive.

8. Again, moral agency is an ultimate fact of consciousness; moral agency implies moral law and accountability. Accountability implies a Moral Ruler or Governor. Moral government implies moral law; moral law is necessarily perfect and implies a perfect Moral

Ruler; and a perfect Moral Ruler must be infinite. Therefore, the moral argument gives God as the infinite and perfect Moral Governor of the universe. (Roman numerals added, some headings added -- Gordon Olson).

LECTURE VIII.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (CONTINUED).

I. ARGUMENT FROM FINAL CAUSES; OR, as it is better expressed, FROM APPARENT ULTIMATE DESIGN.

1. Syllogism -- Major premise: Design implies a designing mind. Minor premise: The universe exhibits conclusive proof of design. Conclusion: Therefore the universe is the product of competent designing mind.

2. Second syllogism -- Major premise: The mind that designed and created the universe is the first cause. Minor premise: But the first cause must be a self-existent, and therefore, as we have seen, immutable, infinite, and perfect being. Conclusion: Therefore God exists, the infinite and perfect First Cause.

The minor premise of the first of the above syllogisms I have not attempted to prove. If anyone calls in question the fact that the universe presents innumerable and conclusive evidences of benevolent design, this is not the place to enlarge upon a subject so extensive. So many treatises have been written upon this subject, so much has been said in respect to the indubitable evidences of design in the construction and working of the universe, that it were a work of supererogation in this connection to attempt to prove it. Suffice it to say in a word, that the revelations of science are continually pouring floods of additional light upon this question, insomuch that even the rocks speak out and bear their testimony that they were created by a designing mind.

II. FACTS AND SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS.

1. We have seen that in consciousness we know ourselves to exist; and that we know the existence of that which is not ourselves. I say, we know this in consciousness. It is certain that the very conception of self as self implies also the conception of that which is not self. Should it be said that we are not directly conscious of that which is not self, I answer, that this may be true of the material creation; that is, it may be true and indeed must be true that sense gives the material not self; but it should be remembered that

sense is an intuitive faculty and gives its object by a direct beholding of it, just as consciousness gives its object by a direct beholding. The thing of which we are conscious is that we directly behold the not self. It is not so much a matter of consciousness that this beholding is by the faculty of sense; for I am just as conscious of seeing or directly knowing the outward world as I am the inward world. I am just as conscious of knowing the not self as I am of knowing the self. I am conscious of this knowledge, and am just as certain of the existence of the one as of the other. So far as certainty is concerned, therefore, it amounts to the same thing whether it is obtained by one faculty of intuition or the other. The knowledge is intuitive and certain, of this knowledge I am conscious; and whether in strict propriety of speech I am conscious directly of the existence of the not self, or of the outward world, or whether on the other hand, I am conscious of knowing it through the medium of sense, is immaterial so far as the fact of this knowledge is concerned.

But here it should be said, that although it is true in strict propriety of speech that we become conscious of the existence of the outward world only through the intuitions of sense, this is not true in respect to the existence of other beings of whose existence we are directly conscious. In another place I shall endeavor to show that we are directly conscious of the existence of God, and this certainly is not given us through sense. But here I wish to be particularly understood to say, that so far as certainty is concerned, it matters not at all through which of the intuitive functions of the intellect we get at truth. If it be by intuition, the certainty cannot be called in question without denying the validity of all knowledge. If one intuitive function of the intellect may deceive us, in other words, if we are not certain of what we directly behold in consciousness, sense, or reason, if each of these faculties is not to be trusted, neither of them is to be. We can no more doubt the validity of the testimony of one than the other. We are certain of that which we intuit; and if we are not, there is no distinguishing the intuitions of one faculty from another in such a way as to know which is to be trusted. They are all alike veracious, or all alike untrustworthy.

2. There is a material nature.

3. There is an order in this nature.

4. First self-evident truth: This nature and this order in nature has a cause out of itself, or it is self-existent and has the law of its order written within itself. If it is self-existent and has the law of its order written within itself, then it is by a necessity of its own nature eternally just

as it is and has been, and therefore immutable, eternal, and infinite.

This we have seen in former propositions, and it needs not to be enlarged upon.

5. Second self-evident truth: Matter cannot be infinite; for it must have a form, and form implies limitation, and therefore finiteness. To speak of matter as having no form is a contradiction. To speak of form as being infinite is also a contradiction. Again, it cannot be infinite, for it is made up of finite parts or particles, and no number of units or finites can ever make an infinite.

Again, it has been shown that if matter is self-existent it must be eternal, infinite, immutable. But it cannot be immutable because we ourselves know that we can introduce many changes in it. That is, if the universe of matter is self-existent and has the law of all its changes inherent in itself, then there is no power that can vary in the least degree these changes; for the law of these changes, if matter be self-existent, must be absolutely omnipotent. In other words, if matter exists and changes under a law of necessity, it is a contradiction to say that any power in the universe, or any conceivable power, can vary the order of these changes.

But as I said, we ourselves know that we change this order, and we know that those around us introduce innumerable variations in the order of changes going on in the material universe around about us.

Dr. Chalmers and others have admitted that without damage to the theistic argument, we may admit that matter is self-existent and therefore eternal. "For," he says, "we must not necessarily suppose the existence of God to account for the collocation of matter." But I cannot consent to this, for the reason, that if matter does eternally exist, necessity must be an attribute of its nature, and in every respect in which it does exist it exists by this necessity, and consequently it is necessarily immutable. That is, no change can ever be introduced into it except under the action of its own inherent necessary laws; and these laws must, to all intents and purposes, be omnipotent; that is, they must have power to resist any conceivable power that might set upon them. To suppose the contrary were to deny the self-existence and therefore the necessary existence of matter. If God did not create the materials out of which the universe is formed, if those materials do in fact exist independent of him, that is, if they are self-existent, the supposition that God could form the material universe and locate matter as we find it located out of self-existent materials, is an absurdity.

III. In the light of the above, THE FOLLOWING POSITIONS ARE MANIFEST:

1. A self-existent material universe, having an eternal and necessary order of development, is first an absurdity.

2. It contradicts consciousness, for we are aware ourselves of acting upon it and changing the order of its development, which could not be were it self-existent and under a law of necessary development.

3. It follows that material nature and its order commenced in time. We have seen that order must be made up of succeeding events, for order can belong to nothing else than changes, but changes must occur in time. Should it be said, that nature itself may have been eternal, and its changes have commenced in time; I answer, this is a contradiction, if this nature has the law of its development or changes in itself. If this law is in itself, then these changes must have been coeval with the existence of that in which this law resides. But eternal changes are a contradiction; and an eternal nature having a law of change in itself is a contradiction, because no eternal changes, and consequently no eternal law of change, can possibly exist.

4. The material universe must have had a cause out of and superior to itself; its existence and changes cannot otherwise by any possibility be accounted for. Indeed, it is a contradiction to affirm the existence of nature, and the order of its changes, except upon the admission that it had a cause out of itself.

5. The cause of the material universe must be a self-existent, and therefore an infinite Being. We have seen that a necessary cause is a contradiction; for a self-existent necessary cause must be an eternal cause, or imply eternal acts of causation; for be it remembered that cause is power in producing action. I say, therefore, that the cause of the material universe must be a self-existent, and therefore a necessarily existent, immutable, infinite Being.

6. Again, this Being must be a free and intelligent Being. No being can be free in the proper sense of freedom who is not intelligent; for free will acts only upon conditions of perceived reasons for action; therefore freedom always implies intelligence.

7. Again, this First Cause must be naturally perfect; that is, every attribute which he possesses must be infinite, and therefore perfect in the highest sense of perfection.

8. Again, we have seen in a former lecture that the ideas of the finite and the infinite are contrasts, always exist together in the mind, and that neither can be held without the other. The same we have seen to be true of the ideas of the perfect and the imperfect, and also of the conditioned and the unconditioned, of succession and time, of body and space. One of these ideas, then,

implies the other; and where one is the other must be. But does the fact of the existence of the finite imply the existence of the infinite; the existence of the imperfect that of the perfect; the existence of the conditioned that of the unconditioned? I answer, yes. (1) Because no finite being is self-existent. Every finite existence, therefore, must have begun to be in time, must have had a cause; and as an infinite series of causes and effects is a contradiction, there must be a First Cause. (2) An imperfect being cannot be a self-existent being; for whatever is self-existent, we have seen, must be infinite, and therefore every attribute which a self-existent being possesses must be perfect in the highest conceivable sense, since, being infinite, nothing can be conceived to be wanting. If then, there be an imperfect being, it must be a dependent and created being; but this implies the existence of a First Cause, infinite and perfect. (3) The same is true of a conditioned being. The very conception of a conditioned being is that of a dependent being, that is, dependent for existence. Such a being, therefore, cannot be self-existent. But if not self-existent, it must have been created; and there must have been a First Cause, which must be self-existent and unconditioned.

IV. PROPOSITIONS, in the light of the foregoing.

1. First proposition: If any event ever occurred, an infinite and perfect God exists. Syllogism--Major premise: We have seen that events imply the existence of a First Cause. Minor premise: We have seen also that a First Cause must be self-existent and therefore infinite and perfect. Conclusion: Therefore if any event exists, God exists, the infinite and perfect.

2. Second proposition: If any consciousness exists, God exists, the infinite and perfect. Syllogism--Major premise: Consciousness must be either an eternal and infinite, or a finite consciousness. If an infinite consciousness, then it must be the consciousness of God, and God exists; if a finite consciousness, it is an event. Minor premise: But the existence of any event, as we have seen, implies the existence of an infinite and perfect Cause. Conclusion: Therefore if any consciousness exists, God the infinite and perfect exists.

3. Third proposition: If any doubt of the existence of God exists, God must exist. Syllogism--Major premise: The existence of doubt is an event. Minor premise: The existence of any event, as we have seen, implies the existence of an infinite First Cause. Conclusion: Therefore, if any doubt exists of God's existence, God the infinite and perfect must exist.

4. Fourth proposition: If God's existence be denied, his existence must be a fact. Syllogism--Major premise: The denial of the existence of God must be an event. Minor premise: The existence of any event implies the existence of an infinite and perfect First Cause. Conclusion: Therefore, if God's existence was ever denied, his existence must be a fact.

5. Fifth proposition: If atheists exist, God exists. Syllogism--Major premise: the existence of an atheist is an event. Minor premise: The existence of any event implies the divine existence. Conclusion: Therefore, if there be an atheist in existence, God the infinite and perfect exists.

V. STATING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ABOVE PROPOSITIONS IN ANOTHER FORM.

1. If any event ever occurred, an infinite, free, and perfect Being must exist; showing, if any event ever occurred it must have been finite, dependent, and in time. Finite, because an infinite event is an absurdity; dependent, because whatever is not infinite is not necessary and therefore cannot be independent. That is, it must be dependent in time, because an event is an occurrence, a something that comes to pass, begins to be. An eternal event is impossible and a contradiction; it must, therefore, occur in time.

2. If anything finite, dependent, and commencing in time exists, it must have had a cause out of and superior to itself. This we have abundantly seen. Therefore, if anything finite, dependent, commencing in time, exists, there must be a First Cause; and this Cause must be a self-existent, eternal and necessary Being; that is, his existence must be necessary, or the ground of his existence is in himself. But as a Cause, he must be free. We have seen that a necessary Cause must be an eternal Cause, and that an eternal Cause implies eternal events, which is a contradiction. A First Cause, then, must be a free, intelligent Cause; hence if any event ever occurred, there must be an infinite, free, and perfect Being existing as a First Cause.

But of this First Cause let me further say: We have seen that a First Cause must be a self-existent Being, consequently that he must be immutable in all his attributes; he must therefore be infinite in all his attributes; and an absolutely perfect Being must be perfect in all the attributes which he possesses.

3. Again, we have seen that the existence of atheism as an event implies the divine existence.

4. Again, if the possibility and reality of theism should be denied, the denial itself would be an event and imply the existence of God.

5. From the foregoing propositions, it follows, that if the universe of creatures is all matter, God must exist as the infinite and perfect First Cause.

6. Again, if the universe of creatures is all mind, as the Idealists maintain, God must exist as the First Cause. The same is true if the universe is only thought, as the extreme school of Idealists maintain. The existence of thought is an event, and really implies the existence of an infinite and perfect First Cause.

7. But further, it has been laid down as a self-evident proposition, that whatever is self-existent is infinite. Of matter it should also be said that it cannot be infinite, for since one of its essential properties is form, and whatever has form cannot be infinite, it must therefore be finite and dependent, and imply the existence of a First Cause out of and above itself; which First Cause is self-existent, infinite, and perfect.

8. Again, our own minds we know to be limited or finite. Our conscious existence implies the existence of God.

9. Again, from what has been said it follows, that whether the universe is all matter, or all mind, or only thought, or whether all this matter, mind, and thought exist, God's existence is equally implied as the infinite and perfect First Cause.

10. Again, knowing ourselves to exist, the nonexistence of God is inconceivable; therefore nihilism is a contradiction and an impossible conception. Suppose any one would say, that he could conceive that nihilism should be true, in the assertion he contradicts himself. He says, I can conceive that there is no existence; but who has this conception? And what is the conception itself? The very existence of the conception shows the absurdity of the statement; and that he who affirms that it is possible that nothing does in fact exist contradicts himself; no such conception is conceivable.

VI. ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

1. Man is capable of being directly taught of God; this cannot be rationally denied. We are conscious of being spirit, and we necessarily conceive of him as spirit. If any one denies that God as a Spirit can instruct our spirits by a direct communication with us, the burden of proof is certainly on him.

2. Again, man is capable of being conscious that he is taught of God. The prophets were so; and every spiritual mind has this consciousness at times. If it be asked how the prophets knew that they were directly inspired of God, I cannot tell; and perhaps they could not tell how God taught them. But they were distinctly conscious that it was God, and no other than God, that taught them. If

it should be objected, as it may be, that they may have been deceived, that the false prophets certainly were deceived and therefore all prophets may have been; I answer, it is true that men may be deceived, as in a dream they may think themselves awake; nevertheless, when they are awake they are aware of it. So if a false prophet may have been deceived, it does not follow that the true prophets were not sure that they were not deceived. If God can directly inspire a man, he can certainly make him aware that he is not deceived; else how could an honest man ever affirm himself to be inspired by God? But if God can directly and personally teach the human mind, and we can be personally aware of it; then we can be conscious of the existence of God in the fact that he personally enlightens and instructs us.

3. But again, man is capable of communion, and sympathy, and moral union with God. If anyone denies this, the burden of proof is upon him. Our necessary conception of God is that he is a mind as we are; that he has intellect, sensibility, and will, as we have. We necessarily conceive ourselves as being in his image. Now this necessary conception which we have of God must be substantially the same conception. To deny it were to call in question our fundamental and irresistible convictions; or in other words, to deny a first truth of reason.

If, then, man is in the image of God, he must be capable of knowing him, of sympathizing with him, and of moral union with him, agreeing with him in design or motive, living for the same end for which he lives. And it is plain that this sympathy may be a sympathy with his views, and therefore intellectual; with his choice, and therefore moral; and with his feelings, and therefore belonging to the sensibility. Thus our whole mind is capable of this communion, and union, and sympathy with God.

4. Again, if we have this communion, and sympathy, and union, we must be conscious of it.

5. Again, millions of the wisest and best of human beings have had this consciousness for years, have avowed this consciousness, have lived in accordance with the existence of such a consciousness. Now, the existence of this consciousness is to the individual a certain knowledge of the existence of God; he is conscious of the existence of God in his personal knowledge of him, communion and sympathy with him. By this I do not mean that he is conscious of his infinity; but he is conscious that he has union with the divine mind, with one whom he certainly regards as infinite and perfect. To the individual, the existence of God is a fact in consciousness.

6. Again, the testimony of those who have this consciousness is valid. They are competent witnesses; they are credible witnesses. Myriads of them in every way, in life and death, give evidence of entire sincerity, and also of being intelligent in their affirmations. Now this testimony is good in its kind; for if one cannot testify to that of which he is conscious, of what can he testify? For this is a certain form of knowledge. The testimony, then, of witnesses who give the highest evidence of sincerity and of virtue in their life and death that can be given, is valid testimony.

To this, it may be, and HAS BEEN OBJECTED, FIRST, that multitudes have evidently been deceived. To this I answer: Evidently been deceived? How has this deception been evident? Has it appeared in their lives or temper? Or, have they testified to contradictions and abnormalities? The objection assumes that there was evidence that they were deceived. Now I admit that many have been deceived, and have given evidence that they were deceived, but this does not begin to prove that all have been deceived. Of many it cannot be said that they have evidently been deceived; for there is no evidence that they were deceived, but the highest evidence that they were not deceived. The fact that many have been deceived does not prove by any means that others may not know that they are not deceived; any more than that a man's supposing himself to be awake when he is asleep proves that he cannot know when he is awake.

OBJECTION SECOND: This argument from consciousness may be, and is, plead[sic.] by the Spiritists. They affirm that they are conscious of direct communion with spirits. To this I answer (1) That the cases are not parallel. Those who are conscious of communion with God are aware of this communion in its directly transforming influence in giving to them a new inward experience, or a new inward spiritual life, filling them with love, and joy, and peace, and adoring views of his attributes and character; of the purifying and elevating influence of this communion. In short, they are not merely aware of its being communion with a spirit, but with a Divine Spirit; and that this communion is to them a new life, spiritual, heavenly; and that it influences the will, the intellect, and the sensibility, and is transforming in its influence, covering the whole of our inward experience and developing itself in a holy life. Now nothing like this is so much as affirmed by the Spiritists. Most of their affirmations are manifestly inferences which they draw from material facts. They hear a rapping, and infer that it is a spirit. But this is no consciousness; they are only conscious of hearing raps. Again, they profess to hear words; to be taught to write

involuntarily, or without knowing what they write; to be taught to speak in an unknown tongue, without knowing what they speak; and sometimes to speak impromptu, not from themselves, but from spirits with them.

Now who does not see that all this is inference? Suppose all the facts which they allege really exist; the testimony is not in point. How do they know that it is a spirit that moves their hand? And that it is such or such a spirit? How do they know that it is a spirit that produces these effects? Are they directly conscious of this spirit within themselves in such a sense as Christians are conscious of communion with God? I am not aware that Spiritists make any such pretensions. But if they do, do they give as high evidence of sincerity, intelligence, and honesty, as spiritual and heavenly minded Christians do? Now I must say that I do not believe that any such testimony in favor of Spiritism exists, or ever did exist.

But (2), If this kind of testimony does in fact exist, which is really the testimony of consciousness, of course it is to be received. The testimony of consciousness is conclusive, and not to be disposed of by such an objection as this. If Spiritists can actually give us the testimony of consciousness that they have had communion with spirits, and know them -- if they are directly conscious of this, it must be true. No one surely can affirm that no such communion is possible; but do they have such communion? Do they give so high evidence to others that they have this communion, that their testimony ought to be received by them? I do not believe that any such testimony exists among them.

Again, while I admit that the testimony of consciousness with regard to communion with finite spirits might be valid, yet I do not admit that it could be valid in the same sense in which the testimony of conscious communion with God can be valid. If God communes with us and we with him, he must be interested to make us fully aware of it. He is able to make us fully aware of it, and to render it impossible that we should be deceived; and such in fact has been the consciousness of the inspired writers and of spiritual Christians in all ages. They really no more doubt their communion with God than they doubt their own existence. If you ask them how they know it, they cannot tell how, anymore than they can tell how they can see an object when their eyes are open upon it; nor any more than they can tell how they are conscious of their own existence. But they can tell you that this communion is to them an indubitable reality; that while it exists it cannot be doubted; and that it is only when it has passed away and cannot be renewed in consciousness, that it is possible to doubt it.

7. Again, in the course of theological inquiries it will be seen that the testimony of consciousness is conclusive upon many theological questions. I have been astonished that so little importance seemed to be attached by Christians, and Christian writers, to this form of testimony. I know that it has been objected that it will not be received by skeptics. But why should it not? Skeptics can resist the evidence of miracles, can deny the evidence of their sense, can call in question first truths of reason; but after all they possess minds, and with all their denials it is impossible for them to get rid of the deep conviction that such a testimony ought to be received. I ask, why should not skeptics receive the oral and written testimony of millions of spiritual minds that affirm that they know God by a direct personal knowledge and intercourse with him; that they are aware of communion with him, of being taught by him, of being led, sustained, and saved from sin by him? They have testified that their communion with him has resulted in a radical change of the great end of their being; that it has resulted in the permanent reformation of their lives; that they have for years kept up habitually and more or less constantly this communion with him, the result of which has been evident to all that knew them. Thus they have lived on the comforts of this intercourse with God; thus they have been sustained in holy living and triumphing over the trials of life; and thus they have died, testifying in life and death that God is, that they know him, have communion with him, and walk with him.

Now why should not this testimony be received on this subject? They surely are competent witnesses in the sense that they know what they say and whereof they affirm. They are also credible witnesses; for they give every evidence in life and in death of entire honesty. Again, they are innumerable, and are uniform in their testimony and agree together. No fact then was ever established by so good and so much testimony from human beings as this. Why, then, should infidels not receive it? To say that individuals have been deceived is nothing to the purpose; for in cases where individuals have been deceived, it is admitted that they have given evidence of being deceived. If this were not so, then there is no ground for saying that any ever were deceived. But what shall we say of those who have given no evidence of having been deceived? The fact that others have been deceived on a question of consciousness, in other words, have misinterpreted the facts of consciousness, or have never had in fact any such consciousness, is no ground for the contention that all have been deceived.

In consciousness I know God through my sensibility, and not through my intelligence merely. With my eyes shut I can recognize the presence of heat. I never saw heat. But I know it in feeling. God sheds his love, that is, himself, abroad in my sensibility. I know that this is God's love, and yet that it is in my heart. I feel it and cannot but know it is God. I cannot tell how I know it; the fact I know. To deny this is to shut us up to speculation, and shut us out from all really transforming knowledge of God. The intuitive function, sense, gets all its intuitions through the sensibility. Sense is spiritual, although the organs of sense are material. In consciousness I seem to have a sense that is related to God. Material objects are revealed to me in and through sensation. I do not infer the existence of the material from sensation, but through sensation I directly behold the material. So in the warmth and light and love and peace and joy of our inward experience I directly and irresistibly recognize God. I feel after God and find him, and I know that I feel and find God. If we can know our organism, or the not me in consciousness, surely we may know God in consciousness. I am conscious of feeling God in my soul. I know it is God and no other than God. The how I do not know. This, like all other knowledge, is a mystery as to the how. (This paragraph added later, in different hand writing, perhaps when he was old -- Gordon Olson).

VII. METHOD OF THE NATURAL REASON.

We have seen that the moral function of the reason, conscience, directly assumes the existence of God as Moral Governor. But does the natural reason, or the function of the reason applied to natural objects and truths, as distinguished from moral objects and truths, necessarily assume and affirm the existence of God? I answer, Yes. Our own existence is a fact, an ultimate fact of consciousness. The existence of the human race is itself a fact of consciousness. This fact of our own conscious existence is the platform on which we stand. This fact it assumes; and it is impossible for us to forget it or not to assume it. Now the human reason, assuming as it does its own existence, directly affirms the existence of God as its logical antecedent, or more strictly as the condition of its existence. God's existence it knows to be implied in the fact of its own existence.

The human reason, therefore, necessarily assumes the existence of God as being implied in its own existence. The fact of its own existence and the existence of God are both intuitively and necessarily affirmed, self-existence in reason implying the existence of God. Therefore, knowing as we do, by an absolute knowledge, that we ourselves exist, it is really a necessary and universal assumption of reason that God

exists; and in this sense the existence of God is a first truth of reason, a truth of universal and necessary assumption.

VIII. SUMMARY REMARKS.

Where, then, do we find ourselves at the present stage of our inquiries on the question of the divine existence?

1. His existence has been demonstrated by the argument a posteriori, reasoning from effect to cause.
2. The reality of his existence has been shown to be an a priori knowledge of conscience.
3. The reality of his existence has also been shown to be a necessary assumption of the reason, implied in its existence. That man being conscious of his own existence, and reason necessarily assuming its own existence, affirms the existence of God directly as the logical condition of its own existence.
4. It has been shown that the fact of his existence is, in multitudes of cases, a truth or a fact of direct and personal consciousness.
5. It has been shown that as certain as any fact or event ever existed, whatever that fact or event might be, God exists. If there ever was any event, God exists. If there ever was a phenomenon, God exists. If there ever was an act, or a thought, or a doubt in existence, God exists. If this is not proof sufficient and conclusive, then it is impossible to prove anything. It has been said, and strangely enough, that the existence of God could not be proved. But we have seen the contrary. Indeed, it is easy to prove the existence of God in so many ways and by such an accumulation of evidence, that to deny his existence is simply ridiculous.
6. The testimony from consciousness or experience is, after all, that which will most affect and best satisfy a certain class of skeptics, matter of fact minds. There are certain important though unrecognized distinctions between:
 - (1) How we know and how to prove to others certain truths, for example, the existence of God. We know by intuition, conscious experience. We prove by demonstration, and by our own testimony. We know a priori, we prove a posteriori.
 - (2) We know the truths given by reason, consciousness, and sense, by intuition. We prove the truths of reason by a perspicuous statement, of consciousness and sense, either by our own testimony or by appeals to the consciousness and sense of those to be convinced.
 - (3) We know many things that we cannot prove, that is, our personal identity, our moral liberty or freedom.

(4) He who insists upon proving everything, can prove nothing.

(5) Truths that we know by intuition, either of reason, consciousness, or sense, we cannot prove to ourselves, because there is no truth more certainly known from which to reason. (Section 6 added in less clear writing, perhaps later in life). (In this lecture, Roman numerals and outline headings added, although some were indicated -- Gordon Olson).

LECTURE IX.

THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

Having, as we suppose, sufficiently discussed the question of the divine existence, the next question for discussion in the natural order of our course is, the natural attributes of God. And the first inquiry is into the method by which we are to ascertain what these attributes are.

We have ascertained first, that God is the First Cause of all finite existences; and secondly, that he is infinite and perfect in his natural attributes. The question, then, of his natural attributes must be settled by a consideration of what must be implied in his being the infinite and perfect First Cause of all finite existences. The question of his moral attributes must be arrived at more particularly through the medium of conscience, or the moral function of the reason. It will be observed that the inquiry is rational in the sense, not that it belongs to the department of natural theology, but that it is particularly that function of the intellect which we denominate the reason, by the use of which we are to ascertain the kind and extent of the natural attributes of God.

I. WHAT IS A NATURAL ATTRIBUTE?

But first, I must define a natural attribute. An attribute is a permanent quality of a thing. This is its generic definition. It is that which is predicable of a thing as essential to its nature. The natural attributes of God are those permanent qualities which belong to his nature; those qualities without which he would not be God.

Again, I remark that the existence of these qualities in God is indicated in the things that he has made. But the infinity of these attributes is not demonstrated in the works of creation, for nothing which has been created is infinite. But the infinity of his attributes is nevertheless irresistibly implied, as we shall see, in his being a First Cause.

For example, we do not logically infer the omnipotence, the omniscience, or the absolute ubiquity of God from his works; for we cannot know that it required absolute omnipotence to create finite works; nor his ubiquity from his presence throughout the material universe; nor his omniscience from his possessing sufficient knowledge to create the universe. Intelligence, power, extension, must be implied in his being the Cause of the universe. But as a Cause he cannot be infinite, that is, he never has exerted the whole of infinity in producing action. In other words, an infinite Cause would imply an infinite effect, which is impossible and a contradiction.

We have seen that cause is power in producing action. Now a being may be infinite without ever exerting the whole of his infinite power in an act of causality; indeed, it would seem to be a contradiction. Therefore, in inquiring into the natural attributes of God, we are not to expect to find any infinite effect in his works; but from the fact that he is a First Cause we find the implication irresistible that he must possess certain attributes, and that they must be infinite in degree. But I must proceed to name some of them.

II. WHAT ARE THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD?

1. SELF-EXISTENCE. By this I mean that the ground of God's existence is in his own nature, and consequently that his existence is unconditioned. He exists of himself. Not that he created himself, for he never began to be; but that he has in himself the quality of necessary existence. This, it will be seen, is implied in his being the First Cause. If he is the First Cause, he is of course uncaused; if uncaused, he never began to be. If he is and always was, it is simply because he possesses this attribute of self, or necessary, existence. This attribute is then plainly implied in his being the First Cause of all finite existences.

2. IMMUTABILITY is another of his natural attributes. This is also implied in his being a First Cause and a self-existent Being. I have defined self-existence to be a necessary existence; a necessary existence exists necessarily; exists just as it does necessarily, and therefore must be incapable of change either from within or from without itself. Change in a necessary existence is a contradiction; that is, a necessary existence must necessarily exist either in a quiescent state, in a state of rest, or in a state of change. In whatever state it necessarily exists, therein precisely it must remain; and to say that this state can be varied is a contradiction.

3. ABSOLUTENESS. The absolute is the unconditioned; and by this attribute we understand that God's existence is above all conditions. All finite existences are conditioned, and we cannot conceive of them as

existing except under the conditions of time, space, and cause. That is, we necessarily conceive that they must exist in time and space, and have been caused. But God, the absolute, is above conditions of time and space, and sustains no such relations to them as that his existence is conditioned upon theirs. This is implied in his being a necessary existence.

4. INFINITY is a natural attribute of God, and a quality of all and each of his attributes. Our finite idea of infinity is that of the unbounded; and of this there are several modifications. We conceive of a mathematical line of infinite length; that is, as unlimited in length. Here we affirm infinity only in one direction. We may affirm a thing to be infinite in more than one respect or direction, without affirming infinity in the highest or absolute sense. For example, we can conceive of two lines of infinite length, but one inch apart. Now the space contained between these two lines we can affirm infinity in two respects: First, that it is infinite in length, because it has no ends; and secondly, that it is infinite in the real amount of its superficial area. But in another sense we affirm it to be finite. In two respects it has no limits; it has no ends, and consequently no whole to it in superficial area; but upon both its sides it is limited. Thus it is that in our conception of infinite, infinities may differ in real amount; as mathematicians teach us, may be multiplied ad infinitum.

But when we affirm infinity as an attribute of God, we mean by it that he is infinite in the absolute sense; that there is no limit to his being in any direction; no bound is set anywhere to his being; that there is no faculty of his nature that is not absolutely infinite. This must be implied in his self-existence; for his existence, we have seen, is necessary; and necessary existence, we have also seen, can neither be annihilated nor changed by any conceivable power. But if God has any attribute that is not really infinite, it is conceivable that it might be changed. Indeed, it cannot be self-existent; and if it be not necessarily existent, it might be annihilated or changed. But if it is necessarily existent, which is implied in his being a First Cause, then it must be infinite in the highest possible sense.

5. . Again, LIBERTY is another natural attribute of God. By liberty is intended the inherent quality of self-activity, or self-action in either of two or more directions. His nature must be such that he originates his own actions, and is an entire sovereign in acting in one way or another. Liberty also implies that he acts one way or the other upon occasions presented to his intelligence, and not under any law of necessity whatever. Liberty in this sense is implied in his being a First Cause. If he had been a necessary being, in the sense that he cannot

abstain from acting in the precise manner in which he does act, it would follow that he must have been a Cause from eternity, which is a contradiction. If he is not free in regard to his actions any more than he is in regard to his existence, then it would involve the absurdity, as has been said, of his being an eternal Cause, and events would have been eternal; which is impossible. Liberty, then, is implied in the fact of his being a First Cause.

6. Again, OMNISCIENCE is a natural attribute of God. By omniscience is meant the actual and necessary knowledge of all objects, actual or possible. In other words, by omniscience is intended infinite knowledge. When omniscience is affirmed to be a natural attribute of God, it is intended that God does not obtain knowledge by study, reflection, or experience, or that he obtains knowledge at all; but that all knowledge is absolutely necessary to him. This is implied in his self-existence. Although he exists above the conditions of time and space, yet he necessarily exists in all duration, and in all space. All objects of knowledge, possible or conceivable, must, from the very nature of his existence, be known to him. That he has knowledge is implied and manifested in the universe which he has created; that he has vast knowledge is implied in the very structure and laws of the universe; but that he has infinite knowledge we know from the fact that every attribute of him, who is self-existent, must be infinite. To this it has been objected that God cannot be omniscient, or infinite in knowledge, because there are no infinite objects of knowledge, the whole creation being but finite. To this I answer, God is himself an object of infinite knowledge, and he must know himself.

7. Again, OMNIPOTENCE is a natural attribute of God. I have said that cause is power in efficient action; and it has been shown that God is Cause, and the First Cause of all finite existences. That power, then, is an attribute of God, is certain, because he is a Cause. By omnipotence is intended power or ability to do whatever is an object of natural power or of infinite power. Infinite natural power cannot do what is not an object of natural power. For example, it is not an object of natural power to influence the choices of free moral agents. This is an object of moral power; that is, of persuasion, argument, and the presentation of considerations adapted to stimulate the actions of the will. The creation and government of the material universe, and the creation of the spiritual universe, are objects of natural power. Now by infinite power is intended power or ability to do whatever is an object of natural power. Natural power cannot perform contradictions. It cannot cause a thing to exist and not to exist at the same time; but it can do all

things that are doable by natural power. That God is a power, or possesses this attribute, is implied, I have said, in his being a Cause. Its absolute infinity is implied in his being a First Cause; for we have seen that a First Cause must be self-existent and infinite in all its attributes.

Dr. Dwight maintained the omnipotence of God upon the ground of this affirmation, that power to originate existence, to create in distinction from to form, implies infinity; that that power which could originate any existence could self-evidently originate all existences, and could do anything that is an object of natural power. This may be true. I think it is. But nevertheless it is not true in such a sense that all minds must admit it. But I think that all minds must admit that a necessarily existent Being must be infinite in all his attributes; else his attributes might be annihilated or changed -- That is, it is conceivable that they might be. But of an absolutely necessary existence we must affirm that change from that state in which it necessarily exists is impossible and a contradiction.

Power is certainly an attribute of God. As God is a First Cause, self-existent and infinite in all his attributes, he must be omnipotent in regard to all his natural attributes. I may say, that we necessarily conceive of them as unlimited. I have said in a former lecture, that we necessarily transfer our conception of ourselves to God, and conceive of him as being like ourselves, only as infinite while we are finite. We know ourselves to be causes, but limited in our power; we know God as a Cause, and irresistibly conceive of him as unlimited in his power. We cannot conceive of anything as impossible to God that does not involve a contradiction.

8. Again, ETERNITY is another natural attribute of God. I have said that God, the self-existent, is above the conditions of time and space. That is, time or duration, as separate from God, is not a condition of his existence. He inhabits eternity, but his existence is not conditioned upon it. By the eternity of God, then, is intended that he sustains no such relation to time or duration that he passes through it, or that his existence is measured by it, or that he grows older. Never having began to be, with him, properly and strictly speaking, there is no time, past, present, or future. All creatures exist under relations of time; their very existence passes through successive moments; they grow older; they have a constant succession in their exercises and thoughts; consequently their consciousness is constantly varying. God is omniscient; his consciousness must always be one.

I said, with him, strictly speaking, there is neither time past, present, nor future: it has been common to speak of God as filling eternity in such a way as that all time is present to him. In a certain sense this is true, but not in the sense in which time is present to us. The word present is relative, implying a past and future -- that there is something else beside the present. As the word self implies not self, as the term here implies a there, so the term present implies a not present. In respects to all creatures God sees that there is a present, a past, and a future; but with him, strictly, there is neither.

We speak of time in respect to God as an eternal now. But if by now is implied a not now, if by now is to be understood as distinguishing present time from time that is not present, this is not speaking with exact propriety of God. We are finite, and our UNDERSTANDING conceptions cannot grasp this truth. Our understanding cannot even conceive of God as being above the conditions of time and space. Our reason affirms that he must be; how he can be it saith not. Our reason affirms that if God is the absolute self-existent Being, he can sustain no such relations to time as those sustained by all finite beings. In communicating with us he speaks of himself in a manner adapted to our understanding conceptions of him. As we are confined to space he speaks of himself as being in every place, without meaning to say the he sustains any such relations to place as we do. As time past, present, and future are realities to us, he speaks of himself in a manner adapted to our practical conceptions of him. He indeed affirms that time to him is no lapse; that he "inhabits eternity;" and "that one day to him is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day;" meaning by this, as he must mean, that all succession of events in time as they appear and are to us, are not so to him. The end is present to him from the beginning; and therefore by the eternity of God, we mean that his existence necessarily fills all duration.

What to us is eternity, past and present, is the same to him. He fills all; but his existence is independent of duration. He fills all the duration antecedent to creation, all duration present and future to created beings; to him it is and must be a unit. Reason says it must be; for it would contradict our rational conception of God to suppose that he grows older, or that anything is otherwise to him than that we call present to us -- "The same yesterday, today, and forever."

That eternity in the sense explained is an attribute of God is implied in his self-existence. He never began to be, he never can cease to be; and yet he grows no older. Much confusion has arisen by attempting to grasp the infinity of God's attributes with the understanding.

Our understanding conception of God is that of a finite being, sustaining substantially the same relations to time and space that we do; that is, that he is living on from generation to generation; has come on in his existence from eternity, and passes on to eternity; and that things with him are past, present and future.

So also our understanding conception of God is that he is everywhere; and yet that whereness is properly affirmable of God, and that the only difference between him and us in this respect is that his existence is indefinitely extended -- this not our rational conception. I have spoken of extension as belonging to God. In the first place, it is proper to say that extension is not a quality of mind in the sense in which it is a quality of matter. Matter is a space-filling substance, is bounded on all sides, is solid, and therefore has form and dimensions, a part here and a part there. Mind is in no such sense related to place. It is not a space-filling substance; it is not surrounded by space in any such sense as to have form and limit. It is not a part of it here and a part there; it has no right or left sides. Of the actual essence of mind or matter we know nothing, except their attributes. The attributes of matter necessarily give it location in space; but the attributes of mind, thought, willing, feeling, do not locate in space -- these need no place. The comprehension of this is perhaps impossible; yet we know it as a fact that no attribute of mind is dependent on the existence of space, or is so related to space as to imply that it has form or extension.

9. This leads me ninthly to say, that UBIQUITY is a natural attribute of God. Ubiquity is OMNIPRESENCE. From what has just been said, it will be inferred that by this I do not mean that whereness is properly predicable of God, and yet we cannot speak of him without supposing him as somewhere. It is true that he is in all space, yet his existence does not occupy or fill space in the sense of excluding anything from it, nor in such a sense that its existence is a condition of his existence. Space is the condition of the existence of body, but not of mind.

That God exists, we have seen; and that he exists of necessity, and therefore every attribute of God must be infinite. Now in the sense in which it can be truly said that God is anywhere, it must be said that he is everywhere; understanding that by whereness we do not mean to predicate locality of him. I have said that he cannot with respect to his own existence say, I am here, or anything is here, for here implies a not here, or there; and there is not there, or not here, in respect to God's existence. In regard to finite beings, he sees that there must be a here and a there, and up and down, a this

way and a that way, a this side and a that side; but in respect to his own existence, there can be no such thing; and such words convey no meaning when applied to the real existence of God. All is alike here to him; and yet not here in any sense that implies that we predicate whereness of God otherwise than as affirming that there is no limit in any direction to his existence, that wherever space is he is, and all of his nature and attributes are alike omnipresent. His is not extended in the sense that a part of him is here and a part there, but all his attributes are in every place.

10. Again, SPIRITUALITY is a natural attribute of God. When we speak of matter or of spirit, we do not mean to be understood as knowing the substratum of any existence, material or spiritual, except as we know it in and through its attributes. Matter is known to us by the perception of certain attributes; mind or spirit is known to us by the conscious exercise of certain natural attributes. We irresistibly affirm that attributes inhere in substance; that substance is and its attributes are. By spirit we mean that substance that thinks, wills, feels. These attributes have nothing in common with the attributes of that which we call matter. Matter is space-filling, spirit is not space-filling; matter has form, spirit has not; matter has solidity, spirit has not; matter has divisibility, spirit has not; matter has inertia, spirit is active; matter is extended in the sense of part here and part there, spirit is not extended in this sense.

I said, spirituality is an attribute of God. Our necessary conception of God is that he is Spirit, as we are spirit. Not that he has a material body, as we are aware of having; but that he has a spirit without body. His spirituality is implied in his self-existence, and in all his natural attributes -- immutability, absoluteness, liberty, omniscience, omnipotence. Indeed it is impossible, if God were material, that he should be infinite, that he should be a first cause or self-existent. If material and self-existent he would be under a law of inherent necessity. If he were material, as matter is made up of particles, he could not be infinite; for an infinite number of particles is an absurdity. If he were material, or space-filling, he must exclude the existence of all other material substances. For if material and omnipresent, he must be infinitely solid, or the spaces would not be filled with God. He could not be solid and infinite, but yet porous. Indeed it is impossible to conceive of God as an infinite material existence; but as a first, free, self-active, Cause, he must be Spirit.

11. Again, MORAL AGENCY must be a natural attribute of God. I have said that we naturally conceive of God as possessing a nature like our own, A moral agent is one possessing intelligence -- including conscience or moral

intelligence, sensibility, and free will. We ourselves are moral agents; God is our creator. We cannot conceive of God as not a moral agent. I said, a moral agent is one possessing intelligence -- including conscience, sensibility, and free will. I should have added to this -- existing under conditions of intellectual development; that is, possessing actual knowledge. There is a distinction to be taken between a moral being and a moral agent. A moral being is a being possessing the attributes above named. An infant before reason is at all developed is a moral being; a man in sleep is a moral being; a man in a fit of insanity is a moral being; but in none of these cases is he a moral agent.

Moral agency implies the possession of these faculties and the natural exercise of them; that conscience should exist as a faculty and be in a state of development; and that the moral being should be awake, and rational as opposed to insane. In other words, the moral being must exist under conditions of the present knowledge of duty, in order to be a moral agent. We necessarily affirm of God that he is good, morally good; and in this assumption is implied our necessary conviction that he is a moral agent. If not a moral agent he cannot have the ideas of right and wrong; he cannot be under moral law; he cannot have moral character. But all men do necessarily conceive of him as having moral character; this is our a priori conviction or necessary assumption.

We have seen also that through the medium of conscience we know God as Moral Governor: this implies that we know him as a moral agent under the relation of Supreme Ruler. But again, moral agency is implied in God's being a first cause. That he has created moral agents is proof conclusive that he has the idea of a moral agent; and his being a first cause shows that he is free. Now if he knows what a moral agent is, and is free, he must have the powers of a moral agent; and being free and omniscient he must in fact be a moral agent. Again, if God has reason, conscience, sensibility, and free will, he must be a moral agent. He must act and act morally, or under moral responsibility to his conscience. He does not necessarily act right, for this were a contradiction. But he must act right or wrong. He must be a moral actor. This is the true idea of a moral agent.

12. UNITY is a natural attribute of God. By this is intended that God is not made up of parts in the sense of particles; or in the sense of possessing various members, as bodies have members; or in the sense of being more than one substance. This is implied in his infinity; in every sense in which he is infinite he must be a unit -- I mean, so far as his existence is concerned.

This infinite essence or substance may possess many capacities or qualities, and be capable of doing, feeling, thinking, infinitely; nevertheless as substance it is one and identical, and cannot be composed of finite parts; for no number of finites could make an infinite, nor even approach the infinite in the least degree. In his essence he must be one; in his capacities he may be many.

13. INDEPENDENCE is also a natural attribute of God. By independence is meant that he exists independently of all other existences; and in the exercise of his attributes is entirely independent. This is implied in his self-existence, and in his being a First Cause. By independence I do not mean that God can deny himself, that he is independent of the subjective laws of his own existence, that his will is independent of his moral nature or conscience; but that in his being and in the exercise of his attributes he is a law to himself. This is implied in his self-existence and infinity.

14. NATURAL PERFECTION is one of his attributes. That is, his nature is absolutely perfect; no conceivable improvement could be made in it. This is also implied in his self-existence. Our necessary conception of God is that of a being infinite in all his attributes; no conceivable improvement could be made in them; in other words, the conception of any limit to any one of them is impossible. (Roman numerals and twofold division added.--Gordon Olson).

LECTURE X.

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

I. WHAT IS MORAL CHARACTER, AND WHAT ARE MORAL ATTRIBUTES?

1. The moral character of a being must reside in his voluntary actions. This is the unequivocal testimony of conscience. It is impossible for us to conceive that moral character should reside in involuntary acts, which are unavoidable.

2. Again, I remark, that moral character must reside primarily, not in a refusal to choose, for that is no choice, but in the ultimate choice of a moral agent. By ultimate choice I mean the choice of an object for its own sake. Every moral agent, from the necessity of his nature, chooses either to please God or to please himself, as his ultimate end, that is, for God's sake or for his own sake. Either God's interest must be practically regarded by him as supreme, and he must choose that

as the supreme object of choice; or he must be selfish. In other words, he must either be benevolent, love God supremely and his neighbor as himself; or love himself supremely. The good of God and his universal kingdom is of infinite value in itself. Every moral agent is bound to choose this for its own sake; and this is good-willing or benevolence.

Opposed to this is willing self-gratification; a practical treating of self as if the gratification of our own desires, appetites, etc., were of supreme importance. Now in this ultimate choice of the good of universal being, or of self-gratification as an ultimate end, moral character must reside. Primarily, surely, it can reside nowhere else. It is this ultimate choice that gives direction and character to all the subordinate actions of the will; that gives direction to the volitions, the actions, and the omissions of all our voluntary lives. This ultimate choice is the root or fountain from which all volition and all moral action spring.

I say, moral character resides in this ultimate choice, and is as this ultimate choice is. If this choice is that of the highest good of universal being, supreme love to God and to our neighbor equal to our love of self, it is benevolence, and the very essence of virtue or righteousness. If this choice be that of self-gratification, this is selfishness and sin, and the very essence of moral evil. Observe, then, benevolence is willing the natural good of universal being. It is willing that state of mind that constitutes and is implied in the highest blessedness of which any being is capable. This choice is moral good or virtue. Moral good, then, or virtue, consists in the choice of natural good, or the blessedness of being for its own sake; while sin consists in choosing to gratify our own desires to the neglect of other and higher interests that do not belong to self. Benevolence, then, is the impartial choice of the universal good of being; sin is the choice of self-gratification and not of good of all in the desire of the intrinsically valuable to being.

3. Again, a moral attribute must be a permanent quality of this ultimate choice. Moral attributes are not like the natural attributes, qualities of the essence or substance of a being; they are the qualities of his ultimate choice or intention. If he is benevolent his moral attributes are moral qualities of his benevolence; if he is selfish, they are the moral qualities of his selfishness.

Benevolence being an ultimate choice, a standing committal of the mind to the good of universal being, certain qualities inhere in it as implied in willing the highest good of God and the universe. So with selfish ultimate choice; it is the committal of the will to one's

own personal gratification as its supreme end, and in this certain qualities inhere and are implied. These qualities of benevolence on the one hand or of selfishness on the other, are the moral attributes of the benevolent or the selfish being. These qualities being inherent elements or qualities of benevolence or selfishness, will manifest themselves in volitions and corresponding actions as their occasions arise to call forth the expression of them. Thus they reveal themselves; but this we shall see in its place.

II. GOD IS MORALLY AND INFINITELY GOOD.

1. This no moral agent can doubt. Every moral agent, from the very fact that he is a moral agent, affirms his obligation to love, obey, and trust in God implicitly and universally. Hence, every moral agent by a necessity of his nature does assume that God is infinitely good; and although his dealings may be entirely mysterious, totally inexplicable, and so far as we can see, unreasonable, yet the conscience will affirm his infinite rectitude, and hold us responsible for obedience and submission under all circumstances. This shows that the goodness of God is a first truth of the moral reason. It is a truth that everybody knows; a truth necessarily and universally affirmed by every moral agent. When I say that it is a first truth of the moral reason, I do not mean that God is necessarily good, for a necessary goodness is a contradiction; but I mean that he is infinitely good, and that all moral agents know it and affirm it. Indeed, more than this may be said; moral agents know that he cannot be God if he were not infinitely good; that if he is to be regarded and treated as God, the Moral Governor, exercising rightful authority over the whole universe, he must be infinitely good. And here let me say, that we have no means, properly speaking, of proving the goodness of God, just because it needs no proof.

But, then, there is another reason. God is infinite and we are finite; we can grasp but a very small portion of his ways. Now it is true that we can find in the world around us very many indications -- indeed, indications innumerable -- of the goodness of God; but then there are so many things inexplicable, that if we were left to judge merely from facts that occur under his providence, we could not arrive at the logical conclusion that he is perfectly and infinitely good. Nor could we arrive at an opposite conclusion. The facts, so far as they can be known to us, would utterly baffle all efforts on our part to arrive at a settled conclusion. For, as we shall see, many of his moral attributes are but very partially revealed as yet in his providence, and we shall also be able to see why this is so.

Again, God is infinite, we are finite. He cannot make to us an infinite revelation, just because we could not understand it. He cannot make us understand his far-reaching plans, and his reasons for what he does. Many of his dealings are therefore to us necessarily mysterious, and not unfrequently appear unreasonable and unjust. The goodness, I have said, of a being resides in his ultimate intention. Now while it is manifest in innumerable instances that God is kind and good, yet there is so much in the complications and seeming inconsistencies of the vast machinery of the universe, that we of course are not able to take in this ocean of mystery, and from it logically prove that God is infinitely wise and good. Nevertheless, we have a certainty that this is so, surpassing that of mere logical demonstration. We are so constituted as to irresistibly know that God is infinitely wise and good. We know that he is a moral agent; we know that his moral character must be either infinitely good or infinitely evil. The assertion that God is a wicked being is revolting to the human mind, and we cannot possibly receive it. No moral agent can entertain with any honesty the conception that God is otherwise than infinitely good. I said, the universal and necessary conviction that we ought universally to obey him, implies that he is infinitely wise and good, and that we know it.

2. The goodness of God must consist in unselfish love or benevolence. The universe, so far as we can search it out, is a unit in the sense that all its parts are so adjusted as to be under one universal law; that is, the material universe as we know it is governed by the universal law of gravity, all the parts being bound together in one system.

Again, all moral agents, we know, are under one law; not the law of necessary action, like the material universe, but the moral law, the law of free action; or in other words, they are under the law of liberty in the sense that they are left free to choose in accordance with this law or in opposition to it, and abide the consequences. When I say they are left free to choose, I mean that the actions of their will are not necessitated; they are under moral obligation[s] to choose in accordance with this law, but are not necessitated to do it. They have power to choose or refuse; but they must abide the consequences. Now in looking into the material universe, so far as the principles of science can go, we see that the one set of material laws is so adjusted as to promote the well being of all sentient existence in just so far as these laws are obeyed. There seems to be contrivance and design in the whole framework of material nature. Our bodies are "fearfully and wonderfully made;" and a consideration of every part exhibits the most striking evidence of the

benevolence of the Creator. Volumes have been written on this subject; and were all written that might be written upon this interesting question, we might say with John, that "the world could not contain the books that should be written."

3. But again, the moral law, or the law for the government of moral agents -- not that to which they do universally conform, but that to which they ought universally to conform -- requires perfect and universal benevolence. This is a direct revelation of God's will in respect to his creatures.

4. Again, God is a moral agent; and we know also that this must be his rule of action. Being a moral agent he has a conscience; and his conscience must postulate as his rule of action this same law of universal benevolence. Thus he is a law to himself: his virtue consists in obeying this law.

He made us in his own image and wrote this law in our very nature; that is, he has given us a conscience that irresistibly and irreversibly postulates this same law as obligatory upon us. Thus he has revealed his own benevolence in the very construction of our nature. He has so made us that we affirm our universal obligation to be benevolent; and also we affirm universally that he is benevolent. Now, if God is not benevolent he does not deserve the respect of the subjects of his government, and has no right to govern. But we cannot possibly conceive ourselves as not under obligation to obey him upon the assumed knowledge that he is perfectly and universally benevolent and not selfish.

I said, that we could not prove by an examination of facts that God is benevolent. By this of course I intended the outward facts of the universe. But when we consult our irresistible convictions and the law of universal benevolence which he has impressed as our rule of duty upon our very nature, we learn with intuitive certainty that God is benevolent. We do not, therefore, need to go abroad to interpret the whole of his vast creation, we do not need to have a history of all God's doings and an explanation of them all to give us reasonable satisfaction that he is benevolent; we know it a priori; we know it in the irresistible convictions of our own minds, and in the law of benevolence which he has so impressed upon our nature that it is impossible that we should not impose it upon ourselves.

This law of benevolence we know to be subjective in the sense that every subject of it, that is, every moral agent, affirms it to be his own rule of duty. And every moral agent also affirms that this law is objective as well as subjective; that God imposes it on him and requires obedience to it. When moral agents affirm obligation to

be benevolent, they affirm this obligation in the name of God. They always and necessarily conceive that it is that which God requires of them, and conceive themselves as amendable to him.

III. TWO OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD.

1. The existence of so much misery in the world. To this I answer:

(1) That God could not have chosen this misery for its own sake. He is a moral agent; and it is impossible that a moral agent should choose misery for its own sake. For this would imply the choice of it universally, and hence the choice of his own misery for its own sake. But this, as we have said, is abhorrent to the very nature of a moral agent; misery cannot be to a moral agent an object of choice for its own sake.

(2) But again, this misery God could not have chosen as a means of gratifying himself; that is, he cannot be a malevolent being in the sense that he ever desires misery for any delight he can take in it on its own account. Misery considered by itself and in its own nature is abhorrent alike to the will and the sensibility of every moral agent.

(3) Again, this misery that exists in the universe was not the end God had in view in creation, for misery is not a good but an evil; and we have seen that we necessarily conceive of God as benevolent. This necessary conception of the benevolence of God forces us to the conclusion that misery was no part of his end, that it was not chosen for its own sake. Nevertheless it exists: now the existence of this misery is not inconsistent with the benevolence of God; it must, therefore, be incidental to the best possible universe that he could make.

In strictness we are not called upon to reply to this objection, unless he who urges it can show that the fact of the existence of so much misery under the government of God is utterly inconsistent with his benevolence. This he cannot show. He cannot show that this misery is not disciplinary in this world; and he cannot show that any degree of misery that may exist in the future world will not conduce to the highest good of the universe as a whole. We are not bound then to show how the existence of misery can be reconciled with the benevolence of God. The burden of proof is on the objector, to prove that it cannot be consistent with the benevolence of God. We have shown by the most conclusive evidence that God is benevolent; but here he brings up certain inexplicable facts, and would insist that these facts are inconsistent with the positive proof that God is benevolent. But this he must prove, and this he cannot do. Even the misery that is in the universe may

all be overruled as a means of the highest ultimate good. The contrary cannot be shown; but until it is shown, the objection is good for nothing in the presence of the positive proof of God's benevolence of which we have spoken.

2. Secondly, the existence of moral evil, or sin, has been urged as a proof that God is not benevolent. But in answer to this objection, I observe:

(1) Sin is voluntary, and consists in selfish acts of free moral agents. God, therefore, cannot be the author of sin; for the sin being a free, voluntary act, can have no author but the sinner himself. The freedom of the will is essential to moral government and moral obligation -- God has made men free moral agents, in his own image; and he regards this freedom of will as sacred. Now, it cannot be shown, in the first place, that it was possible under a moral government to exclude all disobedience; but until this is shown, the objection is good for nothing. "But," says the objector, "Christians assert that God is infinitely powerful, and wise, and good. Now if he is infinitely wise he must have known, when he created moral agents, that they would sin if he did not interpose to prevent it; if he is infinitely powerful, he certainly might have prevented it; if he is infinitely good, he certainly would have prevented it."

But how does this follow? To be sure his omniscience does imply that he knew that if he created moral agents, they would sin unless he prevented it. Now it is supposable that in view of this he might have declined creating them; or, after he had created them, that he should have interposed and so ordered the administration of his affairs as either to abridge their liberty of will, or shut them out from temptation, or have annihilated them and thus prevented their sin. But observe, if he had never created moral agents and established moral government, there could have been no virtuous creature in the universe. Again, if he had adopted such measures, and so created men that they had been less free and had less temptation, then their virtue would not have been so valuable as it now is.

Again, it cannot be shown that any possible administration of a strictly moral government could wholly have prevented sin; or, if any possible administration could have prevented sin, that upon the whole such administration would have resulted in greater virtue and happiness than the one now adopted. It may be that the wisest system naturally possible even to omnipotence, has been adopted. It may be that both sin and misery are unavoidably incidental to a perfect moral administration; and therefore, that they could not have been wisely prevented; that to have so changed

the whole order of arrangement as to have prevented both sin and misery, would have been, upon the whole, so benevolent and wise an arrangement as the one now existing. I said this may be: it can never be shown that the present system is not the wisest and best possible system. The burden of proof is on the objector. But he cannot prove this; and until he does his objection is invalid.

But we may take stronger ground than this: we may say that by the very laws of our nature we are forced to the assumption that the present system, with its incidental evils, is the best possible. This is implied in God's being infinitely wise and good; and this we know he is. He requires of us by his unalterable law to will and do the most good that we can; he requires of himself the same. He cannot have preferred a less to a greater good, a less perfect to a more perfect system. The system that is must be the best that can be, or God is not infinitely wise and good. It cannot be shown that it is not the best that can be. Our irresistible convictions affirm that with all the mystery involved in it to short-sighted creatures like ourselves, yet the system is as perfect as infinite attributes could make it; and that it will result in the greatest good that infinite power and goodness can secure.

These two great objections, then, the existence of natural and moral evil; amount to nothing in the face of all the positive proof of God's benevolence. It is admitted they involve a world of mystery to our short-sightedness; nevertheless, we know that God is good, infinitely wise and benevolent; and that all this that is so mysterious to us is clear to him, and that which he can see to be consistent with his infinite perfections. And here it is worthy of remark, that the benevolence of God appears strikingly in this, that he has so created moral agents that they shall necessarily assume his goodness. From the nature of creatures who begin to be they must begin to learn; and much that is mysterious must necessarily be involved in the vast plans and government of God. These things cannot be explained to creatures who are, as we are, in the infancy of our being, because we are in no position to understand the explanation. God sees the end from the beginning. We see not a step before us; all the future is entirely dark, so far as our knowledge goes. But then we are forced to assume and cannot but affirm that "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all;" that although "clouds and darkness are round about him, yet justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne;" that in the midst of all this, so mysterious and trying to us, we can still say with certainty that God is right, that this is all consistent with his infinite benevolence, and will be fully

explained when we are able to understand the explanation. In the meantime, we fall back upon our irresistible convictions, that God has never done or suffered anything that was not consistent with infinite benevolence.

IV. WHAT ARE THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD?

Having shown sufficiently that God is benevolent, we now proceed to inquire respecting the qualities or attributes of this benevolence. I have said that an attribute of benevolence is a permanent quality of it; by which I mean that such is the nature of benevolence that it is disposed to do, and not to do, certain things.

The attributes of benevolence are of course all voluntary, that is, they are permanent qualities of a voluntary state, or of ultimate choice. Again, many of them are indicated in the works, and providence, and grace of God, as manifested in this world; but they are more specially known as being implied in the nature of benevolence, a good-will to the universe, and especially good-will to moral agents. It is especially by inquiring what must be implied in disinterested benevolence, that we learn what are and what must be the moral attributes of God.

1. JUSTICE must be a permanent quality of God's benevolence. Justice is that quality of benevolence that disposes it never to wrong any being, but to treat all beings according to their intrinsic desert, that is, according to their moral character. This must be a quality of benevolence. The manifestation of it consists in rewarding the righteous and in punishing the wicked. But it is a quality of benevolence, and benevolence is good-will. Now God will manifest this quality of his benevolence in regarding the righteous universally; but it does not follow that it will be manifested where the general good of the universe can dispense with the infliction; for observe, benevolence seeks the highest good of the universal being. The attribute of justice will never allow of any injustice; no being who deserves reward can fail of reward. But, as I have said, it does not follow that benevolence will always execute penal sanctions and take the forfeiture at the hand of one who deserves punishment, where the general good may be secured and yet the infliction dispensed with. For God is not only just but merciful; and it must be remembered that all his moral attributes are attributes of benevolence, and therefore that they will be so manifested as best to secure the highest good of universal being.

But of this attribute it should be further said, that in this state of being it is not to be expected that it will be universally manifested in treating moral agents just as

they deserve. This is certainly a state of probation; it is therefore out of place to administer retribution here. Here we are to expect that the justice of God will wait until probation is finished before it is executed by the infliction of penal sanctions. Indeed, it were impossible that in this state of existence, God should deal with every moral agent as he sees that they deserve. Knowing as little as we do of the motives of men, it would perhaps be impossible for mankind to believe that God was administering impartial justice, should he deal with men precisely according to their character as it appears to him. It is at the close of probation, when a grand assize has been held, and all the facts in the history of every individual made known, that this attribute of justice is to appear in exercise. In the providence of God, there is just enough here and there of an expression of his regard to rectitude to awaken attention and keep the conviction alive that God is just; while there is so much in his providential dealings that came short of justice as to leave the fact on the face of his providence that this is not a state of rewards and punishments.

In conclusion, then, let me say of this attribute, that we do and must irresistibly affirm that benevolence to moral agents implies a disposition to do justly. Especially must this be true in one who sustains the relation of Moral Governor, whose business it is to execute law and treat men according to their deserts. But to avoid all misunderstanding, let me say again, that the attribute of justice must forever prevent God's requiring more than is just, or failing to give to virtue its due; while in the case of forfeiture and crime, benevolence may prefer the exercise of mercy rather than to punish and execute justice, where the public good can be as well secured.

2. This leads me to say that MERCY is another of the moral attributes of God. This attribute consists in that quality of benevolence that disposes it to pardon crime, to dispense with the execution of the penalty of moral law, where the general interests of the government will admit it. It is the opposite of justice, in this: justice is the quality that disposes to execute law; mercy is the quality that disposes to dispense with the execution of penalties where it can be done without injury to the public. Justice is that quality of benevolence that disposes to treat persons as they deserve; mercy is that quality of benevolence that disposes God to deal with sinners better than they deserve, and even the opposite of that which they deserve. Justice disposes to reward with good where good is deserved; mercy disposes to confer good where evil is deserved. These must both be attributes of benevolence; and whether the one or the other shall be manifested in any given case, must

depend upon whether the highest good can be secured by the manifestation of one or the other.

That mercy is an attribute of God, we have said, must be from the very nature of benevolence; but the existence of this attribute is plainly indicated in the forbearance exercised toward sinners in this world. Men are in fact sinners, but they are not executed. God is sparing them, and thus expressing his good-will toward them. Instead of treating them justly, or inflicting upon them unmitigated evil, as they deserve, he is bestowing on them innumerable blessings. This is fact. Now from this it might be reasonably inferred that he is disposed to do them all the good he wisely can, notwithstanding their crimes; and that if it be possibly consistent with the public good he will pardon their crimes, and not take the forfeiture at their hands.

But again, I remark, it is very plain that mercy cannot be exercised under a moral government except upon two conditions: The first is that the sanctity, dignity, and authority of moral law shall be sustained. That is, that the law shall not be dishonored, first, by the sinner himself in disobeying it; and secondly, by God, in lightly setting aside the execution of the penalty without exacting anything that shall assert the authority and sustain the honor of the law. In other words, public justice must be sacred; that must be done which will as thoroughly sustain the authority of the law as the execution of its penalty would do, or the exercise of mercy can never be admitted. The law requires benevolence, that the highest good of being shall always be consulted and secured in the administration of the government of God. This law is to remain the eternal law of God's government. If it be dishonored by sin, the public good manifestly requires that its authority shall be re-asserted by requiring a sacrifice of such a character as shall effectually sustain its authority, effectually declare God's indignation against sin, his love of holiness, his determination to sustain his law, and that shall as effectually rebuke sin as the execution of the penalty would do.

The law is public property, it is God's rule of action as well as ours, imposed on him by his own nature as it is imposed on us by our nature. He cannot repeal or alter it. He may do whatever benevolence may do; and this is consistent with his law. If the law be disobeyed, he must execute its penalty, or some substitute must be provided of a nature that will be understood by his creatures to restore the honor of the law. This must be done as a condition of the exercise of mercy. Were this the place, it might be shown that to meet this necessity was the design and end of the atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ. But I pass to say, that a second condition upon

which this attribute of mercy can be exercised is the entire reformation of the sinner himself. I say, the entire reformation. Sin is voluntary; and while he continues in sin he cannot be forgiven. It is totally inconsistent with the administration of law to pardon the transgressor while he persists in transgression.

Benevolence must delight in the exercise of mercy from its very nature. It is good-will -- delights to do good and to confer good. It delights to bless, and has no pleasure in a curse for its own sake.

(Roman numerals and outline added: I (entirely); II was 4, 1 under it was first sentence, 2 to 4 was 5 to 7; III had no heading reference; likewise IV.--Gordon Olson).

LECTURE XI.

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD (CONTINUED).

3. VERACITY. Veracity is that quality of the divine benevolence that disposes God to keep faith with his subjects. His veracity is the condition of our obligation to believe him. But how shall we prove the veracity of God? If God is at all veracious, he is perfectly and infinitely so. Truth has been defined to be the reality of things; and truthfulness, or veracity, a disposition to represent things as they are. It is plain that conformity to truth must be essential to the highest well-being of moral agents; and it is a universal conviction in the minds of all moral agents that veracity is a duty, and that conformity to truth is essential to the highest well-being of the universe.

We cannot prove the veracity of God by any external evidence; our knowledge of his ways is too limited to enable us to prove it from the facts of creation and providence known to us. Nevertheless we are sure that veracity is a quality of the divine benevolence. All men are certain of this; and this accounts for the fact that no man questions whether God is to be believed, if it is settled that he has spoken. The question is not, Is God to be believed? But, Has he spoken? and What has he said? The fact settled that God has spoken, and the interpretation agreed upon of what he has spoken, and all men consent by irresistible conviction to our obligation to believe him. His affirming his own veracity in the Bible would not to us be conclusive evidence that he is veracious, had we not the revelation of this in our own nature. He has so created us that we approve of veracity and abhor a liar. No man, however wicked, can approve of lying, or respect a liar. All men necessarily

disrespect a liar; and all men would irresistibly disrespect God if they thought him a liar. But no man does, or can suspect God of lying. He has fastened the conviction of his veracity upon us by a necessary law of our being; it would shock us as blasphemy were God accused of lying. Therefore we do not need external proof of the veracity of God; for we have within us a proof that puts the question beyond all doubt. Our own nature proclaims it, and asserts it with an emphasis too strong and deep to be resisted.

It should be remembered that veracity is an attribute of benevolence. It expresses and reveals itself in keeping faith with his creatures for their good, and for the public good; its ultimate end always being the promotion of the highest good of being. The promises of God are of no value except upon the condition that veracity is one of his moral attributes. We trust his promises no farther than we have confidence in him in this respect. If we do not regard him as veracious -- if it be not settled with us, not merely as a conviction, but if our will be not committed to this conviction and in the attitude of trusting him, that is of confiding in his veracity, his promises will not avail us. If we plead them, we shall not rest in them. Hence it is that his promises are so little used. Many there are whose hearts are not in sympathy with his veracity; whose hearts are not committed to this attribute of love. They do not confide in it; hence to them the promises are of no avail.

4. DISINTERESTEDNESS. By this is intended unselfishness. When the disinterestedness of God is spoken of, it is not intended that he is not interested in his creatures; but rather that he is interested in them, but not for selfish reasons. He loves them with unselfish love; his good-will to them is really good-will to them. He seeks their good for their own sakes. He wills their well-being from an unselfish interest in them. But here the inquiry arises, how shall we know that unselfishness, or disinterestedness is a quality of the divine benevolence. I answer, first, it enters into the very conception of benevolence. Benevolence is good-willing, that is, willing the real good of being. On this the choice terminates. It is not the willing of the good of another for the sake of our own good; but it is making good an ultimate -- that is, the good of being; and it is from regard to the being whose good we will. Therefore, it is in its own nature unselfish; it is chosen as an ultimate, and not because of its relation to ourselves. Good to self is not the end, but good to the being or beings whose good we will. But it should be said, that disinterested benevolence does not imply that we have no regard whatever to our own good. The command as it lies revealed in the conscience is, "Love thy neighbor as

thymself." Not, love thy neighbor and hate thymself; but love thy neighbor as thymself. Our own good is of as much value as the good of our neighbor; and the promotion of our own interest is as important -- that is, may be as important -- as the promotion of the good of any other. Furthermore, the securing of our own good is committed particularly to us; and we are held responsible for the securing of our own good.

But the way to secure this is by unselfishness; by laying no undue stress at all upon our own interest, and in regarding the interests of others in ever instance according to their relative value. This same law is God's rule of conduct. Disinterested benevolence in him does not imply that he has in his willing no regard to his own good. This were infinite folly, and even wickedness in him. His is the supreme and infinite good. The aggregate of the good of all creatures cannot be brought into comparison with his; for his is infinite, and the good of all others is only finite, and therefore as nothing in comparison with his. Of course, God ought to love himself supremely, or to be supremely benevolent to himself. To will the good of others rather than his own would be to will the finite instead of the infinite; to reverse the true order of things, and prefer an infinitely less to an infinitely greater good in his regards. Disinterested benevolence, then, in God, must necessarily lay supreme stress upon his own good, because it is infinite.

So, when he requires his creatures to love him supremely, he only imposes the same law upon them that he does upon himself in this regard. All men knowing that God's is the supreme good, are certain that they ought to be supremely benevolent to him. That he may be blessed supremely, infinitely blessed, is what all men ought to wish with all their hearts. This is a universal conviction of moral agents, that they ought to love God supremely, to choose his pleasure rather than their own, to prefer his interest to their own and the interests of all other beings, and supremely to devote ourselves to the doing of his pleasure.

Let it be understood, then, that by disinterestedness in God, we mean that quality of his benevolence that disposes him to will the good of his creatures from regard to them; to lay just that stress upon their good which by its intrinsic importance renders reasonable. He has no selfish reason for promoting their good, but does it for their sake. And this is indeed the only possible way in which he could promote his own good. Were he selfish in his good-will to others, this could not meet the demands of his own conscience and could not therefore result in his blessedness. It could be no real satisfaction to him to will the good of others selfishly, because the

very selfishness of the willing would render it impossible for him to enjoy it. To will their good disinterestedly, for their sake, and promote their happiness rather than his own, is that which gives him enjoyment in this exercise, being conscious that he is disinterestedly willing their good for its own sake. He enjoys the good which he confers upon them. He seeks their will-being because he is interested in it; therefore when he promotes it and secures it, he is completely satisfied; he has that which he sought. He was interested in them; he sought to do them good for their sakes; and when he sees that he has secured that which he sought he is happy, and enjoys the good which he has conferred even better than they do. Hence Christ says, "It is more blessed to give than to receive." Thus it is that disinterested benevolence secures his own good in seeking the good of others. He promotes his own highest glory and happiness in disinterested devotion to the good and happiness of others. Just so it is with benevolence in all beings. This is the divine economy of disinterested benevolence. Every disinterestedly benevolent being promotes his own true happiness and interest best by unselfishly devoting himself to promoting the happiness of others; and thus while benevolence denies self, it therein and thereby promotes the good of self in the highest possible manner.

But how do we know, I inquire again, that this is a quality of the divine benevolence? This question I answered before by saying that disinterestedness enters into the very idea of benevolence. But now I observe, that we are so constituted as irresistibly to know that God is not selfish but benevolent, and that unselfishness is a quality of his benevolence. It is irresistibly affirmed by us, that God is good, perfectly and infinitely good; that unselfishness is essential to moral goodness, and that selfishness is sin; therefore all moral agents necessarily know and assume the unselfishness of God; and there is no such thing as really convincing them that he is selfish. We need not go into the outward universe, and into the history of his providence, to prove that he is unselfish. So little do we know of what he has done, and is doing, and will do in the universe, that historically we may not be able to demonstrate that he is unselfish; but he has not left himself without a witness in this case. He has impressed this conviction upon our very nature. This conviction is necessary and universal, and no moral agent can doubt it; and this is the end of all questioning upon the subject. To be sure the facts of the universe known to us strongly indicate the unselfishness of God; but to all these it might be answered, that we know not the ultimate end which God may have in view. All these

arrangements for our happiness and well-being may be only such arrangements as slave-holders make for the health and comfort of their slaves; or as men make for their domestic animals, having self in view in all they do. They pamper their pets, and feed their slaves, and do all that they do with the design at last to promote their own interest and pleasure. Now it might be said, as it has been said, that the fitting up of this world so comfortably, and even so beautifully, might be consistent with a selfish ultimate design; so that skeptics may cavil in regard to the ultimate or perfect benevolence of God. But to put this beyond all question as a matter of conviction, God has given us a conscience which irresistibly assumes his unselfishness; so that we cannot persuade ourselves, nor can the devil persuade us, that God is selfish. We know irresistibly that he is not.

I further remark upon this subject, that questions like this can only be conclusively settled with us in the way in which they are settled. Our finiteness, our limited knowledge render it impossible for us to know enough of the ways of God, historically to settle the question beyond all doubt that he is unselfish. Therefore this question might be left in agonizing doubt, even in the minds of the highest order of finite intelligences, were it not revealed to them as an irresistible and certain conviction. It is an a priori intuition, or revelation of the fact of God's disinterestedness in the laws of their own being. This is satisfactory; this lays a broad foundation for the repose of faith. This is that which his creatures need; being unable to grasp and understand by an examination of his ways the whole history of his doings, they need a firm foundation upon which to rest. His government over moral agents is moral. The condition of sustaining it is implicit confidence in him; and this confidence in creatures needs a firmer basis of conviction than could be laid by what they can know, or do know historically, of his ways.

Many of his dispensations are not only involved in the greatest mystery, but are often exceedingly trying to us, and no doubt to all his creatures. He cannot give any such account to us of his ways as shall make us understand the high policy of his government, and thus settle us upon the broad basis of historical facts; hence he has so created us that from the earliest moments of our moral agency, we affirm his disinterested benevolence, and that unselfishness or disinterestedness is a quality of his goodness. We assume this as a condition of affirming obligation to obey him. If we could doubt the one, we should deny the other.

5. FORBEARANCE. Forbearance is that quality of the divine benevolence that disposes him to bear with the infirmities and even the sins of his subjects. When they oppose him, trample on his authority, he is not hasty to take the forfeiture at their hands and punish them according to their deserts; but is slow to anger, waits, gives them time to consider, and bears long with their abuses. We are so created that we could not call a being perfectly or infinitely good who had not the attribute of forbearance. Of this attribute we can say that we have the evidence in our own experience that God is forbearing. It is also a matter of observation. We can gather multitudes of evidences in the facts around us of the forbearance of God. We know from our own consciousness that he has borne long with us; we see that he does the same with others; and here we have the evidence both of consciousness and sense that forbearance is one of the moral attributes of God. We also have this attribute given as an irresistible conviction. As we regard God as infinitely good, as infinitely and disinterestedly benevolent, we know that he will not be hasty and impatient, but will forbear as long as he wisely can.

This follows irresistibly from the fact of his unselfish benevolence, and is implied in it. This attribute is manifested in this world in a most striking manner. Its manifestation lies upon the very face of his dealings with ourselves and with all the world around us. Nay, the very existence of our sinful race is only a demonstration of the existence of this attribute, and an instance of its manifestation. Reflecting minds are often greatly affected by the manifestation of this attribute. It is truly marvelous that God should forbear to execute his wrath upon the rebellious and most provoking race of men. No fact is more visible on the face of the world than the forbearance of God as manifested to men.

6. LONG-SUFFERING. By this is intended that quality of his benevolence that suffers himself to be abused, disobeyed, dishonored, for a long time, without executing vengeance. This attribute is also most strikingly manifested in our own history, and in the history of our race. No one surely can doubt that this is an attribute of the benevolence of God. Nay, he has often exercised it to such an extent as greatly to try the faith of some of his servants. He has borne and suffered so long as that, for a time, it was a temptation to them; and they have inquired whether there was a righteous God that ruled the universe. The seventy third Psalm affords a striking illustration of the trial which God's friends are sometimes subjected to by the exercise of his long-suffering.

7. SELF-DENIAL. Self-denial is that quality of benevolence that disposes us to deny ourselves some good for the sake of promoting a higher good of others; to forego some enjoyment or volunteer some suffering of our own as a means or condition of warding off the sufferings of others, and securing to them a greater good. It is manifest that this must be an attribute of disinterested benevolence. Disinterested benevolence is the willing of the good of being for its own sake; consequently it implies the laying the greatest stress upon the greatest good. It does not will good to self because it belongs to self, but the good of being for the sake of being in general. The highest practicable good is that which benevolence seeks; consequently it lays the greatest stress upon the greatest good. From its own nature, therefore, it will forego a less good to self for the sake of a greater good to others. It will volunteer to suffer a less evil for the sake of warding off a greater evil from others. It seeks to secure the highest good that can be secured to whomsoever it may belong.

Self-denial, therefore, for the good of others, when a greater good can thereby be obtained, is necessarily a quality of disinterested benevolence. This attribute of God is greatly manifested in this world. It was this attribute which was peculiarly manifested in the atonement of Christ. "God was manifest in the flesh;" gave his Son a voluntary substitute to suffer and die for guilty men. This was no doubt the most illustrious exhibition of self-denial ever seen in this world, and perhaps in the universe. Self-denial by no means implies selfishness, but always the reverse. True self-denial is the opposite of self-indulgence. It should be remarked that true self-denial is not inconsistent with the highest happiness of God or any other being. It is an attribute of benevolence; and if a benevolent being volunteers to prevent the greater suffering of another, or forego any particular form of good to self for the sake of promoting the higher good of others, this is by no means to deprive himself of any real ultimate good.

Nay, such self-denial as this really affords greater enjoyment than the refusal, under circumstances where it is demanded, could possibly yield. Nay, true self-denial is the only condition of enjoyment in a moral agent where it is demanded by the great law of benevolence. In the exercises of self-denial, if it be true and genuine, we are necessarily satisfied with ourselves. This is the condition of our highest personal enjoyment. Our enjoyment is not that at which we aim; for this would be no self-denial. The aim is to promote the good of others by means of denying ourselves. Benevolence is really sincere in making the sacrifice with a single eye for the sake of the end, that is, the

greater good of others. Their good is the end; we give up a certain good of our own, or volunteer a certain suffering of our own, with the simple disinterested intent to promote their good. Now it is just because we are thus disinterested in this self-denial, because the self-denial is real, intelligent, and genuine, that it produces satisfaction; and thus by reaction upon ourselves gives us even more satisfaction than is obtained by those for whom we deny ourselves. Thus it is that in the atonement of Christ, although the sacrifice on the part of God was real and great, nevertheless it must have been a source of infinite satisfaction to him; and hence it is said of Christ, that "for the joy that was set before him he endured the cross, despising the shame." He also declared that it was more blessed to give than to receive. The self-denial of God, then, must be a condition of his happiness, as it is the condition of his self-respect, the condition of his being infinitely and perfectly good.

But, let it be remembered, that self-denial in him, as in all other beings, is unselfish, as I have said. It was his love to the world, to sinners themselves, that led him to give his only begotten Son to redeem them. Christ laid down his life for our sakes; with the intention to bless us. From unselfish regard to us, he "endured the cross and despised the shame." Nevertheless, with the knowledge that it would promote his own happiness just in proportion as with a single eye he aimed to promote our happiness; just in proportion as he sought not his own interest, he secured it; just in proportion as he denied himself, he secured that at which he did not aim, to wit, his own highest honor and eternal satisfaction.

But how do we know that self-denial is an attribute of the divine benevolence? Suppose a skeptic who denies the atonement should ask how we know that God will deny himself. Skeptics often evince their great ignorance by the low and even blasphemous thoughts they entertain of God. They will often represent God as being infinitely too high to notice creatures so small as we are. They think it ridiculous to suppose that God would give his Son to die for such a race as that of man. They think it infinitely below his dignity to deny himself for our sakes. But this shows their vast ignorance, and how little they have thought of what is implied in the infinite goodness of God. It was not beneath the infinite dignity and divine greatness to create us, surely it is not beneath his dignity and greatness to care for us. Indeed, in this is his true greatness most strikingly manifested, that he cares and expresses his regard not only for the greater, but for the least of all his creatures. He stoops to number even the hairs of our heads; and not a sparrow can fall to the ground without his notice and

commiseration. Who, after all, could call him supremely and infinitely good if he were unwilling to take pains to secure the eternal well-being of creatures whom he had made? Who could after all say that he met their whole ideal of moral perfection in its infinite extent, if he would refuse to volunteer even a suffering, and a great suffering, to save even his guilty and inexcusable enemies from eternal suffering? Who could say that their whole ideal of moral perfection was met by a being who would not stoop to the capacities, and miseries, and sufferings, and circumstances of every creature of his hand, to do them good? And especially where this self-denial must so commend itself to his own nature as really to conduce to his happiness at last, and ultimately to deprive him of no good; or in other words, where from the very nature of God and of self-denial, the exercise of self-denial would be really a source of blessedness to him? Indeed, this is the true idea of moral goodness, it finds its own blessedness in doing good.

To real perfect goodness, personal suffering to relieve others is a luxury. Self-denial for the promotion of the greater good of others is essential to securing the great end upon which the will has fastened; it is the only possible means of meeting our ideal of what we ought to be, and of securing that upon which our heart is set. Our very conception, then, of infinite goodness, is that self-denial must be an attribute of it. Such is our necessary conception of unselfish benevolence that this quality must belong to it; it must be disposed to forego a less good to self for the sake of the higher good of others. And this, I say again, is true economy; for the higher good in this case is in fact obtained, and obtained too without any ultimate loss to the individual sufferer, or the one who denies himself. From the very laws of his being, his sufferings and his self-denial will react and be a luxury to himself.

8. IMPARTIALITY. Impartiality as a moral attribute does not imply that all beings, whether virtuous or vicious, are to be treated alike, for this would be partiality. It would not be the treating of persons according to right reason; it would be making unreasonable discriminations; or rather would be the failing to make the discriminations that reason demands. Impartiality is that quality of benevolence that disposes it to make no unreasonable discriminations; to treat all persons and all interests as the highest good of universal being demands; never showing any favoritism that is unreasonable or inconsistent with the law of right or benevolence.

I have said that it would be partiality, and not impartiality, to treat the righteous and the wicked alike in their ultimate destiny. The present is a state of probation, not of rewards and punishments. Here moral

beings may be treated as not having finished their probation; hence God causes his sun to rise upon the evil and upon the good, and sends rain upon the just and upon the unjust. This attribute of God, from the very nature of a state of probation, is not uniformly manifested to us in this world. Indeed, so ignorant are we that to us it often seems that providential discriminations are unequal and partial. But they only seem to be so. It can never be shown that God is impartial in any of the discriminations which he providentially makes, or in the bestowment of his grace. The fact that one is rich and another poor, that one is born in this and another in another country, one in this age and another in that, one in the enjoyment of certain privileges of which others are denied; the fact that some have the Gospel and others have not -- the facts around us are innumerable of both gracious and providential discriminations, the reasons of which are by no means always apparent to us. Nevertheless, it cannot be shown that God has not benevolent reasons for every one of these discriminations. If he has benevolent reasons, and is therefore obliged by the very law of benevolence thus to discriminate, if upon the whole he sees that these discriminations are wise and demanded by the highest good of being in general, then he is not partial but impartial. It can never, therefore, be shown that God is partial.

But how shall it be shown that he is impartial? I answer, first, it is implied in the fact of his infinite goodness and his unselfish benevolence. If he is infinitely wise and good, as we know he is, it is impossible for him, remaining good, to be otherwise than impartial in the sense already explained. He has benevolent reasons, and must have, for all the discriminations he makes in his treatment of his creatures; and this is impartiality; this we know intuitively to be a quality of unselfish benevolence.

Men are disposed to complain of God as if he were partial; and yet they know he is not. It is true that his dealings are often trying to our short-sightedness and ignorance, and especially to selfishness; but he has not left himself without a witness. We have within, if we will but reflect upon it, the irresistible conviction that God must have infinitely good reasons for all the discriminations which he makes, and for all his dealings with his creatures; that although, in this respect, clouds and darkness are round about him, yet impartial justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne.

9. Again, BENEVICENCE. By beneficence is intended that quality of the divine benevolence that disposes God to great liberality and bountifulness in the bestowment of favors. In other words, it is that quality of his infinite

benevolence that disposes him to exert his infinite attributes for the promotion of the well-being of his creatures. Benevolence is ultimate choice, is good-willing; beneficence is that quality that disposes to the carrying out of good-willing in the life and action in the promotion of that good upon which the ultimate choice terminates. This quality of the divine benevolence is very strikingly manifested in his works and providence. The whole creation in its laws and order and arrangement, are only so many manifestations of the beneficence of God.

10. SOVEREIGNTY. By sovereignty is intended that quality of his benevolence that disposes him to act in accordance with his own discretion. He has nobody wiser than himself to consult, and takes no counsel of creatures in regard to the best way of serving the highest good. He, therefore, in creation, providence, and grace, bestows his favors in a manner that meets his own views of propriety and fitness. He never does injustice to anyone; he never omits any act of kindness or opportunity to do good to any of his creatures, where in his own judgment it would be wise and conducive to the highest general good for him to interpose. But he consults his own discretion. How else could he do? And the sovereignty of God is nothing else than infinite love directed by infinite wisdom.

Sovereignty is no arbitrary exercise of power on the part of God. It is not the doing of his own pleasure capriciously, or a disposition to do this or that way in a capricious manner; but it is simply that quality of his benevolence that disposes him to act in his own wisdom, in accordance with his own view of what is best to be done and most conducive to the highest good. If God were not sovereign in this sense, he would not be worthy of respect. It is no doubt his duty to exercise entire sovereignty in this respect in all his dealings with his creatures, never doing them an injustice, but bestowing favors according to his own discretion. And who can fail to see that such a sovereignty is worthy of God, and that the contrary would be infinitely unworthy of him? Who has a right even to desire that he should do other than exercise this sovereignty and act in accordance with his good pleasure?

It cannot be too distinctly borne in mind that God's attributes, natural and moral, are and must be revealed to our irresistible convictions by an a priori intuition, as the condition of our affirming our universal obligation to obey them and submit under all circumstances. To prove to ourselves or to others a posteriori the existence of these attributes in God, would require an amount of study and knowledge that few possess. God has not left us to the necessity of all this study before we affirm our

obligation to obey and trust him, but has so constituted us that we necessarily affirm from the earliest development of reason, the existence and perfection of all his attributes. If we were really in doubt respecting the attributes of God, we should necessarily be in doubt regarding our obligation to obey, trust, and submit. But this we never can be. (This paragraph in different, hard to read writing, doubtless written during his old age--Gordon Olson).

LECTURE XII.

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD (CONTINUED).

11. FIRMNESS is that quality of the benevolence of God that disposes him to abide by that which he sees to be wise and good at all events. The love of God seems to be regarded by some as what we call mere good nature. It is spoken of as if it were an emotion of fondness, a state of mind that paid comparatively little regard to moral discriminations and distinctions, or to moral principle; a disposition to gratify all classes; and a kind of tenderness that cannot endure to be severe and firm in the execution of law, even though severity and firmness be demanded by the public good. We are sometimes asked, Would a parent execute such wrath upon his children? Could a parent punish forever? And thus the love of God is supposed to be parental really in the sense of parental weakness; but it is perfectly apparent on the face of the universe that God's love is not a weakness, as that of parents often is. Who does not perceive on the face of the world's history a succession of events that show that God is anything but weak, and yielding, and indiscriminating in his love and dealings with his creatures?

Skeptics have stumbled at the Bible because of its representations of the severity with which God deals with his creatures. There is an aspect of inflexibility, firmness, and even sternness, sometimes presented in the Bible representations of God, from which they turn away. They seem disposed to represent God as all mercy. Indeed, it is plain that they so understand his love to consist in a disposition rather to pet and indulge sinners, than in a disposition thoroughly to administer a moral government for the public good. But how strikingly is the firmness of God manifested in the administration of physical government, and in the history of earthquakes, of pestilences, or shipwrecks, of storms. If physical law is violated the chariot of his providence is

driven axle-deep through the blood and bones of those who have thus thrown themselves before it in the violation of the laws of the material universe. What earthly parent has firmness enough to see a ship freighted with his own children dash upon the rocks, or go to the bottom in a storm! What earthly parent could endure to see among his own offspring, or even among human beings anywhere, what God is witnessing every day and every hour! And these desolations only evince his inflexible firmness in the execution of the laws of his providential government. Skeptics who reject the Bible because of its representations of the inflexibility and severity of God, would do well to take lessons of him in the administration of his physical government. They confounded the parental with the governmental relation.

It is perfectly plain that it is the same God who rules in the material universe, that has revealed himself in the Bible. His love is not a weakness. It can endure the trial of doing what is necessary to be done to sustain his government, cost what it may. It required great firmness to support his own authority by sending his Son to make an atonement for sin. It required great firmness to destroy the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, to destroy Jerusalem, to destroy the old world with a flood; but his love is equal to it. It is not cruelty in a ruler to sustain wholesome laws and order, and secure the public good, if need be, by severe measures. It is an infirmity and a weakness in a ruler when he cannot endure to take the measures that are essential to the public weal.

From the very nature of God's benevolence and omniscience, it must be true that he will not yield a point where the public good demands action. He is a ruler; he cannot consult private feelings at the public expense. His compassion is great; his forbearance is great; he delighteth in mercy and judgment is his strange work; yet his firmness is equal to the trial of executing vengeance and carrying out the measures necessary to secure the good upon which his heart is set at any cost.

12. SEVERITY. This term is used sometimes in a bad, and sometimes in a good sense. When in a bad sense it implies selfishness, when in a good sense it is an attribute of benevolence. As applied to God, severity is that quality of his benevolence that causes him to take stringent but benevolent measures in promoting the public good, where these are needed. We often see occurrences around us that to us appear to be severe. They are, however, never so in a bad sense. They are only strong and decided measures demanded by the exigencies of his moral government. It should be remembered that God's benevolence is a righteous benevolence, a holy, sacred benevolence, a sin-hating benevolence, a law-sustaining benevolence. Severity,

then, in a good sense, must be one of its attributes. There is a point beyond which forbearance is no virtue in a ruler; there are occasions on which hesitancy and holding back the bolt of justice were ruin.

What striking instances we sometimes see in providence. A little neglect on the part of a mother, a little ignorance or indiscretion in the nursing of her child, and the result is that it expires in agony in her arms. A slight carelessness and a habitation is burned with all its inmates. A ship is sunk freighted with missionaries, or with multitudes of souls in no way implicated in the carelessness. Nevertheless, they had committed themselves to the conduct, superintendence and providence of the captain and the crew, and they must abide the consequences. No words can adequately describe the apparent severity of some of the dispensations of providence. Now these are facts in the universe of God; and they are quite as difficult to reconcile with our ideas of benevolence and goodness as any recorded in the Bible. Why, then, should the Bible be rejected, and yet the existence and government of God in the universe be admitted?

Cases have occurred in which the radically orthodox views have been rejected because of the severe aspect in which they represent the character of God. But logical necessity forced the same persons to reject the Bible for the same reason; and then to reject the providence of God for the same reason; and ultimately of course to reject the very existence of God. Facts are facts. The world is; these facts are; God is; God is love; these facts are consistent with his love. They are accounted for only by the fact that his love is disinterested benevolence; a law-promulgating, law-sustaining, just, holy, as well as merciful love. It is often necessary for a parent to exercise wholesome severity, a benevolent severity, in the treatment of his children. It is often so with rulers of states and nations; it must be so in every government; and a good ruler must have firmness, and sometimes must exercise severity.

Severity does not imply injustice, does not imply cruelty, but the reverse. It were unjust to the public not to execute laws, and to deal sternly and severely when laws are set at naught and efforts made to upturn the foundations of society and government, and destroy all good. Sometimes Universalists appeal to the prejudices and selfishness of men by inquiring, Would you banish one of your children forever? Would you be so cruel as that? What earthly parent would do it? And do you represent God as worse than human beings? I answer, No; but he is infinitely better. Earthly parents are too weak and often too wicked to take the needed measures to control their children, even for their own

good. But suppose a parent to have a large family of children, and suppose his oldest son to be exceedingly profligate, and to set himself deliberately to debauch and ruin the morals of the whole family. He persuaded the younger sons to drunkenness, the daughters to indelicacy and uncleanness, and the whole of them to rebellion against parental authority. Suppose that no entreaty or influence that the parent can use can restrain this son. Now it is no want of benevolence in the parent to banish this son from his house. It were cruelty to retain him; if he cannot be restrained he must be banished. The father has no right to indulge his parental feelings toward him to the injury and ruin of all the rest of his children. How absurd to appeal to him and ask, Are you so cruel as to banish this son from your house forever? It is more pertinent to ask, Are you so cruel as to allow this son to ruin the whole family?

Just so it is under the government of God. His government is moral, not physical and a government of force. It is a government of moral law, moral considerations and persuasions. Now if moral considerations will not restrain, then sinners must be destroyed. It is cruelty to the universe at large to let them go unpunished, when all appropriate means have been used for their reformation. In such a case, longer forbearance were a crime and not a virtue. Love that would not punish is a weakness and an infirmity, and not that which becomes a ruler.

13. EFFICIENCY. Efficiency is that quality of the divine benevolence that disposes God to be active, energetic, and zealous in the promotion of the great interests of the universe. God's love, remember, is benevolence and not an emotion. Emotions may have no efficiency; and the same is true of passive affections and feelings of fondness. They may expend themselves in feelings, in tears, or smiles, or petting; but such is not the nature of God's love. It is the infinite will in a state of committal to the public good. It is infinite energy; and it is the energizing of this love that hung out the heavens, created the entire universe, and that rolls the wheels of his government, both natural and moral, with an almighty power and energy.

The benevolence of God is an ultimate choice, or committal to the promotion of good. The attribute of efficiency gives existence to the executive volitions that create and govern. The volitions of God that appear in time, that create, sustain, and govern the entire universe, are nothing but expressions of the efficiency of his benevolence. He is spoken of in Scripture as being clothed with zeal in the execution of his purposes as with a cloak; and when great and wonderful things have

been predicated, it is said that the zeal of the Lord of Hosts will do this.

By efficiency, then, as an attribute of the divine benevolence I mean, that it is the quality of his benevolence to be infinitely active and persevering in the accomplishment of his great designs. He does not say, Be ye warmed and clothed, and make no efforts; he does not pity, and exhaust himself in feeling that produces no good; but his executive volitions flash with infinite power over the entire universe; and the forked lightnings are only the faintest glimmerings and expressions of the infinite energy with which he pursues his course.

14. SIMPLICITY. Simplicity is the quality of unity. There is no mixture in the benevolence of God. He is said to be love. He has but one end to which he is devoted; his ultimate choice and purpose are a unit, always one, always the same.

All the forms of virtue of which we speak resolve themselves, in their last analysis, into qualities or attributes of benevolence, as we have seen in these lectures on the moral attributes of God. Virtue, then is one. It consists in benevolence; and its various expressions and manifestations are but expressions and manifestations of one state of mind, to wit, goodwill. That God's benevolence is unmixed, we know by an irresistible conviction. We cannot conceive of God as being otherwise than perfect.

15. IMMUTABILITY is one of the moral attributes. Choice is conditioned upon some object of choice. When the will has made its election and committed itself, it cannot change its position except upon the condition of some motive, or at least apparent reason for doing so; or perhaps it is more correct to say, that the will receives all the considerations and influences which are conditions of its action, either through the intellect or the sensibility. When the will has chosen, either the intellectual views must be changed, or the feelings must be changed, as a condition of the will's changing; otherwise the will would change its purpose, choice, or preference, without any conceivable or possible object. Now while it is true that no feeling, no desire, no thought, no intellectual discovery or consideration can force the will; yet some feeling, desire, thought, or intellectual apprehension or consideration is a condition of choice. In other words, the will's actions are conditioned upon some consideration presented through the sensibility or intellect as an inducement to choose. If it be a feeling, the will may act to gratify it; if it be a thought or intellectual perception, an object then is presented as a

reason for its action. All creatures are finite. The intellectual perceptions and the feelings of finite beings are subject to continual change; so that immutability can be no attribute of their goodness or of their sinfulness. But it is not so with God. God, as we have seen and shall soon farther observe, is infinite in all his natural attributes and in all his moral perfections. He is naturally omniscient; and no new thought or intellectual view can ever be present as a condition of his change of choice. Being omniscient, all the considerations that make him feel are eternally present necessarily considered, and are seen with all the force with which they ever can be seen. Hence, there is infinite fulness, stability, and immutability in all his feelings. His consciousness is one.

Now, if God be absolutely infinite, his mind has from eternity been made up, his choice settled, his whole being committed to one end, and that too in view of every possible or conceivable consideration presented either through his intelligence or his sensibility, that can be conditions of his change of mind. Now as his whole being is a unit and a present, his whole experience and consciousness an infinite and present fulness, change with him is a contradiction. Nor is this inconsistent with his eternal goodness. If in view of every conceivable reason for choice, he has chosen once for all, and his choice is forever immutable, his virtue is all the greater for that. He has committed himself without any variableness or shadow of turning, with a certain knowledge that he never should change, and with a solemn intention never to change.

Now to speak after the manner of men and say, that his continuing in this state is no virtue if change is impossible to him, is absurd. For the only reason why change is impossible to him is because every conceivable reason for action has been taken into the account, and his mind unalterably settled. The stability, therefore, and immutability of his goodness is one of its infinite excellencies, for the reason that it actually embraces and acts in accordance with every possible consideration that ought to influence mind.

But strictly and properly speaking, God does not live on as we do through successive periods of his own existence without change. Change in us is change of consciousness. We are aware of change only by the changes in our consciousness. Did not our consciousness change we should have no conception of the passage of time. Time to us would be only present, did our consciousness always remain the same. But for changes in consciousness, time past, present, and future would have no signification. It should be understood that the absolute omniscience of God renders it certain that his consciousness is invariable.

The conception is of course beyond our comprehension, as the infinity of all his attributes is. We know that so it must be, but when we attempt to grasp it, it is higher than heaven; we cannot attain unto it. We know it must be true, and yet we cannot conceive how it can be true.

Should it be asked, since God is a moral agent and therefore free, is not change possible to him? I answer, that the freedom of the will does not imply power to change a choice without any possible or conceivable object or reason for the choice, existing either in the feelings or in the intellect. Choice is preference. The choice of a single object is preferring its existence to its non-existence. The choice of one of many things is the preference of that one to others. Choice being preference always implies comparison; the existence of a thing is compared with its non-existence, or one thing is compared with another. Now, the will's action is always conditioned upon there being some reason for preference, or change of will. And this reason may be an impulse of the sensibility, or a thought in the intellect. But where no objects are brought into comparison; where the existence of one object cannot be compared with its non-existence; where the intellectual views cannot by possibility change, as in the case of absolute omniscience; where feelings cannot by possibility change, as is also the case with absolute omniscience -- in such cases freedom of will does not imply power to change when the will is committed in view of all the considerations possible or conceivable that might be the conditions of change.

I have spoken of the immutability of God as consisting in the impossibility of change. This inability to change is found in this, that there can be no conceivable reason for change. The most capricious being cannot change his choice except upon condition of some change of thought or feeling. So that the certainty that God will not change is owing to the fact that he is committed with infinite strength; and there is no conceivable or possible reason ever existing in the intellect or sensibility that can be conditions of change. Strictly speaking, God is immutably good because he fills eternity and has no time to change.

16. INFINITY. By infinity is intended that there is absolutely no limit to his benevolence. It is not partial, it is universal; it is not merely to finite creatures but to himself as the infinite; it is goodwill to universal being; it is eternal; it is the choice of his whole mind; it is the devotion of all his attributes, by the act of his will, to this end. It is therefore an ocean, having neither shore nor bound; it is as illimitable as his nature. We know that infinity, immutability, and all these attributes, must be attributes of the divine benevolence, because he is

infinite. We intuitively affirm that as his natural attributes are infinite, so his moral attributes must be infinite.

17. The last attribute that I shall name is HOLINESS. Holiness is that quality of benevolence which is often represented as moral purity; the infinite opposite of all blemish, impropriety, or inconsistency. Holiness is sometimes spoken of as if it comprised the whole character of God; and it must be a quality of all and each of his other attributes. It seems to me that, strictly speaking, it is the quality of symmetry or harmony in his attributes; that quality that adjusts them to each other. For example, God's character is that of perfect moral excellence. We are so constituted that we could not recognize a character as perfect that was all justice or all mercy, all forbearance or all severity, all meekness or all firmness. Indeed, all these qualities of benevolence must be adjusted one to the other; and there must be a law of adjustment, of harmony, of proportion and symmetry pervading the whole of them, else the character would be out of balance. There would be a want; it could not to us realize our ideal of moral beauty and perfection. Should we see a man who was all justice and sternness, we might call him a just man, but should not conceive of him as a perfect character as a holy man. Should we see a man all compassion, we should feel that he was not a perfect man. Were he all meekness, or all mercy -- or take any one of the moral attributes of goodness, it would make a moral monster rather than a symmetrical goodness. We conceive of that character as holy that is symmetrical; and we can conceive of no other character as perfect in holiness except that of symmetry.

Some writer has compared holiness in character to the law of harmony in music. Musical sounds to make harmony need to be adjusted to the subjective laws of harmony that belong to our nature. These sounds must sustain certain relations to each other to be agreeable to us, and to make harmony. Throw them out of this relation, and they produce discord, dissonance, and not harmony. But when these relations are perfect in respect to their distances, and their volume and quality of sound, then the harmony is perfect; our ideal of perfect music is realized, and there is nothing left to desire. So in regard to moral character; there must be harmony; there must be a law of adjustment, proportion, and symmetry in all the moral elements or attributes that make up the character. These must be adjusted to our subjective ideal of perfect goodness. When this symmetry is seen, when this perfect adjustment of moral perfections stands revealed to the mind, our ideal of moral perfection and beauty is realized; and there is no greater joy than results from standing in the presence of

unlimited holiness. In the descriptions of heaven given in the Bible, it is remarkable that it is the holiness of God that excites their enthusiasm, that inspires their awe, that inspires their praises; and the cry of "Holy, holy, holy," while they veil their faces, thunders throughout the upper sanctuary.

But how do we know that God is holy? I reply, we cannot conceive of God as being other than infinite in moral goodness, and we cannot conceive of infinite moral goodness as other than perfectly symmetrical; hence, we cannot conceive of God as other than infinitely holy. We therefore, by the very laws of our nature, irresistibly assume the holiness of God. Our consciences ever recognize him as the perfection of moral purity; hence we are shocked at the suspicion of his being otherwise than perfectly and infinitely holy. We revolt at the conception, and cannot for a moment admit the possibility.

REMARKS--The foregoing are some of the moral attributes of God. These qualities of benevolence are most of them indicated either in his moral or providential government. They are clearly revealed to us in our irresistible convictions of what he must be. The progress of his kingdom will no doubt reveal to his creatures many moral attributes or qualities of his benevolence never yet suggested to finite beings. Neither his justice nor his mercy, as they are now understood, may have been so much as thought of in their appropriate signification, until the occasion of their manifestation existed in the universe. So in the progress of his dispensations occasions may arise that may develop in the thought of his intelligences qualities inherent in his benevolence never yet suggested to the mind of a finite being. Of this we may rest assure, that nothing can ever occur in the eternity to come that shall not find in the benevolence of God some quality that will cause it to meet the emergency, and adapt the dispensations to the occasions.

Thus there are many forms of beauty, yet undeveloped in action, before the minds of creatures; and there may be no end absolutely in the eternal future to the new and striking revelation of the moral attributes of God. In these consist his true glory. When Moses prayed, "Show me thy glory," he passes by and proclaimed the name of the Lord, and suggested to Moses several of his moral attributes as constituting his peculiar glory: "The Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression,

and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty." Exod. 34:6.

From this short view taken of the natural and moral attributes of God, it is clear that his eternity and infinity are devoted to the promotion of the highest possible good. As he requires us to do, so he does. If he requires us to will and do good, he wills and does good himself; if he requires us to be self-denying, he is so himself. He leads the way in every virtue by his own example. And what inconceivable results are yet to be seen by the universe of creatures! What an infinite privilege to be under such a government! To have such a Father, possessing infinite natural attributes, with a heart unalterable to wield them for the highest good of his creatures, and the highest interests of the whole universe!

Again, it is plain that the government of the entire universe is safe in his hands. Nothing can surprize, nothing can defeat him. He will do all his pleasure, in the sense that he will accomplish all the good that he has proposed to himself, and will not be defeated. There is ground of infinite security for the righteous, and of infinite terror on the part of the ungodly who persist in wickedness.

The study of theology is the study of God and his attributes; of his laws, dealings, providential arrangements -- indeed, all truth that can be known to us is but a part of theological truth, or truth respecting God and his affairs, either moral or material. A theological student will make but little progress unless he views everything in a theological light. All truth is symmetrical; all truth emanates from our common center; its relations, proportions, and beauty cannot be seen out of adjustment with the system of truth.

Our finite capacities cannot take in the whole field of truth in its symmetrical adjustment; and yet it will be the study of ages upon ages to all eternity. Its unity, simplicity, symmetry, will be more and more felt, as it is more and more perceived by the progress we shall make in study to all eternity. God the infinite and perfect, the First Cause, the Supreme Ruler, the great natural and spiritual Centre of all being, is the object of our study. Every truth has a sacredness about it, every question a solemnity and meaning; every line of theological instruction has an importance and a sacredness to awe, and stimulate, and sanctify.

GUIDE TO THE SAVIOR.

OR

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING TO AND ABIDING IN ENTIRE HOLINESS OF HEART AND LIFE.

BY PROF. C.G. FINNEY.

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INTRODUCTION.

This little volume contains six lectures, making a part of my course of lectures on entire sanctification in this life, as published in the third volume of my Systematic Theology. I have been repeatedly urged to consent to the publication of these lectures in a small volume by themselves, for the following reasons:

1. Their value to many Christians who can not afford to purchase the entire work on Systematic Theology.
2. Their value to those who, though able to purchase the entire work, have not sufficient leisure to read it.
3. Their value to young Christians and to all that class of persons who would not be able to read and comprehend the larger work entire.
4. They are thought to contain that spiritual food which is greatly needed by all classes of Christians, and should, therefore, as far as possible, be put within the reach of all, and in a form and size the least expensive and most convenient.

Let it be borne in mind that these six lectures are confined to a presentation of the conditions of abiding holiness of heart and life. They are designed, not to define entire sanctification, not to prove its attainability--nor that it has been attained, but simply to indicate the necessary conditions or means of continuing in obedience to God. Those who would understand my views of the whole subject, must read and ponder well the entire course of lectures upon the subject, as found in the third volume to the first edition of my Systematic Theology.

The full scope and bearing of these six lectures will not be so fully seen, separated from the entire course, but it is thought that by themselves they contain sufficient

spiritual instruction to warrant and demand a separate publication.

I might, as is indicated in the lectures themselves, greatly enlarge every head, and swell this to a large volume. But, first, I have not time to do so. Secondly, the volume would then be too large for multitudes of purchasers and readers. Thirdly, on many of the relations of Christ to believers, I greatly desire to enlarge, but upon the whole, I will consent to have the lectures presented as they are found in the original work.

To Christ and his dear children I consecrate these lectures. If any one shall be refreshed by their perusal, I shall be happy to give all the glory to Christ, and be content myself with the satisfaction of having been made instrumental in feeding the "flock of God which he has purchased with his own blood."

THE AUTHOR.

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CHAPTER I.

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING TO HOLINESS.

I. A state of entire sanctification can never be attained by an indifferent waiting of God's time.

II. Nor by any works of law, or works of any kind performed in your own strength, irrespective of the grace of God. By this I do not mean that, were you disposed to exert your natural powers aright, you could not at once obey the law in the exercise of your natural strength and continue to do so. But I do mean, that as you are wholly indisposed to use your natural powers aright without the grace of God, no efforts that you will actually make in your own strength or independent of his grace, will ever result in your entire sanctification.

III. Not by any direct efforts to feel right. Many spend their time in vain efforts to force themselves into a right state of feeling. Now it should be forever understood, that religion does not consist in a mere feeling, emotion, or involuntary affection of any kind. Feelings do not result from a direct effort to feel. But on the contrary, they are the spontaneous actings of the mind when it has under its direct and deep consideration the objects, truths, facts or realities that are correlated to these involuntary emotions. They are the most easy and natural state of mind possible under such circumstances. So far from its requiring an effort to put them forth, it would rather require an effort to prevent them, when the mind is intensely considering those objects and considerations which have a natural tendency to produce them. This is so true that when persons are in the exercise of such affections, they feel no difficulty at all in their exercise, but wonder how any one can help feeling as they do. It seems to them so natural, so easy, and I may say so almost unavoidable, that they often feel and express astonishment that any one should find it difficult to exercise the feelings of which they are conscious. The course that many persons take on the subject of religion has often appeared wonderful to me. They make themselves, their own state and interest, the central point around which their own minds are continually revolving. Their selfishness is so great that their own interests, happiness, and salvation, fill their whole field of vision. And with their thoughts and anxieties, and whole souls clustering around their own salvation, they complain of a hard heart--that they can not love God --that they do not repent and can not believe. They manifestly regard love to God, repentance, faith, and all religion, as consisting in mere feeling. Being conscious that they do not feel right, as they express it, they are the more concerned

about themselves, which concern but increases their embarrassment and the difficulty of exercising what they call right affections. The less they feel, the more they try to feel--the greater efforts they make to feel right without success, the more are they confirmed in their selfishness, and the more are their thoughts glued to their own interests; and they are of course at a greater and greater distance from any right state of mind. And thus their selfish anxieties beget ineffectual efforts, and these efforts but deepen their anxieties. And if in this state, death should appear in a visible form before them, or the last trumpet sound, and they should be summoned to the solemn Judgment it would but increase their distraction, confirm and almost give omnipotence to their selfishness, and render their sanctification morally impossible. It should never be forgotten that all true religion consists in voluntary states of mind, and that the true and only way to attain to true religion is to look at and understand the exact thing to be done and then to put forth at once the voluntary exercise required.

IV. Not by any efforts to obtain grace by works of law. In my lecture on Faith, in the first volume of the Evangelist, I said the following things:

1. Should the Question be proposed to a Jew, "What shall I do that I may work the works of God?"-- he would answer, Keep the law, both moral and ceremonial, that is, keep the commandments.

2. To the same inquiry an Arminian would answer, Improve common grace, and you will obtain converting grace, that is, use the means of grace according to the best light you have, and you will obtain the grace of salvation. In this answer it is not supposed, that the inquirer already has faith; but that he is in a state of unbelief, and is inquiring after converting grace. The answer, therefore, amounts to this; you must get converting grace by your impenitent works; you must become holy by your hypocrisy; you must work out sanctification by sin.

3. To this question, most professed Calvinists would make in substance the same reply. They would reject the language while they retain the idea. Their direction would imply, either that the inquirer already has faith, or that he must perform some works to obtain it, that is, that he must obtain grace by works of law.

A late Calvinistic writer admits that entire and permanent sanctification is attainable, although he rejects the idea of the actual attainment of such a state in this life. He supposes the condition of attaining this state or the way to attain it, is by a diligent use of the means of grace and that the saints are sanctified just so

far as they make a diligent use of the means of sanctification. But as he denies that any saints ever did or will use all the means with suitable diligence, he denies also of course that entire sanctification ever is attained in this life. The way of attaining it, according to his teaching, is by the diligent use of means. If then this writer were asked, "What shall I do to work the works of God," --or in other words, what shall I do to obtain entire and permanent sanctification, his answer, it seems, would be: "Use diligently all the means of grace," that is, you must get grace by works, or, with the Arminian, improve common grace and you will secure sanctifying grace.

Neither an Arminian, nor a Calvinist, would formally direct the inquirer to the law, as the ground of Justification. But nearly the whole Church would give directions that would amount to the same thing. Their answer would be a legal, and not a gospel answer. For whatever answer is given to this question, that does not distinctly recognize faith, as the condition of abiding holiness in Christians, is legal. Unless the inquirer is made to understand, that this is the first, grand, fundamental duty, without the performance of which all virtue, all giving up of sin, all acceptable obedience, is impossible, he is misdirected. He is led to believe that it is possible to please God without faith, and to obtain grace by works of law. There are but two kinds of works--works of law, and works of faith. Now if the inquirer has not the "faith which works by love," to set him upon any course of works to get it, is certainly to set him to get faith by works of law. Whatever is said to him that does not clearly convey the truth, that both justification and sanctification are by faith, without works of law, is law and not gospel. Nothing before or without faith, can possibly be done by any one, but works of law. His first duty, therefore, is faith; and every attempt to obtain faith by unbelieving works, is to lay works at the foundation, and make grace a result. It is the direct opposite of gospel truth.

Take facts as they arise in every day's experience, to show that what I have stated is true of almost all professors and non-professors. Whenever a sinner begins in good earnest to agitate the question, "What shall I do to be saved?" he resolves as a first duty to break off from his sins, that is, in unbelief. Of course, his reformation is only outward. He determines to do better--to reform in this, that, and the other thing, and thus prepare himself to be converted. He does not expect to be saved without grace and faith but he attempts to get grace by works of law.

The same is true of multitudes of anxious Christians, who are inquiring what they shall do to overcome the

world, the flesh, and the devil. They overlook the fact, that "this is the victory which overcometh the world, even our faith," that is with "the shield of faith" that they are "to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked." They ask, Why am I overcome by sin? Why can I not get above its power? Why am I thus the slave of my appetites and passions, and the sport of the devil? They cast about for the cause of all this spiritual wretchedness and death. At one time, they think they have discovered it in the neglect of one duty; and at another time in the neglect of another. Sometimes they imagine they have found the cause to lie in yielding to one sin, and sometimes in yielding to another. They put forth efforts in this direction, and in that direction, and patch up their righteousness on one side, while they make a rent on the other side. Thus they spend years in running around in a circle, and making dams of sand across the current of their own habitudes and tendencies. Instead of at once purifying their hearts by faith, they are engaged in trying to arrest the overflowing of the bitter waters of their own propensities. Why do I sin? they inquire; and casting about for the cause, they come to the sage conclusion, It is because I neglect such a duty, that is, because I do sin. But how shall I get rid of sin? Answer: by doing my duty, that is, by ceasing from sin. Now the real inquiry is, Why do they neglect their duty? Why do they commit sin at all? Where is the foundation of all this mischief? Will it be replied, the foundation of all this wickedness is in the force of temptation--in the weakness of our hearts--in the strength of our evil propensities and habits? But all this only brings us back to the real inquiry again, how are these things to be overcome? I answer, by faith alone. No works of law have the least tendency to overcome our sins; but rather to confirm the soul in self-righteousness and unbelief.

The great and fundamental sin, which is at the foundation of all other sin, is unbelief. The first thing is to give up that--to believe the word of God. There is no breaking off from one sin without this. "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin." "Without faith it is impossible to please God."

Thus we see that the backslider and convicted sinner, when agonizing to overcome sin, will almost always betake themselves to works of law to obtain faith. They will fast, and pray, and read, and struggle, and outwardly reform, and thus endeavor to obtain grace. Now all this is in vain and wrong. Do you ask, shall we not fast, and pray, and read, and struggle? Shall we do nothing--but sit down in Antinomian security and inaction? I answer, You must do all that God commands you to do: but begin where He tells you to begin, and do

it in the manner in which He commands you to do it; that is, in the exercise of that faith that works by love. Purify your hearts by faith. Believe in the Son of God. And say not in your heart, "Who shall ascend into heaven, that is, to bring Christ down from above; or who shall descend into the deep, that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead. But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart, that is, the word of faith which we preach."

Now these facts show that even under the gospel, many professors of religion, while they reject the Jewish notion of justification by works of law, have, after all, adopted a ruinous substitute for it, and suppose that, in some way they are to obtain grace by their works.

V. A state of entire sanctification cannot be attained by attempting to copy the experience of others. It is very common for convicted sinners, or for Christians inquiring after entire sanctification, in their blindness, to ask others to relate their experience, to mark minutely the detail of all their exercises, and then set themselves to pray for and make direct efforts to attain the same class of exercises--not seeming to understand that they can no more exercise feelings in the detail like others, than they can look like others. Human experiences differ as human countenances differ. The whole history of a man's former state of mind, comes in of course to modify his present and future experience. So that the precise train of feelings which may be requisite in your case, and which will actually occur, if you are ever sanctified, will not in all its details, coincide with the exercises of any other human being. It is of vast importance for you to understand, that you can be no copyist in any true religious experience: and that you are in great danger of being deceived by Satan whenever you attempt to copy the experience of others. I beseech you, therefore, to cease from praying for or trying to obtain the precise experience of any person whatever. All truly Christian experiences, are, like human countenances, in their outline, so much alike, as to be readily known as the lineaments of the religion of Jesus Christ. But no farther than this are they alike, any more than human countenances are alike.

But here let it be remembered that sanctification does not consist in the various affections or emotions of which Christians speak, and which are often mistaken for or confounded with true religion; but that sanctification consists in entire consecration, and consequently it is all out of place for any one to attempt to copy the feelings of another, inasmuch as feelings do not constitute religion. The feelings of which Christians speak do not constitute true religion, but often result from a right state of heart. These feelings may properly

enough be spoken of as Christian experience, for, although involuntary states of mind, they are experienced by true Christians. The only way to secure them is to set the will right, and the emotions will be a natural result.

VI. Not by waiting to make preparations before you come into this state. Observe that the thing about which you are inquiring is a state of entire consecration to God. Now do not imagine that this state of mind must be prefaced by a long introduction of preparatory exercises. It is common for persons when inquiring upon this subject with earnestness, to think themselves hindered in their progress by a want of this or that or the other exercise or state of mind. They look every where else but at the real difficulty. They assign any other and every other but the true reason for their not being already in a state of sanctification. The true difficulty is voluntary selfishness or voluntary consecration to self-interest and self-gratification. This is the difficulty and the only difficulty to be overcome.

VII. Not by attending meetings, asking the prayers of other Christians, or depending in any way upon the means of getting into this state. By this I do not intend to say that means are unnecessary, or that it is not through the instrumentality of truth, that this state of mind is induced. But I do mean that while you are depending upon any instrumentality whatever, your mind is diverted from the real point before you, and you are never like[ly] to make this attainment.

VIII. Not by waiting for any particular views of Christ. When persons, in the state of mind of which I have been speaking, hear those who live in faith describe their views of Christ, they say, O, if I had such views, I could believe; I must have these before I can believe. Now you should understand that these views are the result and effect of faith in the promise of the Spirit to take of the things of Christ and show them to you. Lay hold of this class of promises, and the Holy Spirit will reveal Christ to you in the relations in which you need Him from time to time. Take hold, then, on the simple promise of God. Take God at his word. Believe that He means just what He says; and this will at once bring you into the state of mind after which you inquire.

IX. Not in any way which you may mark out for yourself. Persons in an inquiring state are very apt, without seeming to be aware of it, to send imagination on before them, to stake out the way, and set up a flag where they intend to come out. They expect to be thus and thus exercised--to have such and such peculiar views and feelings, when they have attained their object. Now there probably never was a person who did not find

himself disappointed in these respects. God says, "I will bring the blind by a way that they know not. I will lead them in paths that they have not known: I will make darkness light before them, and crooked things straight. These things will I do unto them, and not forsake them." This suffering your imagination to mark out your path is a great hindrance to you, as it sets you upon making many fruitless and worse than fruitless, attempts to attain this imaginary state of mind, wastes much of your time, and greatly wearies the patience and grieves the Spirit of God. While He is trying to lead you right to the point, you are hauling off from the course, and insisting that this which your imagination has marked out is the way, instead of that in which He is trying to lead you. And thus in your pride and ignorance you are causing much delay, and abusing the long-suffering of God. He says, "This is the way, walk ye in it." But you say, no--this is the way. And thus you stand and parley and banter, while you are every moment in danger of grieving the Spirit of God away from you and of losing your soul.

X. Not in any manner, or at any time nor place, upon which you may in your own mind lay any stress. If there is any thing in your imagination that has fixed definitely upon any particular manner, time, or place, or circumstance, you will in all probability either be deceived by the devil, or be entirely disappointed in the result. You will find that in all these particular items on which you had laid any stress, that the wisdom of man is foolishness with God--that your ways are not his ways, nor your thoughts his thoughts. "For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his ways higher than your ways, and his thoughts higher than your thoughts."

But,

XI. This state is to be attained by faith alone. Let it be forever remembered, that "without faith it is impossible to please God," and "whatsoever is not of faith, is sin."

Both justification and sanctification are by faith alone. Rom. 3:30; "Seeing it is one God who shall justify the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith;" and 5:1; "Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ." Also, 9:30,31; "What shall we say then? that the Gentiles, who followed not after righteousness, have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith. But Israel, who followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but, as it were, by the works of the law."

XII. But let me by no means be understood as teaching sanctification by faith as distinct from and opposed to

sanctification by the Holy Spirit or Spirit of Christ, or, which is the same thing, by Christ our sanctification living and reigning in the heart. Faith is rather the instrument or condition than the efficient agent that induces a state of present and permanent sanctification. Faith, simply receives Christ, as king, to live and reign in the soul. It is Christ in the exercise of his different offices and appropriated in his different relations to the wants of the soul, by faith, who secures our sanctification. This he does by divine discoveries to the soul of his Divine perfections and fullness. The condition of these discoveries is faith and obedience. He says, Jno.14:21-23.--"He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me; and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him. Judas saith unto Him, (not Iscariot,) Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world? Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." But I must call your attention to Christ as our sanctification more at large hereafter.

CHAPTER II.

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING TO HOLINESS, CONTINUED.

To ascertain the conditions of entire sanctification in this life we need to consider what the temptations are that overcome us. When first converted we have seen that the heart or will consecrates itself and the whole being to God. We have also seen that this is a state of disinterested benevolence or a committal of the whole being to the promotion of the highest good of being. We have also seen that all sin is selfishness, or that all sin consists in the will's seeking the indulgence or gratification of self; that it consists in the will's yielding obedience to the propensities, instead of obeying God, as his law is revealed in the reason. Now who can not see what needs to be done to break the power of temptation and let the soul go free? The fact is that the department of our sensibility as related to objects of time and sense, has received an enormous development and is tremblingly alive to all its correlated objects, while by reason of the blindness of the mind to spiritual objects, it is scarcely developed at all in its relations to them. Those objects are seldom thought of by the carnal mind, and when they are they are only thought of. They are not clearly seen, and of course they are not felt.

The thought of God, of Christ, of sin, of holiness, of heaven, and hell, excites little or no emotion in the carnal mind. The carnal mind is alive and awake to earthly and sensible objects, but dead to spiritual realities. The spiritual world needs to be revealed to the soul. The soul needs to see and clearly apprehend its own spiritual condition, relations, wants. It needs to become acquainted with God and Christ, to have spiritual and eternal realities made plain, and present, and all-absorbing realities to the soul. It needs such discoveries of the eternal world, of the nature and guilt of sin, and of Christ, the Remedy of the soul, as to kill or greatly mortify lust, or the appetites and passions in their relations to objects of time and sense, and to thoroughly develop the sensibility in its relations to sin and to God, and to the whole circle of spiritual realities. This will greatly abate the frequency and power of temptation to self-gratification, and break up the voluntary slavery of the will. The developments of the sensibility need to be thoroughly corrected. This can only be done by the revelation by the Holy Spirit to the inward man, of those great and solemn and overpowering realities of the "spirit land," that lie concealed from the eye of flesh.

We often see those around us whose sensibility is so developed in some one or more directions, that they are led captive by appetite and passion in that direction in spite of reason and of God. The inebriate is an example of this. The glutton, the licentious, the avaricious man, &c., are examples of this kind. We sometimes, on the other hand, see by some striking providence such a counter development of the sensibility produced as to slay and put down those particular tendencies, and the whole direction of the man's life seems to be changed; and outwardly, at least, it is so. From being a perfect slave to his appetite for strong drink, he can not without the utmost loathing and disgust so much as hear the name of his once loved beverage mentioned. From being a most avaricious man he becomes deeply disgusted with wealth, and spurns and despises it. Now this has been effected by a counter development of the sensibility, for in the case supposed religion has nothing to do with it. Religion does not consist in the states of the sensibility, nor in the will's being influenced by sensibility; but sin consists in the will's being thus influenced. One great thing that needs to be done to confirm and settle the will in the attitude of entire consecration to God, is to bring about a counter development of the sensibility, so that it will not draw the will away from God. It needs to be mortified or crucified to the world, to objects of time and sense, by so deep, and clear, and powerful a revelation of self to self, and

of Christ to the soul as to awaken and develop all its susceptibilities in their relations to him and to spiritual and divine realities. This can easily be done through and by the Holy Spirit, who takes of the things of Christ, and shows them to us. He so reveals Christ that the soul receives him to the throne of the heart and to reign throughout the whole being. When the will, the intellect, and the sensibility are yielded to him, he develops the intelligence and the sensibility by clear revelations of himself in all his offices and relations to the soul, confirms the will, mellows and chastens the sensibility by these divine revelations to the intelligence.

FIRST. It is plain that men are naturally able to be entirely sanctified in the sense of rendering entire and continual obedience to God; for the ability is the condition of the obligation to do so. But what is implied in ability to be holy as God requires us to be?

The ready and plain answer to this question is:

1. The possession of the powers and susceptibilities of moral agents.
2. Sufficient knowledge or light to reveal to us the whole of duty.
3. And also to reveal to us clearly the way and means of overcoming any and every difficulty or temptation that lies in our way.

The first we all possess. The second we also possess, for nothing strictly is or can be duty that is not revealed or made known to us. The third is proffered to us upon condition that we receive the Holy Spirit who offers himself as an indwelling light and guide, and who is received by simple faith.

The light and grace which we need and which it is the office of the Holy Spirit to supply, respects mainly the following things:

FIRST. Knowledge of ourselves, our past sins, their nature, aggravation, guilt and desert of dire damnation.

SECOND. Knowledge of our spiritual helplessness or weakness in consequence of

1. The physical depravity of our natures.
2. Of the strength of selfish habit.
3. Because of the power of temptation from the world, the flesh, and Satan.

THIRD. We need the light of the Holy Spirit to teach us the character of God, the nature of his government, the purity of his law, the necessity and fact of atonement.

FOURTH. To teach us our need of Christ in all his offices and relations, governmental, spiritual, and mixed.

FIFTH. If we would be led fully to the Savior, we need a revelation of him to our souls in such power as to induce in us that appropriating faith without which he is not and cannot be our salvation.

SIXTH. We need to know him in such relations as the following;

I. As King, to set up his government and write his law in our hearts; to establish his kingdom within us; to sway his sceptre over our whole being. As king he must be spiritually revealed and received.

II. As our Mediator, to stand between the offended justice of God and our guilty souls, to bring about a reconciliation between our souls and God. As Mediator he must be known and received.

III. As our Advocate, or Paracletos, our next or best friend, to plead our cause with the Father, our righteous and all-pervading Advocate to secure the triumph of our cause at the bar of God. In this relation he must be apprehended and embraced.

IV. As our Redeemer, to redeem us from the curse of the law and from the power and dominion of sin; to pay the price demanded by public justice for our release, and to overcome and break up forever our spiritual bondage. In this relation also we must know and appreciate him by faith.

V. As our Justification, to procure our pardon and acceptance with God. To know him and embrace him in this relation is indispensable to peace of mind and to release from the condemnation of the law.

VI. As our Judge, to pronounce sentence of acceptance, and to award to us the victor's crown.

VII. As the Repairer of the Breach, or as the one who makes good to the government of God our default, or in other words, who, by his obedience unto death, rendered to the public justice of God a full governmental equivalent for the infliction of the penalty of the law upon us.

VIII. As the propitiation for our sins, to offer himself as a propitiation, or offering for our sins. The apprehension of Christ as making an atonement for our sins seems to be indispensable to the entertaining of a healthy hope of eternal life. It certainly is not healthy for the soul to apprehend the mercy of God without regarding the conditions of its exercise. It does not sufficiently impress the soul with the sense of the justice and holiness of God, with the guilt and desert of sin. It does not sufficiently awe the soul and humble it in the deepest dust to regard God as extending pardon without regard to the sternness of his justice, as evinced in requiring that sin should be recognized in the universe as worthy of the wrath and curse of God, as a condition of its forgiveness. It is remarkable and well worthy of all consideration that those who deny the atonement make sin a comparative trifle, and seem to regard God's

benevolence or love as good nature rather than, as it is, "a consuming fire" to all the workers of iniquity. Nothing does or can produce that awe of God, that fear and holy dread of sin, that sense of self-abasement, that self-abasing, God-justifying spirit, that a thorough apprehension of the atonement of Christ will do. Nothing like this can beget that spirit of self-renunciation, of cleaving to Christ, of taking refuge in his blood. In these relations Christ must be revealed to and apprehended and embraced by us as the condition of our entire sanctification.

IX. As a surety of a better than the first covenant, that is, as a surety of a gracious covenant founded on better promises; as an underwriter or endorser of our obligation; as one who undertakes for us and pledges himself as our security to fulfill for and in us all the conditions of our salvation. To apprehend and appropriate Christ by faith in this relation is no doubt a condition of our entire sanctification. I should greatly delight to enlarge and write a whole course of lectures on the offices and relations of Christ, the necessity of knowing and appropriating him in these relations as the condition of our entire, in the sense of continued sanctification. This would require a large volume at least. All that I can do is to merely suggest a skeleton outline of this subject in its place.

X. We need to apprehend and appropriate Christ as dying for our sins. It is the work of the Holy Spirit to thus reveal his death in its relations to our individual sins, and as related to our sins as individuals. The soul needs to apprehend Christ as crucified for us. It is one thing for the soul to regard the death of Christ merely as the death of a martyr, and an infinitely different thing, as every one knows who has had the experience, to apprehend his death as a real and veritable vicarious sacrifice for our sins, as being truly a substitute for our death. The soul needs to apprehend Christ as suffering on the cross for it, or as its substitute; so that it can say, that sacrifice is for me, that suffering and that death are for my sins. That blessed Lamb is slain for my sins. If thus fully to apprehend and to appropriate Christ, can not kill sin in us, what can?

XI. We need also to know Christ as risen for our justification. He arose and lives to procure our certain acquittal or our complete pardon and acceptance with God. That he lives, and is our justification, we need to know, to break the bondage of legal motives and to slay all selfish fear; to break and destroy the power of temptation from this source. The clearly convinced soul is often tempted to despondency and unbelief, to despair of its own acceptance with God, and it would surely fall into the bondage of fear, were it not for the

faith of Christ as a risen, living, justifying Savior. In this relation the soul needs clearly to apprehend and fully to appropriate Christ in his completeness, as a condition of abiding in a state of disinterested consecration to God.

XII. We need also to have Christ revealed to us as bearing our griefs and as carrying our sorrows. The clear apprehension of Christ as being made sorrowful for us, and as bending under sorrows and griefs that in justice belonged to us, tends at once to render sin unspeakably odious and Christ infinitely precious to our souls. The idea of Christ our substitute needs to be thoroughly developed in our minds. And this relation of Christ needs to be so clearly revealed to us as to become an every where present reality to us. We need to have Christ so revealed as to so completely ravish and engross our affections that we would sooner cut our own throats or suffer others to cut them, than to sin against him. Is such a thing impossible? Indeed it is not. Is not the Holy Spirit able, and willing, and ready to thus reveal him upon condition of our asking it in faith? Surely he is.

XIII. We also need to apprehend Christ as the one by whose stripes we are healed. We need to know him as relieving our pains and sufferings by his own, as preventing our death by his own, as sorrowing that we might eternally rejoice, as grieving that we might be unspeakably and eternally glad, as dying in unspeakable agony that we might die in deep peace and in unspeakable triumph.

XIV. "As being made sin for us." We need to apprehend him as being treated as a sinner, and even as the chief of sinners, on our account, or for us. This is the representation of Scripture, that Christ on our account was treated as if he were a sinner. He was made sin for us; that is, he was treated as a sinner, or rather as being the representative, or as it were the embodiment of sin for us. O! this the soul needs to apprehend--the holy Jesus treated as a sinner, and as if all sin were consecrated in him, on our account! We procured this treatment of him. He consented to take our place in such a sense as to endure the cross, and the curse of the law for us. When the soul apprehends this, it is ready to die with grief and love. O, how infinitely it loathes itself under such an apprehension as this! In this relation he must not only be apprehended, but appropriated by faith.

XV. We need also to apprehend the fact that "He was made sin for us that we might be made the righteousness of God in him;" that Christ was treated as a sinner that we might be treated as righteous; that we might also be made personally righteous by faith in him;

that we might be made the righteousness of God in him; that we might inherit and be made partakers of God's righteousness as that righteousness exists and is revealed in Christ; that we might in and by him be made righteous as God is righteous. The soul needs to see that his being made sin for us, was in order that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. It needs to embrace and lay hold by faith upon that righteousness of God which is brought home to saints in Christ through the atonement and indwelling Spirit.

XVI. We also need him revealed to the soul as one upon whose shoulders is the government of the world; who administers the government moral and providential of this world for the protection, discipline and benefit of believers. This revelation has a most sin-subduing tendency. That all events are directly or indirectly controlled by Him who has so loved us as to die for us; that all things absolutely are designed for and will surely result in our good--these and such like considerations when revealed to the soul and made living realities to [by] the Holy Spirit tend to kill selfishness and confirm the love of God in the soul.

XVII. We also need Christ revealed to the inward being as Head over all things to the church. All these relations are of no avail to our sanctification only in so far forth as they are directly and inwardly and personally revealed to the soul by the Holy Spirit. It is one thing to have thoughts and ideas and opinions concerning Christ, and an entirely different thing to know Christ as he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. All the relations of Christ imply corresponding necessities in us. When the Holy Spirit has revealed to us the necessity and Christ as exactly suited to fully meet that necessity, and urged his acceptance in that relation until we have appropriated him by faith, a great work is done. But until we are thus revealed to ourselves and Christ is thus revealed to us and accepted by us, nothing is done more than to store our heads with notions or opinions and theories, while our hearts are becoming more and more, at every moment, like an adamant stone.

I have often feared that many professed Christians knew Christ only after the flesh, that is, they have no other knowledge of Christ than what they obtain by reading and hearing about him without any special revelation of him to the inward being by the Holy Spirit. I do not wonder that such professors and ministers should be totally in the dark upon the subject of entire sanctification in this life. They regard sanctification as brought about by the formation of holy habits instead of resulting from the revelation of Christ to the soul in all his fullness and relations, and the soul's renunciation of self and appropriation of Christ in all these relations.

Christ is represented in the Bible as the Head of the church. The church is represented as his body. He is to the church what the head is to the body. The head is the seat of intelligence, the will, and in short of the living soul. Consider what the body would be without the head, and you may understand what the church would be without Christ. But as the church would be without Christ, so each believer would be without Christ. But we need to have our necessities in this respect clearly revealed to us by the Holy Spirit, and this relation of Christ made plain to our apprehension. The utter darkness of the human mind in regard to its own spiritual state and wants, and in regard to the relations and fullness of Christ is truly wonderful. His relations as mentioned in the Bible are overlooked almost entirely until our wants are discovered. When these are made known and the soul begins in earnest to inquire after a remedy, it needs not inquire in vain. "Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend up to heaven? that is, to bring down Christ from above; or, Who shall descend into the deep? that is, to bring Christ again from the dead. But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart."

XVIII. Christ as having all power or authority in heaven and earth, needs also to be revealed to the soul, and received by faith, to dwell in and rule over it. The corresponding want must of necessity be first known to the mind before it can apprehend and appropriate Christ by faith in this or any other relation. The soul needs to see and feel its weakness, its need of protection, of being defended, and watched over, and controlled. It needs to see this, and also the power of its spiritual enemies, its besetments, its dangers and its certain ruin, unless the Almighty One interpose in its behalf. It needs thus truly and deeply to know itself, and then to inspire it with confidence, it needs a revelation of Christ as God, as the Almighty God, to the soul, as one who possesses absolute and infinite power, and as presented to the soul to be accepted as its strength and as all it needs of power.

Oh, how infinitely blind he is to the fullness and glory of Christ, who does not know himself and know Christ as both are revealed by the Holy Spirit. When we are led by the Holy Spirit to look down into the abyss of our own emptiness--to behold the horrible pit and miry clay of our own habits, and fleshly, and worldly, and infernal entanglements; when we see in the light of God that our emptiness and necessities are infinite; then, and not till then, are we prepared wholly to cast off self and to put on Christ. The glory and fullness of Christ are not discovered to the soul until it discovers its need of him. But when self in all its loathsomeness and helplessness,

is fully revealed, until hope is utterly extinct as it respects every kind and degree of help in ourselves; and when Christ, the all in all, is revealed to the soul as its all-sufficient portion and salvation, then and not till then, does the soul know its salvation. This knowledge is the indispensable condition of appropriating faith, or of the act of receiving Christ, or that committal of all to him that takes Christ home to dwell in the heart by faith, and to preside over all its states and actions. Oh, such a knowledge and such a reception and putting on of Christ is blessed. Happy is he who knows it by his own experience.

It is indispensable to a steady and implicit faith that the soul should have a spiritual apprehension of what is implied in the saying of Christ that all power was delivered unto him. The ability of Christ to do all and even exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, is what the soul needs clearly to apprehend in a spiritual sense, that is, to apprehend it, not merely as a theory or a proposition, but to see the true spiritual import of this saying. This is also equally true of all that is said in the Bible about Christ, of all his offices and relations. It is one thing to theorize and speculate and opine about Christ, and an infinitely different thing to know him as he is revealed by the Holy Spirit. When Christ is fully revealed to the soul by the Comforter, it will never again doubt the attainability and reality of entire sanctification in this life.

XIX. Another necessity of the soul is to know Christ spiritually as the Prince of Peace. "Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you," said Christ. What is this peace? And who is Christ in the relation of the Prince of Peace? What is it to possess the peace of Christ--to have the peace of God rule in your hearts? Without the revelation of Christ to the soul by the Holy Spirit, it has no spiritual apprehension of the meaning of this language. Nor can it lay hold on and appropriate Christ as its peace, as the Prince of Peace. Whoever knows and has embraced Christ as his peace and as the Prince of Peace, knows what it is to have the peace of God rule in his heart. But none else at all understand the true spiritual import of this language, nor can it be so explained to them as that they will apprehend it unless it be explained by the Holy Spirit.

XX. The soul needs also to know Christ as the Captain of Salvation, as the skillful conductor, guide and captain of the soul in all its conflicts with its spiritual enemies, as one who is ever at hand to lead the soul on to victory and make it more than a conqueror in all its conflicts with the world, the flesh, and Satan. How indispensable to a living and efficient faith it is, and must be for the soul to clearly apprehend by the Holy Spirit, this relation

of Captain of Salvation and Captain of the Lord's Host. Without confidence in the Leader and Captain, how shall the soul put itself under his guidance and protection in the hour of conflict? It can not.

The fact is that when the soul is ignorant of Christ as a Captain or Leader, it will surely fall in battle. If the church as a body but knew the Captain of the Lord's Host; if he were but truly and spiritually known to them in that relation, no more confusion would be seen in the ranks of God's elect. All would be order and strength and conquest. They would soon go up and take possession of the whole territory that has been promised to Christ. The heathen would soon be given to him for an inheritance and the uttermost part of the world for a possession. Joshua knew Christ as the Captain of the Lord's Host. Consequently he had more courage, and efficiency, and prowess, than all Israel besides. Even so it is now. When a soul can be found who thoroughly knows and has embraced and appropriated Christ, he is a host of himself. That is, he has appropriated the attributes of Christ to himself; and his influence is felt in heaven, and earth, and hell.

XXI. Another affecting and important relation in which the soul needs to know Christ, is that of our Passover.

It needs to understand that the only reason why it has not been or will not assuredly be slain for sin is that Christ has sprinkled, as our Paschal Lamb, the lintel and door-posts of our souls with his own blood, and that therefore the destroying angel passes us by. There is a most deep and sin-subduing, or rather temptation-subduing spirituality in this relation of Christ to the soul when revealed by the Holy Spirit. We must apprehend our sins as slaying the Lamb, and apply his blood to our souls by faith--his blood as being our protection and our only trust. We need to know the security there is in this being sprinkled with his blood, and the certain and speedy destruction of all who have not taken refuge under it. We need to know also that it will not do for a moment to venture out into the streets and from under its protection, lest we be slain there.

XXII. To know Christ as our Wisdom in the true spiritual sense is doubtless indispensable to our entire, in the sense of continued, sanctification. He is our Wisdom in the sense of being the whole of our religion. That is, when separated from him we have no spiritual life whatever. He is at the bottom of, or the inducing cause of all our obedience. This we need clearly to apprehend. Until the soul clearly understands this, it has learned nothing to the purpose of its helplessness and of Christ's spiritual relations to it.

XXIII. Very nearly allied to this is Christ's relation to the soul as its Sanctification. I have been amazed at the ignorance of the church and of the ministry respecting Christ as its Sanctification. He is not its Sanctifier in the sense that he does something to the soul that enables it to stand and persevere in holiness in its own strength. He does not change the structure of the soul, but he watches over and works in it to will and to do continually, and thus becomes its Sanctification. His influence is not exerted once for all, but constantly. When he is apprehended and embraced as the soul's sanctification, he rules in and reigns over the soul in so high a sense that he, as it were, develops his own holiness in us. He, as it were swallows us up, so enfolds (if I may so say,) our wills and our souls in his, that we are willingly led captive by him. We will and do as he wills within us. He charms the will into a universal bending to his will. He so establishes his throne in, and his authority over us that he subdues us to himself. He becomes our sanctification only in so far forth as we are revealed to ourselves, and he revealed to us, and as we receive him and put him on. What! has it come to this, that the church doubt and reject the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life. Then, it must be that they have lost sight of Christ as their sanctification. Is not Christ perfect in all his relations? Is there not a completeness and fullness in him? When embraced by us are we not complete in him? The secret of all this doubting about and opposition to the doctrine of entire sanctification is to be found in the fact that Christ is not apprehended and embraced as our sanctification. The Holy Spirit sanctifies only by revealing Christ to us as our sanctification. He does not speak of himself, but takes of the things of Christ and shows them to us.

Two among the most prominent ministers of the Presbyterian church have said to me within a few years that they had never heard of Christ as the sanctification of the soul. O, how many of the ministry of the present day overlook the true spiritual gospel of Christ!

XXIV. Another of Christ's spiritual relations is that of the Redemption of the soul; not merely as the Redeemer considered in his governmental relation, but as a present Redemption. To apprehend and receive Christ in this relation, the soul needs to apprehend itself as sold under sin; as being the voluntary but real slave of lust and appetite, except as Christ continually delivers us from its power by strengthening and confirming our wills in resisting and overcoming the flesh.

XXV. Christ our Prophet is another important spiritual relation in which we need to apprehend Christ by the Holy Spirit as a condition of entire sanctification. He must be received as the great teacher of our souls, so

that every word of his will be received as God speaking to us. This will render the Bible precious, and all the words of life efficient to the sanctification of our souls.

XXVI. As our High Priest we need also to know Christ. I say we need to know him in this relation as really ever living and sustaining this relation to us, offering up, as it were, by a continual offering, his own blood and himself, as a propitiation for our sins; as being entered within the veil and as ever living to make intercession for us. Much precious instruction is to be gathered from this relation of Christ. We need, perishingly need, to know Christ in this relation, as a condition of a right dependence upon him. I all the while feel embarrassed with the consideration that I am not able in this course of instruction to give a fuller account of Christ in these relations. We need a distinct revelation of him in each of these relations in order to a thorough understanding and clear apprehension of that which is implied in each and all of the relations of Christ.

When we sin, it is because of our ignorance of Christ. This is, whenever temptation overcomes us, it is because we do not know and avail ourselves of that relation of Christ that would meet at the time our necessities. One great thing that needs to be done is to correct the developments of our sensibility. The appetites and passions are enormously developed in their relations to earthly objects. In relation to things of time and sense our propensities are greatly developed and are alive; but in relation to spiritual truths and objects and eternal realities, we are naturally as dead as stones. When first converted, if we knew enough of ourselves and of Christ to thoroughly develop and correct the action of the sensibility and confirm our wills in a state of entire consecration, we should not fall. In proportion as the law-work preceding conversion has been thorough and the revelation of Christ at or immediately subsequent to conversion full and clear, just in that proportion do we witness stability in converts. In most, if not in all instances, however, the convert is too ignorant of himself, and, of course, knows too little about Christ, to be established in permanent obedience. He needs renewed conviction of sin, to be revealed to himself and to have Christ revealed to him, and be formed in him the hope of glory, before he will be steadfast, always abounding in the work of the Lord.

Before I close this chapter, I must remark and shall have occasion to repeat the remark, that from what has been said, it must not be inferred that the knowledge of Christ in all these relations is a condition of our coming into our state of entire consecration to God or of present sanctification. The thing insisted on is that the soul will abide in this state in the hour of temptation only so far

forth as it betakes itself to Christ in such circumstances of trial, and apprehends and appropriates Him by faith, from time to time in those relations that meet the present and pressing necessities of the soul. The temptation is the occasion of revealing the necessity, and the Holy Spirit is always ready to reveal Christ, in the particular relation suited to the newly developed necessity. The perception and appropriation of Him in this relation, under these circumstances of trial, is the sine qua non of our remaining in the state of entire consecration.

CHAPTER III.

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING TO HOLINESS, CONTINUED.

XXVII. We need also to know ourselves as starving souls, and Christ as the "Bread of Life," as "the Bread that came down from Heaven." We need to know spiritually and experimentally what it is to "eat of his flesh and to drink of his blood," to receive Him as the bread of life, to appropriate Him to the nourishment of our souls as really as we appropriate bread, by digestion to the nourishment of our bodies. This I know is mysticism to the carnal professor. But to the truly spiritually minded, "this is the bread of God that came down from heaven, of which if a man eat he shall never die." To hear Christ talk of eating his flesh and of drinking his blood was a great stumbling-block to the carnal Jews, as it is now to carnal professors. Nevertheless this is a glorious truth that Christ is the constant sustenance of the spiritual life as truly and as literally as food is the sustenance of the body. But the soul will never eat this bread until it has ceased to attempt to fill itself with the husks of its own doings, or with any provision this world can furnish. Do you know, Christian, what it is to eat of this bread? If so, then you will never die.

XXVIII. Christ also needs to be revealed to the soul as the fountain of the water of life. "If any man thirst," says He, "let him come unto me and drink." "I am the Alpha and Omega, and to him that is athirst will I give to drink of the fountain of the water of life freely." The soul needs to have such discoveries made to it, as to beget a thirst after God, that cannot be allayed except by a copious draft at the fountain of the water of life. It is indispensable to the establishing of the soul in perfect love, that its hungering after the bread and its thirsting for the water of life should be duly enkindled, and that the spirit should pant and struggle after God, and "cry out for the living God," that it should be able to say with

truth: "my soul panteth after God as the hart panteth after the water brooks; "My heart and my flesh cry out for the living God;" "My soul breaketh for the longing that it hath after thee at all times." When this state of mind is induced by the Holy Spirit so that the longing of the soul after perpetual holiness is irrepressible, it is prepared for a revelation of Christ in all those offices and relations that are necessary to secure its establishment in love. Especially is it then prepared to apprehend, appreciate and appropriate Christ as the bread and water of life, to understand what it is to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of God. It is then in a state to understand what Christ meant when He said, "Blessed are they that do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled." They not only understand what it is to hunger and thirst, but also what it is to be filled; to have the hunger and thirst allayed, and the largest desire fully satisfied. The soul then realizes, in its own experience, the truthfulness of the apostle's saying, that Christ "is able to do exceedingly abundantly above all that we ask or think." Many stop short even of any thing like intense hunger and thirst; others hunger and thirst, but have not the idea of the perfect fullness and adaptedness of Christ to meet and satisfy the longing of their souls. They, therefore, do not plead and look for the soul-satisfying revelation of Christ. They expect no such divine fullness and satisfaction of soul. They are ignorant of the fullness and perfection of the provisions of the "glorious gospel of the blessed God," and consequently they are not encouraged to hope, from the fact that they hunger and thirst after righteousness that they shall be filled; but they remain unfed, unfilled, unsatisfied, and after a season, through unbelief, fall into indifference and remain in bondage to lust.

XXIX. The soul also needs to know Christ as the true God, and the eternal life. "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord save by the Holy Spirit." The proper divinity of Christ is never and never can be held otherwise than as a mere opinion, a tenet, a speculation, an article of a creed, until He is revealed to the inner man by the Holy Spirit. But nothing short of an apprehension of Christ as the supreme and living God to the soul can inspire that confidence in Him that is essential to its established sanctification. The soul can have no apprehension of what was intended by his being the "Eternal Life," until it spiritually knows Him as the true God. When He is spiritually revealed as the true and living God, the way is prepared for the spiritual apprehension of Him as the eternal life. "As the living Father hath life in Himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in Himself." In Him was life and the life was the light of men." "I give unto

them eternal life." "I am the way, the truth, and the life." "I am the resurrection and the life." These and similar passages the soul needs spiritually to apprehend, to have a spiritual and personal revelation of them within. Most professors seem to me to have no right idea of the condition upon which the Bible can be made of spiritual use to them. They seem not to understand that in its letter it is only a history of things formerly revealed to men; that it is a fact, a revelation to no man except upon the condition of its being personally revealed, or revealed to us in particular by the Holy Spirit. The mere fact that we have in the gospel the history of the birth, the life, the death of Christ, is no such revelation of Christ to any man as meets his necessities and as will insure or render his salvation possible. Christ and his doctrine, his life, and death, and resurrection, need to be revealed personally by the Holy Spirit, to each and every soul of man to effect his salvation. So it is with every spiritual truth; without an inward revelation of it to the soul, it is only a savor of death unto death. It is in vain to hold to the proper divinity of Christ as a speculation, a doctrine, a theory, an opinion, without the revelation of his divine nature and character to the soul by the Holy Spirit. But let the soul know Him and walk with Him as the true God, and then it will no longer question whether, as our sanctification, He is all-sufficient and complete. Let no one object to this that if this is true, men are under no obligation to believe in Christ and to obey the gospel without or until they are enlightened by the Holy Spirit. To such an objection, should it be made, I would answer,

1. Men are under an obligation to believe every truth so far as they can understand or apprehend it, but no farther. So far as they can apprehend the spiritual truths of the gospel without the Holy Spirit, so far, without his aid, they are bound to believe it. But Christ has Himself taught us that no man can come to Him except the Father draw him. That this drawing means teaching is evident from what Christ proceeds to say: "For it is written," said He, "they shall all be taught of God. Every one therefore that hath heard and hath learned of the Father cometh to me." That this learning of the Father is something different from the mere oral or written instructions of Christ and the apostles, is evident from the fact that Christ assured those to whom He preached with all the plainness with which He was able, that they still could not come to Him except drawn, that is[,] taught of the Father. As the Father teaches by the Holy Spirit, Christ's plain teaching in the passage under consideration is, that no man can come to Him except he be specially enlightened by the Holy Spirit. Paul unequivocally teaches the same thing. "No man," says

he, "can say that Jesus is the Lord but by the Holy Spirit." Notwithstanding all teaching of the apostles, no man by merely listening to their instruction could so apprehend the true divinity of Christ as to honestly and with spiritual understanding say that Jesus is the Lord. But what spiritual or true Christian does not know the radical difference between being taught of man and of God, between the opinions that we form from reading, hearing and study, and the clear apprehensions of truth that are communicated by the direct and inward illuminations of the Holy Spirit.

2. I answer that men under the gospel are entirely without excuse for not enjoying all the light they need from the Holy Spirit, since He is in the world, has been sent for the very purpose of giving to all, all the knowledge of themselves and of Christ which they need. His aid is freely proffered to all, and Christ has assured us that the Father is more willing to give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him than parents are to give good gifts to their children. All men under the gospel know this and all men have light enough to ask in faith for the Holy Spirit, and of course all men may know of themselves and of Christ all that they need to know. They are therefore able to know and to embrace Christ as fully and as fast as it is their duty to embrace him. They are able to know Christ in his governmental and spiritual relations just as fast as they come into circumstances to need to know Him in these various relations. The Holy Spirit, if He is not quenched and resisted, will surely reveal Christ in all His relations and fullness in due time, so that in every temptation a way of escape will be open, so that we shall be able to bear it. This is expressly promised, 1 Cor. 10:13. "There hath no temptation taken you but such as are common to man; but God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it." Men are able to know what God offers to teach them upon a condition within the compass of their ability. The Holy Spirit offers, upon condition of faith in the express promise of God to lead every man into all truth. Every man is therefore under obligation to know and do the whole truth so far and so fast as it is possible for him to do so with the light of the Holy Spirit.

XXX. But be it remembered that it is not enough for us to apprehend Christ as the true God and the eternal life, but we need also to lay hold upon Him as our life. It can not be too distinctly understood that a particular and personal appropriation of Christ in such relations is indispensable to our being rooted and grounded, established and perfected in love. When our utter deficiency and emptiness in any one respect or direction

is deeply revealed to us by the Holy Spirit with the corresponding remedy and perfect fulness in Christ, it then remains for the soul in this respect and direction to cast off self and put on Christ. When this is done, when self in that respect and direction is dead, and Christ is risen and lives and reigns in the heart in that relation, all is strong, and whole, and complete in that department of our life and experience. For example, suppose we find ourselves constitutionally, or by reason of our relations and circumstances, exposed to certain besetments and temptations that overcome us. Our weakness in this respect we observe in our experience. But upon observing our exposedness and experiencing something of our weakness, we begin with piling resolution upon resolution. We bind ourselves with oaths, and promises, and covenants, but all in vain. When we purpose to stand, we invariably, in the presence of the temptation, fall. This process of resolving and falling brings the soul into great discouragement and perplexity, until at last the Holy Spirit reveals to us fully that we are attempting to stand and to build upon nothing. The utter emptiness and worse than uselessness of our resolutions and self-originated efforts, is so clearly seen by us as to annihilate forever self-dependence in this respect. Now the soul is prepared for the revelation of Christ to meet this particular want. Christ is revealed and apprehended as the soul's substitute, surety, life and salvation in respect to the particular besetment and weakness of which it has had so full and so humiliating a revelation. Now if the soul utterly and forever cast off and renounce self, and put on the Lord Jesus Christ as He is seen to be needed to meet his necessity, then all is complete in Him. Thus far Christ is reigning within us. Thus far we know what is the power of his resurrection, and are made conformable to his death.

But I said that we need to know and to lay hold upon Christ as our life. Too much stress cannot be laid upon our personal responsibility to Christ, our individual relation to Him, our personal interest in Him, and obligation to Him. To sanctify our own souls, we need to make every department of religion a personal matter between us and God, to regard every precept of the Bible, and every promise, saying, exhortation, threatening, and in short, we need to regard the whole Bible as given to us, and earnestly seek the personal revelation of every truth it contains to our own souls. No one can too fully understand or too deeply feel the necessity of taking home the Bible with all it contains as a message sent from heaven to him, nor can he too earnestly desire or seek the promised Spirit to teach him the true spiritual import of all its contents. O, he must

have the Bible become a personal revelation of God to his own soul. It must become his own book. He must know Christ for himself. He must know Him in his different relations. He must know Him in his blessed and infinite fullness, or he can not abide in him, and unless he abide in Christ, he can bring forth none of the fruits of holiness. "Except a man abide in me he is cast forth as a branch and is withered."

Apprehending and embracing Christ as our life, implies the apprehension of the fact that we of ourselves are dead in trespasses and in sins, that we have no life in ourselves, that death has reigned and will eternally reign in and over us unless Christ become our life. Until man knows himself to be dead, and that he is wholly destitute of spiritual life in himself, he will never know Christ as his life. It is not enough to hold the opinion that all men are by nature dead in trespasses and sins. It is not enough to hold the opinion that we are in common with all men, in this condition in and of ourselves. We must see it. We must know what such language means. It must be made a matter of personal revelation to us. We must be made fully to apprehend our own death and Christ as our life, and we must fully recognize our death and Him as our life by personally renouncing self in this respect and laying hold on Him as our own spiritual and eternal life. Many persons, and strange to say, some eminent ministers, are so blinded as to suppose that a soul entirely sanctified does not any longer need Christ, assuming that such a soul has spiritual life in and of himself; that there is in him some foundation or efficient occasion of continued holiness, as if the Holy Spirit had changed his nature or infused physical holiness or a holy principle into him. O, when will such men cease to darken counsel by words without knowledge upon the infinitely important subject of sanctification! When will such men--when will the church, understand that Christ is our sanctification; that we have no life, no holiness, no sanctification, except as we abide in Christ and He in us; that separate from Christ, there never is any moral excellence in any man; that Christ does not change the constitution of man in sanctification, but that He only, by our own consent, gains and keeps the heart; that He enthrones Himself, with our consent, in the heart, and through the heart He extends his influence and his life to all our spiritual being; that He lives in us as really and truly as we live in our own bodies; that He as really reigns in our will and consequently in our emotions, by our own free consent, as our wills reign in our bodies? Can not our brethren understand that this is sanctification, and that nothing else is? that there is no degree of sanctification that is not to be thus ascribed to Christ? and that entire sanctification is nothing else than

the reign of Jesus in the soul? nothing more nor less than Christ the resurrection and the life, raising the soul from spiritual death, and reigning in it through righteousness unto eternal life? I must know and embrace Christ as my life; I must abide in him as a branch abides in the vine; I must not only hold this opinion as an opinion; I must know and act on it in practice. O, when the ministry of reconciliation all know and embrace a whole Christ for themselves; when they preach Jesus in all his fullness and present vital power to the church; when they testify what they have seen and their hands have handled of the word of life--then and not till then will there be a general resurrection of the dry bones of the house of Israel. Amen. Lord, hasten the day.

XXXI. We need especially to know Christ as the "All in all." Col. 3:11; "Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all." Before the soul will cease to be overcome by temptation, it must renounce self-dependence in all things. It must be as it were self-annihilated. It must cease to think of self as having in it any ground of dependence in the hour of trial. It must wholly and in all things renounce self and put on Christ. It must know self as nothing in the matter of spiritual life, and Christ as all. The Psalmist could say, "all our springs are in thee." He is the fountain of life. Whatever of life is in us flows directly from Him as the sap flows from the vine to the branch, or a rivulet flows from its fountain. The spiritual life that is in us is really Christ's life flowing through us. Our activity, though properly our own, is nevertheless stimulated and directed by his presence and agency within us. So that we can and must say with Paul, "yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."--Gal. 2:20. It is a good thing for a self-conceited sinner to suffer even in his own view, self-annihilation as it respects the origination of any spiritual obedience to God, or any spiritual good whatever. But this must be before he will learn on all occasions and in all things to stand in Christ, to abide in Him as his "ALL." O, the infinite folly and madness of the carnal mind! It would seem that it will always make trial of its own strength before it will depend on Christ. It will look first for resources and help within itself before it will renounce self and make Christ its "all in all." It will betake itself to its own wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. In short, there is not an office or relation of Christ that will be recognized and embraced, until the soul has first come into circumstances to have its wants in relation to that office of Christ developed by some trial, often by some fall under temptation. It will not be embraced, until in

addition to this Christ is clearly and prevaillingly revealed by the Holy Spirit insomuch that self is put down and Christ is exalted in the heart. Sin has so becrazed and befooled mankind that when Christ tells them, "without me ye can do nothing; and if any man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and is withered," they neither apprehend what or how much He means, and how much is really implied in these and similar sayings, until one trial after another fully develops the appalling fact that they are nothing so far as spiritual good is concerned, and that Christ is "all and in all."

XXXII. Another relation in which the soul must know Christ, before it will steadily abide in Him, is that of "the Resurrection and the Life." Through and by Christ the soul is raised from spiritual death. Christ as the resurrection and the life is raised in the soul. He arises or revives the divine image out of the spiritual death that reigns within us. He is begotten by the Holy Spirit and born within us. He arises through the death that is within us and develops his own life within our own being. Will any one say, "this is a hard saying, who can hear it?" Until we know by our own experience the power of this resurrection within us, we shall never understand "the fellowship of his sufferings, and be made conformable to his death." He raises our will from its fallen state of death in trespasses and sins, or from its state of committal and voluntary enslavement to lust and self, to a state of conformity to the will of God. Through the intelligence, He pours a stream of quickening truth upon the soul. He thus quickens the will into obedience. By making fresh discoveries to the soul, He strengthens and confirms the will in obedience. By thus raising, and sustaining, and quickening the will, He rectifies the sensibility, and quickens and raises the whole man from the dead, or rather builds up a new and spiritual man upon the death and ruins of the old and carnal man. He raises the same powers and faculties that were dead in trespasses and sins to a spiritual life. He overcomes their death and inspires them with life. He lives in saints, and works in them to will and to do, and they live in Him according to the saying of Christ, in his address to his Father, Jno. 17:21. "As thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us;" and again, 23: "I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." He does not raise the soul to spiritual life in any such sense that it has life separate from Him for one moment. The spiritual resurrection is a continual one. Christ is the resurrection in the sense that He is at the foundation of all our obedience at every moment. He, as it were, raises the soul or the will from the slavery of lust to a conformity to the will of God in every instance and at every moment of its consecration to the will of God.

But this He does only upon condition of our apprehending and embracing him in this relation. In reading the Bible, I have often been struck with the fact that the inspired writers were far ahead of the great mass of professed believers. They write of the relations in which Christ had been spiritually revealed to them. All the names and titles, and official relations of Christ must have had great significancy with them. They spoke not from theory or from what man had taught them, but from experience, from what the Holy Spirit taught them. As the risen Christ is risen and lives, and is developed in one relation after another, in the experience of believers, how striking the writings of inspiration appear! As the necessities of our being are developed in experience, and as Christ is revealed as in all new circumstances and relations, just that and all that we need, who has not marveled to find in the Bible, way-marks and guide-boards and mile-stones, and all the evidences that we could ask or desire that inspired men have gone this way and have had substantially the same experience that we have. We are often also struck with the fact that they are so far ahead of us. At every stage in our progress we seem to have, as it were, a new and improved edition of the Bible. We discover worlds of truth before unnoticed by us--come to know Christ in precious relations in which we had known nothing of Him before. And ever, as our real wants are discovered, Christ is seen to be all that we need, just the thing that exactly and fully meets the necessities of our souls. This is indeed "the glorious gospel of the blessed God."

XXXIII. Another precious and most influential relation of Christ in the affair of our sanctification, is that of the Bridegroom or Husband of the soul. The individual soul needs to be espoused to Christ, to enter this relation personally by its own consent. Mere earthly and outward marriages are nothing but sin, unless the hearts are married. True marriage is of the heart, and the outward ceremony is only a public manifestation or profession of the union or marriage of souls or hearts.

All marriage may be regarded as typical of that union into which the soul enters with Christ. This relation of Christ with the soul is frequently recognized both in the Old and New Testament. It is treated of by Paul as a great mystery. The seventh and eighth chapters of Romans present a striking illustration of the results of the soul's remaining under the law on the one hand, and of its being married to Christ on the other. The seventh chapter begins thus, "Know ye not brethren, (for I speak to them that know the law,) how that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? For the woman who hath a husband is bound by the law to her

husband so long as he liveth; but if her husband be dead she is loosed from the law of her husband. So then, if while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if her husband be dead she is free from that law so that she is no adulteress though she be married to another man. Therefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another, even to Christ who was raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God." The apostle then proceeds to show the results of these two marriages or relations of the soul. When married to the law he says of it, "For when we were in the flesh the motions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." But when married to Christ he proceeds to say, "We are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held; that we should serve in newness of spirit and not in the oldness of the letter." The remaining part of this (7th) chapter is occupied with an account of the soul's bondage while married to the law; of its efforts to please its husband; with its continual failures; its deep convictions; its selfish efforts; its consciousness of failures, and its consequent self-condemnation and despondency. It is perfectly obvious, when the allegory with which the apostle commences this chapter is considered, that he is portraying a legal experience for the purpose of contrasting it with the experience of one who has attained to the true liberty of perfect love.

The eighth chapter represents the results of the marriage of the soul to Christ. It is delivered from its bondage to the law and from the power of the law of sin in the members. It brings forth fruit unto God. Christ has succeeded in gaining the affections of the soul. What the law could not do, Christ has done, and the righteousness of the law is now fulfilled in the soul. The representation is as follows: The soul is married to the law and acknowledges its obligation to obey its husband. The husband requires perfect love to God and man. The love is wanting; the soul is selfish. This displeases the husband, and he denounces death against her if she does not love. She recognizes the reasonableness of both the requisition and the threatening, and resolves upon full obedience. But being selfish, the command and threatening but increase the difficulty. All her efforts at obedience are for selfish reasons. The husband is justly firm and imperative in his demands. The wife trembles, and promises, and resolves upon obedience. But all in vain. Her obedience is only feigned, outward and not love. She becomes disheartened and gives up in despair. As sentence is about to be executed Christ appears. He witnesses the

dilemma. He reveres, and honors, and loves the husband. He entirely approves his requisition and the course he has taken. He condemns in most unqualified terms the wife. Still He pities and loves her with deep benevolence. He will consent to nothing that shall have the appearance of disapproving the claims or the course of her husband. His rectitude must be openly acknowledged. Her husband must not be dishonored. But on the contrary he must be "magnified and made honorable." Still Christ so much pities the wife, as to be willing to die as her substitute. This He does, and the wife is regarded as dying in and by Him her substitute. Now since a death of either of the parties is a dissolution of the marriage covenant, and since the wife in the person of her substitute has died under and to the law, her husband, she is now at liberty to marry again. Christ rises from the dead. This striking and overpowering manifestation of disinterested benevolence on the part of Christ in dying for her, subdues her selfishness and wins her whole heart. He proposes marriage and she consents with her whole soul. Now she finds the law of selfishness or of self-gratification broken, and the righteousness of the law of love fulfilled in her heart. The last husband requires just what the first required, but having won her whole heart, she no longer needs to resolve to love, for love is as natural and spontaneous as her breath. Before, the 7th of Romans was the language of her complaint. Now the eighth is the language of her triumph. Before, she found herself unable to meet the demands of her husband, and equally unable to satisfy her own conscience. Now she finds it easy to obey her husband and that his commandments are not grievous, although they are identical with those of the first husband. Now this allegory of the apostle is not a mere rhetorical flourish. It represents a reality, and one of the most important and glorious realities in existence, namely, the real and spiritual union of the soul to Christ, and the blessed results of this union, the bringing forth of fruit unto God. This union is, as the apostle says, a great mystery; nevertheless it is a glorious reality. "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit." --1 Cor. 6:17.

Now until the soul knows what it is to be married to the law and is able to adopt the language of the seventh of Romans, it is not prepared to see, and appreciate, and be properly affected by the death and love of Christ. Great multitudes rest in this first marriage, and do not consent to die and rise again in Christ. They are not married to Christ and do not know that there is such a thing, and expect to live and die in this bondage, crying out, "O wretched man that I am!" They need to die and rise again in Christ to a new life founded in and growing

out of a new relation to Christ. Christ becomes the living head or husband of the soul, its surety, its life. He gains and retains the deepest affection of the soul, thus writing his law in the heart and engraving it in the inward parts.

But not only must the soul know what it is to be married to the law with its consequent thralldom and death, but it must also for itself enter into the marriage relation with a risen, living Christ. This must not be theory, an opinion, a tenet; nor must it be an imagination, a mysticism, a notion, a dream. It must be a living, personal, real entering into a personal and living union with Christ, a most entire and universal giving of self to Him and receiving of Him in the relation of spiritual husband and head. The Spirit of Christ and our spirit must embrace each other and enter into an everlasting covenant with each other. There must be a mutual giving of self and receiving of each other, a blending of spirits in such a sense as is intended by Paul in the passage already quoted: "He that is joined to the Lord is one spirit."

My brother, my sister, do you understand this? Do you know what both these marriages are, with their diverse results? If you do not, make no longer pretense to being sanctified, for you are still in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity. "Escape for thy life."

CHAPTER IV.

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING TO HOLINESS, CONTINUED.

XXXIV Another interesting and highly important relation which Christ sustains to his people, is that of SHEPHERD. This relation presupposes the helpless and defenceless condition of Christians in this life, and the indispensable necessity of guardianship and protection. Christ was revealed to the Psalmist in this relation, and when on earth, He revealed Himself to his disciples in this relation. It is not enough, however, that he should be revealed merely in the letter or in words as sustaining this relation. The real spiritual import of this relation and what is implied in it, needs to be revealed, by the Holy Spirit, to give to it efficiency, and beget that universal trust in the presence, care, and protection of Christ, that is often essential to preventing a fall in the hour of temptation. Christ meant all that He said when He professed to be the Good Shepherd, that cared for the sheep, that would not flee, but that would lay down his life for them. In this relation, as in all others, there is infinite fullness and perfection. If the sheep do thoroughly know and confide in the Shepherd, they will follow Him, will flee to Him for protection in every hour of

danger, will at all times depend on Him for all things. Now all this is received and possessed in theory by all professors of religion. And yet how few comparatively seem to have had Christ so revealed to them as to have secured the actual embracing of Him in this relation and a continual dependence on Him for all that is implied in it. Now either this is a vain boast of Christ, or else He may be and ought to be depended upon, and the soul has a right, to throw itself upon Him for all that is implied in the relation of Good Shepherd. But this relation with all the other relations of Christ, implies a corresponding necessity in us. This necessity we must see and feel, or this relation of Christ will have no impressive significancy. We need, then, in this case as in all others, the revelation of the Holy Spirit to make us thoroughly to apprehend our dependence, and to reveal Christ in the Spirit and fullness of this relation, and to urge our acceptance home upon us until our souls have thoroughly closed with Him. Some fall into the mistake of supposing that when their necessities and the fullness of Christ have been revealed to the mind by the Spirit, the work is done. But unless they actually receive Him and commit themselves to Him in this relation, they will soon find to their shame that nothing has been done to purpose so far as their standing in the hour of temptation is concerned. He may be clearly revealed in any of his relations, the soul may see both its necessities and his fullness and yet forget or neglect to actively and personally receive Him in these relations. It should never be forgotten that this is in every case indispensable. The revelation is designed to secure our acceptance of Him; if it does not do this, it has only greatly aggravated our guilt without at all securing to us the benefits of these relations. It is amazing to see how common it is and has been for ministers to overlook this truth, and of course neither to practice it themselves, nor urge it upon their hearers. Hence Christ is not known to multitudes, and is not in many cases received even when He is revealed by the Holy Spirit. If I am not greatly mistaken, thorough inquiry would show that error upon this subject exists to a most appalling extent. The personal and individual acceptance of Christ in all his offices and relations as the sine qua non of entire sanctification, seems to me to be seldom either understood or insisted on by ministers of the present day, and of course little thought of by the church. The idea of accepting for ourselves a whole Savior, of appropriating to our own individual selves all the offices and relations of Jesus, seems to be a rare idea in this age of the church. But for what purpose does He sustain these relations? Is the bare apprehension of those truths and of Christ in the relations enough, without our own activity being duly excited by the apprehension, to

lay hold and avail ourselves of His fullness? What folly and madness for the church to expect to be saved by a rejected Savior! To what purpose is it for the Spirit to make Him known to us, unless we as individuals embrace Him and make Him our own? Let the soul but truly and fully apprehend and embrace Christ in this relation of Shepherd, and it shall never perish, neither shall any pluck it out of his hand. The knowing of Christ in this relation, secures the soul against following strangers. But thus knowing Him is indispensable to securing this result. If we know him as Shepherd, we shall follow Him, but not else. Let this be well considered.

XXXV. Christ is also the Door by and through which the soul enters the fold and finds security and protection among the sheep. This needs also to be spiritually apprehended, and the door needs to be spiritually and personally answered to secure the guardianship of the Good Shepherd. Those who do not spiritually and truly apprehend Christ as the door, and enter by and through Him, and yet hope for salvation, are surely attempting to climb up some other way, and are therefore thieves and robbers. This is a familiar and well known truth, in the mouth not only of every minister and Christian, but of every Sabbath School child. Yet how few really apprehend and embrace its spiritual import. That there is no other means or way of access to the fold of God, is admitted by all the orthodox; but who really perceives and knows through the personal revelation of the Holy Spirit, what and all Christ meant in the very significant words, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, I am the door of the sheep;" "I am the door; by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out and find pasture?" He who truly discovers this door, and gains access by it, will surely realize in his own experience the faithfulness of the Good Shepherd, and will go in and out and find pasture. That is, he will surely be fed, be led into green pastures and beside the still waters.

But it is well to inquire, What is implied in this relation of Christ?

1. It implies that we are shut out from the protection and favor of God except as we approach Him through and by Christ.
2. It implies that we need to know and clearly to apprehend and appreciate this.
3. That we need to discover the door and what is implied both in the door and in entering it.
4. That entering it implies the utter renunciation of self and of self-righteousness and self-protection, and support, and a putting ourselves entirely under the control and protection of the Shepherd.

5. That we need the revelation of the Holy Spirit to make us clearly apprehend the true spiritual import of this relation and what is implied in it.

6. That when Christ is revealed in this relation, we need to embrace Him and for ourselves to enter by and through Him into the enclosure that every where surrounds the children of God.

It is an inward and not a mere outward revelation that we need. It is an inward, a heart-entering, and not a mere notion, idea, theory, dream of the imagination. It is really an intelligent act of the mind; as much and as real an entering into the fold or favor of God, by and through Christ as we ever entered the house of God on the Sabbath day by the door. When the soul enters by the door, it finds an infinitely different reception and treatment from that of those who climb up into the church upon a ladder of mere opinion, a scaling ladder of mere orthodoxy. This last class are not fed. They find no protection from the Good Shepherd. They do not know the Shepherd and follow Him, because they have climbed up another way. They have not confidence in Him, can not approach Him with boldness and claim his guardianship and protection. Their knowledge of Christ is but an opinion, a theory, a heartless and fruitless speculation. O, how many give the saddest proof that they have never entered by the door, and consequently have no realization in their own life and experience of the blessed and efficient protection and support of the Good Shepherd. Here I must not forget again to insist upon the necessity of a personal revelation of our relations to God as being excluded from all access to Him and his favor save through Christ the door; and also the necessity of the personal revelation to us by the Holy Spirit of Christ as the door, and of what is implied in this; and lastly and emphatically upon the indispensable necessity of a personal, responsible, active and full entering in at this door and gaining access for ourselves to the inclosure of the love and favor of God. Let this never for one moment be forgotten or overlooked. I must enter for and by myself. I must truly enter. I must be conscious that I enter. I must be sure that I do not misapprehend what is implied in entering; and at my peril I must not forget or neglect to enter.

And here it is important to inquire, have you had this personal and spiritual revelation? Have you clearly seen yourself without the fold, exposed to all the unrelenting cruelty of your spiritual enemies and shut out forever by your sin from the favor and protection of God? When this has been revealed, have you been made clearly to apprehend Christ as the door? Have you understood what is implied in his sustaining this relation? And last,

but not least, have you entered this door by faith? Have you seen the door open, and have you entered for yourself, and have you daily this evidence that you follow the Shepherd, and find all you need.

XXXVI. Christ is also the Way of Salvation.

Observe: He is not a mere teacher of the way, as some vainly imagine and teach. Christ is truly "the way" itself, or He is Himself "the way." Works are not the way, whether these works are legal or gospel works; whether works of law or works of faith. Works of faith are a condition of salvation. But they are not "the way." Faith is not the way. Faith is a condition of entering and abiding in this way, but it is not "the way." Christ is Himself "the way." Faith receives Him to reign in the soul and to be its salvation. But it is Christ Himself who is "the way." The soul is saved by Christ Himself, not by doctrine, not by the Holy Spirit, not by works of any kind, not by faith or love, or by any thing whatever but by Christ Himself. The Holy Spirit reveals and introduces Christ to the soul, and the soul to Christ. He takes of Christ's and shows to us. But He leaves it to Christ to save us. He urges and induces us to accept of Christ, to receive Him by appropriating faith as He reveals Him to us. But Christ is the way. It is his being received by us, that saves the soul. But we must perceive the way. We must enter this way by our own act. We must proceed in this way. We must continue in this way to the end of life and to all eternity as indispensable condition of our salvation. "Whither I go ye know, and the way ye know," said Christ. "Thomas said unto Him, Lord we know not whither thou goest, and how can we know the way?" "Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father but by me. If ye had known me, ye should have known my Father also, and from henceforth ye know Him and have seen Him. Philip saith unto him, Lord show us the Father, and it sufficeth us. Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how sayest thou, show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?" Here Christ so identifies Himself with the Father as to insist that he who had seen one had seen the other. Which, therefore, He says, no man cometh to the Father but by Him, we are to understand that no man need expect to find the true God elsewhere than in Him. The visible Christ embodied the true Godhead. He is the way to God, for and because He is the true God and the eternal life and salvation of the soul. Many seem to understand Christ in this relation as nothing more than a teacher of a system of morality by the observance of which we may be saved. Others regard this relation as only implying that

He is the way in the sense of making an atonement and thus rendering it possible for us to be forgiven. Others still understand this language as implying not only that Christ made an atonement and opened up a way of access through his death and mediation to God, but also that He teaches us the great truths essential to our salvation. Now all this, in my apprehension, falls entirely, and I may say infinitely short of the true spiritual meaning of Christ and the true spiritual import of this relation. The above is implied and included in this relation beyond question, but this is not all nor the essential truth intended in this declaration of Christ's. He did not say, I came to open the way nor to teach the way, nor to call you into the way, but "I am the way." Suppose He had intended merely that his instructions pointed out the way, or that his death was to open the way, and his teachings point it out, would He not have said: What! have I so long taught you, and have you not understood my doctrine? Would He not have said, I have taught you the way, instead of saying, I am the way? The fact is, there is meaning in these words, more profoundly spiritual than his disciples then, and than many now, seem capable of understanding. He is Himself the way of salvation, because He is the salvation of the soul. He is the way to the Father because He is in the Father and the Father is in Him. He is the way to eternal life because He is Himself the very essence and substance of eternal life. The soul that finds Him needs not to look for eternal life for it has found it already. These questions of Thomas and Philip show how little they really knew of Christ previous to the baptism of the Holy Spirit. Vast multitudes of the professed disciples of the present day, seem not to know Christ as "the way." They seem not to have known Christ in this relation as He is revealed by the Holy Spirit. This revelation by the Comforter, of Christ as "the way," is indispensable to our so knowing Him as to retain our standing in the hour of temptation. We must know and enter and walk and abide in this true and living way for ourselves. It is a living way and not a mere speculation.

Do you, my brother, know Christ by the Holy Spirit as the "living way?" Do you know Christ for yourself by a personal acquaintance? or do you know Him only by report, by hearsay, by preaching, by reading and by study? Do you know Him as in the Father and the Father as in Him? Philip seemed not to have had a spiritual and personal revelation of the proper Deity of Christ to his own soul. Have you had this revelation? And when He has been revealed to you as the true and living way, have you by faith personally entered this way? Do you abide steadfast in it? Do you know by

experience what it is to live and move and have your very being in God? Be ye not deceived; he that does not spiritually discern and enter this way, and abide in it unto the end, cannot be saved. Do see to it then that you know the way to be sanctified, to be justified, to be saved. See to it that you do not mistake the way and betake yourself to some other way. Remember, works are not the way. Faith is not the way. Doctrine is not the way. All these are conditions of salvation, but Christ in his own person is "the way." His own life, living in and united to you is the way and the only way. You enter this way by faith; works of faith result from and are a condition of abiding in this way; but the way itself is the indwelling, living, personally embraced and appropriated Christ: the true God and the eternal life.

Amen, Lord Jesus; the way is pleasant and all its paths are peace.

XXXVII. Christ is also "the Truth," and as such He must be apprehended and embraced to secure the soul from falling in the hour of trial. In this relation many have known Christ merely as one who declared the truth, as one who revealed the true God and the way of salvation. This is all they understand by this assertion of Christ that He is the Truth.

But if this is all, why may not the same with equal truth be said of Moses, and of Paul and John? They taught the truth. They revealed the true God so far as holy lives and true doctrine are concerned; and yet who ever heard of John, or Paul or Moses as being the way and the truth? They taught the way and the truth, but they were neither the way nor the truth, while Christ is truth. What, then, is truth? Why, Christ is the truth. Whoever knows Christ spiritually, knows the truth. Words are not the truth. Ideas are not the truth. But words and ideas may be signs and representatives of the truth. But the truth lives and has a being and a home in Christ. He is the embodiment and essence of truth. He is reality. He is substance and not shadow, He is truth revealed. He is elementary, essential, eternal, immutable, necessary, absolute, self-existent, infinite Truth. When the Holy Spirit reveals truth, he reveals Christ. When Christ reveals truth, He reveals Himself. Philosophers have found it difficult to define truth. Pilate asked Christ, what is truth, but did not wait for an answer. The term is doubtless used in a double sense. Sometimes the mere reflection or representation of things in signs, such as words, actions, writings, pictures, and diagrams, etc., is called truth; and this is the popular understanding of it. But all things that exist are only signs, reflections, symbols, representations or types of the Author of all things. That is, the universe is only the objective representation of the subjective truth, or is the reflection

or reflector of God. It is the mirror that reflects the essential truth or the true and living God.

But I am aware that none but the Holy Spirit can possess the mind of the import of this assertion of Christ. It is full of mystery and darkness, and is a mere figure of speech to one unenlightened by the Holy Spirit in respect to its true spiritual import. The Holy Spirit does not reveal all the relations of Christ to the soul at once. Hence there are many to whom Christ has been revealed in some of his relations while others are yet veiled from the view. Each distinct name and office and relation needs to be made the subject of a special and personal revelation to the soul, to meet its necessities, and to confirm it in obedience under all circumstances. When Christ is revealed and apprehended as the essential, eternal, and immutable truth, and the soul has embraced Him as such, as He of whom all that is popularly called truth is only the reflection, as He of whom all truth in doctrine, whether of philosophy in any of its branches, or revelation in any of its departments; I say, when the mind apprehends Him as that essential truth of which all that men call truth, is only the reflection, it finds a rock, a resting place, a foundation, a stability, a reality, a power in truth of which before it had no conception. If this is unintelligible to you, I cannot help it. The Holy Spirit can explain and make you see it; I cannot. Christ is not truth in the sense of mere doctrine, nor in the sense of a teacher of true doctrine, but as the substance or essence of truth. He is that of which all truth in doctrine treats. True doctrine treats of Him, but is not identical with Him. Truth in doctrine is only the sign, or declaration, or representation of truth in essence, of living, absolute, self-existent truth in the Godhead. Truth in doctrine or true doctrine is a medium through which substantial or essential truth is revealed. But the doctrine or medium is no more identical with truth than light is identical with the object which it reveals. Truth in doctrine is called light and is to essential truth what light is to the objects that radiate or reflect it. Light coming from objects, is at once the condition of and the medium through which they are revealed. So true doctrine is the condition and the means of knowing Christ, the essential truth. All truth in doctrine is only a reflection of Christ, or is a radiation upon the intelligence from Christ. When we learn this spiritually, we shall learn to distinguish between doctrine and Him whose radiance it is--to worship Christ as the essential truth and not the doctrine that reveals Him--to worship God instead of the Bible. We shall then find our way through the shadow to the substance. Many, no doubt, mistake and fall down and worship the doctrine, the preacher, the Bible, the shadow, and do not look for

the ineffably glorious substance of which this bright and sparkling truth is only the sweet and mild reflection or radiation.

Dearly beloved, do not mistake the doctrine for the thing treated of by the doctrine. When you find your intellect enlightened and your sensibility quickened by the contemplation of doctrine, do not confound this with Christ. Look steadily in the direction from which the light emanates until the Holy Spirit enables you to apprehend the essential truth, and the true light that enlighteneth every man. Do not mistake a dim reflection of the sun for the sun itself. Do not fall down at a pool and worship the sun dimly reflected from its surface, but lift your eye and see where he stands glorious in essential and eternal and ineffable brightness. It is beyond question that multitudes of professed Christians know nothing farther than the doctrine of Christ; they never had Christ Himself personally revealed or manifested to them. The doctrine of Christ as taught in the gospel is intended to direct and draw the mind to Him. The soul must not rest in the doctrine, but receive the living, essential person and substance of Christ. The doctrine makes us acquainted with the facts concerning Christ, and presents Him for acceptance. Do not rest in the story of Christ crucified and risen and standing at the door, but open the door and receive the risen, living and Divine Savior as the essential and all-powerful truth to dwell within you forever.

XXXVIII. Christ is "the TRUE LIGHT." John says of Him, "In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men. And the Light shineth in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not. There was a man sent from God whose name was John. The same came for a witness to bear witness of the Light, that all men through Him might believe. He was not that Light, but He came to bear witness of that Light. That was the TRUE LIGHT which lighteneth every man that cometh into the world." Jesus says, "I am the light of the world; he that followeth me shall not walk in the darkness, but shall have the light of life." And Again, "While ye have the light, believe in the light." "I am come a light into the world." Again, it is said of Saul on his way to Damascus, "And there shined around him a light from heaven, above the brightness of the sun." It is said of Christ in his transfiguration on the mount, "that his raiment became white as the light." Paul speaks of Christ as dwelling in light which no man can approach unto. Peter says of Him, "who called you into his marvelous light." John says, "God is light and in Him is no darkness at all." Of the New Jerusalem it is said, that the inhabitants have no need of the sun, nor of the moon to enlighten it, "for the glory of God and the Lamb are the light thereof."

Light certainly appears to be of two kinds, as every spiritual mind knows, physical and spiritual. Physical or natural light reveals or makes manifest physical objects through the fleshly organ, the eye. Spiritual light is no less real light than physical. In the presence of spiritual light the mind directly sees spiritual truths and objects, as, in the presence of material or natural light, it distinctly sees material objects. The mind has an eye or seeing faculty which uses the material eye and natural light to discern material objects. It is not the eye that sees. It is always the mind that sees. It uses the eye merely as an instrument of vision by which it discerns material objects. The eye and the light are conditions of seeing the material universe, but it is always the mind that sees.

So the mind directly sees spiritual realities in the presence of spiritual light. But what is light? What is natural, and what is spiritual light? Are they really identical, or are they essentially different? It is not my purpose here to enter into any philosophical speculations upon this subject; but I must observe, that whatever spiritual light is, the mind under certain circumstances cannot discern the difference, if difference there is between them. Was that spiritual or physical light which the disciples saw on the mount of transfiguration? Was that spiritual or physical light which Paul and his companions saw on their way to Damascus? What light is that which falls upon the mental eye of the believer when he draws so near to God as not at the moment to at all distinguish the glory that surrounds him from material light? What was that light which made the face of Moses shine with such brightness that the people were unable to behold it? And what is that light which lights up the countenance of a believer when he comes direct and fresh from the mount of communion with God? There is often a visible light in his countenance. What is that light which often shines upon the pages of the Bible, making its spiritual meaning as manifest to the mind as the letters and words are? In such seasons the obscurity is removed from the spirit of the Bible, just as really and as visibly as the rising sun would remove the obscurity of midnight from the letter. In one case you perceive the letter clearly in the presence of natural light. You have no doubt, you can have no doubt, that you see the letters and words as they are. In the other, you apprehend the spirit of the Bible just as clearly as you see the letter. You can no more doubt at the time that you see the true spiritual import of the words, than that you see the words themselves. Both the letter and the spirit seem to be set in so strong a light that you know that you see both. Now what light is this in which the spirit of the

Bible is seen? That it is light every spiritual man knows. He calls it light. He can call it nothing else. At other times the letter is as distinctly visible as before, and yet there is no possibility of discerning the spirit of the Bible. It is then only known in the letter. We are then left to philologize, and philosophize, and theorize, and theologize, and are really all in the dark as to the true spiritual import of the Bible. But when "the true light that lighteth every man," shines upon the world, we get at once a deeper insight into the real spiritual import of the word than we could have gotten in a life-time without it. Indeed, the true spiritual import of the Bible is hid from the learning of this world, and revealed to the babes who are in the light of Christ. I have often been afflicted with the fact that true spiritual light is rejected and contemned, and the very idea of its existence rejected by many men who are wise in the wisdom of this world. But the Bible every where abounds with evidence that spiritual light exists, and that its presence is a condition of apprehending the reality and presence of spiritual objects. It has been generally supposed that the natural sun is the source of natural light. Sure it is that light is a condition of our beholding the objects of the material universe. But what is the source of spiritual light? The Bible says Christ is. But what does this mean? When it is said that He is the true light, does it mean only that He is the Teacher of true doctrine? Or does it mean that He is the light in which true doctrine is apprehended, or its spiritual import understood; that He shines through and upon all spiritual doctrine, and causes its spiritual import to be apprehended, and that the presence of his light or in other words his own presence, is a condition of any doctrines being spiritually understood? He is no doubt the essential light. That is, light is an attribute of his Divinity. Essential, uncreated light is one of the attributes of Christ as God. It is a spiritual attribute of course. But it is an essential and a natural attribute of Christ, and whoever knows Christ after the Spirit, or whoever has a true, spiritual, and personal acquaintance with Christ as God, knows that Christ is light, that his being called light is not a mere figure of speech; that his "covering himself with light as with a garment;" his enlightening the heavenly world with so ineffable a light that no man can approach thereunto and live, that the strongest seraphim are unable to look with unveiled face upon his overpowering effulgence:--I say, to a spiritual mind, these are not mere figures of speech; they are understood by those who are in the light, and who walk in the light of Christ, to mean what they say.

I dwell upon this particular relation of Christ because of the importance of its being understood, that Christ is the

real and true light who alone can cause us to see spiritual things as they are. Without his light we walk in the midst of the most overpowering realities without being at all aware of their presence. Like one surrounded with natural darkness, or as one deprived of natural light gropes his way and knows not at what he stumbles, so one deprived of the presence and light of Christ, gropes his way and stumbles at he knows not what. To attain to true spiritual illumination and to continue and walk in this light, is indispensable to entire sanctification. O that this were understood! Christ must be known as the true and only light of the soul. This must not be held merely as a tenet. It must be understood and spiritually experienced and known. That Christ is in some undetermined sense the light of the soul, and the true light is generally admitted just as multitudes of other things are admitted without being at all spiritually and experimentally understood. But this relation or attribute of Christ must be spiritually known by experience as a condition of abiding in Him. John says, "this then is the message which we have heard of Him, that God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with Him and walk in darkness, we lie and do not the truth. But if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." This light is come into the world, and if men do not love darkness rather than light, they will know Christ as the true light of the soul and will so walk in the light as not to stumble.

I desire much to amplify upon this relation of Christ, but must forbear or I shall too much enlarge this course of instruction. I would only endeavor to deeply impress you with the conviction that Christ is light, and that this is no figure of speech. Rest not, my brother, until you truly and experimentally know Him as such. Bathe your soul daily in his light, so that when you come from your closet your face will shine as if it were the face of an angel.

CHAPTER V.

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING TO HOLINESS, CONTINUED.

XXXIX. Another relation which Christ sustains to the believer, and which it is indispensable that he should recognize and spiritually apprehend as a condition of entire sanctification, is that of "Christ within us."

"Know ye not," says the apostle, "that Jesus Christ is in you except ye be reprobates." --2 Cor. 13:5. "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit if the Spirit of God dwell

in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the Spirit is life because of righteousness." --Ro. 8:9,10. "My little children, of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you." --Gal. 4:19. "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." --Gal. 2:20. Now it has often appeared to me that many know Christ only as an outward Christ, as one who lived many hundred years ago, who died, and arose, and ascended on high, and who now lives in heaven. They read all this in the Bible, and in a certain sense they believe it. That is they admit it to be true historically. But have they Christ risen within them? living within the veil of their own flesh and there ever making intercession for them and in them? This is quite another thing. Christ in heaven making intercession is one thing; this is a great and glorious truth. But Christ in the soul, there also living "to make intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered," is another thing. The Spirit that dwells in the saints is frequently in the Bible represented as the Spirit of Christ and as Christ himself. Thus in the passage just quoted from the eighth of Romans, the apostle represents the Spirit of God that dwells in the saints as the Spirit of Christ and as Christ Himself. Rom. 8:9,10: "But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness." This is common in the Bible. The Spirit of Christ then, or the real deity of Christ dwells in the truly spiritual believer. But this fact needs to be spiritually apprehended and kept distinctly and continually in view. Christ not only in heaven, but Christ within us, as really and truly inhabiting our bodies as we do, as really in us as we are in ourselves, is the teaching of the Bible, and must be spiritually apprehended by a divine, personal, and inward revelation, to secure our abiding in Him. We not only need the real presence of Christ within us, but we need his manifested presence to sustain us in hours of conflict. Christ may be really present within us as He is without us, without our apprehending his presence. His manifesting Himself to us with and in us is by Himself conditioned upon our faith and obedience. His manifesting Himself within us and thus assuring us of his constant and real presence, confirms and establishes the confidence and obedience of the soul. To know Christ after the flesh or merely historically as an outward Savior, is of no spiritual avail. We must know Him as an inward Savior, as Jesus risen and reigning in us, as having arisen and established his throne in our hearts, and as having written and established the authority of his law there. The old man

dethroned and crucified, Christ risen within us and united to us in such a sense that we "twain are one spirit," is the true and only condition and secret of entire sanctification. O that this were understood! Why, many ministers talk and write about sanctification just as if they supposed that it consisted in and resulted from a mere self-originated formation of holy habits. What infinite blindness this for spiritual guides! True sanctification consists in entire consecration to God; but be it ever remembered that this consecration is induced and perpetuated by the Spirit of Christ. The fact that Christ is in us needs to be so clearly apprehended by us as to annihilate the conception of Christ as only afar off, in heaven. The soul needs so to apprehend this truth as to turn within and not look without for Christ, so that it will naturally seek communion with Him in the closet of the soul, or within, and not let the thoughts go in search of Him without. Christ promised to come and take up his abode with his people, to manifest Himself unto them, etc., that the Spirit whom He would send, (which was his own Spirit as abundantly appears from the Bible,) should abide with them forever, that He should be with them and in them. Now all this language needs to be spiritually apprehended, and Christ needs to be recognized as by his Spirit as really present with us as we are with ourselves, and really as near to us as we are to ourselves, and as infinitely more interested in us than we are in ourselves. This spiritual recognition of Christ present with and in us, has an overpowering charm in it. The soul rests in Him and lives, and walks, and has its being in his light, and drinks at the fountain of his love. It drinks also of the river of his pleasures. It enjoys his peace, and leans upon his strength.

Many professors have not Christ formed within them. The Galatian Christians had fallen from Christ. Hence the apostle says: "My little children of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you." Have you a spiritual apprehension of what this means?

XL. We must spiritually know Christ as "our STRENGTH," as a condition of entire sanctification. Says the Psalmist, Ps. 18:1; "I will love thee, O Lord, my strength;" and again, 19:14; "O Lord my strength;" and again, 31:4; "Pull me out of the net for Thou art my strength;" and again, 43:2; "Thou art the God of my strength;" and again, 59:17; "To Thee, O my strength, will I sing;" and again, 144:1; "Blessed be the Lord my strength." In Is. 27:5; "The Lord says, Let him take hold of my strength and he shall make peace with me." Jeremiah says, Jer. 16:19; "O Lord, my strength." Hab. 3:9; "God is my strength." In 2 Cor. 12:9, Christ says to Paul, "My strength is made perfect in weakness." We are commanded to be strong in the Lord and in the

power of his might, that is, to appropriate his strength by faith. We are exhorted to take hold on his strength, and doing this is made a condition of making peace with God. That God is in some sense our strength is generally admitted. But I fear it is rare to apprehend the true spiritual sense in which He is our strength. Many take refuge, not in his strength by faith, but in the plea that He is their strength, and that they have none of their own while they continue in sin. But this class of persons neither truly understand nor believe that God is their strength. It is with all who hold this language and yet live in sin, an opinion, a tenet, a sayso, but by no means a spiritually apprehended and embraced truth. If the real meaning of this language were spiritually apprehended and embraced with the heart, the soul would no more live in sin. It would no more be overcome with temptation while appropriating Christ than God would be overcome.

The conditions of spiritually apprehending Christ as our strength, are:

1. The spiritual apprehension of our own weakness, its nature and degree.
2. The revelation of Christ to us as our strength by the Holy Spirit.

When these revelations are truly made and self-dependence is therefore forever annihilated, the soul comes to understand wherein its strength lies. It renounces forever its own and relies wholly on the strength of Christ. This it does not in the Antinomian, do-nothing, sit-still sense of the term; but on the contrary it actively takes hold of Christ's strength and uses it in doing all the will of God. It does not sit down and do nothing, but on the contrary it takes hold of Christ's strength and sets about every good word and work as one might lean upon the strength of another and go about doing good. The soul that understands and does this as really holds on to and leans upon Christ as a helpless man would lean upon the arm or shoulder of a strong man to be borne about in some benevolent enterprise. It is not a state of quietism. It is not a mere opinion, a sentiment, a humbug. It is, with the sanctified soul, one of the clearest realities in existence that he leans upon and uses the strength of Christ. He knows himself to be constantly and perseveringly active in thus availing himself of the strength of Christ; and being perfectly weak in himself, or perfectly emptied of his own strength, Christ's strength is made perfect in his weakness. This renunciation of his own strength is not a denial of his natural ability in any such sense as virtually to charge God with requiring what he is unable to perform. It is a complete recognition of his ability were

he disposed to do all that God requires of him, and implies a thorough and honest condemnation of himself for not using his powers as God requires. But while it recognizes its natural liberty or ability and its consequent obligation, it at the same time clearly and spiritually sees that it has been too long the slave of lust ever to assert or maintain its spiritual supremacy as the master instead of the slave of appetite. It sees so clearly and affectingly that the will or heart is so weak in the presence of temptation that there is no hope of its maintaining its integrity unsupported by strength from Christ, that it renounces forever its dependence on its own strength, and casts itself wholly and forever on the strength of Christ. Christ's strength is appropriated only upon condition of a full renunciation of one's own. And Christ's strength is made perfect in the soul of man only in its entire weakness; that is, only in the absence of all dependence on its own strength. Self must be renounced in every respect in which we appropriate Christ. He will not share the throne of the heart with us, nor will he be put on by us except in so far forth as we put off ourselves. Lay aside all dependence on yourself in every respect in which you would have Christ. Many reject Christ by depending on self, and seem not to be aware of their error.

Now, do let it be understood and constantly borne in mind that this self-renunciation and taking hold on Christ as our strength is not a mere speculation, an opinion, an article of faith, a profession, but must be one of the most practical realities in the world. It must become to the mind an omnipresent reality in so much that you shall no more attempt any thing in your own strength than a man who never could walk without crutches would attempt to arise and walk without thinking of them. To such an one his crutches become a part of himself. They are his legs. He as naturally uses them as we do the members of our body. He no more forgets them, or attempts to walk without them than we attempt to walk without our feet. Now just so it is with one who spiritually understands his dependence on Christ. He knows he can walk and that he must walk, but he as naturally uses the strength of Christ in all his duties as the lame man uses his crutches.

It is as really an omnipresent reality to him that he must lean upon Christ as it is to the lame man that he must lean upon his crutch. He learns on all occasions to keep hold of the strength of Christ and does not even think of doing any thing without Him. He knows that he need not attempt any thing in his own strength; and if he should, he knows it will result in failure and disgrace just as really and as well as the man without feet or legs knows that for him to attempt to walk without his crutch would

insure a fall. This is a great, and, I fear, a rarely learned lesson with professed Christians, and yet how strange that it should be so, since in every instance, since the world began, attempts to walk without Christ have resulted in complete and instantaneous failure. All profess to know their own weakness and their remedy, and yet how few give evidence of knowing either!

XLI. Christ is also the Keeper of the soul; and in this relation He must be revealed to and embraced by each soul as the condition of its abiding in Christ, or which is the same thing, as a condition of entire sanctification. Ps. 121: "I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help. My help cometh from the Lord which made heaven and earth. He will not suffer thy foot to be moved; He that keepeth thee will not slumber. Behold He that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep. The Lord is thy keeper; the Lord is thy shade upon thy right hand. The sun shall not smite thee by day, nor the moon by night. The Lord shall preserve thee from all evil; He shall preserve thy soul. The Lord shall preserve thy going out, and thy coming in, from this time forth, and even forevermore." This Psalm with a great many other passages of scripture represent God as exerting an efficient influence in preserving the soul from falling. This influence He exerts, of course not physically or by compulsion, but it is and must be moral influence, that is an influence entirely consistent with our own free agency. But it is efficient in the sense of being a prevailing influence.

But in this relation as in all others, Christ must be apprehended and embraced. The soul must see and well appreciate its dependence in this respect, and commit itself to Christ in this relation. It must cease from its own works and from expecting to keep itself and commit itself to Christ and abide in this state of committal. Keeping his soul implies watching over it to guard it against being overcome with temptation. This is exactly what the Christian needs. His enemies are the world, the flesh, and Satan. By these he has been enslaved. To them he has been consecrated. In their presence he is all weakness in himself. He needs a keeper to accompany him, just as a reformed inebriate sometimes needs one to accompany and strengthen him in scenes of temptation. The long established habits of the drunkard render him weak in the presence of his enemy, the intoxicating bowl. So the Christian's long-cherished habits of self-indulgence render him all weakness and irresolution if left to himself in the presence of excited appetite or passion. As the inebriate needs a friend and brother to warn and expostulate, to suggest considerations to strengthen his purposes, so the sinner needs the Paracletus to warn and suggest

considerations to sustain his fainting resolutions. This Christ has promised to do; but this, like all the promises, is conditioned upon our appropriating it to our own use by faith. Let it then be ever borne in mind that as our keeper, the Lord must be spiritually apprehended and cordially embraced and depended upon as a condition of entire sanctification. This must not be a mere opinion. It must be a thorough and honest closing in with Christ in this relation.

Brother, do you know what it is to depend on Christ in this relation in such a sense that you as naturally hold fast to Him as a child would cling to the hand or the neck of a father when in the midst of perceived danger? Have you seen your need of a keeper? If so, have you fled to Christ in this relation? As ye have received Jesus Christ the Lord, so walk ye in Him, that is, abide in Him and He will abide in you and keep you from falling. The apostle certifies, or rather assumes that He is able to keep you from falling. "Now unto Him that is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy--to the only wise God our Savior, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever, Amen." --Jude 24,25. Paul also says: "I know in whom I have believed, and am persuaded that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him against that day."

XLII. The soul needs also to know Christ, not merely as a master, but as a Friend. John 15:13-15. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you. Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth; but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you."

Christ took the utmost pains to inspire his disciples with the most implicit confidence in Him. He does the same still. Most Christians seem not to have apprehended the condescension of Christ sufficient to appreciate fully, not to say at all, his most sincere regard for them. They seem afraid to regard Him in the light of a friend, one whom they may approach on all occasions with the utmost confidence and holy familiarity, one who takes a lively interest in every thing that concerns them, one who sympathizes with them in all their trials, and feels more tenderly for them than we do for our nearest earthly friends. Observe, what emphasis He gives to this relation or to the strength of his friendship. He lays down his life for his friends. Now imagine yourself to have an earthly friend who loved you so much as to lay down his life for you; to die, too, for a crime which you had committed against himself. Were you assured of the strength of his friendship, and did you know withal his

ability to help you in all circumstances to be absolutely unlimited, with what confidence would you unbosom yourself to Him? How would you rest in his friendship and protection? Now even Christians are slow to apprehend Christ in the relation of a friend. They stand in so much awe of Him that they fear to take home to their hearts the full import and reality of the relation when applied to Christ. Yet Christ takes the greatest pains to inspire them with the fullest confidence in his undying and most exalted friendship.

I have often thought that many professed Christians had never really and spiritually apprehended Christ in this relation. This accounts for their depending upon Him so little in seasons of trial. They do not realize that He truly feels for and sympathizes with them; that is, his feeling for and sympathy with them, his deep interest in and pity for them, are not apprehended spiritually, as a reality. Hence they stand aloof or approach Him only in words, or at most with deep feeling and desire, but not in the unwavering confidence that they shall receive the things which they ask of Him. But to prevail, they must believe. "Let not that man that wavereth, think to receive any thing of the Lord." The real, and deep, and abiding affection of Christ for us, and his undying interest in us personally, must come to be a living and an omnipresent reality to our souls, to secure our own abiding in faith and love in all circumstances. There is, perhaps, no relation of Christ in which we need more thoroughly to know Him than this.

This relation is admitted in words by almost everybody, yet duly realized and believed by almost nobody. Yet how infinitely strange that Christ should have given so high evidence of his love to, and friendship for us, and that we should be so slow of heart to believe and realize it! But until this truth is really and spiritually apprehended and embraced, the soul will find it impossible to fly to Him in seasons of trial with implicit confidence in his favor and protection. But let Christ be really apprehended and embraced as a friend who has laid down his life for us, and who would not hesitate to do it again, were it needful--and rely upon it, our confidence in Him will secure our abiding in Him.

XLIII. Christ is also to be regarded and embraced in the relation of an Elder Brother: Heb. 2:10-18: "For it became Him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings. For both He that sanctifieth, and they who are sanctified are all of one: for which cause He is not ashamed to call them brethren: saying, I will declare thy name unto my brethren: in the midst of the church will I sing praise unto thee. And again, I will put my trust in Him. And

again, Behold I and the children which God hath given me. Forasmuch then, as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same: that through death He might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage. For verily, He took not on Him the nature of angels; but He took on Him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behoved Him to be made like unto his brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people: for in that He Himself hath suffered, being tempted, He is able to succor them that are tempted." Matt. 28:10; "Then said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid: go tell my brethren, that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me." John 20:17; "Jesus saith unto her, Touch me not; for I am not yet ascended to my Father; but go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father; and to my God and your God." Rom. 8:29; "For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren." These and other passages present Christ in the relation of a brother. So He is not merely a friend, but a brother. He is a brother possessing the attributes of God. And it is[is it] not of great importance that in this relation we should know and embrace Him. It would seem as if all possible pains were taken by Him to inspire us with the most implicit confidence in Him. He is not ashamed to call us brethren; and shall we refuse or neglect to embrace Him in this relation, and avail ourselves of all that is implied in it? I have often thought that many professed Christians really regard the relations of Christ as only existing in name and not at all in reality and fact. Am I not a man and a brother? He says to the desponding and tempted soul. Himself hath said, A brother is made for adversity. He is the first-born among many brethren, and yet we are to be heirs with Him, heirs of God and joint heirs with Him to all the infinite riches of the Godhead. "O fools and slow of heart," not to believe and receive this brother to our most implicit and eternal confidence. He must be spiritually revealed, apprehended and embraced in this relation as a condition of our experiencing his fraternal truthfulness.

Do let me inquire whether many Christians do not regard such language as pathetic and touching, but after all as only a figure of speech, as a pretense, rather than as a serious and infinitely important fact. Is the Father really our Father? Then Christ is our brother, not in a figurative sense, merely, but literally and truly our brother. My brother? Ah, truly, and a brother made for

adversity. O! Lord, reveal thyself fully to our souls in this relation.

XLIV. Christ is the True Vine and we are the branches. And do we know Him in this relation, as our parent stock, as the fountain from whom we receive our momentary nourishment and life? This union between Christ and our souls is formed by implicit faith in Him. By faith the soul leans on Him, feeds upon Him, and receives a constantly sustaining influence from Him. John 15:1-8; "I am the True Vine, and my Father is the Husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit He taketh away; and every branch that beareth fruit, He purgeth it that it may bring forth more fruit. Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you. Abide in me and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the Vine, ye are the branches; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned. If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you. Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit, so shall ye be my disciples." Now it is important for us to understand what it is to be in Christ in the sense of this passage. It certainly is to be so united to Him as to receive as real and as constant spiritual support and nourishment from Him as the branch does natural nourishment from the vine. "If a man abide not in me," He says, "he is cast forth as a branch and is withered." Now to be in Him implies such a union as to keep us spiritually alive and fresh. There are many withered professors in the church. They abide not in Christ. Their religion is stale. They can speak of former experience. They can tell how they once knew Christ, but every spiritual mind can see that they are branches fallen off. They have no fruit. Their leaves are withered, their bark is dried; and they are just fit to be gathered and cast into the fire. O this stale, last year's religion! Why will not professors that live on an old experience, understand that they are cast off branches, and that their withered, fruitless, lifeless, loveless, faithless, powerless condition testifies to their faces and before all men that they are fit for the flames.

It is also of infinite importance that we should know and spiritually apprehend the conditions of abiding in Christ in the relation of a branch to a vine. We must apprehend our various necessities and his infinite fullness, and lay hold upon and appropriate the whole that is implied in these relations to our own souls and wants as fast as He is revealed. Thus we shall abide in Him and receive

all the spiritual nourishment we need. But unless we are thus taught by the Spirit, and unless we thus believe, we shall not abide in Him nor He in us. If we do thus abide in Him, He says we shall bear much fruit. Much fruit, then, is evidence that we do abide in Him, and fruitlessness is positive evidence that we do not abide in Him. "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will and it shall be done unto you." Great prevalence in prayer, then, is an evidence that we abide in Him. But a want of prevalence in prayer is conclusive evidence that we do not abide in Him. No man sins while he properly abides in Christ. "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature. Old things are passed away; and behold all things are become new."

But let it not be forgotten that we have something to do to abide in Christ.--"Abide in me," says Christ: this is required of us. We neither at first come to sustain the relation of a branch to Christ without our own activity, nor do or can we abide in Him without a constant cleaving to Him by faith. The will must of necessity be ever alive. It must cleave to Christ or to something else. It is one thing to hold this relation in theory, and an infinitely different thing to understand it spiritually and really cleave to Christ in the relation of the constant fountain of spiritual life.

XLV. Christ is also the "Fountain opened in the house of David for sin and uncleanness;" Zec. 13:1. Christ, (let it be ever remembered, and spiritually understood and embraced,) is not only a justifying, but also a purifying Savior. His name is Jesus, because He saves his people from their sins.

XLVI. As Jesus, therefore, He must be spiritually known and embraced. Jesus, Savior! He is called Jesus or Savior we are informed, because He saves his people, not only from hell, but also from their sins. He saves from hell only upon condition of his saving from sin. He has no Savior, who is not in his own experience saved from sin. Of what use is it to call Jesus Lord and Savior unless He is really and practically acknowledged as our Lord and as our Savior from sin. Shall we call Him Lord, Lord, and do not the things which He says? Shall we call Him Savior, and refuse to so embrace Him as to be saved from our sins?

XLVII. We must know Him as one whose blood cleanses us from all sin. Heb. 9:14; "How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" 1 Peter 1:19; "But with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." 1 Peter 1:2; "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the

Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ. Rev. 1:5; "Unto Him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood." When the shedding of Christ's blood is rightly apprehended and embraced, when his atonement is properly understood and received by faith, it cleanses the soul from all sin: or rather, I should say, that when Christ is received as one to cleanse us from sin by his blood, we shall know what James B. Taylor meant when he said, "I have been into the fountain and am clean," and what Christ meant when He said "Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you." "Who hath loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood." "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you and ye shall be clean, from all your filthiness and from all your idols will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you and a new spirit will I put within you. I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh and give you a heart of flesh." It is of the last importance that language like this, relating to our being cleansed from sin by Christ should be elucidated to our souls by the Holy Spirit, and embraced by faith, and Christ truly revealed in this relation. Nothing but this can save us from sin. But this will fully and effectually do the work. It will cleanse us from all sin. It will cleanse us from all our filthiness and from all our idols. It will make us "CLEAN."

XLVIII. "His name shall be called Wonderful" No inward or audible exclamation is more common to me of late years than the term Wonderful. When contemplating the nature, the character, the offices, the relations, the salvation of Christ, I find myself often mentally, and frequently audibly exclaiming WONDERFUL. My soul is filled with wonder, love and praise, as I am led by the Holy Spirit to apprehend Christ sometimes in one and sometimes in another relation as circumstances and trials develop the need I have of Him. I am more and more "astonished at the doctrine of the Lord," and at the Lord Himself from year to year. I have come to the conclusion that there is no end to this either in time or in eternity. He will no doubt to all eternity continue to make discoveries of Himself to his intelligent creatures that shall cause them to exclaim, "WONDERFUL." I find my wonder more and more excited from one stage of Christian experience to another. Christ is indeed wonderful contemplated in every point of view, as God, as man, as God-man, Mediator. Indeed I hardly know in which of his many relations He appears most wonderful when in that relation He is revealed by the Spirit. All, all, is wonderful when He stands revealed to the soul in any of his relations. The soul needs to be so acquainted with Him as to excite and constantly keep awake its wonder

and adoration. Contemplate Christ in any point of view and the wonder of the soul is excited. Look at any feature of his character, at any department of the plan of salvation, at any part that He takes in the glorious work of man's redemption, look steadfastly at Him as He is revealed through the gospel by the Holy Spirit at any time and place, in any of his works or ways--and the soul will instantly exclaim WONDERFUL! Yes, He shall be called Wonderful!

XLIX. "Counsellor." Who that has made Jesus his wisdom, does not and has not often recognized the fitness of calling Him "counsellor?" Until He is known and embraced in this relation, it is not natural or possible for the soul to go to Him with implicit confidence in every case of doubt. Almost every body holds in theory the propriety and necessity of consulting Christ in respect to the affairs that concern ourselves and his church. But it is one thing to hold this opinion, and quite another to so spiritually apprehend and embrace Christ in the relation of counsellor as naturally to call Him counsellor when approaching Him in secret, and as naturally to turn and consult Him on all occasions, and in respect to every thing that concerns us; and to consult him too with implicit confidence in his ability and willingness to give us the direction we need. Thoroughly and spiritually to know Christ in this relation is undoubtedly a condition of abiding steadfast in Him. Unless the soul knows and duly appreciates its dependence upon Him in this relation, and unless it renounces its own wisdom and substitutes his in the place of it, by laying hold of Christ by faith as the counsellor of the soul, it will not continue to walk in his counsel, and consequently will not abide in his love.

L. The Mighty God. "My Lord and my God," exclaimed Thomas when Christ stood spiritually revealed to him. It was not merely what Christ said to Thomas on that occasion that caused him to utter the exclamation just quoted. Thomas saw indeed that Christ was raised from the dead. The mere fact, therefore, that Christ stood before him as one raised from the dead, could not have been proof that He was God. No doubt the Holy Spirit discovered to Thomas at the moment, the true Divinity of Christ, just as the saints in all ages have had Him spiritually revealed to them as the Mighty God. I have long been convinced that it is in vain, so far forth as any spiritual benefit is concerned, to attempt to convince Unitarians of the proper Divinity of Christ. The scriptures are as plain as they can be upon this subject, and yet it is true that no man can say that Jesus is the Lord but by the Holy Spirit. As I have said in substance often, the personal revelation of Christ to the inward man by the Holy Spirit, is a condition of his being known as the

"Mighty God." What is Christ to one who does not know Him as God? To such a soul He cannot be a Savior. It is impossible that the soul should intelligently and without idolatry commit it to Him as a Savior unless it knows Him to be the true God. It cannot innocently pray to Him nor worship Him, nor commit the soul to his keeping and protection until it knows Him as the Mighty God. To be orthodox merely in theory, in opinion, is nothing to the purpose of salvation. The soul must know Christ as God--must believe in or receive Him as such. To receive Him as any thing else is an infinitely different thing from coming and submitting to Him as the true and living and mighty God.

CHAPTER VI.

CONDITIONS OF ATTAINING TO HOLINESS, CONTINUED.

LI. Christ is our Shield. By this name or in this relation He has always been known to the saints. God said to Abraham, I am thy Shield--Gen. 15:1. Ps. 33:20; The Lord is my shield. Prov. 30:5; He is a shield to them that put their trust in Him. A shield is a piece of defensive armor used in war. It is a broad plate made of wood or metal, and borne upon the arm and hand, and in conflict presented between the body and the enemy to protect it against his arrows or his blows. God is the Christian's shield in the spiritual warfare. This is a most interesting and important relation. He who does not know Christ in this relation, and has not embraced and put Him on as one would buckle on a shield, is all exposed to the assaults of the enemy and will surely be wounded if not slain by his fiery darts. This is more than a figure of speech. No fact or reality is of more importance to the Christian than to know how to hide himself behind and in Christ in the hour of conflict. Unless the Christian has on his shield and knows how to use it he will surely fall in battle. When Satan appears, the soul must present its shield, must take refuge behind and in Christ, or all will be defeat and disgrace. When faith presents Christ as the shield, Satan retires vanquished from the field in every instance. Christ always makes way for our escape, and never did a soul get wounded in conflict who made the proper use of this shield. But Christ needs to be known as our protection, as ready on all occasions to shield us from the curse of the law and from the artillery of the enemy of our souls. Be sure to truly know Him and put Him on in this relation, and then you may always sing of victory.

LII. The Lord is "The Portion" of his people.

"I am thy shield and thy exceeding great reward," said God to Abraham. As the reward or portion of the soul we need to know and embrace Christ, as the condition of abiding in Him. We need to know Him as "our exceeding great portion," a present, all-satisfying portion. Unless we so know Christ, as to be satisfied with Him, as all we can ask or desire, we shall not of course abstain from all forbidden sources of enjoyment. Nothing is more indispensable to our entire sanctification than to apprehend the fullness there is in Christ in this relation. When the soul finds in Him all its desires and all its wants fully met, when it sees in Him all that it can conceive of as excellent and desirable, and that He is its portion, it remains at rest. It has little temptation to go after other lovers or after other sources of enjoyment. It is full. It has enough. It has an infinitely rich and glorious inheritance. What more can it ask or think? The soul that understands what it is to have Christ as its portion, knows that He is an infinite portion, that eternity can never exhaust or even diminish it in the least degree; that the mind shall to all eternity increase in the capacity of enjoying this portion, but that no increase of capacity and enjoyment can diminish aught of the infinite fullness of the Divine Portion of our souls.

LIII. Christ is our hope. 1 Tim. 1:1; "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ by the commandment of God our Savior, and Lord Jesus Christ, which is our Hope," Col. 1:26; "To whom God would make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles; which is Christ in you the Hope of glory." Our only rational expectation is from Him. Christ in us is our hope of glory. Without Christ in us we have no good or well-grounded hope of glory. Christ in the gospel, Christ on the cross, Christ risen, Christ in heaven is not our hope; but Christ in us, Christ actually present, living and reigning in us as really as He lives and reigns in glory, is our only well-grounded hope. We cannot be too certain of this, for unless we despair of salvation in ourselves or in any other, we do not truly make Christ our hope. The soul that does not know and spiritually know Christ in this relation has no well-grounded hope. He may hope that he is a Christian. He may hope that his sins are forgiven--that he shall be saved. But he can have no good hope of glory. It cannot be too fully understood or too deeply realized that absolute despair of help and salvation in any other possible way except by Christ in us, is an unalterable condition of our knowing and embracing Christ as our hope. Many seem to have conceived of Christ as their hope only in his outward relation, that is, as an atoning Savior, as a risen and ascended Savior. But the indispensable necessity of having Christ within them, ruling in their hearts and

establishing his government over their whole being, is a condition of salvation of which they have not thought. Christ cannot be truly and savingly our hope any farther than He is received into and reigns in our souls. To hope in merely an outward Christ, is to hope in vain. To hope in Christ with true Christian hope implies,

1. The ripe and spiritual apprehension of our hopeless condition without Him. It implies such an apprehension of our sins and governmental relations as to annihilate all hope of salvation upon legal grounds.

2. Such a perception of our spiritual bondage to sin, as annihilates all hope of salvation without his constant influence and strength to keep us from sin.

3. Such a knowledge of our circumstances of temptation as to empty us of all expectation of fighting our own battles, or of in the least degree making headway against our spiritual foes in our own wisdom and strength.

4. A complete annihilation of all hope from any other source.

5. The revelation of Christ to our souls as our hope by the Holy Spirit.

6. The apprehension of Him as one to dwell in us and to be received by faith to the supreme control of our souls.

7. The hearty and joyful reception of Him in this relation. The dethroning of self or the utter denial or rejection of self and the enthroning and crowning of Christ in the inner man. When Christ is clearly seen to be the only hope of the soul, and when He is spiritually received in this relation, the soul learns habitually and constantly to lean upon Him, to rest in Him, and make no efforts without Him.

LIV. Christ is also our Salvation. Ex. 15:3; "The Lord is my strength and song, and He has become my salvation; He is my God, and I will prepare Him an habitation; my fathers God, and I will exalt Him." Ps. 27:1; "The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? the Lord is the strength of my life; of whom shall I be afraid?" Ps. 38:22; "Make haste to help me, O Lord my salvation." Ps. 62:7; "In God is my salvation and my glory; the rock of my strength, and my refuge, is in God." Ps. 114: "The Lord is my strength and song, and is become my salvation;" Is. 12:2; "Behold God is my salvation; I will trust and not be afraid; for the Lord Jehovah is my strength and my song; He also is become my salvation." Isa. 49:6; "And he said, It is a light thing that thou shouldst be my servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the ends of the

earth." Luke 2:30; "For mine eyes have seen thy salvation." These and multitudes of similar passages present Christ not only as our Savior, but as our Salvation. That is, He saves us by becoming Himself our salvation. Becoming our salvation includes and implies the following things:

1. Atonement for our sins.

2. Convincing us of and converting us from our sins.

3. Sanctifying our souls.

4. Justifying or pardoning and accepting or receiving us to favor.

5. Giving us eternal life and happiness.

6. The bestowment of Himself upon us as the portion of our souls.

7. The everlasting union of our souls with God.

All this Christ is to us, and well He may be regarded, not only as our Savior, but as our Salvation.

Nothing is or can be more important than for us to apprehend Christ in the fullness of his relations to us. Many seem to have but extremely superficial apprehensions of Christ. They seem in a great measure blind to the length, and breadth, and height, and depth of their infinite necessities. Hence they have never sought for such a remedy as is found in Christ. The great mass of Christian professors seem to conceive of the salvation of Christ as consisting in a state of mind resulting not from a real union of the soul with Christ, but resulting merely from understanding and believing the doctrines of Christ. The doctrine of Christ as taught in the Bible was designed to gain for Christ a personal reception to dwell within and rule over us. He that truly believes the gospel, will receive Christ as He is presented in the gospel, that is, for what He is there asserted to be to his people, in all the relations He sustains to our souls, as fast as these relations are revealed to him by the Holy Spirit.

The newly converted soul knows Christ in but few relations. He needs trials and experience to develop his weakness, and to reveal to him his multiplied necessities, and thus lead him to a fuller knowledge of Christ. The new convert embraces Christ so far as he knows him, but at first he knows but little of his need of Him, except in His governmental relations. Subsequent experience is a condition of his knowing Christ in all his fullness. Nor can he be effectually taught the fullness there is in Christ any faster than his trials develop his real necessities. If he embraces all he understands of Christ, this is the whole of present duty in respect to him; but as trials are in his way he will learn more of His

own necessities, and must learn more of Christ and appropriate Him in new relations, or he will surely fall.

LV. Christ is also the Rock of our Salvation:

Ps. 19:14. Let the words of my mouth, and the meditation of my heart, be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength, [margin, Rock,] and my Redeemer.

28:1. Unto Thee will I cry, O Lord, my Rock; be not silent to me; lest if Thou be silent to me, I become like them that go down into the pit.

31:2. Bow down thine ear to me, deliver me speedily, be thou my strong Rock, for a house of defense to save me. 3. For thou art my Rock and my fortress; therefore, for thy name's sake, lead me, and guide me.

42:9. I will say unto God my Rock, why hast thou forgotten me? why go I mourning because of the oppression of the enemy?

61:2. From the end of the earth will I cry unto Thee, when my heart is overwhelmed; lead me to the Rock that is higher than I.

73:26. My flesh and my heart faileth: but God is the strength [margin, Rock] of my heart, and my portion forever.

78:35. And they remembered that God was their Rock, and the high God their Redeemer.

89:26. He shall cry unto me, Thou art my Father, my God, and the Rock of my salvation.

94:22. But the Lord is my defense, and my God is the Rock of my refuge.

95:1. O come, let us sing unto the Lord; let us make a joyful noise to the Rock of our salvation.

Isa. 17:10. Because thou hast forgotten the God of thy salvation, and hast not been mindful of the Rock of thy strength, therefore shalt thou plant pleasant plants, and shalt set it with strange slips.

32:2. And a man shall be as a hiding-place from the wind, and a covert from the tempest; as rivers of water in a dry place, as the shadow of a great Rock in a weary land.

It is deeply interesting and affecting to contemplate the relations in which Christ revealed Himself to the Old Testament saints. He is a Rock of Salvation, a Strong Hold or Place of Refuge. In this relation the soul must know Him, and must take hold of Him or take shelter in Him.

LVI. He is also a Rock Cleft, from which the waters of life flow. 1. Cor. 10:14. "And did all drink the same spiritual drink, for they drank of that spiritual Rock that

followed them, and that Rock was Christ." As such the soul must know and embrace Him.

LVII. He is a great Rock that is higher than we, rising amid the burning sands of our pilgrimage, under the cooling shadow of which the soul can find repose and comfort. He is like the shadow of a great Rock in a weary land. To apprehend Christ in this relation, the soul needs to be brought into sharp and protracted trials until it is faint and ready to sink in discouragement. When the struggle is too severe for longer endurance, and the soul is on the point of giving up in despair, then when Christ is revealed as a great rock, standing for its defense against the heat of its trials, and throwing over it the cooling, soothing influence of his protection, it finds itself at rest and refreshed, and readily adopts the language of a numerous class of passages of scripture, and finds itself to have apprehended Christ as inspired men apprehended and embraced Him. It is truly remarkable that in all our experiences we can find that inspired writers have had the like, and in every trial and in every deliverance, in every new discovery of our emptiness, and of Christ's fullness, we find the language of our hearts most fully and aptly expressed in the language of the living oracles. We readily discover that inspired men had fallen into like trials, had Christ revealed to them in the same relations, and had similar exercises of mind; insomuch that no language of our own can so readily express all that we think and feel and see.

LVIII. He is the Rock from which the soul is satisfied with honey. Ps. 81:16. "He should have fed them also with the finest of wheat; and with honey out of the rock should I have satisfied thee." The spiritual mind apprehends this language spiritually, and it is doubtless really intended to be understood. It knows what it is to be satisfied with honey from the Rock, Christ. The divine sweetness that often refreshes the spiritual mind when it betakes itself to the Rock, Christ, reminds it of the words of this passage of scripture.

LIX. He is the Rock or Foundation upon which the church as the temple of the living God, is builded.

Matt. 16:18. And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my church--and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

Rom. 9:33. As it is written, Behold I lay in Zion a stumbling stone, and a rock of offense; and whosoever believeth on Him shall not be ashamed.

1 Pet. 2:8. And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offense, even to them which stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed.

He is a sure foundation. He is an eternal Rock, or the Rock of Ages--the corner stone of the whole spiritual edifice. But we must build for ourselves upon this Rock. It is not enough to understand as a tenet, a theory, an opinion, an article of our creed, that Christ is the Rock in this sense. We must see that we do not build upon the sand. Matt. 7:26,27. "And every one that heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand; And the rain descended, and the floods came, and beat upon that house; and it fell and great was the fall of it."

LX. He is the "strength of our heart." He is not only our refuge and strength in our conflicts with outward temptations and trials in the sense expressed in Ps. 46:1. "God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble," but He is also the strength of our heart and our portion forever, in the sense of Ps. 73:26; "My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever." He braces up and confirms the whole inner man in the way of holiness. What Christian has not at times found himself ready to halt and faint by the way? Temptation seems to steal upon him like a charm. He finds his spiritual strength very low, his resolution weak, and he feels as if he should give way to the slightest temptation. He is afraid to expose himself out of his closet, or even to remain within it lest he should sin. He says with David, "I shall fall by the hand of Saul." He finds himself empty--all weakness and trembling. Were it not that the strength of his heart interposes in time, he would doubtless realize in his experience his worst fears. But who that knows Christ has not often experienced his faithfulness under such circumstances, and felt an immortal awaking, reviving, and strength taking possession of his whole being? What spiritual minister has not often dragged himself into the pulpit so discouraged and faint as to be hardly able to stand, or to hold up his head? He is so weak that his spiritual knees smite one against the other. He is truly empty and feels as if he could not open his mouth. He sees himself to be an empty vine, an empty vessel, a poor, helpless, strengthless infant, lying in the dust before the Lord, unable to stand, or go, or preach, or pray, or do the least thing for Christ. But lo! at this juncture, his spiritual strength is renewed. Christ, the strength of his heart develops his own almightiness within him. His mouth is open. He is strong in faith, giving glory to God. He is made at once a sharp threshing instrument to beat down the mountains of opposition to Christ and his gospel. His bow is renewed in his hand and abides in strength. His mouth is opened and Christ has filled it with arguments. Christ has girded

him to the battle, and made strong the arms of his hands with the strength of the mighty God of Jacob.

The same is true of every Christian in substance. He has his seasons of being empty that he may feel his dependence; and anon he is girded with strength from on high and an immortal and superhuman strength takes possession of his soul. The enemy gives way before him. In Christ he can run through a troop, and in his strength he can leap over a wall. Every difficulty gives way before him, and he is conscious that Christ has strengthened him with strength in his soul. The will seems to have the utmost decision, so that temptation gets an emphatic no! without a moment's parley.

LXI. Christ is He through whom we may reckon ourselves dead indeed unto sin, and alive unto God. This we are exhorted and commanded to do. That is, we may and ought to account or reckon ourselves through Him as dead unto sin and alive unto God. But what is implied in this liberty to reckon ourselves dead unto sin and alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord? Why, certainly:

1. That through and in Him we have all the provision we need, to keep us from sin.
2. That we may and ought to expect to live without sin.
3. That we ought to account ourselves as having nothing more to do with sin than a dead man has with the affairs of this world.
4. That we may and ought to lay hold on Christ for this full and present death unto sin, and life unto God.
5. That if we do thus reckon ourselves dead unto sin and alive unto God in the true spiritual sense of this text, we shall find Christ unto our souls all we expect of Him in this relation. If Christ cannot or will not save us from sin, upon condition of our laying hold of Him and reckoning ourselves dead unto sin, and alive unto God through Him, what right had the apostle to say, Reckon yourselves indeed dead unto sin and alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord? What! does the apostle tell us to account or reckon ourselves dead indeed unto sin, and shall D. D's tell us that such reckoning or expectation is a dangerous delusion?

Now, certainly nothing less can be meant by reckoning ourselves dead unto sin and alive unto God through Jesus Christ, than that through Christ we should expect to live without sin. And not to expect to live without sin, through Christ, is unbelief. It is a rejection of Christ in this relation. Through Christ we ought to expect to live to God, as much as we expect to live at all. He that does not expect this, rejects Christ as his sanctification and as Jesus who saves his people from their sins.

Do not understand me as teaching that we must first know Christ in all these relations before we can be sanctified. The thing intended is, that coming to know Christ in these relations is a condition or the indispensable means of our steadfastness, or perseverance in holiness under temptation--that when we are tempted from time to time, nothing can secure us against a fall but the revelation of Christ to the soul in these relations one after another, and our appropriation of Him to ourselves by faith. The gospel has directly promised in every temptation to open a way of escape so that we shall be able to bear it. The spirit of this promise pledges to us such a revelation of Christ as to secure our standing, if we will lay hold upon Him by faith, as revealed. Our circumstances of temptation render it necessary that one time we should apprehend Christ in one relation, and at another time in another. For example, at one time we are tempted to despair by Satan's accusing us of sin, and suggesting that our sins are too great to be forgiven. In this case we need a revelation and an appropriation of Christ as having been made sin for us; that is, as having atoned for our sins--as being our justification or righteousness. This will sustain the soul's confidence and preserve its peace.

At another time we are tempted to despair of overcoming our tendencies to sin and give up our sanctification as a hopeless thing. Now we need a revelation of Christ as our sanctification, etc.

At another time the soul is harrassed with the view of the subtlety and sagacity of its spiritual enemies, and greatly tempted to despair on that account. Now it needs to know Christ as its wisdom.

Again, it is tempted to discouragement on account of the great number and strength of its adversaries. On such occasions, it needs Christ revealed as the Mighty God, as its strong tower, as its hiding place, its munition of Rocks.

Again, the soul is pressed with a sense of the infinite holiness of God, and the infinite distance there is between us and God on account of our sinfulness and his infinite holiness, and on account of his infinite abhorrence of sin and sinners. Now the soul needs to know Christ as its righteousness, and as a Mediator between God and man.

Again, the Christian's mouth is closed with a sense of guilt, so that he cannot look up nor speak to God of pardon and acceptance. He trembles and is confounded before God. He lies along on his face, and despairing thoughts roll a tide of agony through his soul. He is speechless and can only groan out his self-accusations before the Lord. Now as a condition of rising above this

temptation to despair, he needs a revelation of Christ as his Advocate, as his High Priest, as ever living to make intercession for him. This view of Christ will enable the soul to commit all to Him in this relation, and maintain its peace and hold on to its steadfastness.

Again, the soul is led to tremble in view of its constant exposedness to besetments on every side, oppressed with such a sense of its own utter helplessness in the presence of its enemies as almost to despair. Now it needs to know Christ as the Good Shepherd who keeps a constant watch over the sheep, and carries the lambs in his bosom. He needs to know Him as a Watchman and a Keeper.

Again it is oppressed with a sense of its own utter emptiness, and is forced to exclaim, I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. It sees that it has no life, or unction, or power, or spirituality in itself. Now it needs to know Christ as the True vine from which it may receive constant and abundant spiritual nourishment. It needs to know Him as the fountain of the water of life, and in those relations that will meet its necessities in this direction. Let these suffice as specimens to illustrate what is intended by entire or permanent sanctification being conditioned on revelation and appropriation of Christ in all the fullness of his official relations.

In my estimation, the church as a body, I mean the nominal church, have entirely mistaken the nature and means or conditions of sanctification. They have not regarded it as consisting in a state of entire consecration, nor understood that continual entire consecration was entire sanctification. They have regarded sanctification as consisting in the annihilation of the constitutional propensities instead of the controlling of them. They have erred equally in regard to the means or condition of entire sanctification. They seem to have regarded sanctification as brought about by a physical cleansing in which man was passive; or to have gone over to the opposite extreme, and regarded sanctification as consisting in the formation of habits of obedience. The Old School have seemed to be waiting for a physical sanctification, in which they are to be in a great measure passive, and which they have not expected to take place in this life. Holding, as they do that the constitution of both soul and body is defiled or sinful in every power and faculty, they of course cannot hold to entire sanctification in this life. If the constitutional appetites, passions, and propensities are in fact, as they hold, sinful in themselves, why then the question is settled that entire sanctification can not take place in this world nor in the next, except as the constitution is radically changed, and that of course by

the creative power of God. The New School, rejecting the doctrine of constitutional and moral depravity and physical regeneration and sanctification, and losing sight of Christ as our sanctification, have fallen into a self-righteous view of sanctification, and have held that sanctification is effected by works or by forming holy habits, etc. Both the Old and New School have fallen into egregious errors upon this fundamentally important subject.

The truth is, beyond all question, that sanctification is by faith as opposed to works. That is, faith receives Christ in all his offices and in all the fullness of his relations to the soul; and Christ, when received, works in the soul to will and to do of his good pleasure, not by a physical, but by a moral and persuasive working. Observe, He influences the will. This must be by a moral influence, if its actings are intelligent and free, as they must be to be holy. That is, if He influences the will to obey God, it must be by a divine moral suasion. The soul never in any instance obeys in a spiritual and true sense, except it be thus influenced by the indwelling Spirit of Christ. But whenever Christ is apprehended and received in any relation, in that relation He is full and perfect; so that we are complete in Him. For it hath pleased the Father that in Him should all fullness dwell; and that we might all receive of his fullness until we have grown up into Him in all things, "Until we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ."

HEART OF THE TRUTH PREFACE

The method of giving Theological Instruction in this Institution is as follows:

1. A series of questions is propounded for discussion, comprising an outline of a system of Natural and Revealed Theology.
2. Each of these questions comes up in order, for discussion.
3. Upon each one, every member of the class is required to make up his mind, and prepare a brief statement of his views, in writing.
4. Each student is then called upon, in order, to present his views to the class, the Professor presiding. His views and statements are then made the subject of thorough examinations and discussion by the class, and by the Instructor. Questions are freely asked, and difficulties started. Answers and explanations are given, until the views of the class are settled upon the point or points discussed by him. Then another, and another are called upon in a like manner to present their views, upon which like discussion ensues, until the class have mastered the whole subject. Here the discussion is arrested, and the Professor sums up and presents the whole subject to the class in one or more lectures. The skeletons of these lectures have heretofore been copied out by each student as a kind of memoranda, to which he might in future refer, to refresh his memory. This has cost so much labor, that the students have earnestly solicited their publication. For their use and benefit, they are therefore principally intended.

To those students and others, who may read these skeletons, it may be important to make the following remarks, explanatory of which has not, and what has been my design in preparing them for the press:

1. It has been no part of my design to relieve the student from the necessity of deep study, research, and original investigation upon every topic in Theology.
2. I have not intended to give anything like a detailed history of the Theological opinions, that have prevailed in former ages.
3. Nor have I intended, any farther than is demanded by the nature of Polemic Theology, to give a history of the Theological Opinions that are at present entertained by different schools.
4. I have not intended so to prepare these skeletons that they can be well *understood without deep thought, and in many instances without discussion and explanation*. I have felt, that to leave them in such a state as to require much thought, was of great

importance to students who would thoroughly understand Theology.

5. I have not intended to exhaust any subject of discussion; but simply, in my statements, to comprise an outline of the subject.

6. I have not intended so to prepare these skeletons, that students would, or could, on examination, barely retail my language or statements.

7. I have not intended to leave the bones of these skeletons so wholly disconnected, that students, unpracticed in Theology, would not be able, by sufficient attention and diligence, to arrange and unite them in their order.

8. Nor have I aimed so fully to unite them by statements and propositions, as to preclude the necessity of much and close thought, in order to see the connection and truth of the proposition. But,

9. I have designed to render all these subjects perspicuous to those who have given a thorough attention to Theology. They are designed as memoranda, as the summing up of previous discussions, thought, and investigation, rather than as essays from which Theological information is to be derived.

10. I have intended so to shape these skeletons, that those who understand *them, should have a general, and pretty thorough acquaintance* with Theology, as a science, so as not to be at a loss for an answer to almost any question upon Theological subjects.

11. I have intended however, that these skeletons should be in such a form as to render it unnatural for students to fall into the habit of following exactly in my track in their statements, answers to questions, and discussions of Theological subjects.

12. These skeletons have undergone repeated revisions, enlargement, and modification. And should I live, and continue in my present employment, it is probable, that from year to year, this will continue to be the case with my Theological lectures.

13. Additions will be made to them from year to year, as the course of discussion shall render it necessary or expedient. Should these additions ever grow to a sufficient size to render their publication necessary, for the same reasons that have demanded the publication of these, they will probably be given to the public.

14. These lectures contain as full an outline of Theological Study as we have hitherto been able to fill up in our discussions and investigations, during the three years allotted to Theological Instruction in this Institution. Such additional topics of discussion will be

considered from time to time, as we may be enabled to investigate, and add to the usual labors of the class.

15. It is felt that these skeletons are in an imperfect state - that many of the statements may be seen hereafter, to need modifying. I have felt it to be an exceedingly difficult thing, so to prepare these skeletons, as that their publication should be a sufficient memoranda to the graduated classes, without forestalling the studies and investigations of subsequent classes. I have done, under the circumstances, the best I could. And whether I have exactly accomplished what I have intended, can be known only by the results.

16. In some instances, I have given such *definitions as I have, with the design* to awaken thought, or suggest the inquiry why are these definitions, stated under several different heads. And why are they just as they are. If I have so stated them as to suggest these inquiries, and lead the student to search for, and find out their answer, my object in this respect, is accomplished. To the superficial and unpracticed Theologian, many things that I have said, will of course be unintelligible. But those who think, and love to think, will, I hope, be able to understand them.

My design was at first, not to publish, but barely to print a small number of copies exclusively for the use of the students. But as it was supposed that others would desire to possess them, I have consented to their publication, reminding my readers that they are a bare skeleton of the course of Theological study here pursued.

THE AUTHOR.

LECTURE I

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE----No. I

- I. Define the study upon which you are about to enter.
- II. Notice some of the requisite personal qualifications for this study.
- III. Some of the advantages to be derived from the study of Systematic Theology.
- IV. Some things to be avoided.

I. *Define the study of which you are about to enter.*

1. Theology is the science of God, and of divine things. It teaches the existence, natural and moral attributes, laws, government, and whatever may be known of God, and of our relations, duties, and responsibilities to him and to the universe. In its most comprehensive sense it embraces all knowledge.

2. It may be and generally is divided into *Natural and Revealed Theology*.

This distinction does not imply that natural Theology is not revealed.

(1.) **NATURAL THEOLOGY** is that which derives its evidence from the works of God, or from nature, as it is commonly, but erroneously expressed.

(2.) **REVEALED THEOLOGY** is that which derives its doctrines and evidence from the Bible.

(3.) Theology is again subdivided into *Didactic, Polemic, and Pastoral*.

DIDACTIC, is the system of theological doctrines with their evidences, both of Natural and Revealed Religion.

POLEMIC, is controversial. It relates to the disputed doctrines of Theology.

It consists in the controversial maintaining of them, in opposition to their opponents.

PASTORAL, relates to the relations, duties, and responsibilities of Pastors.

It consists in a judicious application of the great principles of the government of God to the Pastoral relation and office.

II. *Notice some of the requisite personal qualifications for this study*

1. The ardent love of truth for its own sake.
2. The supreme and disinterested love of God.
3. An intense desire to know more of him.
4. Strong desire to make him known to others.
5. A willingness to make any personal sacrifice for this end.

6. A sense of ignorance and dependence upon divine teaching.

7. A willingness to practice as fast as you learn.

8. A fixed purpose to *know* and *do* the whole truth.

9. A state of mind that will not be diverted to make provision for the flesh.

10. Docility of mind.

11. Such humility as to be willing to expose your ignorance.

12. The love of study.

13. Sound education.

14. Industrious habits.

15. Patience and perseverance in investigation.

16. A mind so balanced as to be duly influenced by evidence.

17. Knowledge of the laws of evidence.

18. Knowledge of correct rules of biblical interpretation.

19. Knowledge of the limits of human research and investigation.

III. *Some of the advantages to be derived from the study of Systematic Theology.*

1. A constantly increasing sense of your own ignorance.

2. The highest advantages for growth in personal holiness.

3. The habit of rapid, correct, and consecutive thought.

4. System in thinking and communicating thought.

5. Facility in preparations for the pulpit.

6. Exactness in the statement of the doctrines of Christianity.

7. Facility in proving them.

8. Consistency of views and statements.

9. A Settled state of mind in regard to religious truth.

10. Ability to teach the doctrines and duties of religion.

IV. *Some things to be avoided.*

1. Tempting God, by demanding an impossible or unreasonable kind or degree of evidence.

2. A caviling state of mind.

3. Defending error for the sake of argument.

4. Committing yourself to an opinion.

5. Avoid calling in question first truths.

6. Avoid attempting to prove them.

7. Avoid begging the question.

8. Avoid impatience at the ignorance or stupidity of your classmates.
9. Avoid an ambition to excel them in study and argument.
10. Avoid a disputatious spirit.
11. Avoid stating one thing and proving another in your skeletons.
12. Avoid the use of weak and inconclusive arguments.
13. Avoid an involved method of stating your propositions.
14. Avoid stating more than you can prove.
15. Avoid leaving your propositions, until fully supported by evidence or argument.
16. Avoid the accumulation of evidence or argument after your proposition is fully established.
17. Avoid prolixity in the statement of your propositions.
18. Avoid the great error of supposing that truths which are self-evident to some minds, are so to all.

REMARKS

1. The study of Theology demands much prayer.
2. You will never get any effectual knowledge of Theology without the illumination of the Holy Spirit.
3. Take care that your hearts keep pace with your intellects.
4. Grieve not the Holy Spirit.

LECTURE II.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE---No. 2

- I. Some things implied in the study of Theology.
- II. Some things that we *know* of man, independently of any revelation or knowledge of God.
 - I. *Some things implied in the study of Theology.*
 1. All reasoning implies the existence of a reasoning faculty. Hence,
 2. Of a reasoner, possessing such attributes as are suited to the exercise of reasoning.
 3. All study therefore assumes, or presupposes the existence and attributes of a *student*.
 4. The study of Theology implies and assumes the existence and attributes of a student capable of knowing God.
 5. Our first inquiry then is, on what evidence are these assumptions based?

6. That they are no mere unsupported assumptions will appear if we glance at.

II. *Some things that we know of man, independently of any revelation or knowledge of God.*

1. The existence of man.

(1.) The fact of our existence is not an assumption without proof.

(2.) It is a direct and positive affirmation of reason, founded upon the testimony of consciousness. *Consciousness* is the mind's recognition of its own exercises or states. I am conscious of *thought, volition, emotion*, and consciousness is to my own mind the highest possible evidence.

It cannot be doubted. Upon this testimony, reason affirms and cannot doubt the fact of my own existence; or that thought implies *athinker*, reasoning a *reasoner*, etc.

(3.) This truth is so certainly *known* by us, that to doubt it implies its truth, because doubt implies the existence of a doubter.

(4.) Pretended doubters of their own existence, therefore, always and necessarily assume the fact which they profess to doubt.

(5.) We have therefore a right to assume in the outset, the fact of our own existence.

(6.) We are conscious of certain mental impressions or states, the causes of which we necessarily refer to objects without ourselves. These states or impressions we call sensations.

(7.) Sensation informs us of the existence of those around us who exhibit the same phenomena of which we are conscious. Hence reason affirms, and cannot doubt the existence of our fellow men.

(8.) In the presence of this evidence, we can no more doubt their existence, than our own.

2. Nature of man.

(1.) Man has a body.

a. By consciousness we know that man has a *body* or a *material* habitation.

b. Of the substratum, or ultimate elements or element of body, we know nothing.

c. We call that *body* or *matter* which exhibits the phenomena of solidity, extension, form, divisibility, etc. These phenomena are all we know of matter, and our only means of knowing its nature.

d. Consciousness forces upon us the conviction that we have a body.

e. We can no more doubt it than we can doubt our existence altogether.

f. This truth never was seriously doubted, and pretended doubters have taken as much care of their bodies as others.

(2.) Consciousness itself implies or presupposes the existence of mind. We are conscious of thought---thought implies a thinker, or something that thinks. Besides, consciousness itself presupposes a subject, or that *something* is conscious.

a. We know nothing of the substratum or essence, or ultimate element of mind any more than of matter. We are in utter ignorance of what the essence of either is.

b. We call that mind, which exhibits the phenomena of *thought, volition, emotion. etc.*

c. The phenomena of matter and mind are entirely distinct and dissimilar exhibiting no evidence that their substrata are identical.

d. The phenomena of matter and mind exhibit the highest evidence that their substrata, or natures, are distinct and diverse.

e. We can no more doubt that we have mind, than that we think.

f. But some maintain that mind is only thought, volition, emotion, etc., and that these are the result of exquisite cerebral organization. In other words, that the brain, or matter, thinks, when thus organized. Their argument runs thus:

1. No thought is manifest where there is no brain.

2. But where there is living brain, there is always thought.

3. The perfection of thought, intelligence, volition, is in proportion to the amount and perfection of the cerebral substance. Hence the inference that matter, in the form of brain, thinks.

But this only proves what all admit, that brain is the organ of mind, and the only medium through which it can manifest itself in this state of existence---that the capacities of mental development must, and do depend upon the perfection of the cerebral organization.

To the fact that the phenomena of mind and matter, are entirely distinct and dissimilar, and that therefore it is unphilosophical to infer identity of essence, they reply, that chemistry affords many illustrations and confirmations of their views. The union of chemical elements, and the action of inorganic affinities often, nay, always result in the production of substances

differing entirely from either of the elements of which they are composed.

To this it may be replied,

1. That the result, so far as we have any light from chemistry, is always material and therefore does not differ *essentially*, or in *essence* from the elements of which it was composed.

2. Consciousness of continued personal identity proves that the brain is not the thinking agent or mind. It is a well settled truth, that the particles of which the human body is composed are perpetually changing, and that the substance of the entire body is changed several times during the period of an ordinary life. If then mind and matter are identical---if the brain or any other part of the body, or the whole body, is the man, the thinking agent, we are not the same person at any two moments. But consciousness testifies to our continued personal identity. The body then can only be the organ or instrument of the mind, and not the mind itself.

3. That there is nothing in natural science at all analogous to that for which they contend, the unvarying results of all combinations of matter being *material* and exhibiting only the phenomena of matter and that continually. Man therefore is a compound being, uniting in one person two distinct natures, called Body and Mind.

3. Attributes of man.

(1.) Of Body.

a. The body of man possesses all the attributes or properties of matter.

b. The attributes of an organized being.

c. The attributes of an animal body.

d. Subject to decay of course.

(2.) Attributes of mind.

The mind of man has natural and moral attributes.

THE NATURAL ATTRIBUTES are what we know of the nature of mind, some of which are:

a. Intellect, or the power to think or reason.

b. Will, or the power of volition.

c. Reason, or the power to distinguish truth from error, good from evil, or to deduce just inferences from facts or propositions.

d. Conscience, or the power to pass judgment upon the moral qualities of actions and to approve or condemn accordingly.

Consciousness testifies to the existence of these and other natural attributes of the mind of man. Their existence cannot be doubted.

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES of mind are its voluntary but permanently and controlling moral dispositions or preferences, such as selfishness or benevolence, justice or injustice, etc. The existence of these is a matter of consciousness and cannot be doubted.

4. Man is an *Agent*, i.e. He originates his own actions. Proof. Consciousness.

5. Man is a *Free Agent*, i.e. he possesses intelligence with the power and liberty of choice.

Proof.

(1.) Consciousness.

(2.) Agency implies freedom.

(3.) The fact that men are governed by motives implies liberty of will.

(4.) We are as sure that we are free as that we exist. That we act freely as that we act at all.

6. Man is a *Moral Agent*.

Moral agency implies the possession of intellect, reason, will, conscience. A susceptibility to pleasure and pain, with some degree of knowledge on moral subjects.

Man is conscious of possessing these. He therefore knows himself to be a moral agent. The moral agency of man is further proved by the following considerations:

(1.) All government is founded upon the universal recognition of this truth.

(2.) All praise and blame which all men award to each other is founded upon the universal acknowledgment of this truth.

(3.) It cannot be and never was seriously disbelieved. The pretended doubters of it are as ready as others to praise or blame those around them for their actions.

(4.) The actual influence of moral considerations upon men, demonstrates their moral agency.

7. Man is an *Immortal Agent*.

Only a few of the proofs of this will be adduced in this place.

Proof. (1.) Life of mind is not dependent on the body, for nearly every part of the body has been destroyed in different persons, and yet the mind lived.

(2.) When the body is dying the mind often possesses full vigor.

(3.) General belief of all nations and generations.

(4.) Man's capacity for endlessly increasing in virtue and enjoyment.

(5.) If man is not immortal, his moral capabilities are inexplicable.

(6.) As man is capable of endless improvement, economy demands his immortality.

(7.) If man is not immortal, his moral powers are worse than useless.

(8.) If man is not immortal, God is not just, as He does not reward man here according to his conscious character.

(9.) Conscience refers retribution to a future state. We must not anticipate the bible argument in this place as we have proved neither the existence of God, nor the truth of the Bible.

LECTURE III.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE---No. 3

I. The importance of a correct and thorough knowledge of the laws of evidence.

II. What is *evidence* and what is *proof*, and the difference between them.

III. Sources of evidence in a course of theological inquiry.

IV. Kinds and degrees of evidence to be expected.

V. When objections are not, and when they are fatal.

VI. How objections are to be disposed of:

VII. On whom lies the burden of proof.

VIII. Where proof or argument must begin.

I. *The importance of a correct and thorough knowledge of the laws of evidence.*

1. Without correct knowledge on this subject our speculations will be at random.

2. The ridiculous credulity of some, and the no less ridiculous incredulity of others, are owing to ignorance, or a disregard of the fundamental laws of evidence. E.g.; Mormonism is ridiculous *credulity*, founded in utter ignorance or a disregard of the first principles of evidence in relation to the kind and degree of testimony demanded to establish anything that claims to be a revelation from God.

Every form of religious skepticism, on the other hand, is ridiculous *incredulity*, founded in ignorance, or a disregard of the fundamental laws of evidence, as will be shown in its place.

II. *What is evidence and what is proof, and the difference between them.*

1. Evidence is that which elucidates and enables the mind to apprehend truth.
2. Proof is that degree of evidence that warrants or demands belief---that does or ought to produce conviction.
3. Every degree of *evidence* is not *proof*. Every degree of light upon a subject is *evidence*. But that only is *proof* which under the circumstances can give reasonable satisfaction.

III. *Sources of evidence in a course of Theological Inquiry.*

This must depend upon the nature of the thing to be proved.

1. Consciousness may be appealed to upon questions that are within its reach, or on questions of experience, but not on other questions.
2. Sense may be appealed to on questions within the reach of our senses, but not on other questions.
3. The existence of God must be proved by his works, as an appeal to the Bible to settle this question would be *assuming* both the fact of his existence, and that the Bible is his word.
4. The Divine authority of the Bible, or of any book or thing that claims to be a revelation from God, demands some *kind* of evidence that none but God can give. Miracles, are one of the most natural and impressive kinds. Prophecy another.
5. Without God's own testimony, all other evidence would be uncertain and unsatisfactory upon such a question.
6. Appeals may also properly be made to such other evidences, external and internal, as might be reasonably expected if the revelation in question were really from God.
7. As the universe is a revelation of God, we may legitimately wander into every department of nature, science, and grace, for testimony upon theological subjects.
8. Different questions, must however draw their evidences from different departments of revelation. Some from his works and providence, others from his word, and others still from all these together.

IV. *Kinds and degrees of evidence to be expected.*

KINDS.

1. No impossible or unreasonable kind is to be expected, e.g.: The evidence of sense is not to be

demanded or expected when the thing to be proved is not an object of or within the reach of sensation.

2. Nor of consciousness when the question is not one of *experience* and does not belong to the exercises of our own minds.

3. It is a sound rule that the best evidence in *kind* shall be adduced, that the nature of the case admits: for instance,

(1.) Oral testimony is not admissible where written testimony may be had to the same point.

(2.) Of course oral traditions are not to be received where there is written history to the same point.

(3.) But oral testimony is admissible in the absence of written, as then, it is the best that the nature of the case admits.

(4.) So oral traditions may be received to establish points of antiquity, in the absence of contemporary history.

(5.) Any book claiming to be a revelation from God, should, in some way, bear his own seal as a kind of evidence at once possible and demanded by the nature of the subject.

DEGREE OF EVIDENCE.

1. Not, in general, demonstration; as this would be inconsistent with a state of probation under a moral government.

2. Not, in general, such a degree of evidence as to preclude the possibility of cavil or evasion, for the same reason.

But, 1. Such an amount of evidence on all fundamental questions as to afford reasonable satisfaction to an honest and inquiring mind.

2. Such an amount of evidence upon the face of creation itself as should gain the general assent of mankind to the facts of the Divine existence and of human accountability.

3. That the evidence could be more or less, *Latent, Patent, Direct, Inferential, Incidental, Full, and Unanswerable* according to its relative importance in the system of Divine truth.

V. *When objections are not, and when they are fatal.*

NOT FATAL.

1. Not when they are not well established by proof.

2. Not when the truth of the objection *may* consist with the truth of the proposition which it is intended to overthrow.

3. Not when the affirmative proposition is conclusively established by testimony, although we may be unable to discover the consistency of the proposition with the objection.

4. *Not always fatal because unanswerable.*

BUT AN OBJECTION IS FATAL,

1. When it is an unquestionable reality, and plainly incompatible with the truth of the proposition against which it lies.

2. When the higher probability is in its favor.

3. When the objection is established by a higher kind or degree of evidence than the proposition to which it is opposed. E.g. Consciousness is the highest kind of evidence: an objection founded in, or supported by consciousness will set aside other testimony.

4. The testimony of *sense* is not always conclusive in the face of other testimony, and an objection founded in, and supported by sensation is not always fatal.

5. An objection is fatal, when it fully proves that the proposition in question is not merely *above*, but plainly *contrary* to the affirmations of reason.

VI. How objections are to be disposed of.

This depends upon their nature.

1. If mere cavils without reason or proof, they may remain unnoticed.

2. So, if they appear reasonable, if *proved*, and are yet without proof, we are not called on to reply.

3. We are not bound to explain the objection and show that it *is* consistent with the proposition against which it is alleged, but simply that if a *fact*, it *may be* consistent with it. It then rests with our opponent to show that if it *might* be consistent with the proposition, yet as a matter of fact it *is* not.

4. No objection is competent to set aside *first truths*, such as that a whole is equal to all its parts. A part is less than a whole, etc.

5. No objection can set aside the direct testimony of consciousness.

6. Nor can an objection set aside the unambiguous testimony of God.

7. First, and self-evident truths, the affirmations of reason, consciousness, and the testimony of God, can never conflict with each other.

8. There is always a fallacy in whatever is flatly inconsistent with either of these.

VII. Where lies the burden of proof.

1. Always on him who makes the affirmation, unless his affirmation is sufficiently manifest without proof.

2. The *onus probandi* lies with the affirmative until the evidence fairly amounts to *proof* in the absence of opposing testimony.

3. When the affirmative evidence amounts to proof, the *onus* is upon the objector.

4. Every kind and degree of evidence that may as well consist with the negative as the affirmative of the proposition to be proved, leaves the *onus* unchanged.

5. When the evidence, or an argument, or an objection proves too much, as well as when it proves too little, it leaves the *onus* unchanged.

6. If an objection needs proof, the *onus* lies upon the objector.

VIII. Where proof or argument must begin.

1. Proof or argument, must commence where uncertainty commences.

2. Hence, all argument and proof take for granted such truths as need no proof but are either axioms, self-evident truths, or such as are already sufficiently apparent.

LECTURE IV.

EXISTENCE OF GOD

FIRST, State the several methods of proof.

SECOND, Show to what they amount.

FIRST, *State the several methods of proof.*

I. Moral argument, or argument founded in the demand of our moral nature. *Short method.*

1. I am conscious of *feeling* moral obligation to do right and avoid wrong.

2. I am conscious of mental states for which I feel praise or blame-worthy, or in other words: I am conscious of having a moral character.

3. Moral character implies a moral nature or constitution.

4. It also implies a law or rule of moral action apprehended by the mind.

5. This law within implies a law without.

6. A moral constitution and moral law imply a creator, law-giver, and judge. This creator or author of my nature; this law-giver and judge, is God.

Again, 1. I cannot resist the conviction that I am accountable for my actions, not merely to myself and society, but to some lawgiver.

2. This *irresistible* conviction of accountability implies, either that accountability is a dictate of my nature, or that the evidence of it is *overwhelming*.

3. I *am* therefore accountable for my conduct, or my moral nature deceives me.

4. But accountability implies a *rightful ruler*. This ruler is God.

Again, 1. My senses inform me that other men exhibit the same phenomena of which I am conscious.

2. Hence I cannot resist the conviction that they have a moral nature, and are accountable like myself.

3. Hence I cannot but award them praise or blame for their conduct.

4. This is a dictate of my moral constitution.

5. My nature then demands that I should regard them as subjects of moral government.

6. But moral government implies a moral governor. This governor is God.

7. Hence the existence of God is a dictate of my moral nature.

Rem. Upon this argument the common convictions of men in regard to the Divine existence seem to be based, as this truth is admitted previous to a knowledge of any theoretic argument whatever.

2. This argument always has insured, and always will insure the conviction of the great mass of men.

II. Physical argument, or argument from the external world. *Short method.*

1. Every event must have a cause.

2. My senses testify that the universe exists, and is a system of changes or events.

3. These events do not cause themselves. To suppose this were absurd.

4. They have not existed in an eternal series. This supposition were also absurd.

5. There must have been a first cause.

6. The first cause must have been *uncaused, self-existent, independent, and eternal*. This must be God.

Rem. This confirms the moral argument.

For answers to the atheistic objections and their arguments see *Atheism*.

III. Argument from final causes. *Short method.*

1. Means imply an end.

2. Existences sustaining the relation of means to an end, imply design.

The highest evidence of design may be manifested in two ways,

(1.) When the greatest number of beneficial results arise from the simplest means. Or from the application of one principle or power, to the production of vast and complicated events.

Gravitation is an instance of this.

(2.) Where a vast and complicated mechanism is constructed for the production of a simple but highly important end. Vide. human physiology. The universe abounds with both these extremes of art, and affords a demonstration of design.

3. Design implies a designer.

4. The universe is a system of existences, sustaining the relation of means to an end.

5. It had therefore, a designer.

6. This designer is God.

Rem. This argument sets aside the doctrine of chance or fate.

IV. Historical argument. *Short method.*

1. Men have intellect and reason.

2. Therefore their opinions are based upon facts real or supposed.

3. The truth of any proposition in which all nations and ages have agreed must be highly probable.

4. But all ages and nations have agreed in the proposition, "There is a God."

5. Therefore his existence is, to say the least, highly probable.

Objection 1. The fact of this coincidence needs proof.

Answer. That this coincidence has been nearly universal is beyond doubt.

Obj. 2. If this coincidence be admitted, it proves nothing, as all men have believed other things that are false. - E.g. that the sun goes round the earth.

Ans. 1. There was high evidence of this, and the conviction was based upon nothing less than the apparent evidence of their senses.

2. The objection only proves that the historical argument may possibly be *inconclusive*.

3. The historical argument does prove that there is a high degree of evidence everywhere discoverable of the existence of God.

V. Argument direct from consciousness. *Short method.*

1. *I think, therefore I am.*
2. I was not always. Of this, there is abundant evidence.
3. I began to be, and did not create myself.
4. I descended from a race like myself.
5. This race is made up of a series of individuals.

A series of dependent events, sustaining to each other the relation of cause and effect, implies an independent first cause, for an infinite number of dependent links without an independent first, is absurd.

6. A series implies a first.
7. There must have been a first man.
8. He must have been *self-created*, or *self-existent*, and *uncreated*, or created by some other being.
9. He could not create himself.
10. Self-existence is *necessary* existence,
11. He had not a *necessary* existence, for he is dead.
12. He must have begun to be, and must have been created.
13. His Creator must have been uncaused, and eternally self-existent. This cause is God.

Again, 1. The same must be true of every series of existences.

2. Every series must have had a *distinct* self-existent cause, or all existences must have had one and the same first cause.
3. One first cause is sufficient, and it is unphilosophical to suppose more without evidence.
4. The universe as a whole is a unit, and most philosophically attributed to one first cause. This cause is God.

VI. Metaphysical argument.

1. All existences are *necessary* or *contingent*.
 - (1.) That existence or being is *necessary* whose non-existence is naturally impossible.
 - (2.) That existence is *contingent* whose non-existence is naturally possible.
2. *Ideas* of existences are *necessary* or *contingent*.
 - (1.) That *idea* is *necessary*, the non-existence of whose object, under the circumstances, cannot be conceived of as possible.

(2.) That *idea* is *contingent*, the non-existence of whose object may, under the circumstances, be conceived of as possible.

3. That must be a real existence of which we have a *necessary idea*, for the *idea* is *necessary* only because the non-existence of its object under the circumstances cannot be conceived of as naturally possible. - E.g. space, duration.
 4. *Necessary ideas* need to be suggested to, or developed in the mind. - E.g. the ideas of space and duration and the *idea* that they are infinite are *necessary ideas* when once suggested. We cannot conceive that space and duration should not exist, and that they should not be infinite.
 5. The *idea* of causality, or that every event must have a cause, is a *necessary idea* when once suggested by an event, for the mind in the presence of the event, cannot conceive that its occurrence without a cause, was naturally possible.
 6. The *idea* of my own *present* existence is a *necessary idea* when suggested by *present* consciousness of mental action. I think, therefore, *I am*, and cannot conceive of my *present* non-existence as possible.
 7. The *idea* of the *present* existence of the universe is a *necessary idea* when suggested or developed by *present* conscious sensations. With this evidence before me, I cannot conceive of the *present* non-existence of the universe as possible.
 8. The *idea* of a *first cause* is a *necessary idea* when once suggested by the events of the universe. With these events before me I cannot conceive that they had no cause, or that there was not a first cause.
 9. The *idea* that the first cause is eternal, self-existent, and independent, is a *necessary idea* when once suggested to the mind.
 10. The *idea* that this cause is *intelligent* is a *necessary idea* when once suggested by a *knowledge* of the evidences of design apparent in the universe.
 11. The ideas of God's existence and attributes are therefore *necessary ideas* when suggested or developed by a *knowledge* of the events of the universe.
 12. But *necessary ideas*, as above defined, are the representatives of *realities*, therefore God's existence is a reality.
- Again*, 1. Consciousness is the mind's cognizance of its present state or exercise.
2. We are certain of that of which we are conscious.
 3. Hence our mental states or exercises are realities.

4. My existence is an affirmation or inference of reason direct from consciousness. I think, therefore, I *am*.

5. The existence of other beings is also an affirmation of reason direct from consciousness. I am conscious of sensations, the cause of which I must refer to objects external to myself. Therefore these objects *exist*.

6. The existence of God is an inference or affirmation of reason removed one step back from consciousness.

7. I think, therefore I *am*. This is the first inference. I *am*, the universe is, therefore God is, is the second step or affirmation, the second has the same certainty as the first because it is based upon it.

8. The existence of God then is as certain as my own existence, and the existence of the universe.

Second. --- *What these arguments amount to.*

1. If they do not amount to a demonstration, it is because the nature of the fact to be proved renders the demonstration of it to our limited faculties impossible.

2. Demonstration is that which shows that the proposition in question cannot but be true.

3. The events of the universe being *admitted* or proved, it is impossible that God should not exist.

4. The contrary supposition is an absurdity, as it assumes that the universe of events is uncaused, which is absurd.

5. The argument for the existence of God amounts to a demonstration. Other objections will be answered under the head "*Atheism*."

LECTURE V.

ATHEISM

FIRST. Define Atheism.

SECOND. Some of the different forms or modifications of Atheism.

THIRD. Answer the principal objections of Atheists, to Theism.

FOURTH. Point out some of the difficulties of Atheism.

First.--- *Define Atheism.*

Atheism is the opposite of Theism. Theism is a belief in the existence of God.

Atheism is the disbelief of his existence.

Second.--- *Some of the different forms or modifications of Atheism.*

I. Skeptical Atheism, or Atheistical Skepticism.

This form of Atheism professes to hold no opinion as to the existence of God, alleging that the evidence in favor of, and that against the divine existence, are too nearly balanced to afford any rational ground of conviction either way. Hume and some others have taken this ground.

II. Speculative or Dogmatic Atheism.

This modification of Atheism, maintains that the evidence against the existence of God decidedly preponderates.

Atheists of this school either deny the existence of the material universe, or attempt to account for its existence upon principles that are consistent with the denial of the divine existence.

Atheists are however, greatly divided along themselves. Some of them maintain that the universe is all matter, and that what we call mind is only the result of cerebral organization; or, in other words, that matter is, in some forms, intelligent, especially in the form of brain.

Others maintain that the universe is all mind, and that what we call the universe is the fiction or creation of our own minds.

An extended examination of these systems of "philosophy, falsely so called," will not of course, be undertaken in these lectures. The doctrines of these self-styled philosophers will be examined no farther than is necessary to establish the truths of Theology.

III. Pantheism.

This is a *misnomer*. The name denotes a belief in the existence of God, and yet the doctrine or system denies the existence of the true God, and maintains that the universe is itself God. To confound God with the universe, and hold that He is identical with it, is certainly Atheism, under whatever name it may attempt to conceal itself.

IV. Practical Atheism.

This admits, in words, and profession, the existence of God, but denies him in works. With this kind of Atheism, the present lecture has nothing to do.

These are the principal modifications of Atheism, both ancient and modern.

Third. *Answer the principal objections of Atheists to Theism.*

Obj. I. Atheists object to Theism, that it is founded in the natural credulity of the human mind.

Ans. 1. It is a notorious fact that men are not naturally credulous, but obstinately incredulous, in respect to those doctrines that rebuke their lusts.

2. The existence of the true God is an idea big with terror to depraved man.

3. Hence the general admission of God's existence, in despite of the strong prejudices of depraved human nature, is a powerful argument for its support.

Obj. II. They maintain that facts demonstrate, that the God of Theists cannot exist.

E.g. Theists maintain that God is omniscient, and also that he created the universe; but say the Atheism, before the universe existed there were no objects of knowledge. Therefore previous to creation no omniscient being could have existed.

Ans. Omniscience is the knowledge of all actual or possible events and things. This knowledge may have resided, and Theists maintain that it actually did eternally reside in the mind of God.

Obj. III. Theists maintain the immutability of God, and also that he governs the world. But, say the Atheists, we are conscious of freedom; but our freedom is inconsistent with the immutability of God as the governor of the world; therefore there can be no immutable God that governs the world.

Ans. This is a mere begging of the question. To say that God's immutability and our free agency are inconsistent with each other is bare assertion.

Again, Atheists allege that creation itself implies a change in God; and is therefore inconsistent with his immutability.

Ans. Theists maintain the immutability of God in respect to his nature and his character. Creation certainly implies no change in either of these, but only the exercise of his natural and moral attributes. If to this it be replied, that character is nothing else than the exercise of the natural attributes, and that before creation he could have had no moral character, and that the work of creation was the formation of moral character and therefore implied a change; it may be answered, that character consists in design or intention, and that God always designed or intended to create the universe; and therefore creation implies no formation or change of character in him.

Obj. IV. Theists maintain that God is a being of infinite natural and moral perfections.

To this Atheists object.

1. That the physical imperfections of the universe are entirely inconsistent with the existence of those natural and moral attributes which Theists ascribe to God.

Ans. That is perfect which is entirely suited to the end for which it was designed. Theists maintain that the universe was made and is governed for the glory of God, in the promotion of virtue and happiness; and that so far as we can see, it is in the best possible manner suited to that end.

2. To this Atheists object, that the actual existence of so much sin or moral evil, together with all the misery occasioned by it, is inconsistent with the existence either of infinite goodness, infinite knowledge, or infinite power; and that Theists may take which horn of the trilemma they please: that one of three things must be true: either God did not foresee that these evils would exist, in which case he is not omniscient, or foreseeing it, he had not power to prevent it, in which case he is not omnipotent, or, foreseeing it and being able to prevent it, he had not the goodness to do so. Whichever of these suppositions be true, it demonstrates that the Theist's God cannot exist.

Ans. This is again begging the question. Infinite goodness, knowledge and power, imply only that if a universe were made, it would be the best that was naturally possible. This objection assumes that a better universe, upon the whole, was a natural possibility. It assumes that a universe of moral beings could, under a moral government, administered in the wisest and best manner, be wholly restrained from sin: but this needs proof, and never can be proved.

Moral agency implies freedom: freedom implies the power to resist every degree of motive that can be brought to bear upon mind. That it would have been possible to prevent sin under a moral government, or had it been possible, that it would have been wise, so to alter the administration as wholly to exclude it, is a gratuitous assumption, and any argument or objection founded upon this assumption is of no weight: as certainly it is no impeachment of the natural or moral attributes of God, that moral and natural evils exist, if their existence was, upon the whole, the less of two evils, and preferable to such an arrangement as would have entirely excluded them.

3. The force of this objection lies in the fact that there are things in the universe, all the reasons for, and uses of which, we do not understand. Suppose we are unable to account for the existence of natural and moral evil in a universe like this, is this fact to set aside the world of evidence that the universe was made and is governed by a God? Certainly nothing is more unreasonable.

Obj. V. Atheists deny that there is sufficient evidence of design in the structure of the universe to warrant a rational belief in a designer.

Ans. 1. There are two ways in which design may be most strikingly manifested. One is where a single principle, property, or law, is so applied as to produce the greatest number of beneficial results. The application of the law of gravitation is an instance of this kind. The other is, when a most complicated and labored piece of mechanism is constructed for a single but highly important end. The human frame is an instance and illustration of this. Now the universe everywhere abounds with instances of these two extremes of art, and affords the highest possible evidence of design.

2. This objection, if allowed, sets aside the possibility of settling any question by evidence, as it is founded in a virtual denial of *allevidence*.

Obj. VI. Atheists object that we can have no conception of such a being as the Theist's God.

Ans. There is a difference between a real and an *adequate* conception. A conception may be real so far as it goes, without including a conception of all that belongs to its object. It is plain that we can form a real, though inadequate, conception of God. If we could form no conception of God we could believe nothing about him. But we can and do; therefore this objection is good for nothing.

Obj. VII. Theists maintain that God created the universe out of nothing. This Atheists maintain is naturally impossible.; "*Ex nihilo, nihil fit*," is a favorite axiom of theirs, when contending against this doctrine of Theism.

Ans. 1. This is assumption.

2. The eternal existence of the matter of which the universe is formed, may be admitted without invalidating the proof of God's existence.

3. But that matter is not self-existent appears from the fact that if it is eternal it must have eternally existed, either in an elementary state or in a state of combination and consequently of change. If in an elementary state, it never could have passed into a state of combination. If in a state of combination and change its existence from eternity involves the doctrine of an infinite series, which is absurd; as will be shown in its place.

Obj. VIII. We can as well conceive of the existence of the universe in its present state without a cause, as to conceive of the existence of God without a cause.

Ans. We cannot conceive of the existence of any event without a cause; but the universe in its present state we know to be a stupendous series of events. God's

existence is *no event* at all, as he never began to be. The difference then of the two suppositions in question, is as the supposition that myriads of events occur without any cause, and that God's existence which is *no event* is without a cause.

Obj. IX. But here they object more definitely, and say that if the universe is an exquisitely constructed machine, the mind that could create it must be still more wonderful and exquisite in its structure, and that we may as well suppose the eternal self-existence of the universe as to suppose the eternal self-existence of a being who could create it.

Ans. The universe we *know* to be continually changing and that therefore it cannot by any possibility have been eternally self-existent, for in that case either those changes have been eternally going on or they have not. If they have, then they must have occurred in an eternal series of dependent events, which is absurd and impossible. If these changes have not been eternally occurring the universe must have existed from eternity in a changeless state. In this case no change could by any possibility have taken place but by the action of some power not inherent in the universe itself; and this power must have been God. We certainly know, therefore, that the universe is not eternally self-existent. But we conceive of God, as possessing an eternal necessary self-existence, and as, therefore, unchangeable. The difficulty in the two conceptions in question, does not lie in supposing an eternal, necessary, self-existence to be impossible or unreasonable; because this supposition is not inconsistent with any first truth. It is not supposing that any event occurs without a cause; for eternal self-existence is *no event*; as it never begins to be. But the difficulty lies in supposing that *events* and things that *begin to be* really occur without any cause. This we cannot by any possibility conceive. Here we are brought back then to the same conclusion, that the difference in the two suppositions in question is as the supposition that myriads of events occur without a cause, and that what is *no event* exists without a cause.

Obj. X. To the affirmation of Theists that with the facts of the universe before us, we necessarily have the idea of a first cause, or of a God; they object, and say that as a matter of fact *they* have no such idea.

Ans. They also affirm that *they* have no idea of causality, and do not believe in the reality of it. But who does not know that this is an affirmation in the face of stubborn facts, and that they really have the idea of causality, and cannot doubt it nor act in consistency with the denial of it in any case whatever. These are the

principal objections of Atheists to Theism, with brief and what are supposed to be their appropriate answers.

Fourth. *Point out some of the difficulties of Atheism.*

I. Difficulty. One of the fundamental and fatal difficulties of Atheism is that it is founded upon the denial of a first truth.

1. Causality, or that every event must have a cause, is certainly a first truth. It cannot be, and never was, seriously doubted; and professed doubters uniformly recognize it in all their actions.

2. It cannot be *denied* without *admitting* it. The denial implies a denier; the denial is the effect of which the denier is the cause.

3. It cannot be *doubted* without assuming its truth, as the doubt is an effect of which the doubter is the cause.

4. The denier knows that he states a falsehood in the denial: for if he did not believe in causality he would not and could not attempt the denial.

5. If he did not believe in causality, he would not attempt to say, do, or think anything whatever, any more than he would attempt to fly, or make a universe, or create a God.

6. That causality is a matter of universal belief, and everywhere and necessarily regarded as a first truth, is evident from the fact that nearly every sentence in every language is constructed upon the admission of this truth. What are the nominative case, the verb, and the objective case, but the cause and the effect?

7. No mind can conceive of causality as being *untrue*, and if it could, the very conception itself would be both an instance and a proof of the truth of it; as the conception would be of itself an effect of which the conceiver would be the cause.

8. Theism is based upon this first truth, and is as certain as the foundation upon which it rests. The whole argument for the existence of God is either a single irresistible inference from the existence of the universe, or a series of irresistible inferences standing one upon another, and having for their foundation the certain and immutable truth of causality, or that every event must have a cause. The conclusion is as certain as the premise. The premise everybody knows to be true; and if anyone denies the truth of the inference, viz. that there is a God, it must be the denial of his heart and not of his intellect. But as Atheism is founded in a denial of this first truth it must be a tissue of absurdity.

II. Difficulty. Another difficulty of Atheism is, that it is fundamentally inconsistent with itself. To the doctrine that God created the universe out of nothing, Atheists

object, "*ex nihilo nihil fit.*" But in accounting for the *existence* of the universe as *it is*, they ascribe all events to chance. Now chance is either nothing or something. If *nothing*, to ascribe the existence of the universe to it, is to contradict their favorite maxim just quoted. If *something* adequate to the production of such effects, then they admit causality, and chance is only another name for God.

III. Difficulty. One of the main pillars of Atheism is the doctrine of an infinite series; and that the present universe is one of an eternal series of changes through which matter has been eternally passing by its own inherent properties, laws, or affinities. But to this it may be answered:

1. That it both admits and denies causality. It admits it in maintaining that the changes, and even the structure of the universe, are caused by the inherent properties of matter. It denies it by assigning no sufficient or adequate cause. For an inadequate cause is the same as no cause.

2. The properties and laws of matter cannot account for the *existence* of matter.

3. If the self-existence of matter be admitted, the properties and laws of matter cannot account for the *locations* of matter, and consequently for the movements and events of the universe.

4. Were not the locations of matter such as they are, the events of the universe would not be what they are. (See locations of the planetary system.)

5. The structure and location of the organs and parts of the human body, evince incomparably more design and skill, than do the inherent laws and properties of matter.

6. Supposing the universe to have been created out of nothing, the evidence of the divine existence exhibited in the locations of matter, are to those exhibited in its properties and laws, as myriads to one. For the known properties and laws of matter are but few, while the dispositions or localities of matter are innumerable.

7. The unorganized is the natural state of matter. This is proved by the fact, that in all cases as soon as life is extinct the matter composing organized bodies returns to an unorganized state, by the action of its inherent properties and laws. This fact demonstrates that bodies are not organized, by the action of affinities inherent in matter, but by a principle of vitality or life which modifies and overrules, for the time being, the action of the laws and affinities inherent in matter.

8. If matter were brought into an organized state by the force of its inherent properties and affinities, then all matter would be found in an organized state, and being

once in that state, it would forever remain in it, unless disorganized by some power out of itself.

9. It is plain, then, that the properties and laws inherent in matter, and that power, whatever it is, that organizes matter into living bodies and sustains that organization, are antagonist forces.

10. There are three states in which matter is found---the *unorganized*, as in the clods of earth---that of *vegetable organization*---and that of *animal organization*.

11. We have seen that the first of these states must be *natural*, because all matter, in whatever state of organization, tends, and if left to itself, returns to the unorganized state.

12. The other two states, those of vegetable and animal organization, are the antagonists of the first and differ so widely from each other that by no apparent possibility can these three states be ascribed to the inherent properties of matter.

13. Should it be admitted then, that matter with all its inherent properties and laws, is self-existent, this would not at all account for the dispositions and locations of matter, nor for the existence of living bodies either vegetable or animal.

14. If men, or any race of animals were extinct, no law of matter could restore them.

15. If Geology proves anything, it proves that the present races of organized beings have not existed always.

16. The universal law that like begets like, proves that the present races of animals did not spring from former races whose remains have been disinterred by the labors of the geologists. This also is proved by geology itself.

17. Therefore the existence of the present organized world demands the interference of a God, to say the least, at the commencement of its being.

But again: This doctrine of an infinite series, the truth of which the Atheist assumes, admits that every event or change is *conditioned or dependent* upon its *immediate* cause, that the existence of matter in one peculiar form or state of combination is the cause of its passing into another form or state of combination, but a *conditional* event implies and demands an *unconditional* cause, either immediate or remote. Conditional events are like the links of a suspended chain---but a suspended chain, with an infinite number of *dependent* links without some absolute and independent support, is absurd and naturally impossible. An infinite series of dependent events,

cannot be, the doctrine then of an infinite series is false and absurd. But as Atheism assumes its truth as its fundamental support, Atheism is itself false and absurd.

IV. Difficulty. Atheism attempts to keep itself in countenance by demanding in support of theism, the most unreasonable and impossible kinds and degrees of evidence. For the existence of God, Atheists demand the testimony of sense, and inquire, "Who has seen God?" To this it may be answered:

1. That the objection is founded in a ridiculous ignorance or disregard of the first principles and laws of evidence, one of which is, that a proposition is to be supported by that kind or degree of evidence which the nature of the case admits. But as God is a Spirit it is unreasonable and absurd to demand for his existence the direct testimony of sense.

2. But we have the indirect testimony of sense for the existence of God, just as we have for the existence of men. Who has at any time seen a man? Our senses inform us of the existence of a body, but this which we see is certainly not the man, the thinking agent, but from the phenomena exhibited to our senses by this body, we naturally and necessarily infer the existence of the man or living agent within, for we cannot conceive that these bodily actions and motions should have no cause, and as they are similar to those of which we ourselves are conscious, our reason affirms that the tenant within is a man like ourselves. As we infer the existence of man from the phenomena which he exhibits to our senses, so we infer the existence of God from the phenomena which he exhibits to our senses.

V. Difficulty. Atheism as a system, if system it may be called, is founded on, or supported by no self-evident truth, but is merely a system of evasions, which evasions are founded in the denial of first and self-evident truths.

VI. Difficulty. Atheism has not a particle of evidence for its support.

VII. Difficulty. Atheism is contradicted by a universe of witnesses.

VIII. Difficulty. Atheism is a ridiculous system of both *credulity* and *incredulity*. It is ridiculous *credulity* to believe that all things, or anything comes by chance.

Should a man believe that a watch *chanced* to grow upon a tree, would not this be an evidence and an instance of ridiculous credulity?

But Atheists pretend to believe that all things are by *chance*.

It is ridiculous *incredulity* to doubt what all men know to be true, that every event must have an adequate cause.

IX. Difficulty. That modification of Atheism that denies the existence of the material universe is ridiculous incredulity, because it professes to doubt that for which all men have the evidence of all their senses.

X. Difficulty. Atheism requires impossible credulity, for its fundamental doctrines never were, nor can be believed by a sane mind. For no human being ever did or can believe that the universe of events exists without a cause.

XI. Difficulty. Its tendencies condemn it. These are,

1. To unsettle all belief, for if the evidence in favor of the existence of God, be rejected as inconclusive and insufficient to demand belief, it follows that nothing can be proved by evidence, and that universal skepticism on every subject, including our own existence, is the only reasonable state of mind.

2. A second tendency of Atheism is to destroy all science and all knowledge. If no credit is to be given to testimony, if all evidence is to be set aside, then the foundations of knowledge and science are destroyed and no one can reasonably say, that he is certain of anything, not even of his own existence, or that he has any sufficient ground for believing anything whatever.

3. Another tendency of Atheism is, to beget universal distrust, and to annihilate that confidence upon which all society is founded. Hence:

4. Another tendency of Atheism is to annihilate all government. Without confidence, certainly no government can exist. If no degree of evidence is to be credited, there is in no case any foundation for confidence, and if no foundation for confidence, government is an impossibility. If then the principles of Atheism were carried out, they must inevitably overthrow all science and all government.

5. Fifth tendency of Atheism is to unbalance mind and to produce universal insanity. What is insanity, but a state of mind that is not influenced by evidence? And Atheism, if real, must to say the least, be a species of moral monomania; as it is, in respect to the existence of God, the setting aside of all evidence and therefore the perfection of irrationality.

6. A sixth tendency of Atheism is to annihilate all restraint upon sin. Remove from the human mind those powerful motives that are connected with a belief in the existence of God, and you unchain the tiger, and burst open the flood-gates of lust and every species of iniquity.

7. Another tendency of Atheism is to confirm selfishness. That selfishness is the character of unregenerate man is a matter of fact. That selfishness is

detestable, is what all men feel. Nothing can annihilate it but faith in the existence, attributes, and character of God. To deny these, is to perfect and perpetuate selfishness forever.

8. Another tendency of Atheism is to annihilate all those motives to virtue which are alone influential in a world like this.

9. Another tendency of Atheism, is to annihilate the domestic virtues and affections. If the existence of God, and that the domestic relations are a divine institution be denied, there can be, in a world like this, no sufficient support and protection of those relations, and consequently universal licentiousness must prevail. Hence,

10. Atheism delivers men over to the gratification of lust as their highest wisdom. Denying as it does the existence of God, of a future state, and all distinction between virtue and vice---all moral accountability and responsibility, the inference of Paul is just, "Let us eat and drink for tomorrow we die."

11. Another tendency of Atheism is to lessen infinitely the value of life. In denying the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and adopt the system of Atheism, and of what comparative value is human life? Let the horrors of the French revolution answer.

12. Atheism leaves the mind in universal doubt and distress in regard to all existences and events. Truth is the natural element of the mind. It can by no possibility be at peace without it. To overthrow all evidence---all knowledge---all confidence, is to render the happiness of mind impossible, and to deliver it over to mourning, lamentation, and woe.

13. Atheism renders virtue impossible. It denies the foundation of all virtue. In denying the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, the relation of cause and effect, it completely annihilates the distinction between right and wrong, and renders it impossible that there should be any such thing as holiness, or virtue in the universe.

14. It produces present and insures eternal misery. That Atheists are eminently wretched men, is evident from their history, and from the very nature of mind it must be so. Truth is the element and natural food of mind, and in just as far as it is fed with and conformed to the truth it is happy. But in proportion as it departs from truth it is miserable.

Atheism is the extreme of error, and for this reason it is *necessarily* the extreme of agony.

XII. Difficulty. The *spirit* of Atheism condemns it. Atheism manifestly has not its seat in the understanding

but in the heart. It is not properly a sentiment, but a temper. This is evident,

1. From the fact that it does not proceed from any want of evidence of the existence of God.

2. Nor is it based on any contrary or opposing evidence. For Atheism has not a particle of evidence for its support.

3. Nor is Atheism an affirmation of reason, but as directly opposed to reason as possible.

4. Nor is Atheism a deduction or a doctrine of science, but, as we have seen, it involves a denial of all science.

5. Nor is it founded in an incapacity to see the bearings of the evidence of Theism. Nothing is more patent, than the everywhere abounding evidence of the Divine existence.

6. Nor does it proceed from a want of time or opportunity to weigh and consider the evidence in favor of Theism.

7. Nor does it proceed from the manifest useful tendency of Atheism, for it were madness to affirm the usefulness of its tendency.

8. Nor has Atheism grown out of any hurtful tendency of Theism.

9. But Atheism is manifestly a spirit of selfishness. It manifests itself, and its own nature in many ways.

(1.) It is a spirit of ingratitude. Should a man on a desolate island, find that every night while he is asleep, his cave was supplied with all the necessaries of life, and should thus continue from month to month and from year to year, without exciting in him the earnest desire to know and thank his benefactor, universal reason would affirm that was the spirit of ingratitude. And what is Atheism, but ingratitude the most detestable?

(2.) Atheism is an uncandid spirit. It is the spirit of caviling against stubborn and undeniable facts.

(3.) Atheism is hatred to truth.

(4.) Atheism is a reckless spirit. It strikes with ruthless hand and endeavors to blot out the existence of God and virtue from the universe.

(5.) It is a spirit of prejudice, as is evident from its *ex parte* examination of the great question of Theism.

(6.) It carps and cavils at the few apparent, though unreal discrepancies of the word of God.

(7.) It lays great stress upon the absurdities of vulgar prejudice as it profanely styles the sincere though unlearned opinions of believers in a God.

(8.) It triumphs much over the weak and inconclusive arguments of some Theists.

(9.) Atheists are in the habit of ascribing the events of the universe to *nature*, instead of nature's God.

(10.) Atheists cavil, and stumble, and triumph, in view of the physical and moral evils of the world, which could not be, did they possess a considerate and benevolent state of mind.

(11.) Atheists triumph greatly, when in the infancy of any new form of science, anything is discovered that *appears* to be inconsistent with the doctrine of Theism, but when fuller investigation has corrected their error, and science gives its unqualified testimony in favor of Theism, they are neither convinced nor silenced, but shift their ground and continue their cavils.

(12.) Atheism is the Spirit of pedantry. It affects great learning. It professes to be philosophy itself.

(13.) Atheists affect to be independent thinkers, above vulgar prejudice; able to lay aside the shackles of early education and to think for themselves.

(14.) Atheists are impatient of the restraint of religion. They evidently want to be rid of the fear and the knowledge of God, and proudly say to Jehovah, "depart from us for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways."

(15.) Atheists seem determined to rid themselves of the idea of accountability. Theism lays restraints which they abhor upon their lusts. They rave, and madly break away from all reason and truth that they may serve their lusts.

(16.) Atheists reject as unreasonable whatever is *above* reason.

(17.) Atheists demand proof of first, and self-evident truths.

(18.) Atheists deify reason, while at the same time they set at naught its most solemn affirmations.

(19.) Atheists reject as unworthy of credit, whatever they cannot comprehend.

This they do when opposing Theism, but when supporting Atheism, they can swallow a universe of incomprehensibilities and absurdities.

(20.) Atheism is a disputatious spirit,

(21.) It is a spirit of opposition to the province of God.

(22.) It is uniformly connected with a wicked life.

(23.) It is the spirit of political fanaticism, and always tends, and aims to overthrow all government.

(24.) It is a bloody cruel, misanthropic spirit. Its history is written in the blood of the French Revolution

LECTURE VI.

DIVINE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE

I will show,

FIRST. That a farther revelation from God, than that which is made in the works of nature and providence is needed.

SECOND. That such a revelation is possible.

THIRD. That the partial revelation of God given in the works of creation and providence, renders a still farther revelation of himself probable.

FOURTH. That the scriptures of the Old and New testaments are a direct revelation from God.

Before entering upon the direct discussion of this subject, I will make several remarks upon the nature and degree of evidence to be expected in this case, if the Bible is, as it claims to be, a revelation from God.

1. Such evidence only is to be expected as the nature of the case admits. The divine authority of the Bible is a question of fact. It is a fact of remote antiquity. Facts of antiquity may be proved by contemporaneous history. In case any such history exists oral traditions are not admissible as evidence because they are not the best evidence which the nature of the case admits. Whenever a fact is of such remote antiquity as to have no contemporaneous history, in this case tradition may be received as the best evidence which the nature of the case admits. And when the tradition is manifestly ancient, unbroken, and uncontradicted either by facts or opposing traditions, it is good evidence, and amounts to proof.

2. The burden of proof is always on the affirmative side of the question, or on him who affirms a fact, until the fact is so established in the absence of counter proof, as to demand belief.

3. Where an objection is an affirmation, or consists in an alleged fact, it must be proved, or it is of no weight. E.g.-If to the fact that the Bible is a revelation from God, it is objected that the Bible is the work of priestcraft, or a fabrication of political men for wicked purposes, this affirmation must be proved or it can be of no weight.

4. A witness in order to establish a fact must be both competent and credible. Competency relates to the propriety of his being heard at all. A *competent* witness is one against whom there is no such objection as to exclude him altogether from being heard.

Credibility relates to the degree of credit to which the testimony of a witness is entitled. A *credible* witness is one whose testimony ought to be believed.

5. A *record* in order to be proof, must be both authentic and genuine. Its authenticity relates to its authorship. Its *authenticity* relates to its authorship. Until its authenticity be established, or that it was written by the author to whom it is ascribed, it is incompetent and cannot be received in evidence.

Its *genuineness* relates to its being either the original document, or a true copy, without material alterations or interpolations. The competency or credibility of any written document, depends of course, upon the competency and credibility of its author. If its author be competent and credible and the authenticity and genuineness of the record be established and the record is then the best evidence which the nature of the case admits.

6. Where a record does not claim to be the original document, but only a genuine copy, an editorial, or explanatory remark, so situated as to be plainly distinguished from the body of the work itself, is not fatal or injurious; but may be rather confirmatory of the truth of the record.

7. If a record be made up of several independent documents, all relating to the same subject, or compiled and collected and arranged in the order of a book, the credibility of the book is not at all diminished, by such additional remarks of the compiler as, while they can be easily distinguished from the words of the original authors, may yet be important in establishing their connection, and showing their mutual relations or dates.

The credibility of a witness is affected by his interest in the question at issue. If he testifies in favor of his own interest this detracts from his credibility. If he testifies against his own interest, this fact enhances the value of his testimony. This is also true of a letter or any other written document, where an author was interested in the question upon which he was writing. If he wrote on the side of his own interest, the credibility of what he writes, is affected as his oral testimony would be under the same circumstances. So also, if what he wrote was contrary to his interest, it enhances the value of his written as would be the case with his oral testimony.

9. Where there are several witnesses to a fact or collection of facts, there must be a substantial agreement among them, else they will destroy each other's testimony. If they flatly contradict each other in regard to the same facts, their testimony must go for nothing.

10. The same is true of written documents if they are adduced in proof of any fact or collection of facts, there must be a substantial agreement among them, or they do not amount to proof.

11. But such apparent discrepancies as demonstrate the absence of collusion among the witnesses or writers greatly strengthen the proof, if upon close examination it be found that the discrepancies are not real.

12. The proof of any fact or collection of facts is strengthened by the number of competent and credible witnesses testifying to the same fact or facts, or when one witness testifies to one fact, and another to another, if all the facts testified to are consistent with, or dependent upon each other.

13. Proof is greatly strengthened by the testimony of competent and credible witnesses to a great number of independent facts or incidents which, when compared together, are seen to be entirely consistent with each other.

14. The proof is still farther strengthened if these facts have extended through a series of years or centuries, have occurred at different places, and cover in the whole, a large extent of territory. These circumstances strengthen the proof because they forbid the idea of collusion or design on the part of those connected with these circumstances at the times and places when and where they occurred, to impose on the credulity of coming generations.

15. Anything, and everything that precludes the idea of collusion among the witnesses or writers, among whose statements or writings there is a substantial coincidence, gives weight to their testimony. Their agreement with each other, and with themselves, when they wrote at different places and periods, and under different circumstances, is always to be taken into the account as greatly strengthening the proof.

16. The absence of counter testimony when such testimony might be expected, if the affirmative of the question were not true, is a circumstance that strengthens the proof: E.g.: the utter absence of all counter testimony in regard to the resurrection of Jesus Christ, is a circumstance that greatly confirms the evidence of his resurrection, in as much as, that under the circumstances of the case, it is incredible that no counter testimony should exist, if, as a matter of fact he had not risen from the dead. Also the fact of the entire absence of all counter proof in respect to the authenticity, genuineness, and credibility of any book of the Bible, for it is utterly incredible that all the enemies of Christianity should be, and should always have been unable to disprove either the authenticity or genuineness of a single book of the Bible, if they were not authentic and genuine.

17. Cavils are not to set aside evidence, or even to be noticed, if it is plain that they are nothing but cavils.

18. The power of working miracles confers the highest competency and credibility upon the witness who professes to bring a revelation from God, as a well attested miracle can be nothing else than the seal or testimony of God to the truth of what he asserts.

19. The well attested record of a miracle is as good evidence of the fact of the miracle, as the testimony of eyewitnesses would be.

20. The spirit of Prophecy, or the foretelling of future events which actually come to pass, and which none but God could have foreknown, is conclusive evidence, that the prophet bears a revelation from God.

I come now to the direct discussion of the subject.

First. *A farther revelation from God than that made in the works of creation and providence, is needed.*

1. As a matter of fact the true God was known in this world, to a very limited extent. Even the greatest and wisest of men had but very little if any right knowledge of the true God.

2. The way of salvation for sinners could not be known by the light of nature, and consequently a revelation that would convey this knowledge was imperiously demanded.

3. As a matter of fact, there was no such knowledge among men, as could sanctify them and fit them for heaven.

4. The greatest philosophers on earth felt themselves to be altogether in the dark in regard to that kind of service which God would accept, and altogether doubtful whether God could by any possibility forgive sin.

5. The state of the entire heathen world, even the most learned and polished nations of both ancient and modern times, demonstrates that without the Bible, the light of nature does not as a matter of fact, make men holy.

6. If men never have been, in any nation or generation, made holy without a direct revelation of the will of God to men, it is not at all likely that they ever will be, and therefore certain that a farther revelation from God is needed.

Second. *A revelation from God is possible.*

This seems to be true *a priori*, and is therefore to be taken for granted till the contrary be proved. That God, who made mankind, should be able to communicate his will to them, seems to be self-evident, and until the contrary be proved, is to be taken for granted.

Third. *The partial revelation made in the works of God, rendered a farther revelation probable.*

1. The benevolence of God as manifested in the works of creation and providence, renders it probable that he would make a farther revelation to mankind.

2. Our moral constitution is such, that we are as a matter of fact, capable of indefinite moral improvement. And as the light of nature does not secure the moral perfection of which our nature is capable, it is unreasonable to suppose that the author of our nature would leave us without higher and more efficient means of improvement. And as these means of improvement could be nothing else than a more perfect knowledge of himself and of his will, such a revelation was highly probable.

3. The great ignorance of mankind, taken in connection with their great necessities and their great desire to know more of the universe and of its author, rendered it highly probable that such a revelation would be given. This was felt, and even predicted by some of the wisest heathen philosophers,

4. The notices in nature both within and without us of moral government--that men are the subjects of moral law, and are going forward to a state of retribution, when properly considered, are calculated to beget the expectation of a farther revelation from God than was contained in the works of creation and providence.

5. The notices within us of our own immortality, being so great as to beget the general conviction that we are immortal, also rendered it highly probable that some more definite revelation in relation to the will of God and the future destiny of man would be given.

6. More especially, the universal consciousness of sin, that has everywhere manifested itself in all ages and nations, and the great perplexity and ignorance of mankind in regard to its first existence in this world, its desert, and whether it could be forgiven, and on what conditions, and what would be the consequence if unrepented of and unforgiven, not only rendered a further revelation necessary, but highly probable.

Fourth. *The Scriptures are a Revelation from God.*

Under this head I am to show,

I. The Authenticity of the Bible.

II. Its Genuineness.

III. Its Credibility.

I. *The Authenticity of the Bible.*

I will begin with the authenticity of the New Testament, for if this can be established it will render the proof of the authenticity of the Old Testament more easy and convincing.

1. Here as there is contemporaneous history, that is the best proof which the nature of the case admits, that the several books of the New testament were written by the authors to whom they are ascribed. It will not be expected that in a mere skeleton, I should give quotations from history. In this skeleton form I can only say, that it is the universal testimony of contemporary historians both Christian and Infidel, that those books were written by the authors to whom they are ascribed. By contemporary historians, I mean those who wrote either at, or immediately subsequent to the time, in which these writings purport to have been written. It is certain from these historians, both infidel and christian, that the several books of the New Testament were then in existence, that they were the reputed writings of the authors whose names they bear, and that these men were universally understood to be their authors.

2. It is agreed by the best judges of the Greek language, that the New Testament must have been written by *native Jews*, at the very timewhen it purports to have been written. It is written in Hebraistic Greek. None but a Jew who had been brought up in Palestine *could* have written this dialect, nor could such Jews have written it, before about the time at which it purports to have been written; because, until about that time, the Jews who were natives of Palestine did not understand Greek. Nor could it have been written in Hebraistic Greek, by any generation subsequent to the Apostles, as after the destruction of Jerusalem the Hebraistic Greek ceased to be used.

3. Another consideration that goes to establish the authenticity of the books of the New Testament is, that they are writings of such a nature as would not have been unjustly claimed from ambitious motives by ambitious men. Nor would they have been claimed for ambitious men by their particular friends.

4. The absence of all counter testimony in relation to the authenticity of the New Testament is a strong, and it would seem, conclusive evidence in support of its authenticity, as it would seem utterly incredible that no evidence should exist that these books were written by other than their reputed authors, if that had been in fact the case.

5. Had it been possible the Jews, and jarring Christian sects, would have impeached the authenticity of these books; and the fact that they have not, and especially that the Jews have not, who were highly interested to do so, and who possessed every possible advantage for doing so, were the thing possible in itself; amounts to a demonstration that these books are authentic.

6. The authenticity of such of them as could be questioned, has been denied, and ample proof has been adduced to substantiate their authenticity.

Particulars respecting the authenticity of each particular book belong more properly to the department of Biblical Literature. What has been said must suffice in respect to the authenticity of the New Testament as a whole.

II. *The Genuineness of the Bible.*

I will next establish the genuineness of the New Testament, after which it may be properly introduced in proof of the authenticity and genuineness of the Old Testament. The credibility of the two Testaments, will be discussed at the same time.

The New Testament which we now have, does not claim to be the original document, but only purports to be a true copy of the original. That it is so, will appear:

1. From the fact, that the various jarring Christian sects which have existed from the time of their publication, would at once have detected any material addition to, subtraction from, or alteration of them.

2. The enemies of Christianity, especially the Jews, and infidels, have always been on the watch, and would have instantly detected any material alterations in those writings.

3. Among thirty thousand manuscript copies of the New Testament, not a single material alteration or omission can be found.

4. Any redundant book or passage would have created confusion. The Apocryphal books are an illustration of this. Those books contain doctrines and state facts, inconsistent with each other, with the rest of the Bible, and with other facts of which we have the most ample proof. This is as might be expected, were any books to set up the claim of a divine revelation, that were not so in fact.

5. The genuineness of the New Testament is established by the fact, that nearly every sentence of it is quoted by one and another of the early friends and enemies of Christianity. And from their quotations it is certain that the text was then just what it is now, as the words as they are found in our Testament exactly correspond with those quotations.

I will now examine the authenticity of the Old Testament.

1. Of the Pentateuch, or of the five books ascribed to Moses. Here I observe, that there is no contemporaneous history, as these books were in existence long before any written history that has come down to us. Tradition, therefore, previous to all history,

is the best evidence the nature of the case admits. And as this tradition is manifestly as ancient as the writings themselves, and universal among the Jews, and uniform, it amounts to the most convincing proof. For tradition uniformly ascribes the five books of the Pentateuch to Moses as their author.

2. The earliest Jewish writings which we have confirm this tradition. The Prophets are unvarying in their testimony, that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. Christ also, and all the writers of the New Testament confirm this tradition, and bear an unvarying testimony to this truth.

3. Josephus, and all Jewish historians, as far back as they go, bear their unequivocal testimony to the authenticity of the Pentateuch.

4. There is no counter testimony, either traditionally or historical which is unaccountable, and it would seem impossible, if Moses were not the real author of these books. What has been adduced then is good proof, and sufficient to establish such a fact in a court of law.

I will examine the authenticity of the other books of the Old Testament.

1. It is not pretended that the authors of every part of the Old Testament were certainly known. Nor is it to be expected, that writings of such very remote antiquity, and in a case in which there is little or no contemporary history, should all be traced with exact certainty to their real authors. But that these books were all compiled, and of course received by inspired men, is a fact of which there is, to say the least, satisfactory evidence. There are two traditions among the Jews which are easily reconcilable with each other, that seem to set this subject in a satisfactory point of view. One tradition is that the books were compiled by Ezra; and the other tradition is that they were compiled by Nehemiah. From all the circumstances of the case the probability is, that they were both concerned in their compilation.

2. All Jewish history, so far as I know, accords with these traditions.

3. Josephus mentions all the books of the Old Testament as canonical, and in the order in which they occur in our Bible.

4. Christ and his Apostles confirm their authenticity.

5. The Jews have been and are interested to impeach the authenticity of the books of the Old Testament, as they are appealed to by Christians to establish the Messiahship of Christ. The Jews certainly possessed the most ample opportunities and means of impeaching the authenticity of these books, if such a thing were possible, and in their controversy with Christians, they

have been in the highest degree interested to do so; and the fact that they have not done so, amounts almost to a demonstration, that those books are really authentic.

Let me now examine the **Genuineness** of the books of the Old Testament.

1. The jarring sects among the Jews, who held various systems of philosophy, and of course gave a different interpretation of many passages of the sacred oracles, would naturally and certainly have detected any material alteration in them, had any such thing occurred, either by accident or design.

2. The Jews always used extreme caution in preserving their sacred writings from corruption or alteration. They numbered the lines, and words, and letters of every book, and kept such records, as would show the exact middle word or letter of every book. And to many such like devices did they have recourse, to prevent the possibility of alteration by any transcriber, either by accident or design.

3. The New Testament abundantly establishes the genuineness of the Old. Christ repeatedly rebuked the Jews, for their unwritten traditions, many of which were inconsistent with the letter and spirit of their sacred writings; but in no case did he complain of them for having adulterated the scriptures themselves. He uniformly speaks of the writings of the Old Testament as they existed in his day, as being genuine. The Apostles follow his example, and confirm abundantly the genuineness of the different books of the Old Testament.

III. *The Credibility of the Bible.*

I will now establish the credibility of both Testaments. This may be done by evidence both external and internal.

1. That the writers were competent witnesses, or so circumstanced as that nothing can be alleged as a reason why their testimony should not be received, is beyond dispute.

2. The credibility of the writers, or that they were men of good character, is not that I know of called in question.

3. The authenticity then of these books is presumptive evidence of their credibility.

4. Their genuineness is also presumptive evidence of their credibility, as it shows:

(1.) The high and sacred regard in which they were held by those who possessed them, and who possessed the highest means of judging, whether they were or were not a revelation from God.

(2.) Their genuineness is evidence of their credibility, inasmuch as it manifests a direct providence in preserving them from loss and interpolations.

5. Universal tradition anterior to history, of such events as might be expected to be thus preserved; e.g. the deluge, and the preservation of one family, in a vessel or ark. It is found to be true, that in every part of the world traditionally accounts of this event are preserved.

6. Geology confirms the Mosaic account of creation, when that account is rightly understood.

7. The credibility of the scriptures is confirmed, by the advance of various sciences, and by those sciences too, which in the infancy of their existence threatened to develop facts, inconsistent with the credibility of the Bible. But the greater maturity of those sciences shows that they are all confirmatory of the truth of the sacred writings.

8. There are no opposing facts; i.e. there is no established fact of history or science, that militates against any fact or doctrine of the Bible. And that this should be so is wholly incredible, were not the Bible true.

9. History by both friends and enemies, as far back as it goes, confirms the credibility of the Bible.

10. It is said that the records of the Roman Empire confirm the principal facts in relation to the death and resurrection of Christ, and many other things recorded in the Bible.

11. The *existence* of the ordinances of both Testaments, is evidence that they must have been instituted at the time, and for the purposes at which and for which the Bible asserts them to have been instituted.

Almost innumerable other external evidences might be adduced; but---I pass to examine some of the internal evidences of their credibility.

1. Prophecy. The agreement of prophecy with the facts of history is admitted. But it is said that the prophecies were written after the facts occurred. To this I answer:

(1.) That there is abundant proof to the contrary.

(2.) Many of the most important prophecies are now fulfilling and to be fulfilled. These prophecies were written many hundred, and some of them many thousand years since, and cannot therefore, by any possibility, have been written after the occurrence of the facts which they predicted.

(3.) Many of these prophecies were of such a nature as to render it utterly impossible for anyone but God to foresee and foretell them. Prophecy, then, with its

fulfillment, is conclusive evidence of the credibility of the Bible.

2. Miracles. The miracles recorded in the Bible are admitted as facts; but, by the enemies of revelation are ascribed to delusion, or to infernal agency. It is said that Roman Catholics and the heathen have recorded miracles, in attestation of the truths of their religion. I answer:

(1.) These pretended miracles are all widely different, in kind and circumstances, from those recorded in the Bible. They are not well established by proof. They were not wrought under such circumstances as to render delusion and deception impossible.

There is not one of them that can compare with the miracles of Christ and his Apostles, or with the fact of the resurrection of Christ from the dead.

(2.) The gift of languages is another miracle, between which and the pretended miracles in support of other religions, there is no analogy. Miracles are nothing else than the seal of God to that truth, in confirmation of which they are wrought. See Hebrews 2:4: "God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will."

3. There is a substantial and marvelous agreement among a great number of writers, recording a great number of facts, extended through a great number of years and spread over a great extent of territory.

4. There are such apparent, and yet not real discrepancies, among them, as to forbid the supposition of any collusion or common design among them to deceive their readers.

5. The integrity and manifest disinterestedness of the writers, in recording their own faults, are evidence of their credibility.

6. They could have no conceivable motive to impose upon mankind. They certainly could gain nothing earthly by it. And it is absurd to suppose that they could hope to gain a heavenly inheritance, by inducing mankind to believe a lie.

7. They were not only not interested to impose upon mankind, but were in the highest degree interested not to publish those writings especially, if they were untrue. Their publishing those doctrines was certain to make them great trouble in this world, and, if untrue, to bring down the wrath of God upon them in the next.

8. Their circumstances, their lives, and death, attest the sincerity of the writers, and that they really believed what they wrote to be true.

9. The facts were of such a nature, as that they could not be deceived in respect to their truth. They could be inspected by all their senses. The miracles which they recorded were not wrought in darkness, nor in secret, nor in the presence of only a few friends. They were performed in the most public manner and in the presence of all classes of persons. They were so various and of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of deception.

10. There is a marvelous internal correspondence, between these writings and all known facts of history, and philosophy, natural, mental, and moral.

11. The recorded facts are many of them confirmed by various and wide spread traditions, ancient medals, and inscriptions, confirmatory of their truth.

12. Another internal evidence of the truth of the Bible is its agreement with our moral nature and consciousness. Did it contradict our consciousness, or the express affirmations of our reason, we could not believe it. But it most perfectly accords with both; which is a most unaccountable circumstance, upon any other supposition than that the Bible is a revelation from God.

13. The Bible exactly describes the character of man, as established by the history of the world, and explains the otherwise inexplicable mystery of his present condition.

14. Another evidence of the credibility of the Bible is found in the fact, that it is exactly suited to the character and wants of mankind.

15. The Bible places the salvation of men upon a rational and practicable foundation, by rendering forgiveness consistent with a due administration of justice, and at the same time providing adequate means for the reformation of men.

16. The exact accordance between the facts and doctrines of the Bible and the works of creation, is a strong evidence that they both have the same Author.

17. The system of moral government revealed in the Bible, ought to be, and must be the law and government of God.

18. It explains and reconciles the providence of God, and the moral condition of this world, with his character and attributes as manifested in creation.

19. Its tendency to promote good morals, to support good and overthrow evil governments, are facts which strongly confirm its truth.

20. The tendency of the doctrines of the Bible to beget a happy life and a peaceful death, is felt and acknowledged by infidels themselves. It is a contradiction to say that falsehood could produce these

effects. Falsehood is what is contrary to the nature and reality of things. But such effects can be ascribed only to what is according to the nature and reality of things, and therefore the Bible must be true.

21. The exact accordance of the Bible with the doctrines of natural religion when properly understood, is demonstration of its credibility.

22. The success of the gospel demonstrates its adaptedness to overthrow whatever is false, and contrary to nature and reality, and this is demonstration of its truth.

23. It challenges investigation, and triumphs in proportion to the scrutiny it receives.

24. The Bible was written by good men or bad men. If by good men, it is what it professes to be; for good men would not lie. If by bad men, then wicked men understood spiritual subjects, devised a system of religion sufficiently spiritual and powerful, and in such exact accordance with the nature and relations of things, as to overthrow all error and sin, and were the perfection of reformers and benefactors of mankind.

25. Many facts were published which might have been and certainly would have been disproved, if untrue, by both Jews and Gentiles. The miracles and resurrection of Christ, and the miracles of the Apostles, among the Gentiles, could have been and would have been disproved if untrue.

26. The writers of the Bible mention many facts as having occurred among those to whom they wrote, of which facts they must have had knowledge, or have known that the writers' statements were false.

27. The Acts of the Apostles is or was perhaps the most easily disproved, if untrue, of any book in the world. Yet no one fact, among the great number recorded in that book, has been disproved.

28. The numerous and manifestly undesigned coincidences of the Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles, strongly corroborate the truth of both.

29. The entire agreement of the two Testaments with each other, considering the circumstances of the case, is strongly confirmatory of their credibility.

30. The standing and increasing evidence from the fulfillment of prophecy, seems to put the credibility of the Bible beyond dispute.

REMARKS:

1. If this testimony does not establish the truth and divine authority of the Bible, there is an end of attempting to establish anything by evidence.

2. If all this testimony can exist and yet the Bible fail to be true, it is the greatest miracle in the universe.

3. If the Bible be true, everything is plain, and the whole mystery of our existence and circumstances is explained. If the Bible is untrue we are all afloat. The existence of the universe, the existence, and character, and destiny of man, are highly enigmatically, and we are left in the most distressing darkness and uncertainty, in regard to everything which we need to know.

LECTURE VII.

INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE

FIRST. What is not implied in the inspiration of the Bible.

SECOND. What is implied in it.

THIRD. How a question of this kind cannot be proved.

FOURTH. How it can be proved.

FIFTH. Prove that the Bible is an inspired book.

SIXTH. Answer objections.

First. *What is not implied in the inspiration of the Bible.*

1. It is not implied in the inspiration of the Bible, that the several writers received everything which they recorded by direct revelation from God. Many things which they recorded may have been known by them, irrespective of divine inspiration. In these cases inspiration was concerned only in directing them what to write and how to write.

2. The inspiration of the scriptures does not imply that the writers were passive instruments, without using their own powers of moral agency in writing.

3. It does not imply that the sacred writers did not preserve their own style and peculiar manner of writing and expressing their thoughts, for this would naturally be true under the direction of the omniscient Spirit of God, whether he merely suggested the thoughts, and left them to the selection of their own words, or whether he suggested the words as well as the thoughts. For in employing human agency, it is as easy for the Spirit of God to conform himself entirely to the habits, education, and natural style of the writer, as to dictate in any other manner. And this would be just what we should expect him to do, to accommodate himself to the habits of that mind which he employed, rather than to set aside those habits.

4. Nor does the inspiration of the sacred writers imply, that they recorded no circumstance of comparatively little importance; for if they were really inspired by the omniscient God, it might be expected that they would write in a very natural and easy manner. And if the connection or circumstances demanded it, that they would mention some things which in themselves are of comparatively little importance.

5. Nor does the inspiration of the Bible imply that no various readings have crept into the text through the carelessness of transcribers.

6. Nor does it imply, that every part of the Bible is equally intelligible to beings in our circumstances.

7. Nor does it imply, that we shall be able infallibly to understand in this age of the world, everything which they wrote

8. Nor does it imply, that the writers themselves understood, in all cases, the import of what they wrote.

9. Nor that the different writers would of course notice the same particulars in recording the same transaction. For in relating the same occurrence, some might naturally notice some particulars of the transaction and others other particulars.

10. Nor that we may not, in our circumstances, find some difficulty in some instances in reconciling the different writers with each other. But---

Second. *The inspiration of the Bible does imply:*

1. That there is a real substantial agreement among all the writers, and that when rightly understood, they do not in anything contradict each other.

2. It implies, that the several writers always wrote under such a degree of divine illumination and guidance, whether of suggestion, elevation, or superintendence as to be infallibly secured from all error.

3. That they not only wrote nothing false, but that they communicated authoritatively the mind and will of God.

Third. *How not proved.*

1. A question of this kind cannot be settled by an appeal to tradition.

2. Nor by an appeal to history.

3. Nor by an appeal to the miraculous power of the writers, independently of their own assertions in respect to their inspiration. Miracles are God's testimony that what they say is true. But the question is, what do they say?

4. Nor can this question be settled by the assertion of the several writers, unless they were endued with miraculous powers. It has been common in every age of

the world, for men to be deceived in regard to their own inspiration. Should those writers therefore insist upon their own inspiration, and should their perfect honesty be admitted, it would not conclusively prove their inspiration of God, without the power of miracles, for they might be deceived.

5. The inspiration of the Bible cannot be proved by any appeal to the elevated and what might seem to us super-human style, in which different parts of it may be written; for that might seem super-human to us, which after all was only the effect of a highly excited though natural state of mind.

6. Nor can the inspiration of the Bible be proved by an appeal to the doctrines it contains.

7. Nor can it be proved, independently of the style and doctrines. Both the style of the sacred writers, and their doctrines, may be and ought to be taken into the account, in the discussion and decision of this question. But neither of them by itself would amount to proof. For if the doctrines were true, and it were admitted that they are the truths of God, it would no more prove the inspiration of the writers of the Bible, than the fact that thousands of other men have written the truths of God, would prove that they were inspired.

Fourth. *How this question can be proved.*

1. The question in respect to the inspiration of the Bible is not a controversy with professed infidels, but with Unitarians, and those who profess to believe the truth of the Bible.

2. In discussing this subject with them, the authenticity, genuineness, and credibility of the Bible may be taken for granted.

3. The integrity of the several writers may also be taken for granted.

4. Not only may these things be taken for granted, but let it be remembered, that in the preceding lecture, on the divine authority of the Bible, these points have also been proved.

I will now remark, that the proof of this question may be made out with entire satisfaction, by showing:

1. That Christ promised his Apostles both the gift of miracles and of inspiration.

2. They actually possessed miraculous power.

3. They affirm their own inspiration.

4. In their admitted honesty.

5. Their style.

6. Their doctrines.

7. The prophecies which they uttered.

8. Their substantial agreement with each other and with all known facts in history and science.
9. The purity, power, and success of their writings. These, when put and viewed together, will amount to a conclusive argument in favor of the inspiration of the scriptures.

Fifth. *Prove that the Bible is an inspired book.*

I. By Christ's words

1. By referring to the promises of Christ, when He first sent the Apostles forth to publish his religion. Matthew 10:19,20: "But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak; for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you."
2. When he gave them their commission. Luke 12:11,12.
3. When he predicted the destruction of Jerusalem. Mark 13:1, Luke 21:14-15.
4. In his last address to his disciples, in the 14th and 16th chapters of John.
5. Christ promised that the Spirit should reveal to them many things which he had not taught them. John 16:12-15.
6. He promised that the Holy Spirit should instruct them in everything. John 18:26.
7. That he should reveal to them future events. John 16:13.
8. That he would give them all the instruction they should need as Apostles and publishers of his religion. John 16:12, & 14:26, & 14:17, & 15:26, 27, & 16:13.
9. Christ endued the Apostles with miraculous powers. Matthew 10:1; Mark 16:15, 17, 18; Luke 9:1.

II. By the Apostles and writers of the New Testament.

1. The writers of the New Testament unqualifiedly assert their own inspiration, and God confirms their testimony by miracles. Galatians 1:11, 12; 1 Corinthians 2:10, 12, 13, & 14:37; 2 Corinthians 2:17; 1 Thessalonians 2:13, & 4:8. 1 John 4:6.
2. The writers of the New Testament put their own writings upon a level with those of the prophets and Old Testament writers. Ephesians 2:20; 2 Peter 3: 15, 16.
3. It has been generally admitted, that the oral instructions of the Apostles were inspired. But they considered their writings as of the same authority with their oral instructions John 20:31; 1 John 1:1-4; 2 Thessalonians 2:15; 1 Corinthians 15:1; Ephesians 3:3; Acts 15:28.

4. They consider their own writings as of such high authority that an unqualified reception of them and obedience to them, is everywhere made by them an indispensable condition of salvation.

5. The belief that the Old Testament was given by inspiration of God was universal among the Jews, and Christ and the Apostles invariably confirm this opinion. Luke 24:27, 44; 2 Peter 1:21; 2 Timothy 3:16.

6. They speak of the Old Testament as the word of God. This is so common with them that I need not cite instances.

7. Christ and the Apostles speak of the entire Old Testament as of equal authority; quoting from all parts of the Old Testament, as from the word of God.

8. The Old Testament writings are called the commandments, testimonies, and ordinances of the Lord.

9. Every act of obedience or disobedience to the Old Testament writers, is considered by Christ and the Apostles as obedience or disobedience to God.

10. There is not an instance in which Christ or the Apostles intimate that a single sentence of the Old Testament is either spurious or uninspired.

11. This is incredible if both Christ and his Apostles did not regard the Old Testament as given by the inspiration of God.

12. It was also dishonest in them thus to treat those writings, if they were not what they were supposed by the Jews to be.

13. In addition to what has been said, let it be remembered that the strict integrity of the writers of the New Testament is admitted and if it were not, it is so apparent on the very face of their writings that it could not reasonably be questioned.

14. Add to this the fact that the style in which the scriptures are written, entirely favors the idea of their inspiration.

15. The doctrines contained in the Bible, must, to say the least, many of them have been given by inspiration, either to the Apostles, or to those from whom they received them, as without a direct revelation from God they could not have been known to men.

16. The prophecies both of the Old and New Testaments are a demonstration of the inspiration of the writers so far as those parts of scripture are concerned.

17. There is beyond all contradiction a substantial agreement among all the writers of the Bible with each other, and with all known facts.

18. The purity, power, and success of the gospel, is corroborative of their claim to inspiration.

These facts when taken together seem to establish the inspiration of the scriptures, beyond doubt.

Sixth. *Answer objections.*

I. *Objection.* It is objected that Mark and Luke were not Apostles, and therefore the promises of inspiration and of miraculous power, did not extend to them.

Answer.

1. That these promises of miraculous power, and of inspiration were not confined to the Apostles, is evident from the fact that multitudes besides the Apostles, actually possessed the power of working miracles, and doubtless the gift of inspiration.

2. The gospels of Mark and Luke must have been written under the eye of the Apostles. Or at least the Apostles must have been familiar with them, as Luke was the companion of Paul, and I believe it is generally conceded that Mark was the companion of Peter.

3. If the Apostles had not approved and confirmed these gospels, they could not have been so universally received by the Church as of divine authority from the very first. This seems to be evident from the fact that so many gospels or histories of Christ were at that time rejected by the Church as not inspired.

These considerations are to my own mind satisfactory in regard to these gospels.

II. *Objection.* It is objected, that the Apostles seldom make any direct claim to inspiration.

Answer. This is easily accounted for by the fact that their claims were already so abundantly established as to render the frequent assertion of their inspiration, not only unnecessary, but improper, inasmuch as it would have had the appearance, either of ostentation or of suspicion that their claim to inspiration was doubtful.

III. *Objection.* It is objected, that Paul, in some instances, seems to declare that he was not inspired.

1 Corinthians 7:10, 12, 25, 40.---"And unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord." ---"But to the rest speak I, not the Lord."---"Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord: yet I give my judgment, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful."---"And I think also that I have the Spirit of God."

2 Corinthians 8:8,10,11,17.---"I speak not by commandment, but by occasion of the forwardness of others, and to prove the sincerity of your love."---"And herein I give my advice."---

Upon these passages I remark,

1. If Paul really intended to notify his readers that in these instances, he did not write under the influence of a divine inspiration, it greatly confirms the fact of his actual inspiration in all other cases. For why should he be so careful in these particular instances, to guard his readers against the supposition that he spoke by divine authority, if in other cases, he did not in fact do so.

2. But Paul might, and probably did mean nothing more in these instances than that the Lord had given no express command in respect to these particulars, as no universal rule in relation to such matters could be adopted in the then circumstances of the Church, and that he therefore, as an inspired Apostle, did not mean to give a command in the name of the Lord, but simply give his inspired advice as one who had the Spirit of the Lord.

3. In 2 Corinthians 11:17, he says, "That which I speak, I speak it not after the Lord, but as it were foolishly, in this confidence of boasting."

The Apostle seems here to have meant that he felt embarrassed by the circumstances under which they had placed him, and was constrained therefore to speak not after the example of the Lord, in respect to speaking in his own defense, but was obliged to speak as it were foolishly, as if he were a confident boaster. This does not imply that he did not consider himself inspired, but that his inspiration made it necessary under the circumstances, for him to say what might appear immodest, and as inconsistent with Christian humility.

REMARKS

1. The question of the inspiration of the Bible, is one of the highest importance to the Church and to the world.

2. The necessities of the Church plainly demand an authoritative, and unerring standard, to which they can appeal in all matters of faith and practice.

3. Those who have called in question the plenary inspiration of the Bible, have, sooner or later, frittered away nearly all that is essential to the Christian religion.

4. Our faith in the divine inspiration of the Bible is so abundantly supported by evidence, that every Christian should be able to give a reason for his confidence in its inspiration.

LECTURE VIII.**DEISM**

FIRST. Define Deism.

SECOND. Notice the different classes of Deists.

THIRD. Notice their principal objections to Christianity.

FOURTH. Consider some of the difficulties of Deism.

First. *Define Deism.*

Deism is Godism, in opposition to no God or Atheism. The name Deist originated in France and was assumed by a class of infidels to avoid the stigma of Atheism.

Second. *Different classes of Deists.*

Although there are several modifications of Deism, they are, by their own writers, divided into two classes, and called mortal and immortal Deists. The mortal Deists admit the existence of God, but deny his providential and moral government, the immortality of the soul, the distinction between virtue and vice, and of course future rewards and punishments, and, for the most part, nearly all the doctrines of natural religion. The immortal Deists profess a belief in all these. The peculiarity of all Deists is their rejection of Christianity and of the Bible as a revelation from God. They agree in discarding all pretenses to divine revelation as either imposture or enthusiasm.

Third. *Their principal Objections to Christianity.*

Obj. I. They object that a revelation is unnecessary; that the powers of the human mind are such, and the light of nature so abundant, as to render any farther revelation of the character and will of God wholly unnecessary. This objection has been sufficiently answered in the preceding lecture. I will only add here, that the true question is not what the human mind, aided by the light of nature, is capable of doing, but what it really has done. Not what men might do were they disposed, but what they really have done in searching out the character and will of God, and in conforming themselves to it.

Obj. II. Another objection is, that a direct revelation from God, is highly improbable. To this I have already sufficiently replied in the preceding lecture.

Obj. III. Another objection is that a direct revelation is impossible---that God is a Spirit, and that man is either wholly material or, at least shut up to the necessity of receiving all his ideas from sensation, and that as God is neither visible nor tangible---as he cannot approach our minds through the medium of our senses, he has no means of communicating directly with our minds, and that therefore a direct revelation, were it necessary, is impossible. To this I reply,

1. It is mere assumption. It is true that we receive our ideas of sensible objects from sensation, but it is not true that we can have no idea of spiritual beings except through sensation.

2. It is not only a gratuitous assumption, that God cannot communicate with minds because he is not a material being, but it is highly absurd. The very fact that he is a spirit, and not a material being, gives him direct access to our minds without either the formality or the difficulty of approaching our minds through our senses.

Obj. IV. Another objection is that there are so many pretended revelations from God, and they differ so fundamentally in their character, that it is the safest and most reasonable course to reject them all as unworthy of credit. To this I reply,

1. That counterfeits imply true coin.

2. That among all the pretended revelations from God, there is not one except our Bible whose claims are of any serious consideration---whose external or internal evidences are of any serious weight.

3. The very fact that so many pretended revelations have been made and received by great portions of mankind, shows how universally mankind have felt the necessity of a divine revelation, and how important it is that a true one should be made.

4. Anything like a diligent inquiry, would satisfy Deists themselves that there is no analogy between the other professed revelations from God with which the world has abounded, and that contained in the Bible.

5. I believe it is now generally admitted by Deists themselves, that the claims of all other books as pretended revelations from God, are frivolous, and of no account, when compared with the claims and evidences of the christian Bible, as a divine revelation.

6. Hence, their efforts are aimed to overthrow the Bible, and not to discredit other pretended revelations from God.

To the Bible they object,

(1.) That the different books, especially of the Old Testament, are not well authenticated. To this I reply, that it is not pretended that we are acquainted with the name of the particular writer of every book of the Old Testament. Nor is this to be expected. As there is no contemporaneous history, it is not at all wonderful that we should not be certain of the names of the writers or compilers of all these books. The same objection would lie with equal force, against the poems of Homer or the history of Herodotus.

Again, so far as history and tradition go, they are uniform in their testimony in respect to the authenticity and genuineness of those books, the names of whose authors Christians pretend to know.

These books often refer to each other, and to the names of their authors.

Christ and his Apostles uniformly acknowledged them both as authentic and genuine, i.e.: they quoted the Pentateuch as the writings of Moses, the Prophets, the Psalms, etc. as so many parts of divine revelation, thus leaving their impressive testimony to the genuineness of the books of the Old Testament.

(2.) They object to the Bible, that if these books were originally written by the authors to whom they were ascribed, they have become so mutilated by transcribers, so many interpolations and various readings have been introduced as to destroy their credibility.

This has been sufficiently answered in the preceding lecture, but I would here just add, that as a matter of fact, the preservation of the integrity of the text of our Bible, may, when all the circumstances are taken into the account, be justly considered as one of the wonders of the world. That in thirty thousand manuscript copies which have been collected and collated, there should not be one material omission, interpolation, or alteration, is certainly matter of astonishment, and gratitude.

(3.) They object that the different books which compose the Bible contradict each other. This objection is founded in a very superficial view and consideration of the contents of the Bible. It has been so often and so ably considered, that I need not in this place enter into a critical examination of those particular parts and passages that have been objected to as inconsistent with each other.

(4.) They object to the Bible, that the writers give names to places by which they were not called until after the time when they purport to have been written.

To this I reply, that there are a few instances, in the Old Testament, in which places are called by names by which they were not called at the time when these parts of the Bible purport to have been written. But when this matter is well considered, it does not in the least degree detract from the credibility of these writings. They were written for the benefit of the Jews, and of the world. And passed from time to time under the review of succeeding inspired writers. When therefore, the name of any place was changed, either an inspired or an uninspired transcriber might insert the more modern name of the place alluded to for the benefit of the reader without at all impairing the integrity of the text.

Indeed, this is just what might be expected, and what might have been, and plainly must have been of great importance.

(5.) They object, that there are passages found in it which could not have been written by the reputed authors of those books in which they are found. In the Pentateuch, e.g., the death of Moses is recorded, which plainly could not have been written by Moses himself. To this it may be replied, that such passages are so plainly the work of a compiler, as not at all to impair the integrity of the text, any more than if the compiler had said: "Now this passage was written by me, and not by Moses." It was never pretended that every word found in the Bible, was written by the authors to whom the various books were ascribed. It is cheerfully admitted that a few such interpolations as the one above alluded to, are found in different parts of the Bible, and are plainly the notes of a compiler. But still it is reasonably insisted that as these interpolations are easily distinguished from the original text, they in no degree, detract from the credibility of the original text.

(6.) They object that Geology and several other sciences demonstrate that the books of Moses cannot be true. They array Geology against the Mosaic account of the creation.

And to the fact that the whole human race sprung from one pair as is recorded by Moses, they object that the great diversity of human languages and complexions, demonstrates that the human race could not have descended from one pair. To their objection on the ground of Geology it is replied; that if Geology really deserves the name of a science, and can really be depended upon as truth, its developments rather confirm than discredit the Mosaic account of creation, when that account is properly understood. And with respect to the objection founded in the diversity of complexions and languages, it may be replied, That the Bible itself gives an account of the confusion and division of the languages of the earth.

That a more extended and recent examination and classification of the languages of the earth, have already rendered it almost certain as a matter of fact, that the languages of the earth were originally one.

And as to the diversity of complexions among mankind, they can be accounted for in the most philosophical manner, by the different habits of mankind, in connection with the different climates in which they reside. These truths have been shown most satisfactorily.

(7.) They object that the Bible contains precepts unjust and unworthy of God, e.g.: Such as the command to the

Israelites utterly to exterminate their enemies, men, women, and children. To this it may be replied,

a. That as to the adults of those nations thus devoted to destruction, God had a right to destroy them for their sins by whatever instrumentality he pleased.

b. If all those were to be destroyed whose sins deserved destruction, it was rather an act of kindness than otherwise to destroy with them the infants, inasmuch as they would be left entirely without protection or support.

c. It cannot be shown, nor is it probable that the infant children were sent to hell, but from the known character of God it is highly probable that their being cut off was a great mercy to them, and the means of their eternal salvation. If so God did them no injustice, but showed them an infinite kindness.

d. It may be observed that in giving the commandment to destroy their enemies, he made the Israelites the instruments of executing his own justice upon his enemies. But he gave them no liberty to do this in a wrong spirit, or in any other temper than that of entire benevolence. And it is as certain, and as reasonable to suppose that they might do this in a good spirit, as that any executioner might take the life of any victim of justice without ill-will or malicious feeling.

(8.) They object that the Bible contains doctrines contrary to reason. To this it may be answered, that the Bible contains no doctrine *contrary* to reason. But only, as might reasonably be expected, above reason. And certainly this is no objection to the Bible as a revelation from God, but rather a confirmation of its claims to divine origin. For in this, it is in entire keeping with his works and providence which everywhere abound, with things too high, and too deep for the human reason to grasp and comprehend.

(9.) They object to the Bible, that it is mystical and unintelligible. I reply,

It is admitted that the more spiritual doctrines of the Bible will of course appear mystical and unintelligible to a *carnal* mind. But it is insisted that, as a whole, the Bible is one of the plainest and most intelligible books in the world.

To this it is objected that there are innumerable Christian sects, all claiming to receive their peculiar tenets from the Bible, which, they say, demonstrates its mysticism and unintelligibility.

To this it may be again replied, that the different Christian sects do not differ so much in their fundamental views as is generally supposed, that on the contrary, all that have any reasonable claims to the

name of Christian are agreed in respect to every doctrine and fact that is fundamental to the Christian system.

There is no more difficulty in understanding the Bible, than in interpreting any other book that claims to lay down rules of human conduct. There has been, for example, much more discrepancy of opinion in respect to the meaning of legislative acts, and much more difficulty in coming at the real meaning of those who have enacted laws, more litigation, expense, and ultimate uncertainty in respect to their interpretation, than there has been in respect to the interpretation of the Bible. And this, to say the least, is not a little wonderful when we consider that human statutes are written with the utmost caution and the utmost precision of human language which the nature of the case will admit. There is perhaps no book in the world of the same size against which the objection of unintelligibility might not more reasonably be made than against the Bible.

(10.) Deists affirm that the Bible is the work of priest-craft and imposition. To this I reply,

a. That it is bare assertion.

b. That it is utterly uncandid in view of all the testimony in favor of the Bible.

c. They are bound to prove this assertion.

d. They cannot prove it.

e. The utter absence of proof is wholly incredible if in fact the Bible is the production of priest-craft. By what priest or priests was it written? At what time? In what country? In what language? For what purpose? It is next to impossible that there should be no evidence, either historical or traditional of such a fact, if indeed such a fact ever existed.

(11.) They insist that the Bible is the fabrication of political demagogues for political purposes. To this objection the very same answers may be given as above.

(12.) It is objected that the doctrine of Atonement contained in the Bible beggars all credibility--that it is utterly incredible, and morally impossible that God should condescend to do for mankind what the Scriptures represent him as doing in the work of the Atonement To this I reply,

That this would be a conclusive objection upon any other supposition than that God is *love*. If God is not *love* it is freely admitted that the doctrine of the Atonement is utterly incredible. But if he is *love*, as the Bible and all his works affirm, the doctrine of Atonement is just what might be expected of such a being under the

circumstances, and therefore one of the most reasonable doctrines in the world.

(13.) They object to the general spirit of Christianity as exhibited by its professors. To this I answer,

a. That some of them have objected to the meekness, humility, and excellencies of the Christian character, as being unworthy of men, and have recommended the exact opposite spirit and traits of character. To this class of objectors no other answer need to be given than that they are mad, and know not what they say, nor whereof they affirm.

Another class have objected, not to the spirit of Christianity itself, as exhibited and required by its founder, but to an anti-christian spirit everywhere condemned and denounced in the Bible. If the Bible approved of their wicked conduct and spirit, the objection would be fatal. But as it is, it is of no weight, as it is not of the spirit of Christianity, but of Anti-Christianity of which they complain.

(14.) They object that revealed religion is inconsistent with liberty of inquiry and of opinion. If by liberty of inquiry and opinion they mean that men are, or ought to be at liberty to hold and inculcate any opinion whatever without being morally responsible for their opinions, the objection is absurd and ridiculous. But if they mean that the Bible or the Christian religion does not allow and invite, and even challenge and demand the most solemn and thorough investigation, and the formation of the most solid and well founded opinions on all religious subjects, their objection is false, for this is precisely what the Bible and the Christian religion do demand of every man, that he shall "Prove all things and hold fast that (and that only) which is good."

Fourth. *Consider some of the Difficulties of Deism.*

I. *Difficulty.* The first difficulty that I shall notice, is, that their objections to Christianity are almost without an exception, either cavils, or alleged facts, but wholly unsupported by evidence. Most of them are mere cavils, unworthy of serious notice. Some of them might appear reasonable if supported by evidence, and others might be conclusive, were they not manifestly untrue. But as they are, taken together, they are of "no value, and a thing of naught."

II. *Difficulty.* To the doctrine of the mortal Deists, it may be reasonably objected that it is disguised Atheism. For while they profess to believe in the existence of God, their doctrines, or rather denials, blot out in the detail, his natural, and moral attributes

1. They deny his wisdom. Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and of the most suitable means for the

obtaining of those ends. But the mortal Deists represent God as having created the universe without any end, and as using no means to bring about any beneficial result. This is certainly involved in their denial of the divine providence.

2. They deny his intelligence, as they represent him as having acted in creation without any reasonable motive. For certainly, if the universe was not worth governing, it was not worth creating.

3. They deny all his moral attributes, benevolence, justice, mercy, truth, holiness, for which of these is consistent with the creation of such a universe as this, and afterwards refusing to care for it, or exercise a providential government over it.

To mortal Deism I object again, that it is contrary to the belief of all nations in all ages. It has been shown in a former lecture, that all nations of men in all ages, have believed in and acknowledged the grand and peculiar doctrines which mortal Deists deny, such as the immortality of the soul, the distinction between virtue and vice, the doctrine of a divine providence, and a future state of more perfect rewards and punishments.

To their denial of the distinction between virtue and vice, I object,

1. That it is contrary to consciousness. We certainly know that there is such a distinction. It is the dictate of our own moral nature. It is forced upon us by testimony that we cannot resist. And they themselves often manifest a conviction of its truth in awarding praise and blame to those around them.

2. If there is, in fact, no such distinction, our nature is such as to render it impossible for us to believe that there is none. Our moral nature demands such a distinction. And with respect to ourselves we should be morally praise or blame worthy, were there no law except that which is founded in our own nature. But the fact that our nature is what it is, affords the most unanswerable evidence, that a broad and important distinction actually exists between virtue and vice.

3. As our nature demands such a distinction, and as we are capable of perceiving clearly that there is a moral quality in actions, such a distinction must in fact be recognized in the government of God, or God is unjust.

To the doctrine of human annihilation, I object that this also is virtual Atheism, as it denies the essential attributes of God, for which of his attributes is consistent with the annihilation of beings capable of endless improvement, and who need an eternity to develop their faculties, and answer the highest ends of their being.

To the doctrines of immortal Deists, I object,

1. They are inconsistent in holding the doctrines of natural, and rejecting those of revealed religion. For they inculcate precisely the same lessons, so far as natural religion goes, and revealed religion only supplies what is manifestly wanting in the truths of natural religion.
2. The immortal Deists are inconsistent in believing in the moral attributes of God. For a denial of several of these attributes is in fact involved, in rejecting a revelation. E.g.—It involves the denial of his wisdom. Wisdom, I have said, is the choice of the best ends, and the best means for the accomplishment of these ends. Now that revelation as a matter of fact, is the necessary means of attaining the highest perfection of human nature, cannot, with any show of reason, be denied. With what consistency then do they hold to the wisdom of God, and deny that he has provided the necessary and indispensable means of effecting the holiness and happiness of his kingdom.
3. The immortal Deists, are inconsistent in maintaining the *justice* of God. It cannot, with any show of reason, be maintained that God deals with all men, in this state of existence, precisely according to their character. And without a divine revelation, how could it be positively shown that he would deal upon the principles of exact justice in a future life.
4. They are inconsistent in maintaining the mercy of God. To pardon sin, is the appropriate exercise of mercy. But without a divine revelation, how could it be known that God will pardon sin? How could it be ascertained that he could with any consistency, and safety, dispense with the execution of his law, in the pardon of sin? Some of the wisest men that have ever lived, who were ignorant of the Bible, have maintained that God could not forgive sin, and this conclusion seems to be the perfection of human reason, without a knowledge of the Atonement.
5. They are inconsistent in maintaining the infinite benevolence of God. Infinite benevolence would doubtless do all for man that the nature of the case admits. And the nature of the case certainly admits and demands a revelation.
6. They are inconsistent in holding the power, omniscience, and goodness of God, inasmuch as they deny and set aside the only explanation that reconciles the existence of these attributes in God, with the facts of the universe.
7. To the doctrine that nothing is to be received as an article of faith that is incomprehensible, I object; that this doctrine is destructive of their own systems and quite as inconsistent with it as with the system of Christianity. It is also inconsistent with the belief of almost everything else, as almost everything, contains something in or about it that is incomprehensible.
8. If they reject revelation, they are bound to maintain the doctrine of universal damnation.
 - (1.) Because all men deserve it.
 - (2.) Without the Bible we cannot see how they can consistently be forgiven, should they repent.
 - (3.) Without the motives presented in the Bible, it is a fact, that mankind never would repent. Without a knowledge of the Atonement, men know not that the goodness of God leadeth them to repentance; but after their hardness and impenitent heart treasure up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgments of God.
9. Every evidence in favor of the Bible, as a revelation from God, is a difficulty of Deism, with which it must grapple, and to which it is bound to give some reasonable answer.
10. To admit Deism to be true, we must admit that all the evidence in favor of the divine authority of the Bible is false, and that too without a particle of opposing evidence. This is to set aside all evidence, and consequently all science, and all knowledge, and all belief on every subject.
11. To admit the falsity of all the evidence in favor of a divine revelation, is to swallow the grossest absurdity, and to attempt to sustain Deism by a miracle, more stupendous than all the miracles recorded in the Bible. For certainly, that all this evidence should be false, were the greatest wonder and the greatest miracle in the universe.
12. Therefore Deism requires ridiculous credulity, and almost infinitely more faith, to believe that the Bible is an imposture, in view of all the evidence that exists, than to believe it is what it professes to be.
13. Deism is indebted to Christianity for nearly all the truth that it contains. It is true, that the doctrines of natural religion might be discovered by unaided reason; but as a matter of fact, they never have been to any considerable extent. And none but those Deists who have had access to the Bible have ever given anything like a consistent account of the doctrines of natural religion.
14. Deists are bound to account for the fact that the most enlightened and virtuous men have believed, that the Bible was a revelation from God. Sir Isaac Newton, than whom a greater philosopher never blessed the earth, was a firm believer in, and defender of the Bible, as a revelation from God.

15. Deists are bound to account for the fact that no one ever renounced the Christian religion upon a death bed, while nothing has been more common than for Deists to renounce their Deism in a dying hour.

16. The lives and deaths of Deists prove the inefficacy of their system to sustain them in virtue while alive, and in peace when they die.

17. Deism is, on many accounts, highly dishonorable to God.

18. It is also ruinous to man.

19. Its spirit condemns it.

20. Its tendencies, when well considered, are a complete refutation of it.

21. Upon the supposition that Christianity is not true, infidels are bound to account for the astonishing change in the conduct of the Apostles, after Christ's resurrection---how it came to pass, that instead of their former timidity, they were so fearless, so persevering, so willing to sacrifice every worldly interest, in defense of the truth that Christ had risen from the dead. If they were not honest and sincere, infidels are bound to show upon what principle of human nature such lives as they lived, and such deaths as they died, can be accounted for. With respect to the resurrection of Jesus Christ, it was a matter about which they could not be deceived. If they had stolen him from the sepulcher, as the Jews foolishly pretended, they knew it, and were certain that he had not risen from the dead. The certain knowledge that he had risen from the dead, would naturally result in that change which was witnessed in them. But upon no other conceivable supposition can their conduct be accounted for.

22. Again. Upon the supposition that Christianity is not true, Deists are bound to account for the fact, of the exact fulfillment of such great multitudes of prophecies, extending in an unbroken chain, from the present time back through hundreds and thousands of years. These prophecies have been so literally fulfilled, that some opposers of Christianity have insisted upon the great particularity with which they were fulfilled to the very letter, and have consequently inferred, that they were histories written after the occurrence of the facts which they describe.

23. Upon the supposition that Christianity is not true, Deists are bound to disprove or account for the miracles wrought in confirmation of the truth of the scriptures. That these were real and not pretended miracles, there can be no doubt.

24. If Christianity is not true, Deists are bound to account for the fact, that the Apostles so repeatedly

appealed to the Jews themselves, and to all classes of persons, before whom and among whom those miracles were wrought, and referred to those miracles as facts, which were universally admitted, and could not be denied. They are bound also to show why it was, that neither the friends nor enemies of Christianity, during the first centuries, ever pretended to call in question the reality of those miracles.

LECTURE IX.

NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

I am to show:

FIRST. What is meant by a natural attribute.

SECOND. What are some of the natural attributes of God.

First. What is meant by a natural attribute.

A natural attribute is that which pertains to a thing by a natural necessity, or whatever is attributable to it, as essential to its existence and nature. The natural attributes of God are those qualities, capacities, elements, susceptibilities, and natural perfections that constitute whatever we know of his nature and essence.

Second. Some of the natural attributes of God, etc.

I. Eternity.

II. Omniscience.

III. Omnipresence.

IV. Omnipotence.

V. Spirituality.

VI. Immutability.

Having established the divine authority of the Bible, we are, from this point in our inquiries, at liberty to quote it freely as a matter of record, and as conclusive evidence of what it plainly and unequivocally asserts. The natural attributes of God may be discovered, and their existence proved by the light of nature. But the infinity of these attributes, at least some of them, can only be fully and unanswerably proven from the Bible.

I. The Eternity of God.

1. I will show what is meant by the eternity of God, and also prove that eternity is an attribute of God.

By the eternity of God is meant:

(1.) That he is without beginning.

(2.) That he will never cease to be.

(3.) That he is eternal in such a sense as to grow no older.

(4.) That eternity is to God what present time is to us.

(1.) That he is without beginning, has been already established in the proof of his existence as a first cause of all things.

(2.) That he can never cease to be is certain:

a. Because he is self-existent. Self-existence is necessary existence. But necessary existence cannot cease to be. He cannot destroy himself. No created power can destroy him. He cannot fail or die with age, as he grows no older. If he did, there is no proof that a mere spirit can fail with age. As he exists independently of any cause, it is naturally impossible that he should cease to exist; for there can be no cause of his non-existence or ceasing to exist. His ceasing to exist, then, would be an event without a cause, which is absurd and naturally impossible.

b. The Bible fully declares, that God is without beginning or end; i.e. that he is absolutely eternal. He is spoken of as the "eternal God." And the Bible fully and unequivocally, in many ways, declares his eternity.

(3.) He is eternal in such a sense as to grow no older. If he grows older, it is intuitively certain that he had a beginning:

a. Because, if his age can be at all reduced, by subtracting years or ages, it can be exhausted.

b. If he grows older, his age can be reduced as certainly as ours can.

c. If anything can be added to his age, then something can be subtracted from it; and it can be reduced to nothing. If anything could be added to or subtracted from space, so as to make more or less of the aggregate, it could be reduced to nothing.

d. If God grows older, he was once comparatively young. If comparatively young, he was once really young. And if once young, he began to be.

e. If he grows older, he has had new thoughts, exercises, and experiences, in the same sense that we have. In this case it is intuitively certain, that his knowledge commenced, and has increased with his age.

f. If his exercises and experiences are progressive, or if succession can be predicated of them, it is intuitively certain, that not only his knowledge has increased, but his holiness has increased, and both of them must forever increase.

g. If there is succession in God's existence and exercises, it is intuitively certain that he never was,

never will be, never can be, infinite in age, knowledge, experience, holiness, or happiness.

h. If succession can be predicated of God's existence and mental states, it is intuitively certain, that he is not only not infinite, but that he is infinitely less than infinite--that when compared with eternity, he is but a babe, or infinitely young---when compared with omniscience, he is infinitely ignorant---and when compared with infinite blessedness, his happiness falls infinitely short of it. And that in all these particulars, he will forever remain as far from infinite as he now is, or ever has been.

i. If succession can be predicated of his existence, the existence of every moment must be dependent upon the existence of the preceding moment. He exists this moment, because he existed the moment previous. This involves the absurdity of an infinite series of dependencies. If succession can be predicated of his mental states or exercises, this would involve the same absurdity.

j. There is no need of supposing God's existence to be successive like ours; because, eternity past and future to us, all that we call duration, really exists at present, as much and in the same sense as all space exists. In respect to space, the terms before, behind, and the ideas represented by the words above, below, right, left, there, etc., are only relative; and apart from finite existences, these words have no meaning. Remove all finite existences, and there could be no room for any such language.

With respect to the existence of God, there is no right, left, up, down, there, behind, before, etc. There is here and there to all finite existences; but to God everything is *here*. So in respect to what we call duration. Times past and future are relative, and respect only finite existences, or such existences as began to be. They cannot possibly respect a being who never began to be, and who grows no older. He can no more pass on through duration, than through space. Neither space nor duration can have any meaning with him, except as it respects finite existence. All space is to him here, a single point where he exists. All eternity is to him now, or that point which is filled up by his present experience. With respect to his existence, he cannot say, yesterday--tomorrow---when I was young--- when I am older. And when he speaks of his acts or existence, with respect to duration, as being past or future, he must mean by it just what he would mean, should he speak of his existence or acts in respect to place. If he speaks of working here or there, in this or that place, it does not imply that God is confined to place, or has locality. Nor when he speaks of things as past or future, ought we to understand him

as speaking thus in respect to himself. In respect to all finite existences, there is in fact locality, time, and place, past and future. But to affirm these things as true of God, is to suppose him finite instead of infinite.

(4.) Eternity is to God as present time is to us.

a. By time, as it respects ourselves, we mean that portion of duration which commences with our birth and ends with our death.

b. By past time, we mean that portion of this period, through which we have passed and of which nothing remains to us but the remembrance.

c. By present time, we mean that point indicated by present consciousness; the point at which that mental state of which we are conscious is in exercise.

d. Our mental states or exercises are single, and successive, And by past, present, future, we refer to the order in which they or the occasions of them occur.

e. Time to us is the progression of existence and experience. Present time is that which is filled up by our present experience and consciousness. Successive exercises are successive experience. Successive experience is increasing knowledge. Succession, therefore, belongs to a finite being.

f. But God is not a finite being. He cannot be omniscient, and yet obtain knowledge from experience. Succession cannot therefore be predicated of him, either in relation to his existence or mental states. He always has the same mental state or consciousness. He can have no new thoughts, as there is no possible source from which to derive them. He can have no new affections or emotions, as He can have no new ideas or knowledge.

Therefore, his present consciousness is his eternal consciousness, and eternity is to him what present time is to us. God's existence is infinite, both in respect to duration and space. This is expressly declared in the Bible; and if it were not true he is infinitely less than infinite. As it respects God's existence then, space has no other idea than *here*. And eternity has no other idea than *now*. All here and there must respect such existences as are not omniscient. All past and future must respect such existences as are not eternally self-existent, and always equally and eternally old.

Omnipresence, to us, means both here, there, anywhere, and everywhere. But to God, it means only here. So eternity to us, means all past, present and future duration. But to God it means only *now*. Duration and space, as they respect his existence, mean infinitely different things from what they do when they respect our existence. God's existence and his acts, as they respect finite existence, have relation to time and place. But as

they respect his own existence, everything is *here* and *now*. With respect to all finite existences, God can say I was, I am, I shall be, do, will do; but with respect to his own existence, all that he can, say is, *I am, I do*.

g. The Bible seems to favor this view of the subject, although it would guard against pressing our minds with such a metaphysical nicety. Thus God calls himself "**I AM**." Christ says, "Before Abraham was, **I AM**." To him a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years. A thousand years here is a definite for an indefinite period. As when God says the cattle on a thousand hills are his, he means the cattle on all hills are his. This I understand to be an expression of the same kind. Its connection plainly leads us to this inference, that by a thousand years we are to understand all time, of which it is said, that it is as one day, or as present time to God.

2. I will now notice some objections to this view.

Obj. 1. We can form no conception of an existence, to which there is no succession.

Ans. 1. The difficulty of this conception lies in our finite and progressive existence. All our thoughts, exercises, and experience, and knowledge, are progressive. Consequently we can form no positive conception of the *modus existendi* of a being, to whom succession does not appertain. Nor is this difficulty attributable to any want of perfection in our creation. As we are finite and began to be, it was impossible that God should create us in a manner that would obviate this difficulty. We once had no existence. We must therefore begin to be. Everything, therefore, with respect to us must be successive. Nor is this a difficulty that need be injurious to us. For we conceive of God with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes, when we conceive of his existence as coeval with all other existences and events.

2. We can form no other conception of infinity, than that it exists and is that which is unlimited; and of course, that a positive conception of it is inconceivable by finite minds. To say that we have a positive conception or idea of infinity is a contradiction, as it supposes there is a whole of infinity, which implies a bound or limit; which contradicts the true meaning of infinity.

3. Although we can form no positive idea or conception of infinity; yet we can see that to speak of it as incapable either of increase or diminution, is a contradiction. So, although we can have no positive idea of the eternal, self-existence of God; yet we can see, that to say he began to be, is absurd and contradicts his eternity. So, although we can have no positive idea of his existence

and mental states, as not successive; yet we can see that succession in his existence and mental states, involves the absurdity, that he grows older--- that he was once young---that he began to be---that he never was and never will be an eternal being---that he never was and never can be an infinite being---that he never can, in the least degree, approach towards being eternal in his duration, or infinite in his knowledge or happiness.

Obj. II. God always speaks just as if his existence and acts were successive.

Ans. He must of course speak of them as they appear and really are to us, or we should receive no ideas from what he says.

Obj. III. God sees things as they are or as they are not. Now as events do really occur in succession, they must appear so to him.

Ans. To us they occur in succession, but not to him. To us they have relation to place, but not to him. To us they occur before, behind, in time past, present, or future; but to him they occur *here*, and they occur *now*.

Obj. IV. It confounds and overturns all our methods of reasoning, with respect to the reality of events.

Ans. Events really are, with respect to us, what they appear to be. Our reasonings concerning the reality and existence of things, may be just as it respects ourselves and as it respects God. And yet, as it regards time and place, everything may be here and now to him, while to us they are spread through immensity and eternity. In other words, God is infinite and we are finite. We must always conceive of things, and reason as finite beings. He will always conceive of things, and reason as an infinite being, apprehending realities as they are to us, and in the relation they sustain to us in regard to time and place, and also having that infinitely different view of them that respects his own infinite existence.

II. *God's omniscience.*

By the omniscience of God is not meant, merely the capacity of knowing all things. A distinguished commentator has defined omniscience to be a capacity to know whatever is wise to be known. This definition was resorted to, to avoid the inference of personal election from the fore-knowledge of God. Omnipotence, says this commentator, (not to use his words, but his idea,) is not the absolute doing of all that is do-able; but ability to do whatever is wise to be done. Omnipotence, therefore, in its exercises, is directed by wisdom. So omniscience, he says, is under the direction of wisdom. And while God's omnipotence does not do what is unwise to be done, just so omniscience does not know what is unwise to be known. To this statement it is

sufficient to reply, that the thing must be previously known, before wisdom could decide whether the knowledge of it would be wise or unwise. But omniscience is the absolute knowledge of all existences, even, and things, actual or possible.

PROOF.

1. His works afford the most convincing evidence of a degree of knowledge, to which certainly a finite being can fix no bounds.

2. His providential government of the universe, strengthens and confirms this proof.

3. Prophecy would seem to prove that God must really be omniscient. Multitudes of the prophecies respect the future exercises and conduct of free moral agents. And a being who can with certainty predict the events of all time and eternity, foreseeing the end from the beginning, in respect to the exercises, and character, and destiny of moral agents, must be omniscient.

4. The administration of moral government, depends upon the exact knowledge which he possesses of the state of mind of every moral being in the universe, and of the exact result in which every movement of his government and providence will terminate.

5. His works of grace, in searching the heart, and bringing about the conviction, conversion, and salvation of sinners, must prove him omniscient.

6. The Bible expressly ascribes omniscience to him:

John 21:17: "Thou knowest all things."

John 2:24, 25: "But Jesus did not commit himself unto them, because he knew all men, and needed not that any should testify of man: for he knew what was in man."

John 16:30: "Now are we sure that thou knowest all things, and needest not that any man should ask thee: by this we believe that thou camest forth from God."

Psalms 139:1-6: "O Lord, thou hast searched me, and known me. Thou knowest my down-sitting and mine up-rising; thou understandest my thought afar off. Thou compasses my path, and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word in my tongue, but, lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether. Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thy hand upon me. Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it."

1 Chronicles 28:9: "And thou, Solomon my son, know thou the God of thy father, and serve him with a perfect heart, and with a willing mind; for the Lord searcheth all hearts, and understandeth all the imaginations of the

thoughts: if thou seek him, he will be found of thee; but if thou forsake him, he will cast thee off forever."

Romans 8:27: "And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God."

1 Corinthians 2:10: "But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God."

Revelation 2:23: "And I will kill her children with death; and all the churches shall know that I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts: and I will give unto everyone of you according to your works."

III. *The omnipresence of God.*

By omnipresence is meant essential ubiquity. Some understand by the omnipresence of God, not essential ubiquity, but that he merely knows all things. They object to the idea of his essential ubiquity, that it predicates extendibility of God. And that to say that God is everywhere essentially present, is to maintain that only a part of God is in any one place.

Again, they object, that mind has no relation to place, any more than an hour has. To these objections I answer:

1. They confound mind with matter. God is a real existence; an hour is not. Existence must certainly and necessarily sustain relation to space or place. An hour does not, cannot. God must sustain relation to place, but not the same relation that matter does. Matter fills that portion of space occupied by it, to the exclusion of other material substances. God occupies all space, but not in such a sense as matter occupies space.

2. These objections exclude the idea of God's being anywhere. Whereness is a necessary idea suggested by the idea of existence, or substance. With respect to the first objection, that essential ubiquity implies that only a part of God is in any one place, it is nonsensical, when applied to mind. The fact is, that wherever mind is, there all the attributes of mind are, and may be exercised, whether in any one point of space or occupying all space.

The proof of the essential ubiquity of God is:

(1.) His works of creation and providence. It is certain, that he must exist wherever he works or exercises any personal agency. It is not supposed that the universe is infinite.

Therefore his presence throughout the universe would not prove him absolutely omnipresent. But if he can exist in more places than one at the same time; if he

can and does exist in every part of the universe at the same time, the inference is fair, that he may be and is omnipresent.

(2.) The Bible speaks of God as being present in every part of the universe. Psalms 139:7-10: "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me."

It is impossible for us to know how extensive the universe is. But, as has been said, absolute omnipresence is a legitimate inference, from creation, providence, and the Bible.

IV. *The omnipotence of God.*

By the omnipotence of God is meant:

1. Not an ability to perform contradictions.
2. But an ability to accomplish whatever is an object of physical power.

The proof of God's omnipotence is:

1. The works of creation.
2. Sustaining and governing the physical universe.
3. The Bible ascribes omnipotence to God. Job 42:2: "I know that thou canst do everything." He is frequently called the Almighty.

V. *The Spirituality of God.*

By the spirituality of God, we understand that his existence or substance is immaterial---a substance or existence possessing properties essentially different from those of matter.

The proof of the spirituality of God is:

1. One of the properties of matter is solidity. If God were material, no other material being could exist. As he is omnipresent he would of course, if he were material, exclude all other material existences.
2. If God is material, it is impossible that he should not exhibit any one property of matter.
3. The Bible expressly affirms that "God is a Spirit."

VI. *Immutability of God.*

By immutability is meant the unchangeableness of the nature of God. That he is naturally unchangeable, is evident, because:

1. His existence is necessary, and necessarily just what it is.
2. He did not create and cannot change his own nature.

3. As his existence, as it is, depends on no cause, change in his nature is naturally impossible, as a change in his nature would be an event without a cause.

REMARKS:

1. God's natural attributes are just such as perfectly qualify him to sustain the office of Universal Ruler of the universe.
2. His moral character must be a matter of infinite interest and importance to the universe.
3. His praise-worthiness does not depend upon the existence of his natural attributes, but upon the use he makes of them.
4. Omniscience does not render the existence of events necessary.
5. Omnipotence does not render universal salvation certain nor probable.
6. Natural omnipotence affords no proof that sin could have been prevented under a moral government.

LECTURE X.

MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

FIRST. Show what is meant by a moral attribute.

SECOND. What are some of the moral attributes of God.

THIRD. Prove that he possesses such attributes.

First. *Show what is meant by a moral attribute.*

A *natural* attribute is that which belongs to the nature of a being. A *moral* attribute is a disposition or state of the will. It is a permanent choice or preference of the mind, in opposition to a constitutional or natural attribute, on the one hand, and to individual exercises, on the other.

Second. *What are some of the moral attributes of God.*

Benevolence may be considered either as an attribute of God, or as the sum of all his moral attributes. It seems to be convenient sometimes to speak of his benevolence as an attribute, and at other times as the sum of them all. It should however, always be understood, that God's entire character, and every moral exercise of his infinite mind, is only some modification of his benevolence. And that when we speak of benevolence as an attribute we do it merely for convenience sake, and for the purpose of directing the mind particularly to that expression of it, that consists in willing good to *its object*. When we speak of justice,

mercy, truth, wisdom, holiness, etc., we also use these terms for convenience sake, for the purpose of confining the attention to those particular modifications or expressions of benevolence. I shall consider these attributes in the order in which I have just named them, viz., Benevolence, Justice, Mercy, Truth, Wisdom, Holiness.

Moral attributes, presuppose **moral agency**. I will therefore, in this place, premise a few remarks upon the subject of the moral agency of God.

1. A moral agent, as has been remarked in a former lecture, is a being who possesses understanding, reason, conscience, and freewill. Understanding, reason, and conscience are all plainly implied in omniscience, for it is impossible that God should know all things without possessing these faculties.

2. That God has a will, must be certain from the fact that the whole power of mind to produce any effect without itself, lies in the will. This we know from our own consciousness to be true of ourselves, and from the phenomena exhibited to our senses, with respect to the existence and nature of God, we necessarily infer that he is a mind like ourselves, and that his power to produce effects without himself, lies wholly in his will. We are so constituted that we cannot conceive of any other possible manner in which he should produce effects without himself, any more than we can conceive the existence or nature of a class of objects which would require the addition of another sense to enable us to perceive them.

3. The existence then, and phenomena of the universe afford as high evidence that God possesses a will, as that he exists at all.

4. That the will of God is free, I infer,

(1.) From the fact that we know ourselves to be free, with as much certainty as we know that we exist.

(2.) We can form no conception of a voluntary being that is not free, for volition always implies freedom.

(3.) Volition and necessity are terms of opposition. Volition can no more be produced by force, than material changes can be produced by motives. Volition can be produced in no other way than by motive, and if produced by motive, it is absurd, and a contradiction to say that it is not free.

Third. *Prove that God possesses such attributes.*

BENEVOLENCE

1. God must be *benevolent*, or *malevolent*. It is impossible that he should be indifferent, or have no will at all, in respect to his own good, and the good of the

universe. It were absurd, to say that he is omniscient, and yet neither wills the happiness or misery of himself or any other being.

2. God can, by no possibility, be both benevolent and malevolent at the same time. In other words, he cannot will both the happiness and misery of himself, and the universe at the same time. These are opposite states of the will, and it is absurd to suppose that they can both exist at the same time.

3. If God is malevolent at all, he must not only be perfectly, but infinitely and unchangeably malevolent. As God is an infinite being, perfect malevolence in him, is infinite malevolence, and it is absurd to say that what is infinite, can be changed.

4. If God is malevolent, he is immutably so, because he can never have any new thoughts as motives that shall induce any change in him. He cannot, from himself, or from any of his creatures, by any possibility, ever get any new information, or possess any new thoughts, and consequently his moral character, whatever it is, is unchangeable. His mind must be made up. He must have decided his own character and *benevolence*, or *malevolence* must be the unalterable state of his will.

That he is benevolent, I argue,

5. From the fact of his omniscience. He could not but know all the reasons in favor of benevolence, and all the reasons against malevolence. He could not by any possibility be ignorant of the reasons on either side, nor so divert his mind from them as that they should not have their full influence in deciding his character, and in confirming it forever. Finite beings are ignorant of many of the reasons for benevolence, and against malevolence. They may and often do divert their attention from those reasons with which they are really acquainted, and do not act under the influence of what knowledge they have. But God is omniscient. Every motive that exists, lies with all its weight upon his mind, and that constantly. And as there are infinitely higher motives to benevolence than to malevolence, and as these motives are fully known, to and appreciated by God, we reasonably infer from this consideration, that he is benevolent.

6. I infer the benevolence of God, from the fact, that the motives to benevolence are absolutely infinite, just as great as the value of his own eternal happiness, and the happiness of the whole universe.

7. I infer his benevolence from the fact that the motives against malevolence are absolutely infinite. Malevolence naturally and necessarily creates mutiny and war, and misery in the mind of a moral agent, while benevolence just as naturally and necessarily produces harmony;

peace, and happiness. The motives against malevolence that must be constantly and fully before the mind of God, that are perfectly comprehended and weighed by him, are just as great as his own eternal and infinite misery with the eternal and perfect misery of the whole universe. For certainly perfect and infinite malevolence in God would make himself and the whole universe as miserable as possible.

8. That God is not malevolent, I infer from the fact that the universe as it actually exists, is not what it certainly would be under the government of an infinitely malevolent being.

9. That he is benevolent, is shown in many ways from the constitution of our own nature.

(1.) He is a moral being, and must therefore deserve the respect and esteem of other moral beings. We are so constituted that we admire and esteem benevolence, but naturally and necessarily abhor malevolence. Now if God is benevolent, we are so constituted that we must respect and approve his character in spite of ourselves. The wickedest moral agent in the universe, must respect and approve his character if it is benevolent. But on the contrary, if it is malevolent, he has so created us that we only need to know him to be under the constitutional necessity of abhorring him. It is absurd therefore to say that God is a moral being, and has so created other moral beings, that they are under a constitutional necessity of abhorring him whenever they know him.

(2.) Another evidence of the benevolence of God, which is to be found in our own constitution is the conscious fact that the sight of misery excites compassion in us. If God were a malevolent being, and willed the misery of his creatures, it is absurd to suppose that he would so have constituted moral agents, as that they would feel naturally prompted by the very laws of their being, to relieve misery, and as far as possible prevent it.

Another fact to be noticed in our own constitution is that compassion or benevolence produces happiness in us, and is both accompanied with and followed by a feeling of complacency and happiness. If benevolence is necessarily attended with and followed by happiness and self-complacency, this must afford almost a demonstration that the author of our nature is benevolent and not malevolent. The conscious fact that benevolence always produces peace and happiness, and malevolence a sense of guilt and misery in us, is most decisive proof that the author of our nature is benevolent, and not malevolent.

(3.) The decisions of conscience are also a striking proof that the author of our nature is benevolent and not

malevolent. It unhesitatingly approves of benevolence and condemns malevolence, and would as readily condemn malevolence in God as in any of his creatures.

(4.) The place which conscience holds in our mental constitution, is a striking evidence of the benevolence of God. It is manifestly the supreme moral faculty, i.e., it possesses a rightful supremacy, although it has not always the power to control the will. It possesses the right though not always the power of government. Now to suppose that God is malevolent and still the author of our nature is absurd, as it would be equivalent to supposing that his disposition is malevolent, and his works benevolent.

10. If God is not benevolent, he must abhor himself. We naturally and necessarily abhor malevolence, both in ourselves and everybody else. And if God is a moral being and malevolent, he must abhor himself from the very constitution of his being.

11. If God is a malevolent being, he is infinitely miserable.

12. If he is a benevolent being, he must be infinitely happy.

13. Benevolence is everywhere manifest in the works of God. There is not only in every department of nature evidence of design, but of benevolent design. There is not only contrivance manifested, but these contrivances manifestly tend to happiness as their end. The universe not only affords the highest evidence that the whole system of events sustain the relation of means to an end, but that this end is happiness. The adaptation of external nature to our intellectual and moral constitution affords the highest proof that the author of the universe consulted the happiness of sentient and moral beings in its creation.

14. The Bible expressly declares that God is love. And all its representations of his character are in accordance with the assertion that God is benevolence.

(1.) The Bible represents God as exercising a universal providence over the universe, and the history of this world shows that it has not been as miserable as it would have been under the providence of a perfectly and infinitely malevolent being.

(2.) His moral law proves his benevolence. Law is an expression of the will of the law-giver. In other words: it is the law-giver's will expressed. But this law requires universal and perfect benevolence. But God's will and law are the same thing. Therefore God is benevolent.

(3.) The sanction as well as the precept of his law, proves him benevolent. The sanction is in the first place indicated,

a. By the natural and necessary connection of benevolence with happiness, and of malevolence with misery.

b. The Bible informs us that God will award eternal happiness to the benevolent, and eternal misery to the malevolent. These sanctions afford the highest evidence that we are capable of receiving of God's infinite benevolence.

(4.) The *Bible* as a revelation from God, is both an instance and a striking proof of the benevolence of God. Its doctrines are a most stupendous revelation of God's benevolence, and afford the highest evidence of its being infinite, that the mind of man or angel can conceive.

The evidences of God's benevolence are as numerous as all his works and ways. It is unnecessary to proceed any farther in the direct proof of his benevolence. I shall therefore now consider such *objections* to the benevolence of God as seem to require notice.

It is admitted on all hands that God must be in some degree benevolent. But it is contended by some that so far as the light of nature goes, it would appear that he is of a mixed character, and that neither his providence nor his works, indicate unmingled benevolence in him. The mixture of both moral and natural good and evil in this world, has induced many heathen nations to adopt the idea of two Gods of opposite characters, a benevolent and malevolent one. Others have supposed that good and evil were eternally existing principles, forever conflicting with each other, and that the prevalence sometimes of one and sometimes of the other, and the modified influence of both, accounts for the actually existing state of the universe.

Many who have possessed the Bible have felt unable to answer the objections that seem to lie against the perfect benevolence of God in the actually existing state of things in the universe. Before I enter upon the consideration of these objections, I must remind you of the substance of what has been said in a former lecture, in regard to the influence of objections in setting aside evidence.

1. When a proposition is well established by evidence, an objection interposed to overthrow it, must be a matter of fact, and not a mere conjecture or assertion.

2. If a fact, it must be plainly inconsistent with the truth of the proposition against which it is alleged, for if the existence of the fact *may be* consistent with the truth of the proposition which is well established by evidence, it does not by any means invalidate the evidence in favor of the truth of the proposition. The objector is therefore bound to show not only that his objection is a reality and

a truth, or a fact, but that it cannot be reconciled with the truth of the proposition. Otherwise, when the proposition is well supported by evidence, his objection will not overthrow it. I come now to notice the objections.

Objection I. It is objected that many animals are furnished with weapons or instruments with which to inflict pain. To this I reply:

1. These weapons were many of them given for self-defense, which shows God's regard for the happiness and rights of their possessors.

2. Many of them were given as means of securing their prey, or the food on which they are to subsist. In neither of these cases was the infliction of pain the end for which these weapons were given. The end, in both cases, was benevolent, and the infliction of pain is only *incidental* to the securing of these benevolent ends.

Obj. II. It is objected that the fact that different species of animals prey and subsist upon each other, is an evidence that God is not perfectly benevolent, To this I reply:

1. Animal life, while it lasts, is a real blessing, and probably in every instance, more than compensates for the pain of death.

2. From the very constitution of animals, they are necessarily mortal, and it is certainly good economy to make the carcass of one, food for others, as in this case a greater number of animals can subsist upon the earth. E.g.: Let the earth be filled with vegetable eating animals, as many as could subsist upon that species of diet. Then let us suppose another class of animals to subsist upon the flesh of the vegetable-eating animals, and another class to subsist upon the milk both of the vegetable and flesh-eating animals. It is easy to see that in this way a greater amount of animal life, and consequently of bestial happiness can be secured than would be otherwise possible. The fact that animals do so subsist, is therefore a striking evidence of the economic benevolence of the Creator. Just so in the sea. One species of fish may live on certain marine substances, and when the number is so multiplied as that no more can be supplied with such kinds of aliment other species may exist that will prey upon these, as is actually the fact, and thus a greater number of fishes may exist than were otherwise possible.

3. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say, that it cannot be shown that the whole amount of animal happiness is not greater than if animals and fishes did not prey upon one another.

Obj. III. It is objected that the pains and evils to which we are naturally and necessarily subjected in this world,

are inconsistent with the perfect benevolence of God. To this I reply:

1. It cannot be shown that pain was ever purposed as an end, either in the formation or government of anything in the universe, and wherever there is pain, it is only incidental to the obtaining some benevolent end. Teeth were not made to ache, but for a benevolent purpose. Yet pain is incidental to their existence, or rather arises out of their abuse.

2. All pain or natural evil is the result of an infraction of laws that were established for the accomplishment of wise and benevolent ends. The pain is incidental to the existence of those laws. Those laws are wise and good and benevolent. But the infraction of them produces pain.

Obj. IV. It is objected that infants and innocent animals are often involved in the calamities and evils which they have not deserved by any violation of law physical or moral. Answer,

1. Infants and innocent animals are parts of a great system, and so connected with holy and sinful beings as to be benefited by their virtues, and injured by their vices. They receive the benefits on the one hand, and the injuries on the other, not because of their own good or ill desert, but as a necessary consequence of the wise and benevolent arrangement that has so connected them with this system of existences.

2. Notwithstanding all the injuries of which they are sometimes the subjects, in consequence of this connection, their existence as a whole, is nevertheless a blessing.

3. It cannot be shown, that in a world like this, sickness, pain, death, and other apparent ills are, after all, real evils. They certainly are often only blessings in disguise. And it cannot be shown, that upon the whole they are not invariably so.

4. With respect to the death of infants and of animals, their death may be mercifully ordered to prevent still greater calamities befalling them. And in the case of infants, there is no reason to doubt that their natural death is only the entrance upon eternal life.

Obj. V. It is objected, that the existence of sin or moral evil in the universe sets aside the proof of the perfect benevolence of God. It is affirmed by some, that aside from revelation, the perfect benevolence of God cannot be proved, as the existence of sin in the universe must appear to be inconsistent, either with his wisdom, power, or goodness. To this I reply:

1. That to set aside the proof of God's benevolence, it must be made to appear, that the universe, as it is, is

not, in itself, a good---that upon the whole it is not better than no universe at all; but this can never be shown; because, even in this world, life is regarded as a blessing and as a real good.

2. To set aside the proof of the *perfect* benevolence of God, it must be shown, that the universe is not as perfect as it might have been---that upon the whole, a better and more desirable universe was possible; but this can never be shown. *For,*

(1.) The universe is valuable only as it results in happiness; and it cannot be shown, that a greater amount of happiness, upon the whole, could have been procured by any possible arrangement, than will result from the present system.

(2.) Freedom, or liberty, is essential to virtue.

(3.) Virtue is essential to happiness.

(4.) The amount of happiness depends upon the amount and strength of virtue.

(5.) The strength of virtue depends:

a. On the perfection of liberty,

b. On the amount of temptation resisted and overcome.

Hence:

(6.) There is the most virtue where there is the highest liberty, and the most temptation overcome. Hence:

(7.) The most happiness will result from that system in which there is the most perfect liberty, with the greatest amount of trial or temptation, resisted and overcome. Hence:

(8.) It cannot be shown that the present system, with all its natural and moral evils, does not, after all, result in a greater amount of virtue and happiness than any other system would or could have done. Had there been more temptation, it might have destroyed all virtue. Had there been less, virtue had certainly been less valuable, and final happiness less complete.

3. The existence of sin is no valid objection to the *perfect* benevolence of God, unless it be shown that sin could have been prevented, under a system of moral government. It is manifest that sin could have been prevented in only one of two ways:

(1.) By a refusal on the part of God, to create a universe of moral beings and administer over them a moral government; or,

(2.) By so modifying the administration of moral government, as to have suffered so much less temptation as should have secured universal obedience.

But to have created no universe of moral beings would not have been benevolent, if their existence is a real blessing.

When they were created, to have so modified the administration of government as to have secured universal obedience, might not, to say the least, have resulted upon the whole, in so great strength of virtue, and so perfect happiness in those who are virtuous as will result from the present form and circumstances of God's government. It cannot be shown, therefore, that it would have been either wise or benevolent, so to have modified the form and administration of moral government, as to have excluded sin entirely from the universe.

4. It cannot be shown that wholly to have excluded sin from the universe was naturally possible. Mind is influenced by motive. Motive implies knowledge. All moral beings, except God, begin to be. They are at first entirely destitute of knowledge. Many things they must learn by experience, and can come to a knowledge of them in no other way. And as there would be in the universe no knowledge, either of the nature or tendencies of sin, without experience, it can never be shown, that the prevention of sin, under a moral government, and among races of beings who commenced their existence in a state of entire ignorance, is naturally possible. But until this is shown, the existence of sin is no valid objection to the perfect benevolence of God.

Let it be remembered, that in view of the abundant proof of God's benevolence that everywhere exists, we are called upon only to show, that natural and moral evil *may* be accounted for in consistency with the supposition that God is *perfectly* and *infinitely* benevolent. We are not bound to show *how* sin came to exist, or *how* God will dispose of it; but only that its existence may be accounted for in consistency with the truth of all the evidence for the benevolence of God. It is doubtless true that all natural evil does at the time, or will ultimately result in salutary restraint upon moral beings. And as all moral evil is increasing the experience and knowledge of the universe in respect to its nature and tendencies, it is certain that its ultimate result will be confirmatory of the divine authority over all virtuous minds. Just as the developments of the nature and tendencies of alcohol, give strength and efficiency to the principles and moral obligations of the temperance reformation.

Obj. VI. If God is benevolent, says the objector, why did he create moral beings, knowing as he must have

known, that so many of them would fall into sin and perish.

Ans. 1. If the creation of the universe finally results in greater good than evil, its creation was a dictate of benevolence.

2. That it will finally result in greater good than evil we have every reason to believe, from the fact that all virtuous beings will be happy of course, and abundant means are provided for the reclaiming and saving myriads of sinners.

INFERENCES AND REMARKS.

1. If God is infinitely benevolent, it is said that the salvation of all men is secured.

Ans. This assumes, that God *can* wisely save all men.

2. If God is infinitely benevolent he loves all men alike, and will of course save them all.

Ans. With the love of benevolence God does love all men and devils, irrespective of their character; but with the love of complacency, or delight in their character, upon which kind of love his final treatment of them as judge of the world must be based, he does not and cannot regard all men alike. For as a matter of fact, they are not alike.

3. It is said, that if God does not save all men, his love is partial and not universal.

Ans. This would be true, if he were not alike benevolent to all; but it would be partiality itself for him finally to treat all men alike. This would be partiality to the wicked, or treating them with unreasonable favor, and not according to their real characters.

4. If God is benevolent, then he is not angry with the wicked every day, as the Bible affirms that he is.

Ans. He is angry with the wicked every day, and his anger *against* the wicked is only a modification of his benevolence to the universe. His anger against sinners is equal to and a modification of his love of the order and happiness of the universe.

5. If God's benevolence is infinite, he cannot sin; i.e. he cannot be made willing to sin. There can be no such amount of temptation existing as to overcome the infinite strength of his virtue.

6. If God is love, it is certain that he will employ the whole of his natural attributes in promoting the virtue and happiness of the universe, to the full extent of his power.

7. What an infinite privilege it is to live under the government of such a Being, possessing infinite natural attributes, with a heart to use them all with most divine

economy for the promotion of happiness and virtue forever.

8. What an infinite amount of happiness must finally result to the universe, from the administration of a moral government by such a Ruler:

LECTURE XI.

MORAL ATTRIBUTES.---No. 2.

JUSTICE OF GOD

FIRST. Define the term Justice.

SECOND. Show the several senses in which it is used.

THIRD. Prove that God is just.

FOURTH. Answer an objection.

First. *Define the term Justice.*

Justice is a hearty and practical regard to the rights of all beings. I say it is hearty and practical. It is an affection of the mind; an efficient affection that results in corresponding action.

Second. *Different senses in which the term is used.*

1. *Commercial Justice.* This relates to trade, and is the rendering of exact equivalents in human dealings.

2. *Commutative Justice.* This relates to government, and consists in substitution, or the substituting of one form of punishment, which is preferred by the criminal, and equally advantageous to the government, for another form which he deserves, and to which he has been sentenced. Thus banishment or confinement in the state prison during life is sometimes substituted for the punishment of death.

3. *Remunerative Justice.* This is governmental, and consists in bestowing merited rewards upon virtue.

4. *Retributive or Penal Justice.* This also is governmental, and consists in the infliction of merited punishments.

5. *Public Justice.* This also is governmental, and consists in a due and practical regard to the public rights and interests. It is that which the public have a right to expect and demand for the protection of public morals and the public good, and is that which the law-giver is bound to exercise.

6. *General Justice.* This is synonymous with whatever is upon the whole right, and best to be done. This is righteousness and true holiness, and includes both mercy and grace, when their exercise is consistent with

what is upon the whole wise and good. Every form of justice is some modification of benevolence. It is a good will to being in general, carried out in its application to the particular circumstances under which it is manifested. Thus benevolence or good will to the public, leads to the infliction of penal evil upon transgressors. This manifestation of benevolence, we call retributive or penal justice.

Commercial justice does not relate to God. All the other forms which I have mentioned do.

Third. *Prove that God is just.*

1. The justice of God is manifested by the fact, that he has subjected the universe to laws, physical and moral, with appropriate sanctions.

2. These sanctions are universally remuneratory and vindicatory, i.e. virtue is rewarded, and vice i.e. punished.

3. The sanctions, so far as we can see, are universally proportioned to the importance of the precept.

4. The remuneratory part of the sanction, that which promises reward to virtue, is in no case set aside when the precept is obeyed.

5. The vindicatory part of the sanction, that which threatens evil to disobedience, is in no case dispensed with, unless full satisfaction be made to public justice.

6. The fact that the penalty attaches, and the work of retribution *commences* instantly on the breach of the precept.

7. The instant and constant bestowment, to some extent, of the rewards of virtue upon obedience. The constitution of moral beings is so framed by their author, that obedience and disobedience to moral law, are instantly followed, the one by the sweets which are naturally and necessarily connected with obedience, and the other with the stings, gnawings, and agonies, that are certainly and necessarily connected with disobedience.

8. Nothing but the Atonement, which is the satisfaction of public justice, ever arrests and sets aside the execution of penal justice in any instance.

9. We reasonably infer the justice of God from the very constitution of our nature. We are so constituted, as from the very laws of our being, to approve, honor, and love justice, and to abhor injustice. If, therefore, God is not just, he has so created us, that we need only to know him to render it impossible for us not to abhor him.

10. If God is not just, he must be unjust; for it is naturally impossible that he should be neither.

11. If God is unjust, he is perfectly so. Justice and injustice are moral opposites, and can never be predicated of the same being at the same time.

12. If God is unjust, he is unchangeably so, as he can never have any new thoughts, purposes, designs, or volitions. Whatever therefore is true of his moral character is immutably and eternally true.

13. If God is unjust, he is infinitely so. Every attribute of God must, like himself, be infinite. Perfect Justice in an infinite being must be Infinite Justice.

14. As a matter of fact, the universe cannot be under the government of a being of infinite injustice.

15. If God is unjust, he must be so, in opposition to absolutely infinite reasons against injustice, and reasons, too, that are forever present to, and acting with all their weight upon his mind.

16. If God is unjust, he is so in spite of absolutely infinite motives in favor of justice, and with the whole weight of those infinite motives fully before and perfectly apprehended by his infinite mind. The supposition that he is unjust, under these circumstances, is absurd, and the thing morally impossible.

17. Injustice is a form of selfishness. And it has been shown that God is not selfish, but infinitely benevolent.

18. But justice is only a modification of benevolence, therefore, God must be just.

19. If God is unjust, he is infinitely wicked and infinitely miserable. It is impossible that injustice should not make a moral being miserable.

20. If God is not just he must abhor himself.

21. If he is unjust it is our duty to hate him.

22. The Bible everywhere represents God as just:

Deuteronomy 32:4: "He is the Rock, his work is perfect; for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth, and without iniquity; just and right is he."

Nehemiah 9:33: "How be it thou art just in all that is brought upon us; for thou hast done right, but we have done wickedly."

Job 4:17: "Shall mortal man be more just than God? Shall a man be more pure than his Maker?"

Isaiah 45:21: "Tell ye, and bring them near; yea, let them take counsel together: who hath declared this from ancient time? who hath told it from that time? have not I the Lord? And there is no God else besides me, a **Just** God and a Savior: there is none besides me.

Zephaniah 3:5: "The **Just** Lord is in the midst thereof: he will not do iniquity: every morning doth he bring his

judgment to light; he faileth not: but the unjust knoweth no shame."

Zechariah: 9:9: "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee: he is **Just**, and having salvation."

Acts 3:14: "But ye denied the Holy One and the **Just**."

Acts 7:52: "And they have slain them which showed before of the coming of the **Just One**."

Acts 22:14: "And he said, The God of our fathers hath chosen thee, that thou shouldest know his will, and see that **Just One**."

Fourth. *Answer an objection.*

Obj. As a matter of fact, moral beings are not dealt with according to their characters in this world.

Ans. 1. There is enough of justice visible here, plainly to intimate that God is just, and yet so much wanting as to create a clear inference, that this is a state of trial and not of rewards.

2. The execution of law, both in its remuneratory and vindicatory clauses, commences and only commences in this life, and the process continues to eternity.

3. Facts as they exist, force the conclusion, that the government of God is moving on as fast as circumstances will allow, to a more perfect and most perfect dispensation of rewards, in a future world.

4. The perfection discoverable in the precept of law, must eventually be carried out, in the final perfection of retributive and remunerative justice, or it will involve the character of God in a manifest contradiction, which cannot be.

5. The Bible fully explains the otherwise, to some extent, mysterious state of things in this world, in respect to the administration of justice, and most perfectly reconciles all that passes here, with the infinite justice of God.

6. Final and perfect justice cannot be consistency dispensed till after the general judgment; for until the history of every being is fully known to the universe of moral beings, they could not possibly understand the reasons for his dealings with his creatures. And the dispensation of perfect justice, previous to the universal development of character, might be and doubtless would be a great stumbling block to the universe.

INFERENCES AND REMARKS:

1. If God is just, the duty of restitution where wrong has been done, must certainly be insisted on by him.

2. If God is just, he is no respecter of persons.

3. If God is just, he abhors injustice in us.

4. If God is just, the finally impenitent must be damned.

LECTURE XII.

MORAL ATTRIBUTES---No. 3.

MERCY OF GOD

FIRST. Show what Mercy is not.

SECOND. What it is.

THIRD. In what cases it can be exercised.

FOURTH. To what extent.

FIFTH. On what conditions.

SIXTH. That Mercy is an attribute of God.

First. *Show what Mercy is not.*

1. Not mere goodness. Justice is as much an attribute of goodness as mercy is. A judge is good in proceeding to pass sentence and command the execution of law upon a criminal; but in this there is no mercy.

2. Mercy is not mere grace. Grace is gratuitous favor; something unearned, and of course undeserved.

Second. *Show what Mercy is.*

Mercy is a disposition to pardon crime. Its exercise consists in the arresting and setting aside the execution of law, when its penalty has been incurred by disobedience. It is in reference to crime the exact opposite of justice. Justice executes the penalty, and mercy pardons or sets aside the execution.

Third. *When it can be exercised.*

It can be exercised only where there is guilt. An innocent being cannot possibly be the subject of mercy. He may be the subject of benevolence, and of justice; but he cannot be forgiven, unless he has incurred guilt. Hence,

Fourth. *To what extent Mercy can be exercised.*

It can be exercised no farther than desert of punishment goes. If a man deserves to be punished for one year, or for a thousand years, thus far he may be forgiven, but no farther. All beyond his desert of punishment is justice and not mercy. If a man be sentenced to the state prison for three years, for three years he may be pardoned; but for a longer time he cannot. When his three years are expired, it is justice and not mercy that releases him from farther confinement.

Fifth. *On what conditions.*

I have said that in respect to crime, mercy and justice are, in their exercise, direct opposites. Of course they can be reconciled with each other only upon certain conditions. The conditions of mercy are always two, and if in any case mercy is exercised without regard to these conditions, injustice is done.

1. Satisfaction must be made to public justice. Public justice is that which the public have a right to demand for their own security in case of a violation of law. Something must be done, that will as effectually secure the public interests, and act as efficiently in the prevention of crime, as the execution would do, or the penalty cannot be set aside by an act of mercy. Where this can be done, however, to the full satisfaction of public justice, mercy and justice are at one.

2. The other condition is, that the subject of it must be in a suitable state of mind.

(1.) He must be fully sensible of his great guilt and desert of punishment. And while he justifies himself in whole or in part, he is not a proper subject for the exercise of mercy.

(2.) He must repent. He must deeply abhor his conduct, and fully justify the government. He must love the law and abhor himself, or he ought not to be forgiven.

(3.) He must be willing to make his confession as public as his crime; and while he is too proud to confess, he is in no state of mind to be forgiven. And should he be forgiven without confession, his pardon would be a virtual condemnation of the law.

(4.) He must forsake his crime and all disposition to repeat it. Should a man confess that he had committed murder, and yet plead his blood thirsty disposition as an excuse, and shamelessly avow the continuance of this disposition, this were an infinitely good reason why he should not be forgiven.

(5.) He must make restitution. While a thief has the stolen property in possession and refuses to restore it, he is in no state of mind to be forgiven. Nor is the fraudulent man, the liar, or any sinner, in a suitable state of mind to be forgiven, until he has done, and is willing to do all within his power, to make restitution in every case of wrong.

(6.) He must justify the law, both precept and penalty. While he condemns either, as unnecessarily strict or severe, it is a denial of his desert of the threatened punishment; and his asking for mercy is, under these circumstances, only a demand of justice; praying that the penalty may be set aside, upon the ground that he does not deserve it.

(7.) He must justify all the measures of government by which he has been brought under condemnation. While he has any excuse to make, any quarrel with the government, any caviling at the precept or penalty of the law, or any objections to those governmental measures that have laid him under the sentence of death, to forgive him under these circumstances were but to

justify his cavils, to echo his sentiments, to adopt his principles, to turn against the law, and go against the government. This, in any just government cannot be.

Sixth. *Mercy is an attribute of God.*

1. That God is merciful, or disposed to pardon sin, when it can be consistently done, must be fairly inferred from the divine forbearance, as manifested in this world.

2. The same may be inferred from the manifestly disciplinary nature and design of many of his providences.

3. All nations have believed that God is merciful, which belief must be founded upon proof everywhere existing of the divine forbearance.

4. We justly infer the mercy of God from the constitution of our own nature. We naturally and necessarily admire and approve of a merciful disposition, while we naturally and necessarily disapprove and abhor an unmerciful disposition. If, therefore, God is not merciful, but unmerciful, we need only to know him to be under the necessity of abhorring him.

5. God must be merciful or unmerciful, and perfectly so; for these being opposite states of mind, can never be exercised by the same being at the same time.

6. If God is merciful or unmerciful he must be infinitely so. As his nature is infinite, so are all his attributes.

7. As a matter of fact, the universe cannot be under the government and providence of an unmerciful being.

8. God's mercy must be unchangeable, as whatever is infinite is unchangeable of course.

9. That God is merciful is an irresistible inference from his benevolence. If God is benevolent, a disposition to forgive, in case the public interests can be made consistent with it, is a thing of course in a benevolent mind.

10. If God is unmerciful, he is so in spite of infinitely and fully perceived motives to the contrary.

11. If God is not merciful, he must abhor himself; as a moral being he cannot help it.

12. If God is unmerciful, it is our duty to abhor him.

13. If he is unmerciful, he must be infinitely miserable; as the feelings of self-reproach and self-condemnation must be infinitely strong in his mind.

The doctrines of Atonement and forgiveness of sin, are but a revelation of the mercy of God. The Bible everywhere ascribes mercy to God, and speaks of its exercise as that in which he has peculiar delight:

Mich. 7:18: "Who is a God like unto thee, that pardoneth iniquity, and passeth by the transgression of the

remnant of his heritage? He retaineth not his anger forever, because he delighteth in **MERCY**."

Psalms 25:10: "All the paths of the Lord are **MERCY** and truth unto such as keep his covenant and his testimonies."

Psalms 52:8: "I trust in the **MERCY** of God forever and ever."

Psalms 62:12: "Also unto thee, O Lord belongeth **MERCY**."

Psalms 86:5: "For thou, Lord, art good, and ready to forgive; and plenteous in **MERCY** unto all them that call upon thee."

Psalms 130:7: "With the Lord there is **MERCY**, and with him is plenteous redemption."

Luke 1:50, 54: "And his **MERCY** is on them that fear him from generation to generation. He hath holpen his servant Israel, in remembrance of his **MERCY**."

INFERENCES AND REMARKS.

1. If God is infinitely merciful, no sin is too great for forgiveness, if repented of.
2. If he is infinitely merciful, he is just as ready to forgive the greatest as the least sin.
3. If mercy cannot be exercised, but upon the two conditions already specified, but for the Atonement no sin could have been forgiven.
4. Notwithstanding the Atonement, no sin can be forgiven without repentance, reformation, and restitution.
5. Many are deceived in supposing themselves forgiven, who have not confessed and made restitution.
6. Many are shut up in impenitency, by refusing to confess and make restitution.
7. If God is infinitely merciful, we need not wait in the use of means, to move him to the exercise of mercy; as he is continually using means with us to make us willing to accept, or bring us into a state of mind in which it can be consistent for him to exercise mercy.
8. They deny the mercy of God, who say that men are punished according to their deeds, and then go to heaven. This is justice and not mercy. When sinners have been punished according to their deeds, whether in this or any other world, there is no mercy in exempting them from farther punishment. It is justice that gives them a discharge when their term of punishment is completed.
9. To ask or expect pardon, without repentance, forsaking sin, and making restitution, is an insult to God.

10. The necessity of repentance is as much a doctrine of natural as revealed religion. Both alike declare, that without repentance there is no forgiveness.

LECTURE XIII.

MORAL ATTRIBUTES---No. 4.

TRUTH OF GOD

FIRST. Define Truth.

SECOND. Prove that Truth is an attribute of God.

First. Define Truth.

Truth, as a moral attribute, is a state of mind. It is a disposition to represent things and facts as they are. There are other definitions of truth. But the inquiry now is, what is truth as an attribute of mind? It is the opposite of falsehood, which, considered as an attribute, is a disposition to misrepresentation.

A distinction is sometimes made between physical and moral truth. But I can see no other meaning to the distinction than that one respects physical, and the other moral objects.

Second. Prove that Truth is an attribute of God.

1. It may reasonably be inferred from the uniformity and certainty of the operation of the physical laws of the universe.
2. His truth may be inferred from his unbending firmness in the execution of the penalty of physical laws, lest public confidence in the entire certainty of their operation, should be shaken. E.g. - With all his benevolence, and tender love for his creatures, what an amount of suffering and pain does he witness and inflict in consequence of a violation of physical laws, rather than interpose by miracle, and thus beget uncertainty in the minds of men with respect to the results of such violation.
3. His truth is strongly manifested by the sacrifice he made in the Atonement, lest public confidence in his veracity should be shaken.
4. Our constitutional love of truth and abhorrence of falsehood affords the just inference that truth is an attribute of God. If he has so constituted us that we necessarily venerate truth and abhor falsehood, if he is not a God of truth, his works entirely contradict the real state of his mind. But this cannot be, for his works are nothing else than the effects of his volitions. Therefore as his character is, so his works are. If moral beings, the only beings capable of truth or falsehood, are so made

as necessarily to abhor lies, and approve of truth, it affords the highest evidence that truth is an attribute of God.

5. God must be either true or false. Truth or falsehood must be an attribute of God. It is impossible that he should be inclined to tell neither truth nor falsehood. But he cannot be both. These are opposite states of mind, and cannot both possibly exist in the same mind at the same time.

6. If falsehood is an attribute of God, he is infinitely and unchangeably false. The same reasonings that have been suggested in speaking of his Benevolence, Justice and Mercy, are as conclusive in respect to this as any of his other attributes.

7. If God is not a God of truth, no moral being can respect or love him.

8. If not, he deserves to be hated by all moral beings.

9. If not, he can have no complacency in himself.

10. If not, he must infinitely and eternally abhor himself.

11. If not, he must be as much more miserable than Satan is, as he is greater than Satan. Satan is a liar and the father of lies. And as truth is the natural element of mind, it must be certain that an infinite disposition to misrepresentation, would produce infinite misery in the mind of God.

12. If falsehood is an attribute of God, it is so in opposition to the influence of absolutely infinite motives in favor of truth.

13. The entire consistency of his works, providence, and word, evinces his truth.

14. His benevolence, affords an unanswerable argument in favor of his truth.

15. The independence of God is such, as that he can have no conceivable motive to falsehood, or, to say the least, motives to misrepresentation are infinitely outweighed by the inducements to represent things as they are.

16. The moral power of God consists wholly in his truth. The power of any being to influence mind, depends upon the confidence reposed in his veracity.

17. Truth must be believed to be an attribute of God, or moral government could not exist.

18. Universal and hearty confidence in this attribute of God, would give entire efficiency to moral government, and render its influence over the minds of moral beings complete.

19. If truth be not an attribute of God, he must forever deceive the universe, or his moral government over the universe must be entirely destroyed.

20. If falsehood be an attribute of God, his disposition to deceive is infinite. It therefore follows with absolute certainty that he always will so perfectly deceive his creatures, as to render it impossible for them to perceive that truth is not an attribute of his.

21. The Bible proves his truth.

(1.) It requires truth of us.

(2.) It requires us to abhor liars.

(3.) It declares that God abhors liars.

(4.) That he is a God of truth.

(5.) That he cannot lie.

(6.) That he is a God keeping his covenants and promises, fulfilling his threatenings, and many instances are recorded in the Bible of his great faithfulness and truth.

(7.) The fulfillment of prophecy.

(8.) The redeeming his pledge to support his government by the sacrifice of his Son.

(9.) He requires us to believe him upon pain of eternal death.

As the Bible has been shown to be true, its testimony is both admissible and conclusive.

22. Faith or confidence in his veracity is the *sine qua non* of all virtue.

23. Confidence in his truth invariably produces a holy life.

OBJECTION.

To the truth of God it is objected that as a matter of fact, God did not fulfill his threatening denounced against Adam, nor against Nineveh. To this I answer:

1. In Jeremiah 18:7, 8, we are informed of the principle in the government of God, involved in all his dealings with his creatures. "At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them."

2. A promise, or threatening, positive in form, may imply a condition, and when the condition is understood, or may and ought to be understood, there is exact truth, if God acts in conformity with the threatening or promise, whenever the condition is fulfilled.

3. It is plain that Jonah and the Ninevites understood that God's threatening was conditional. Jonah expressly informs God that he so understood him. Jonah 4:2.--- "And he prayed unto the Lord, and said, I pray thee, O Lord, was not this my saying when I was yet in my country? Therefore I fled before into Tarshish; for I knew that thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and repentest thee of the evil." That the Ninevites understood his threatening as conditional, is perfectly plain both from what they said, and what they did. The king proclaimed a fast expressly with the hope and expectation that the city would be spared if the people repented. Jonah, 3:5-10:---"So the people of Nineveh believed God, and proclaimed a fast, and put on sackcloth, from the greatest of them even to the least of them. For word came unto the king of Nineveh; and he arose from his throne, and he laid his robe from him, and covered him with sackcloth, and sat in ashes. And he caused it to be proclaimed and published through Nineveh, (by the decree of the king and his nobles,) saying, let neither man nor beast, herd nor flock, taste anything; let them not feed, nor drink water. But let man and beast be covered with sackcloth, and cry mightily unto God: yea, let them turn, every one from his evil way, and from the violence that is in their hands. Who can tell if God will turn and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we perish not? And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way; and God repented of the evil that he had said that he would do unto them; and he did it not."

4. The passage already quoted from Jeremiah shows that all God's promises and threatnings are conditional, whether the condition is expressed or not---that this is a universal principle with him.

5. With respect to Adam it is no doubt true, that death, in the sense intended by God, really began its ravages immediately upon his transgression.

REMARKS.

1. If God is a God of truth, he means as much by what he says, as he appears to mean.
2. If so, he has no secret will contrary to his expressed will.
3. If so, he really deserves universal confidence.
4. If so, how great must be the sin of unbelief.

LECTURE XIV.

MORAL ATTRIBUTES---No. 5.

WISDOM OF GOD

FIRST. Define Wisdom.

SECOND. Prove that Wisdom is an attribute of God.

First. Define Wisdom.

1. Wisdom is the most benevolent use of knowledge and power.

2. The attribute of wisdom in God, is his disposition to use his knowledge and power in the most benevolent manner. In other words, to exercise his natural attributes for the promotion of the highest good.

3. It is the choice of the best or most benevolent ends, and of the most suitable means for the accomplishment of those ends.

Second. Wisdom is an attribute of God.

1. The benevolence of God has been established. Benevolence is good willing, or the love of being and of happiness. The exercise of benevolence, together with its carrying out, or its gratification, constitutes the happiness of God.

2. God's happiness is infinitely the greatest good in the universe. It is plainly the greatest possible good. To purpose to do what he most loves to do, and thus promote his own happiness by the exercise and gratification of his infinitely benevolent disposition, is certainly the perfection of wisdom. His supreme end must have been the promotion of his own glory and happiness, as this was the highest, most worthy, and desirable end that he could propose to himself. A subordinate end, is the virtue and happiness of his creatures. Their happiness is not regarded as a mere means of promoting his own, but as an end, something chosen for its own sake. Yet an end subordinate to his own glory and happiness, as the virtue, glory, and happiness of all creatures, is infinitely less valuable than the glory and happiness of God.

3. The Bible declares that God made all things for himself.

4. The Bible declares that God governs all things for his own glory. This certainly is wise.

5. The means which he has selected and which he uses for the promotion of these ends declare his wisdom.

(1.) The creation of the material universe must have been a source of enjoyment to him. At the end of every day's labor, he declared his satisfaction by pronouncing it good.

(2.) In the works of creation all his natural attributes were exercised and reflected upon him.

(3.) His providential government is a continued exercise and reflection upon himself of his natural and moral attributes.

(4.) If an artist takes pleasure in imitating the works of God, what must have been God's happiness in creating, and what must now be his happiness in sustaining the universe. Every moral being is in some degree sensible of the pleasures of taste. There is reason to believe that the taste of God is infinitely refined and exquisite. The beautiful and diversified scenery of the world and of the universe---the exquisite and inimitable penciling of the flowers---the colors and sweet sublimity of the rainbow, and a countless number of grand, sublime, beautiful, and exquisite things in the creation of God, render it manifest that he not only possesses taste of a most refined character, but that he has given himself full scope in its exercise and gratification. The great western prairies are his flower gardens. He has scattered a profusion of beauties, not only wherever there are mortal eyes to behold them, but also where no eye but his own beholds them.

(5.) His happiness must have been still more refined and exquisite in the creation and government of sentient beings, and in the numberless adaptations and contrivances for the promotion of their happiness.

(6.) The providential care of them must also be a source of continual enjoyment to him.

(7.) But most of all, the creation, government, and happiness of moral beings, afforded him exquisite enjoyment. When he had made man, he manifested his supreme pleasure in this work by pronouncing it "very good." Moral beings are capable of sympathizing with him, of being governed by the same motives, of forming the same character, of enjoying the same kind of happiness, capable of understanding his works and word, and of holding communion and fellowship with him. Thus it appears that God has chosen the highest ends, and the best means of accomplishing them, which is the perfection and the whole of wisdom.

6. The Bible everywhere ascribes wisdom to God, and affirms that all wisdom belongs to him. It speaks of him as "God only wise," and "the only wise God," and affirms that wisdom is an eternal attribute of God.

REMARKS.

1. In the material and moral universe, God has spread out before himself a vast field of usefulness.

2. In the works of creation he has opened to himself an endless source of enjoyment.

3. He takes more pleasure in giving than we do in receiving.

4. All that he has done and is doing for sinners must afford him great satisfaction.

5. The more we depend on him to do for us, the more highly we please him.

6. We can be truly happy only as we imitate God.

LECTURE XV.

MORAL ATTRIBUTES---No. 6.

HOLINESS OF GOD

FIRST. Premise several remarks.

SECOND. Define Holiness.

THIRD. Prove that Holiness is an attribute of God.

First. Remarks.

1. The whole of a moral being is his nature and his character.

2. His nature composes his substance and essence, including the whole of his natural attributes.

3. His character consists in the exercise or use he makes of his nature.

4. A natural attribute has no moral character.

5. A moral attribute is a disposition, and as a disposition is a voluntary state of mind. Therefore moral attributes are what principally constitute moral character.

Second. Define Holiness.

It is a disposition to do universally right in opposition to wrong. It is a disposition to do what is upon the whole best to be done. It is moral purity. It is benevolence, guided by wisdom, justice, and mercy. It includes complacency in right character, and opposition to sinful character.

Holiness is moral perfection, and nothing short of moral perfection, or moral rectitude, is holiness. In other words: it is conformity of heart and life to the perceived nature and relation of things. In creatures it may improve in degree, because knowledge may improve. But in kind it can never improve. Holiness is holiness. It is the opposite of all sinfulness, and all improvement in holiness must be in degree and not in kind.

In God holiness can never improve in any sense, because his knowledge is already infinite. Holiness in man expresses the whole of moral excellence. So in

God it may express the whole of his moral excellence, and is properly styled an attribute only in the largest sense of that term, or in the same sense in which benevolence may be styled an attribute of God. God is called light. His moral attributes viewed separately are like prismatic colors. When combined they are an ineffable blaze of holiness. In other words, the holiness of God when considered as embracing his whole moral perfection, is a moral light, so ineffably intense as that the highest intelligences in the universe are represented in the Bible as unable to behold it without veiling their faces.

That holiness is purity or moral *perfection*, is proved by the following facts:

1. That the Bible represents holiness as the contrast of defilement or pollution.
2. That whatever was to be set apart, or consecrated to God, and considered as sanctified, must be physically *perfect*. Any blemish or imperfection was inconsistent with its being sanctified.
3. The Bible represents holiness as the opposite of sin.

Third. *Holiness is an attribute of God.*

1. God is holy or sinful. As he is a moral being, it is impossible that he should not be one or the other. As was said of his benevolence, so I now say of his holiness, that he cannot possibly be of a mixed character. He must be *perfectly* holy or sinful, because holiness and sin are opposite states of mind, and he cannot by any possibility exercise them both at the same time.

2. His character, whether holy or sinful, must be unchangeable. As he can have no new thoughts, and consequently no motives of any kind whatever to change.

3. His holiness or sinfulness must be infinite, for as his nature is, so are his attributes. But that the universe was not created and is not governed by an infinitely wicked being is most evident.

4. Our own nature is proof of the holiness of God. We constitutionally approve of holiness and disapprove of sin. If God is not holy he has so created us as to lay us under the constitutional necessity of abhorring him whenever we know him.

5. If he is not holy he must abhor himself.

6. If he is infinitely sinful, he must be infinitely miserable.

7. All holy beings know from their own consciousness, that holiness necessarily results in happiness, and that sin necessarily results in misery. If therefore, God is

holy, he is infinitely happy: if sinful, he is infinitely miserable.

8. If not holy he must resist absolutely infinite motives to holiness.

9. The physical perfection of his works, declares his moral purity.

10. The Bible everywhere ascribes holiness to God.

11. His moral law is but an expression, or an embodying and holding forth the holiness of his heart.

12. The work of atonement is an overwhelming proof of the holiness of God.

13. The conditions of the Gospel are such as strongly to manifest the holiness of God.

14. He is worshipped in heaven as a holy God. Isaiah 6:3: "And one cried unto another, and said, holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." Revelation 4:8: "And the four beasts had each of them six wings about him; and they were full of eyes within; and they rest not day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come."

LECTURE XVI.

UNITY OF GOD

FIRST. What is intended by the term unity, as applied to God.

SECOND. Some remarks in respect to the manner in which this subject has been treated in different ages and nations.

THIRD. Prove the Unity of God.

First. *What is intended by the Unity of God.*

1. It is not intended that he is one in the sense of Unitarians, who deny the proper divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

2. Nor that he is one in the sense of the Swedenborgians, who hold the Son to be only the human nature of the Father, and the Holy Spirit to be only the divine power, influence, or operation; but,

3. By the unity of God is intended that he is one in opposition to Polytheism, or the doctrine of the existence of many gods.

4. That he is one in opposition to the doctrine of Dualism, or the sentiment that there are two gods, the one good, the other evil.

5. That he is one in opposition to Tritheism, or the doctrine that there are three distinct, separate and independent beings in the God-head, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and that their unity is only a moral one.

6. By the unity of God it is intended that God is one in essence or substance, one substratum of being, yet subsisting in three persons.

Second. *Some remarks upon the manner in which this subject has been treated.*

1. It has been supposed by many that the doctrine of the divine unity is exceedingly plain and manifest, and among the most easily discerned truths of natural religion. To this it may and should be answered:

(1.) That if this were true, the fact cannot be accounted for that the most enlightened nations, that have not enjoyed the light of revelation, have believed in the existence of many gods. They have felt the force of the evidence everywhere abounding in favor of the existence of a God or Gods, but have, almost without exception, settled down upon the conclusion, either of Dualism or Polytheism.

(2.) The wisest philosophers of the most enlightened nations have not, except in a very few instances, arrived even at the conception of the idea of the unity of God, and have felt such great difficulties in the way of demonstrating it, without the aid of revelation, as to leave them, after all, in much doubt.

(3.) The mass of the Jews themselves, previous to the Babylonish captivity, believed in the existence of many gods, and only supposed Jehovah, or their God, to be superior to all other gods. They only claimed the supremacy of their God, at the same time admitting the real existence, and agency, and providence of the gods of other nations. This accounts for their repeated relapses in Polytheism. Their inspired men held more worthy notions in respect to the unity of God. But the great mass of the nation appear to have been in great ignorance upon this subject until after the Babylonish captivity.

Jacob in his early life appears to have admitted the existence of more gods than one, and suffered the existence of idolatry in his family, as appears from the fact that Rachel, his favorite wife, stole her father's gods.

Solomon either admitted the existence of more gods than one, or was guilty of the most criminal neglect in suffering his wives to practice idolatry even in the holy land.

2. Since revelation has poured its clear light upon the subject of the unity of God, it is easy for us to see the

consistency of this truth with natural reason. But it is a remarkable fact that no nation that has once lost the true idea of the unity of God, has ever again arrived at the truth upon this subject without divine revelation. It is often easy when a truth has been suggested, to demonstrate it by the light of nature. But it is a very different thing, as all experience shows, to discover truth before it has been suggested by revelation.

Third. *Prove the unity of God.*

1. There is positive proof of the existence of a first cause at the head of a series of events.

2. It is impossible that there should be more than one first cause of the same series.

3. There is no necessity for supposing the existence of more than one first cause of all events.

4. The supposition of more than one is therefore unphilosophical.

5. The human mind evidently feels a difficulty in admitting the existence of more than one infinite being. All Polytheistical nations have conceived of their gods as being finite, not infinite. And whenever the idea of the existence of one infinite God has been entertained, he has been regarded as the supreme God, and no nation has admitted the idea of more than one infinite God.

6. There is not a particle of proof that more than one infinite God exists. One of the principal reasons for supposing the existence of many gods, by heathen nations, was the fact that the creation of the universe was regarded as too great a work to have been performed by any one being. This conclusion was just in them, as they regarded their gods as finite, and not infinite. But when the infinity of God is understood, there is no longer any reason for supposing the existence of more gods than one.

The doctrine of Dualism, or that two Gods exist, one the author of good, the other the author of evil, was founded in the fact of the existence of both good and evil in the universe. That a good God could not be the author of the evil, they justly inferred. And taking it for granted that evil must have some other author than its perpetrator, they ascribed it to the existence and agency of a wicked God. But the existence of good and evil affords no evidence, when rightly understood, of the existence of more than one God. It is true that the evil cannot be attributed to a good God as its author; but it is also true that a good God might create moral agents, and place them under moral government, and for wise reasons decline absolutely preventing their falling into sin. This suggestion sufficiently accounts for the existence of sin

in the universe, which leaves Polytheism and Dualism destitute of a vestige of proof. Therefore,

7. The belief in more than one God is utterly unreasonable, as it is the belief of that of which there is no evidence.

8. If there is more than one God, it is of the highest importance that we should be acquainted with the fact, and be able to pay that homage and service to each which we must owe to God.

9. If there is more than one God, the total absence of all evidence of this truth seems incredible.

10. The universe as a whole is a unit.

(1.) This is indicated by its name.

(2.) One set of laws everywhere prevail.

(3.) This is also evident from the mutual dependence of all its parts.

11. There is a manifest unity of design running through all the universe, which affords the strongest presumptive proof of the unity of God.

12. In view of all these considerations, if the doctrine of more than one God is asserted, the *onus probandi* lies on him who asserts it.

13. Tritheists do not pretend to find in the light of nature the proof of the existence of three distinct and infinite beings, united in the office, and called by the official name of God. But base their theory upon scripture testimony, affirming that the Bible teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are distinct, separate and infinite beings; and that the unity of God, so largely insisted on in the Bible, is only a moral unity.

14. If the bible does not teach the absolute unity of existence or being in the God-head, it seems impossible that any language should teach this doctrine.

(1.) It is affirmed that God is *one*.

Deut. 6:4: "Hear O Israel; The Lord our God is **ONE** God."

1 Cor. 8:4, 6: "There is none other God but one." "There is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him."

Mark 12:29: "The first of all the commandments is, Hear O Israel; The Lord our God is **ONE** Lord."

Gal. 3:20: "Now a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is **ONE**."

Eph. 4:6: "**ONE** God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all."

Matt. 23:9: "Call no man your father upon the earth: for **ONE** is your Father, which is in heaven."

John 8:41: "We have **ONE** Father, even God."

1 Tim. 2:5: "For there is **ONE** God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus."

James 2:19: "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils believe and tremble."

(2.) He is God and Jehovah *alone*.

2 Kings 19:15: "And Hezekiah prayed before the Lord, and said, O Lord God of Israel, which dwellest between the cherubim, thou are the God, even thou **ALONE**, of all the kingdoms of the earth."

Ps. 86:10: "For thou art great and doest wondrous things, thou art God **ALONE**."

Isa. 27:16, 20: "O Lord of hosts, God of Israel, that dwellest between the cherubim, thou art the God, even thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth." "Now therefore, O Lord our God, save us from his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou art the Lord, even thou **ONLY**."

Neh. 9:6: "Thou, even thou art Lord **ALONE**."

(3.) There is none *else*.

Deut. 4:39: "Know therefore this day, and consider it in thine heart, that the Lord he is God in heaven above, and upon the earth beneath: there is **NONE ELSE**."

Isaiah. 44:8: "Is there a God beside me? yea, there is no God; I know not any."

Deut. 4:35: "The Lord he is God, there is **NONE ELSE** besides him."

Isa. 45:5, 6, 14, 22: "I am the Lord, and there is **NONE ELSE**." "That they may know from the rising of the sun, and from the west, that there is none beside me: I am the Lord, and there is **NONE ELSE**." "Surely God is in thee, and there is **NONE ELSE**; there is no God." "I am the Lord, and there is **NONE ELSE**." "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth, for I am God, and there is **NONE ELSE**."

Isa. 46:9: "Remember the former things of old; for I am God, and there is **NONE ELSE**."

(4.) There is none *beside* him.

2 Sam. 7:22: "Wherefore thou art great, O Lord God: for there is none like thee, neither is there any God **BESIDES** thee."

2 Sam. 22:32: "For who is God save the Lord? and who is a rock, save our God?"

2 Kings 5:15: "Behold now I know that there is **NO** God in all the earth, **BUT** in Israel."

Hosea 13:4: "Yet I am the Lord thy God from the land of Egypt, and thou shalt know **NO** God **BUT** me: for there is no Savior **BESIDES** me.

(5.) None *with* him.

Deut. 32:39: "See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no God **WITH** me."

(6.) None *before* him.

Ex. 20:3: "Thou shalt have **NO** other gods **BEFORE** me."

Isa. 43:10: "Ye are my witnesses, saith the Lord, and my servants whom I have chosen; that ye may know and believe me, and understand that I am he: **BEFORE ME THERE WAS NO GOD FORMED.**"

(7.) None *like* him.

Ex. 8:10: "That thou mayest know that there is none **LIKE** unto the Lord our God."

Ps. 35:10: "All my bones shall say, Lord, who is **LIKE** unto thee?"

Micah 7:18: "Who is a God **LIKE** unto thee?"

1 Kings 8:23: "And he said, Lord God of Israel, there is no God **LIKE** thee, in heaven above, or on earth beneath."

Ex. 9:14: "For I will at this time send all my plagues upon thine heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people; that thou mayest know that there is none **LIKE** me in all the earth."

Deut. 33:26: "There is none **LIKE** unto the God of Jeshurun."

2 Sam. 7:22: "Wherefore thou art great, O Lord God: for there is none **LIKE** thee."

1 Chron. 7:20: "O Lord there is none **LIKE** thee."

Ps. 86:8: "Among the gods there is none **LIKE** unto thee."

Isa. 46:9: "Remember the former things of old; for I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none **LIKE** me."

Jer. 10:6, 7, 10: "For as much as there is none **LIKE** unto thee, O Lord; thou art great, and thy name is great in might. Who would not fear thee, O King of nations? for to thee doth it appertain: forasmuch as among all the wise men of the nations, and in all their kingdoms, there is none **LIKE** unto thee." "But the Lord is the true God, he is the living God, and an everlasting King: at his wrath the earth shall tremble, and the nations shall not be able to abide his indignation."

Isa. 40:18: "To whom then will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him?"

Isa. 46:5: "To whom will ye liken me, and make me equal, and compare me, that we may be like?"

(It is the publishers belief that either the following points are misnumbered or else points 15-39 are missing.)

30. These things cannot possibly be true if there is more than one separate, independent existence, possessing the attribute of God.

31. Natural and revealed theology agree in revealing *but one* God.

32. They agree in rejecting the idea of more than one.

33. Natural religion reveals this with the highest evidence that the nature of the case admits.

34. The Bible reveals it in the most full and unqualified manner conceivable.

LECTURE XVII.

TRINITY OR TRI -UNITY OF GOD

FIRST. State the doctrine.

SECOND. The point now under consideration.

THIRD. The sources of evidence.

FOURTH. The amount of evidence to be expected, if the doctrine be true.

FIFTH. Adduce the proof.

SIXTH. Answer objections.

First. *State the doctrine.*

1. That there is one only living and true God.

2. That he subsists in three persons, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

3. That there are three divine, distinct, though not separate moral agents, in the Godhead.

4. That they exist in one essence, or substratum of being.

Second. *The point now under consideration.*

1. Not the unity of God, or that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are one. The divine unity has been already established. But:

2. The point of inquiry before us respects the distinct personality and divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Third. *The sources of evidence.*

1. We are not to expect to gather clear evidence of the doctrine of the Trinity or Tri-Unity of God, from the works of creation, as the perfect moral and essential unity of

the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, would preclude all possibility of discrepancy of views or operations in the creation or government of the universe. Everything, therefore, in the creation and government of the material universe, may be expected to indicate only the existence of one God, without distinct notices of a Trinity of persons.

2. The only source from which we can expect proof, is that of direct revelation, oral or inspired.

Fourth. *The amount of evidence to be expected, if the doctrine is true.*

1. We are not to expect that the *quo modo*, or mode of the divine existence will be, by revelation, made intelligible to, or brought so within the comprehension of our minds, that we shall be able fully to understand it. All that we can know of infinite is, that it exists; but whether an infinite mind subsists in one or many persons in one substratum of being, we cannot know but by a divine revelation. And by revelation we can only know the fact, without a possibility of comprehending the *quo modo*.

2. We are not to expect such a formal and metaphysical statement of the doctrine as has been common in polemic theology; for this is not the manner in which revelation is given upon any subject.

3. We may reasonably expect evidence, direct, inferential, incidental, full, and conclusive, or otherwise, as the knowledge and belief of it is more or less essential to salvation.

4. If it be a fundamental doctrine, or a doctrine the belief of which is essential to salvation, it is reasonable to expect traditionary notices of it, where there are traditionary notices in heathen nations of other fundamental truths of revelation.

5. We may expect to find the traditionary notices such as we have of other important truths, such as images, medals, oral or written statements, more or less obscure, in proportion as other fundamental truths are known and preserved among men.

6. If the doctrine of the Trinity in the God-head be a fundamental doctrine, we may expect its announcement at the commencement of revelation, to be more or less full, in proportion as other fundamental doctrines are there revealed.

7. We might expect the revelation of this truth in its fuller and fuller development, to keep pace with the fuller revelation of other fundamental doctrines.

8. We might suppose, that before revelation closed, it would be revealed with such fullness, as to satisfy an honest mind, that was disposed to rest in the naked testimony of God.

9. But we should expect this and every other fundamental doctrine, to be so left by revelation as not to preclude all cavil, evasion, or gainsaying. This might be expected, from the nature of probation, moral agency, and the existence and design of moral government.

10. It would not be unreasonable to expect some intimation of the doctrine in the name of God.

11. It would not be unreasonable to suppose, that their common or collective name, should be plural, and when action is ascribed to them, that the verb should be singular.

12. Beside this, it would not be unreasonable to expect each person to have a singular name, or appellation peculiar to himself, as Father, Son or Word, and Holy Ghost.

13. We should expect the unity of God as opposed to Dualism, Tritheism, and Polytheism, to be fully and strongly revealed.

14. We might reasonably expect also, a full revelation of the distinct personality of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but in such a way as not to contradict the essential unity of God.

15. If the doctrine of the Trinity be a doctrine of revelation, we may expect the absolute Deity of the three persons to be fully revealed.

16. We might expect that the common or collective name, or names of the God-head, would be given to each and either of the three persons indiscriminately.

17. We might expect that divine attributes should be ascribed to each and all of them.

18. We might expect the works of God to be ascribed to either and each of them indiscriminately; for if they subsist in one substratum of being; what one does, they all do by him.

19. It might be expected that what one of the persons did or does, would be represented either as *his* act, or as the act of *the whole God head*.

20. We might expect a perfect moral unity, to be plainly asserted or implied in revelation.

21. We might expect that each person, would be represented as filling a distinct office, as exercising peculiar functions, and as sustaining peculiar relations to the universe.

22. We might expect that they would speak of each other as distinct persons.

23. It might be expected they would speak of themselves altogether as one.

24. That they would all claim and receive divine honors.
25. We might expect that when any official act or relation demanded it, they would claim superiority, or acknowledge inferiority and dependence, as their official relations and functions might require.
26. If the official work or relations of either person to creatures, were such as might obscure the evidences of his divinity, we might expect a correspondingly full revelation of the divinity of that particular person. See Christ.
27. So if for these or for other reasons, the distinct personality of either required special proof, we might expect to find it in revelation. It is not pretended that the proof would not be sufficient, if in all the above named particulars it was not complete. Yet when the importance of the doctrine is considered, in connection with the infinite benevolence of God, and his great desire to enlighten and save mankind, it is not unreasonable to expect those intimations of it which have been above noticed.

Fifth. *Adduce the proof.*

Here I will premise the following remarks:

1. The full proof of this doctrine includes the proof of the Divinity of Christ, and of the personality and Divinity of the Holy Ghost. In the present skeleton I shall not examine those subjects extensively, but defer their proof to a future occasion.
2. I remark, that many seem to have come to the examination of this subject, with a determination not to receive this doctrine, unless it is so unequivocally taught in the Bible as that it can by no possibility be explained away or evaded.
3. Many of the German and other critics have practically adopted this as a sound rule of Biblical interpretation, that every text is to be so explained as to evade this doctrine, if it possibly can be evaded.
4. They have manifestly set aside, in practice, what all Biblical scholars admit in theory--- that the Bible is to be received in its plain, natural, and common sense import, unless there be some obvious reasons for resorting to another mode of interpreting a particular passage.
5. The opposers of this doctrine, and not a few of its advocates, have manifestly adopted the principle, that, judging *a priori*, the doctrine of the Trinity or Tri-Unity of God, is highly improbable, and unreasonable, and therefore, that no text is to be received as teaching this doctrine, if it will by any possibility admit of any other construction.
6. I feel bound to protest against this assumption, and the practical adoption of this rule of Biblical interpretation, either by the enemies or friends of this doctrine.
7. I insist that the doctrine of a Trinity in the God-head is so far as we can see, as consistent with reason as any other view of the subject whatever. And that we are to come to the Bible, in examining this question, with this plain and simple rule of interpretation before us---that every passage, as read in the original, is to be taken in its plain and obvious import, entirely irrespective of the difficulty or mysteriousness of the doctrine of the Trinity of God.
8. In referring to the different texts, especially in the Old Testament, I shall follow very much the order in which Knapp has considered them.
9. It will not be expected in this skeleton form, that I should enter into a critical examination of the opinions of learned divines upon them; but leave you to consider them according to their obvious import.
10. It is not generally pretended by the friends of this doctrine, nor do I contend that the doctrine of the Trinity in the God-head is formally and unequivocally taught in the Old Testament; but it is contended that it is so plainly intimated in different passages, when viewed in their connections and relations to each other, as fully to account for the fact of the extensive understanding and reception of this doctrine by the Jews.
11. I propose now to consider only some of those passages that treat in a more general manner of the doctrine of the Trinity, leaving, as I have already intimated, the particular examination of the personality and divinity of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, for future occasions.
12. This doctrine, like all other fundamental doctrines of the Bible, is revealed with greater and greater fullness and distinctness as revelation progresses, and is brought out in connection with the Atonement, and by the New Testament writers, as might be expected, in a much fuller and more satisfactory manner than in the Old Testament.

I come now to the examination of scripture testimony.

- I. The plural names of God, Eloheim, Adonai, etc. It is said that these forms *may be* regarded as the *pluralis excellentiae* of the oriental languages. To this I answer,
 1. That they may be, but that this proves nothing.
 2. The plural form of the name of God is, as might be expected, if the doctrine of the Trinity were true.

3. We are to give this circumstance no greater or less weight than belongs to it, and by itself, it would prove nothing satisfactory. Yet taken in connection with the other and abundant proofs of this doctrine, the plural forms of the divine name are to be regarded as a circumstance of importance.

II. Those passages that speak of God as more than one.

1. Gen. 1:26: "And God said, let us make man after our image."

Of this passage it has been suggested, that God addressed the angels, when he said, Let us make man. To this I reply:

(1.) It is mere conjecture.

(2.) Those whom he addressed were not mere witnesses, but actually concerned in the creation of man, and must therefore have possessed divine power.

(3.) There is no instance, unless this is one, in which God is represented as consulting creatures in respect to what he should do, not even in cases where they are co-workers with him.

2. Gen. 3:22: "And the Lord God said, Behold the man is become as one of us."

This passage is remarkable. Here God says of Adam, "Behold the man is become as one of us." This seems as plainly to imply a plurality in the God-head, as any form of expression could.

3. Gen. 11:7: "Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech."

Here again God is represented as consulting other divine personages, and saying, "Let us go down," etc. To these passages it has also been replied, that they may be only the *pluralis excellentiae*, such language as kings are in the habit of using when speaking of themselves. To this I reply:

(1.) God is represented as using this language before any kings existed.

(2.) The fact that such language might have been in use when Moses wrote, does not seem sufficiently to account for the plural form of the divine name; and,

(3.) As Polytheism was the great sin of the world, in making a revelation to man, we should expect all such language to be avoided, as might convey the idea of a plurality in the God-head, unless that were really the fact.

III. I refer to those texts in which there seems to be more than one Jehovah, and more than one Eloheim.

1. Gen. 19:24: "Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven."

Here it is said Jehovah rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from Jehovah out of heaven. The Jehovah here mentioned as raining upon Sodom, appears to be the same person who the day before had visited Abraham, and to whom Abraham had presented several petitions, which were granted. It appears that Lot prayed to him to spare Zoar, which request also was granted. He said to Lot respecting Zoar, "Haste thee, *for I can* do nothing till thou be come hither." This Jehovah, to whom Abraham and Lot prayed, is the identical Jehovah that rained fire and brimstone from Jehovah out of heaven, as if one Jehovah were in heaven and another on earth.

2. Dan. 9:17: "Now therefore, O God, hear the prayer of thy servant, and his supplications, and cause thy face to shine upon thy sanctuary that is desolate, for the Lord's sake."

Here Daniel is represented as praying to God in the name of the Lord. To this it has been said, that it may mean nothing more than that God would answer his prayer for his own sake. To this I answer:

The inquiry is not what it might by some possibility mean. But what does such language, in its obvious import seem to imply? "Hear, O our God, hear the prayer of thy servant for the Lord's sake." This, taken in connection with the many passages where God is besought to do things for the Lord's and Christ's sake, appears to be a parallel passage and to mean the same thing.

3. Zech. 10:12: "And I will strengthen them in the Lord and they shall walk up and down in his name saith the Lord."

Here Jehovah speaks of another Jehovah, in whose name they shall walk up and down.

4. Zech. 2:8, 9: "For thus saith the Lord of hosts, After the glory hath he sent me unto the nations which spoiled you; for he that toucheth you toucheth the apple of his eye. For, behold, I will shake mine hand upon them, and they shall be a spoil to their servants; and ye shall know that the Lord of hosts hath sent me."

Here Jehovah of hosts speaks of a Jehovah of hosts that had sent him, and declares that they that touch Zion touch the apple of that Jehovah's eye who had sent him. Again in the 11th verse, Jehovah of hosts speaks of himself as having been sent by Jehovah of hosts. And continuing to the 13th verse, he speaks of Jehovah as

one distinct from himself, and as raised up out of his holy habitation."

5. Ps. 45:7: "Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness: therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows."

Here God, or *Eloheim*, addresses another *Eloheim*.

IV. I refer to those texts where God is spoken of as three.

1. Is. 48:16: "Come ye near unto me, hear ye this; I have not spoken in secret from the beginning; from the time that it was, there am I: and now the Lord God, and his Spirit hath sent me."

It is contended by some that this passage should be rendered, "The Lord God hath sent me and his Spirit." Whichever rendering is preferred, it cannot reasonably be denied that three distinct persons are recognized in this text as divine. The person spoken of as being sent declares that he had not spoken in secret from the beginning, or from eternity. It is plain beyond all reasonable debate, that in this text the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are spoken of.

2. Num. 6:24-26: "The Lord bless thee, and keep thee; the Lord make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace."

The repetition of the divine name, Jehovah, three times in this passage is very remarkable, and, as we shall by and by see, was understood by the Jews to intimate the doctrine of a divine Trinity.

3. Matt. 28:19: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

Here the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are spoken of in connection, and in such a manner as that no one of them is represented as divine any more than the other.

2. Deut. 6:24: "And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our good always, that he might preserve us alive, as it is at this day."

4. John 14:23: "Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him."

Here Christ promises that himself and his Father will come and make their abode with those who love him. Other passages abundantly teach that they come in the person of the Holy Spirit.

5. 2 Corinthians 13:14: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all. Amen."

This benediction appears to be a prayer addressed to the three persons of the God-head.

V. I refer to those passages where the Son of God is spoken of in the Old Testament.

1. Ps. 2:7: "I will declare the decree: the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee."

That the Son of God, or the Messiah, is here spoken of, is attested by the Apostles.

Acts 13:33: "God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that he hath raised up Jesus again: as it is also written in the second psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee."

Ps. 72:1: "Give the king thy judgments, O God, and thy righteousness unto the king's Son," compared with,

Ps. 89:27: "Also I will make him my first born, higher than the kings of the earth."

These passages have always been understood as relating to the Son of God as Messiah. They do not indeed prove the divinity of the Son; but speak of him as distinct from the Father.

With respect to the Holy Spirit, I observe that he is so often spoken of throughout the Bible as distinct from the Father, that I will not here enter into an examination of any of the texts.

I will now close the examination of scripture testimony upon this question, reminding you that the principal scripture proofs of this doctrine are to be examined in considering the personality and divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

I will next refer you:

1. To intimations of this doctrine among ancient heathen nations, which I shall borrow from **Dwight's Theology**, vol. 2, page 390:

(1.) "*The Hindoos have, from the most remote antiquity, holden a Triad in the Divine nature.*"

The name of the Godhead among these people is *Brahme*. The names of the three persons in the Godhead are *Brahma*, *Veeshnu*, and *Seeva*. *Brahma* they considered as the Father, or Supreme Source; *Veeshnu* as the Mediator, whom they assert to have been incarnate; and *Seeva* as the Destroyer, and Regenerator: destruction being in their view nothing but the dissolution of preceding forms, for the purpose of reviving the same being in new ones.

The three faces of Brahma, Veeshnu, and Seeva, they always formed on one body, having six hands; or two to each person. This method of delineating the Godhead is ancient beyond tradition, universal, uncontroverted, and carved everywhere in their places of worship; particularly in the celebrated cavern in the Island of Elephanta.

(2.) *Equally well known is the Persian Triad, the names of which were Ormusd, Mithr, and Ahriman; called by the Greeks Oromasdes, Mithras, and Arimanius . Mithras was commonly styled Triplasio. Among them, as well as among the Hindoos, the second person in the Triad was called the Mediator, and regarded as the great Agent in the present world.*

In the Oracles ascribed to Zerdusht, or Zoroaster, the famous Persian Philosopher, are the following declarations:

'Where the Eternal Monad is, it amplifies itself, and generates a Duality.'

'A Triad of Deity shines forth throughout the whole world, of which a Monad is the head.'

'For the mind of the Father said, that all things should be divided into Three; whose will assented, and all things were divided.'

'And there appeared in this Triad, Virtue, Wisdom, and Truth, who knew all things.'

'The Father performed all things, and delivered them over to the Second mind, whom the nations of men commonly suppose to be the First.'

The third Person, speaking of himself, says, 'I Psyche, or Soul, dwell next to the Paternal mind, animating all things.'

(3.) *The Egyptians, also, acknowledge a Triad, from the earliest antiquity, whom they named originally Osiris, Cneph, and Phtha; and afterwards Osiris, Isis, and Typhon. These Persons they denoted by the symbols Light, Fire, and Spirit. They represented them, also, on the doors, and other parts of their sacred buildings, in the three figures of a Globe, a Wing, and a Serpent. Abenephius, an Arabian writer, says, that; 'by these the Egyptians shadowed Theon trimorphon, or God in three forms.'*

One of the Egyptian fundamental axioms of Theology, as given by Damascius, and cited by Cudworth, is, 'There is one Principle of all things, praised under the name of the Unknown Darkness, and this thrice repeated.' In the Books, attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, is the following passage:

'There hath ever been one great, intelligent Light, which has always illumined the Mind; and their union is nothing else but the Spirit, which is the Bond of all things.'

Here light and mind are spoken of as two Persons, and the Spirit as the third; all declared to be eternal.

Jamblichus, a Platonic Philosopher, styled by Proclus the Divine, declares, that 'Hermes speaks of Eicton as the first of intelligences, and the first intelligible; and of Cneph, or Emeph, as the Prince of the Celestial Gods; and of the Demiurgic, or creating Mind, as a third to these. Jamblichus calls these the Demiurgic Mind, the Guardian of Truth, and Wisdom.

(4.) *The Orphic Theology, the most ancient recorded in Grecian history, taught the same doctrine.*

In the abridgment of this Theology by Timotheus, the Chronographer, are found its most important and characteristic doctrines. Of these the fundamental one is, that an Eternal, Incomprehensible Being exists, who is the Creator of all things. This supreme and eternal Being is styled in this Theology, *Phos, Boule, Zoe; Light, Counsel, Life.*

Suidas, speaking of these three, says, they express only one and the same power.' Timotheus says further, that Orpheus declared, 'All things to have been made by One Godhead in three names; or rather by these names of One Godhead; and that this Godhead is all things.'

Proclus, a Platonic Philosopher, already mentioned, says, that Orpheus taught 'the existence of One God, who is the ruler over all things; and that this One God is three Minds, three Kings; He who is; He who has, or possesses; and He who beholds. These three Minds he declares to be the same with the Triad of Orpheus; viz: Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus.

(5.) *The Greek Philosophers, also, extensively acknowledged a Triad.*

Particularly, Pythagoras styled God *to hen*, or the Unity; and *monas*, or that which is alone; and also *to agathon*, or the good.

'From this Eternal Monad,' says Pythagoras; there sprang an infinite Duality; that is from Him, who existed alone, two proceeded, who were infinite.'

Plato also held a Triad; and named them *to Agathon*, the Good; *Nous, or Logos*, Mind, or Word; and *Psuche kosmou*, the Soul of the World. The *to Agathon* he also calls *protos Theos*, and *megistos Theos*.

Parmenides, the founder of the Eleatic Philosophy, says, The Deity is *hen kai polla*; one and many. Simplicius, commenting on Plato's exhibition of the

doctrine of Parmenides, says, that 'these words were a description of the *autou Ontos*,' the true or original existence; and Plotinus says, that Parmenides acknowledged three Divine Unities subordinated. The first Unity he calls the most perfectly and properly One; the second, One many; and the third, One and many. Plotinus further says, that Parmenides acknowledged a Triad of original Persons. Plotinus speaks of God as being; 'the One, the Mind, and the Soul;' which he calls the original or principal persons. Amelius calls these Persons three Kings, and three Creators.

Numenius, a famous Pythagorean, acknowledged a Triad. The second Person he calls the Son of the first; and the third he speaks of, as proceeding also from the first.

(6.) *In the Empires of Thibet and Tangut, a Triune God is constantly acknowledged in the popular religion.* Medals, having the image of such a God stamped on them, are given to the people by the Delai Lama, to be suspended, as holy, around their necks, or otherwise used in their worship. These people also worshipped an idol, which was the representation of a three-fold God.

(7.) A medal, now in the Cabinet, of the Emperor of Russia, was found near the River Kemptschyk, a branch of the Jenisea, in Siberia, of the following description:

A human figure is formed on one side, having one body and three heads. This person sits upon the cup of the Lotos; the common accompaniment of the Godhead in various Eastern countries; and on a sofa, in the manner of Eastern Kings. On the other side is the following inscription: 'The bright and sacred image of the Deity, conspicuous in three figures. Gather the holy purpose of God from *them:love him.*' A heathen could not more justly or strongly describe a Trinity.

(8.) *The ancient Scandinavians acknowledged a Triad, whom they styled Odin, Frea, and Thor.*

In the Edda, the most remarkable monument of Scandinavian Theology, Gangler, a Prince of Sweden is exhibited as being introduced into the hall or palace, of the gods. Here he saw three thrones raised one above another, and on each throne a sacred person. These persons were thus described to him by his guide: 'He, who sits on the lowest throne, is Har, or the Lofty One. The second is Jafn Har, or Equal to the Lofty One. He, who sits on the highest throne, is Thridi, or the Third.'

(9.) *The Romans, Germans, Gauls, acknowledged a Triad, and worshipped a Triad, in various manners.*

The Romans and Germans worshipped the Mairiae; three goddesses inseparable, and always united in their worship, temples, and honors.

The Romans also, together with the Greeks and Egyptians, worshipped the Cabiri, or Three Mighty Ones.

The Diana of the Romans is stamped on a medal, as having three faces or three distinct heads, united to one form. On the reverse is the image of a man, holding his hand to his lips; under whom is this inscription: 'Be silent; it is a mystery.'

The German goddess Trygla, was drawn in the same manner.

The Gauls also, united their gods in triple groups, in a manner generally similar, as is evident from sculptures, either now or lately remaining.

(10.) *The Japanese and Chinese anciently acknowledged a Triad.*

The great image of the Japanese is one form, with three heads; generally resembling that of Brahma, Veeshnu, and Seeva, already described as worshipped by the Hindoos. The Chinese worshipped in ancient times one Supreme God, without images, or symbols of any kind. This worship lasted until after the death of Confucius, about 500 years before the birth of Christ.

Lao-Kiun, the celebrated founder of one of the philosophical, or religious sects, in China, delivered this, as the great leading doctrine of his philosophy: 'That the Eternal Reason produced One; One produced Two; Two produced Three; and Three produced All things.'

(11.) *The American Nations also, have in several instances acknowledged a Triad.*

The Iroquois hold, that before the creation, three Spirits existed; all of whom were employed in creating mankind.

The Peruvians adored a Triad, whom they styled the *Father and Lord Sun*, the *Son Sun*, and the *Brother Sun*.

In Cuquisaco, a province of Peru, the inhabitants worshipped an image, named *Tangatanga*; which in their language signifies "One in Three, and Three in One."

2. I will refer you to the testimony of the ancient Jewish Church, which I shall borrow from the same source: Vol. 2, p. 386:

"Philo, the celebrated Jew of Alexandria, who lived before the birth of our Savior, calls the *Logos* the Eternal *Logos* or Word; and says, that; he is necessarily eternal, and the image of the invisible God.'

Further, he says, 'He, who is, is on each side attended by his nearest Powers; of which one is *Creative*, and the other *Kingly*. The Creative is God, by which he founded and adorned the Universe. The Kingly is Lord. He who is in the middle, being thus attended by both his Powers, exhibits to the discerning mind, the appearance, sometimes of One, and sometimes of Three.'

Of the *Logos* he says, 'He, who is the begotten, imitating the ways of his Father, and observing his archetypal patterns, produces forms; that is, material things. He often calls the *Logos*, the *Divine Logos*; and represents him as the Manager, or Ruler of the world. He further says, that God governs all things according to the strictest justice, having set over them his righteous *Logos*, his first begotten Son.' The duration of created things he ascribes to this cause; that they were framed by Him, who remains; and who is never in any respect changed; the *Divine Logos*.' Finally, he calls the *Logos* an Angel; the name of God; a man; the beginning; the eternal image; the most ancient Angel; the Archangel, of many names; and the high priest of this world; and says, 'His head is anointed with oil.'

The Chaldee Paraphrasts, and other Jewish commentators, speak of this subject in a similar manner.

They speak of the *Mimra*, the Hebrew term, rendered in the Greek *Logos*, and in the English *Word*, as 'the Word from before the Lord,' or which is before the Lord; as a Redeemer; as only begotten; as the Creator. They say, 'the Word of the Lord' said, 'Behold Adam, whom I have created, is the only begotten in the world; as I am the only begotten in the highest heavens.' They paraphrased the text, Genesis 3:8: *And they heard the voice of the Lord God, walking in the garden, thus: 'They heard the Word of the Lord God,' etc.*

Several Jewish commentators say, that 'it was the Voice which was walking.'

One of them says, that 'Our first parents, before their sin, saw the Glory of God speaking to them; but after their sin, they only heard the Voice walking.'

Philo and Jonathan both say, that 'it was the Word of God, which appeared unto Hagar.'

Jonathan says, 'God will receive the prayer of Israel by his Word.' Paraphrasing Jeremiah 29:14: he says, 'will be sought by you in my Word.'

The *Jerusalem Targum*, or Paraphrase, says, 'Abraham prayed in the name of the Word of the Lord, the God of the world.'

Jonathan says also, 'God will atone by his Word for his land, and for his people; even a people saved by the Word of the Lord.'

Psalms 110:1: They paraphrase, '*The Lord said unto his Word*,' instead of '*My Lord*,' as in the original.

The Jewish commentators say, 'there are *three Degrees* in the Mystery of Aleim, or Elohim; and these *degrees* they call *persons*. They say, 'They are all one, and cannot be separated.'

Deut. 6:4: *Hear, O Israel! JEHOVAH, our Aleim* is one **JEHOVAH**, is thus rendered by the author of the Jewish Book *Zohar*:

'The Lord, and our God, and the Lord, are One.' In his comment on this passage the author says, 'the **LORD**, or **JEHOVAH**, is the beginning of all things, and the perfection of all things; and he is called the Father. The other, or our God, is the depth or the fountain of sciences; and is called the Son. The other, or Lord, he is the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from them both, etc. Therefore he says, *Hear, O Israel!* that is, join together this Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and make him One Essence; One Substance; for whatever is in the one is in the other. He hath been the whole; he is the whole; and he will be the whole.' Again: 'What is the name of King Messiah? Rabbi Akiba hath said, **JEHOVAH** is his name. As it is declared, Jeremiah 23:6: *And this is his name, by which they shall call him, Jehovah our Righteousness.*' These commentators, also, call him the Branch; the Comforter; Gracious; Luminous; etc.

And again: 'The Holy Ghost calls the King Messiah by his name: **JEHOVAH** is his name: for it is said, Exodus 8:1: *The Lord is a man of war; Jehovah is his name.*'

3. The testimony of the early Christian fathers. Vol. 2, p. 183:

(1.) "*To the Pre-existence of Christ the following testimonies must, I think, be regarded as complete.*

a. Justin Martyr, who flourished in the year 140, and was born about the close of the first century, declares Christ to have been the person who appeared to Abraham, under the Oak of Mamre; and asserts that the person, here called **LORD** or **JEHOVAH**, to whom Abraham prays for Sodom, and who in the next chapter, is said to rain fire and brimstone on the *Cities of the Plain*, was no other than Christ. He also asserts, that Christ appeared to Moses in the bush.

b. Irenaeus, who flourished in the year 178, declares, that Christ, as God, was adored by the Prophets; was *the God of the living, and the living God*; that he spoke to Moses in the bush; and that afterwards the

same person refuted the doctrine of the Sadducees, concerning the resurrection of the dead. He further says, that Abraham learned divine truth from the *Logos*, or *Word of God*.

c. Theophilus of Antioch, who flourished in the year 181, declares, that Christ, assuming to *prosopon tou patros*, the character of the Father, that is, the Divine character, came to Paradise in the appearance of God, and conversed with Adam.

d. Clemens Alexandrinus, who flourished in the year 194, exhibits Christ as the Author of the former precepts, and of the latter; that is, of the scriptures of the Old Testament, and of the New; deriving both from one fountain.

e. Tertullian declares, that it was the Son of God who spoke to Moses, and who appeared, that is, as God, at all times; that he overthrew the Tower of Babel; confounded the languages of men; and rained fire and brimstone on Sodom and Gomorrah. He calls him *Dominus a Domino*; and says, that he only, and always, conversed with men, from Adam down to the Patriarchs and Prophets, in visions and dreams; and that no other God conversed with men, beside the *Word* who was afterward to be made flesh.

(2.) *That Christ was the Creator of the world, in the view of the ancient Church, the following testimonies satisfactorily prove:*

a. Barnabas, who, as you well know, was a companion of the Apostles, and could not but know their views of this subject, says, in an epistle of his, yet remaining, 'The Sun in the heavens was the work of the Son of God.'

b. Hermas, also a companion of the Apostles, says, that 'the Son of God was more ancient than any creature; seeing he was present with the Father at the creation of the world.'

c. Athenagoras, who flourished in the year 178, says, that 'by Christ, and through Christ, all things were created; since the Father and the Son are *hen*; one thing; one substance.'

d. Justin Martyr declares, that 'more than one Divine person is denoted by the phrase, *The man is become as one of us*; and that one of these is Christ.'

e. Clemens Alexandrinus says, 'The *Logos* is the universal Architect; that is, the Maker of all things. He further says, 'The *Logos* is the Creator of men and of the world.' He also speaks of the *Logos* as the universal Ruler, and Instructor.

(3.) *That Christ was truly God, in the view of the ancient Church, will fully appear from the following testimonies:*

a. Clement of Rome, who was a companion of the Apostles, calls Christ 'the sceptre of the greatness of God,' and says, 'he had it in his power to have come with pomp and magnificence, but would not.'

b. Polycarp, a disciple of St. John, when at the stake, addressed a prayer to God, which he concluded in this manner: 'For all things I praise thee; I bless thee; I glorify thee; together with the eternal and heavenly Jesus Christ; with whom, unto thee, and the Holy Spirit, be glory, both now and forever, world without end Amen.'

c. Justin Martyr declares, that 'Christ the *first born Word of God*, existed as God; that he is Lord and God, as being the Son of God; and that he was the *God of Israel*.'

He also says, 'We adore and love the *Word* of the unbegotten and invisible God.' And again: 'Him (the Father of righteousness) and *that Son* who hath proceeded from him, and the Prophetic Spirit, (that is, the Spirit of Inspiration) we worship and adore.'

This doctrine, also, Trypho, his Jewish antagonist, admits as the doctrine of the Gentile Christians, generally.

d. The Church of Smyrna, in their Epistle to the other churches concerning the martyrdom of Polycarp, in which the above mentioned doxology is quoted, says, 'We can never forsake Christ, nor worship any other; for we worship him as being the Son of God.'

e. Athenagoras says, 'The *Nous kai Logos*, Mind and Word of God, is the Son of God;' and, 'We who preach God, preach God the Father, God the Son, and Holy Ghost; and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are **ONE**.'

f. Tatian, Bishop of Antioch, who flourished in the year 172, says, 'We declare that God was born in human form.'

g. Melito, Bishop of Sardis, who flourished in the year 177, says, 'We are worshippers of one God, who is before all, and in all, in his Christ, who is truly God the Eternal Word.'

h. Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, says, 'The three days before the creation of the heavenly luminaries, represent the Trinity; God, and his Word, and his Wisdom.'

i. Clemens Alexandrinus prays to Christ to be propitious, and says, 'Son and Father, both one Lord, grant, that we may praise the Son and the Father, with the Holy Ghost, all in **ONE**; in whom are all things, *through* whom are all things in **ONE**, through whom is Eternity, of whom we are all members, to him, who is in all things

good, in all things beautiful, universally wise and just, to whom be glory, both now and forever. Amen.' He also says, 'Gather together thy children, to praise in a holy manner, to celebrate without guile, Christ, Eternal Logos, infinite age, Eternal Light, Fountain of Mercy.'

k. Tertullian says, 'The name of Christ is everywhere believed, and everywhere worshipped, by all the nations mentioned above. He reigns everywhere, and is everywhere adored. He is alike to all a King, and to all a Judge, and to all a God and a Lord.'

Again: 'Behold all nations henceforth emerging from the gulf of error, to the Lord God the Creator, and to God his Christ.'

Tertullian also declares, that 'Tiberias received accounts from Palestine, of the things, which manifested the truth of Christ's Divinity.'

To these Christian testimonies, all of the two first centuries, I shall subjoin a few others, out of multitudes, which belong to a later period.

The testimony of Origen, in his comment on the text, has been already seen. He, also, says, 'We (Christians) worship **ONE** God, the Father and the Son.'

He further says, 'Now, that you may know the omnipotence of the Father and the Son to be one and the same, as He is one and the same God and Lord with the Father; hear what St. John hath said in the Revelation: These things saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty. For who is the Almighty that is to come, but Christ?'

He, also, mentions the Christians, as saying, 'that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are **ONE** God; and speaks of this as a difficult, and perplexing doctrine, to such as hear not with faith, or are not Christians.'

Again, he says: 'When we come to the grace of Baptism, we acknowledge **ONE** God only, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.'

Origen flourished in the year 230.

Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, who flourished in the year 248, says, 'Christ is our God; that is, not of all, but of the faithful, and believing.'

The Council of Antioch, which sat about the year 264, in their Epistle, say, 'In the whole Church, he is believed to be *God*, who emptied himself, indeed, of a state of equality with God; and *man*, of the seed of David, according to the flesh.'

Eusebius, the celebrated ecclesiastical historian, who flourished in the year 315, declares, that Pilate, in his letter to Tiberias, concerning the miracles of Christ,

says, that 'he was raised from the dead; and that he was already believed by the body of the people to be God.'"

4. The representation of heathen nations concerning the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Same: Vol. 2, p. 386:

"Pliny the Younger, in his letter to the Emperor Trajan, from the province of Bithynia, whither he went with proconsular authority, writes, that 'certain Christians, whom he had examined, affirmed, that they were wont to meet together on a stated day, before it was light, and sing among themselves, alternately, a hymn to Christ, as to some God.' This letter is, with the highest probability, placed in the year 107.

Celsus, an eminent Epicurean Philosopher and adversary of the Christians, charges them with worshipping Christ, 'who,' he says, 'has appeared of late;' and whom he calls, 'The Minister of God.' Celsus flourished in the year 176.

At the same time flourished Lucian, the celebrated writer of Dialogues, and a philosopher of the same sect. In the *Philopatris*, a dialogue frequently attributed to him, Triphon represents the Christians as 'swearing by the Most High God; the Great, Immortal, Celestial Son of the Father; the Spirit, proceeding from the Father; **ONE** of three, and three of **ONE**.'

Hierocles, who flourished about the year 303, a heathen philosopher also, says that 'the Christians, on account of a few miracles proclaim Christ to be God.'

On these testimonies I shall only ask a single question. Can any person, who has them before him, doubt for a moment, that the Christian Church, in its earliest ages, acknowledged and worshipped, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as the only living and true God?"

Sixth. Answer Objections.

Obj. I. It is objected, that the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity is a contradiction. To this I reply:

It is no contradiction, because it is not affirmed, nor was it ever supposed, that God is three and one, in the same sense.

Obj. II. This doctrine is said to be unreasonable.

Ans. It is only *above* reason.

Obj. III. It is said to be absurd, to make what is incomprehensible an article of faith.

Ans. 1. Then it is absurd to make the infinity or spirituality of God articles of faith; for they are certainly incomprehensible.

2. If this objection be good, it is absurd to believe our own existence, or the existence of anything else, as

the *modus existendi* is in every case altogether incomprehensible.

3. The fact, and not the *quo modo*, is the thing to be believed. And this is no more incomprehensible than millions of facts which all receive.

Obj. IV. It is objected, that a Trinity in Unity is inconceivable.

Ans. It is not more so than the fact of our own existence, and the union of body and soul.

Obj. V. It is objected that this doctrine embarrasses and confounds the mind.

Ans. 1. It is not the fact, but the philosophy, or *quo modo*, that embarrasses the mind. You may as well confound yourself with the philosophy of your own existence, and maintain the materiality of mind to escape the union of two natures, as to confound yourself with the philosophy of this doctrine, and reject because you cannot comprehend it.

To avoid incomprehensibilities, some explain away the essential Unity, and others the Trinity of God; but no more relieve the difficulty, than materialists do, when they attempt to get rid of mystery by maintaining the intelligence of matter. The fact is, that we know nothing of infinity, only that it exists; and for ought we can know, an infinite mind may as well exist in ten thousand persons as one.

2. It is most remarkable, that many of those who have thought it highly unreasonable to affirm that God could exist in three persons, each possessing the powers of moral agency, are now adopting the Pantheistic philosophy, and maintaining that the Universe is God.

This is not only admitting but maintaining, that there are myriads of moral agents in one God. Not only so; but vegetables, trees, and animals, are so many parts of God. Marvelous consistency this!

To get rid of the doctrine of a Trinity, there must be a most manifest wresting of scripture, and a practical and total disregard of some of the most universally confessed rules of Biblical interpretation.

LECTURE XVIII.

DIVINITY OF CHRIST

FIRST. Show what is intended by the Divinity of Christ.

SECOND. Show that Christ is truly Divine or that he is the true God.

THIRD. Answer objections.

First. *What is intended by the Divinity of Christ.*

1. By the Divinity of Christ is not intended that he is a divine being in the sense in which angels are divine beings.

2. Nor in the sense in which super angelic creatures might be divine.

3. Nor that he is God in any subordinate sense of the term.

4. That he is properly and absolutely God.

Second. *Show that Christ is truly divine.*

The proof of the divinity of Christ is to be gathered of course from the Bible. In establishing it, I shall pursue very much the course that has been pursued by Pres. Dwight.

I. I adduce those texts in which the proper names of God are ascribed to Christ.

1. He is called God.

Gen. 32:30: "And Jacob called the name of the place Peniel: for I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved." Compared with---

Ex. 33:20: "And he said thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me, and live." And---

John 1:18: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, hath declared him." And---

John 6:46: "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father."

Isa. 7:14: "Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name **IMMANUEL** ." Compared with---

Matt. 1:23: "Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name **EMMANUEL** , which, being interpreted, is, God with us." And---

John 1:1: "In the beginning was the **WORD** , and the **WORD** was with God, and the **WORD** was God ." And---

Rom. 9:5: "Whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came who is over all, God blessed forever. Amen." And---

1 Tim. 3:16: "And without controversy great is the mystery of godliness: **GOD** was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, and received up into glory."

Titus 1:3: "But hath in due times manifested his word through preaching, which is committed unto me, according to the commandment of God our Savior."

Heb. 1:8: "But unto the Son, he saith, Thy throne, O **GOD**, is forever and ever; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of thy kingdom."

Heb. 3:4: "For every house is builded by some man; but he that built all things is God." Compared with---

John 1:3, 10: "All things were made by **HIM**; and without **HIM** was not anything made that was not made."

2. He is called the *true* God.

1 John 5:20: "And we know that the Son of God is come and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is **TRUE**; and we are in him that is **TRUE**, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the **TRUE** God, and eternal life."

3. He is called the *mighty* God.

Isa. 9:6: "For unto us a child is born, unto a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, The **MIGHTY** God, The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace."

4. He is called the Lord God *Almighty*.

Rev. 15:3: "And they sing the song of Moses the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb, saying, Great and marvelous are thy works, Lord God Almighty; just and true are thy ways, thou King of saints."

5. He is called the *Almighty*.

Rev. 1:8: "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the **ALMIGHTY** ."

6. He is called the *only wise* God.

Jude 25: "To the **ONLY WISE** God our Savior, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever. Amen."

7. He is called the *great* God.

Titus 2:13: "Looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the **GREAT GOD** and our Savior Jesus Christ."

8. He is called the *God of Israel*.

Ex. 24:9, 10: "Then went up Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel; and they

saw the **GOD OF ISRAEL**: and there was under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire-stone, and as it were the body of heaven in his clearness." Compared with---

Ex. 33:20: "And he said, Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live." And---

John 1:18: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." And---

John 6:46: "Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father."

9. He is called *Jehovah* in several instances, in the 12th chapter of Zechariah.

Isa. 6:1, 3, 5, 8, 11, 12: "In the year that king Uzziah died I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple." "And one cried unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." "Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts." "Also I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? Then said I, Here am I, send me." "Then said I, Lord, how long? And he answered, Until the cities be wasted without inhabitants, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate, and the Lord have removed men far away, and there be a great forsaking in the midst of the land." Compared with---

John 12:40, 41: "He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. These things said Esias, when he saw his glory, and spake of him."

10. He is called *Jehovah of Hosts*.

Isa. 6:3, 5: "And one cried unto another, and said Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." "Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts ."

In the original this is Jehovah of Hosts.

II. The natural attributes of God are ascribed to Christ.

1. Eternity.

Rev. 1:10,11: "I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day, and heard behind me a great voice, as of a trumpet, saying, I am Alpha and **OMEGA**, the first and the **LAST**; and what thou seest, write in a book, and send it unto the seven churches which are in Asia; unto Ephesus, and

unto Smyrna, and unto Pergamos, and unto Thyatira, and unto Sardis, and unto Philadelphia, and unto Laodicea."

Rev. 2:8: "And unto the angel of the church of Smyrna write: These things saith the **FIRST** and the **LAST**, which was dead, and is alive."

Isa. 44:6: "Thus saith, the Lord the King of Israel, and his Redeemer the Lord of Hosts; I am the first, and I am the **LAST**; and besides me there is no God."

2. Omniscience.

John 21:17: "He said unto him the third time, Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me? Peter was grieved because he said unto him the third time, Lovest thou me? And he said unto him, Lord, thou **KNOWEST ALL THINGS**; thou knowest that I love thee."

Matt. 11:27: "**ALL THINGS** are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him."

Rev. 2:23: "And I will kill her children with death; and all the churches shall know that I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts; and I will give unto every one of you according to your works."

That searching the heart implies omniscience is manifest.

1 Kings 8:39: "Then hear thou in heaven thy dwelling place, and forgive, and do, and give unto every man according to his ways, whose heart thou knowest; for thou, even thou only knowest the hearts of all the children of men."

John 2:23,24: "Now when he was in Jerusalem at the Passover, in the feast-day, many believed in his name, when they saw the miracles which he did. But Jesus did not commit himself unto them, because he knew all men."

3. Omnipresence.

Matt. 18:20. 'For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.'

Matt. 28:20. 'Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.'

4. Omnipotence.

Rev. 1:8. 'I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty.'

Heb. 1:2. 'Hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds.'

John 1:3. 'All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made.'

5. Immutability.

Heb. 13:8. 'Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever.'

Ps. 102:27. 'But thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end.' Compared with---

Heb. 1:10, 'And, Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands.'

III. The works of God are ascribed to Christ.

1. Creation.

John 1:3,10. 'All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made.'

Ps. 33:6. 'By the word of the Lord were the heavens made; and all the hosts of them by the breath of his mouth.'

Col. 1:16. 'For by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him, and for him.'

Eph. 3:9. 'And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ.'

Heb. 1:2. 'Hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds.'

Heb. 4:11. "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honor, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created."

2. He governs the universe.

Isa. 6:5. 'Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the **KING**, the Lord of Hosts.'

Here he is called the King of the universe.

Isa. 9:6,7. 'For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, The mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice, from henceforth even forever. The zeal of the Lord of Hosts will perform this.'

Dan. 7:13,14. 'I saw in the night-visions, and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of

heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations and languages, should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.'

Acts. 10:36. 'The word which God sent unto the children of Israel preaching peace by Jesus Christ; he is Lord of all.'

Ps. 45:6. 'Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever; the scepter of thy kingdom is a right sceptre.'

Rom. 9:5. 'Whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed forever. Amen.'

1 Cor. 15:25. 'For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet.'

Eph. 1:20. 'Which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places.'

Philippians 2:9--11. 'Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth.'

The whole of the 2d and 72nd Psalm represent Christ as the governor of the world.'

3. He raised the dead.

John 5:28, 29. 'Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice. And shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.'

John 10:17,18. 'Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself; I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father.'

John 6:39, 40, 44, 54, 'And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.' 'No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me draw, him; and I will raise him up at the last day.' 'And this is the will of him that hath sent me, that everyone which seeth the Son, and believeth on him may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day.' 'Whose eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day.'

4. He forgives sins.

Matt. 9:2-7. 'And, behold they brought to him a man sick of the palsy, lying on a bed; and Jesus, seeing their faith, said unto the sick of the palsy, Son, be of good cheer, thy sins be **FORGIVEN** thee. And, behold, certain of the scribes said within themselves, This man blasphemeth. And Jesus knowing their thoughts, said, Wherefore think ye evil in your hearts? For whether is easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee; or to say, Arise and walk? But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to **FORGIVE** sins, (then saith he to the sick of the palsy,) Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house. And he arose, and departed to his house.'

5. He gives eternal life to men.

John 10:27, 28. 'My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them **ETERNAL LIFE**; and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand.'

Rev. 21:6. 'And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end; I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely.'

Rev. 2:7, 17, 28. 'He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches; To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God.' 'He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches; To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it.' 'And I will give him the morning star.'

6. He shall judge the world.

Acts 17:31. 'Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will **JUDGE** the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead.'

John 5:22. 'For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all **JUDGMENT** unto the Son.'

Also, Matt. 2:5.

7. He upholds all things.

Heb. 1:3. 'Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and **UPHOLDING ALL THINGS** by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high.'

8. He inspired the prophets.

1 Pet. 1:11. 'Searching what, or what manner of time, the Spirit of Christ which was in them, did signify, when

it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow.'

9. He commissions ambassadors.

2 Cor. 5:20. 'Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us; we pray you in Christ's, stead be ye reconciled to God.'

IV. He sustains the relations of God to his creatures.

1. He is King.

John 1:49. 'Nathaniel answered and said unto him, Rabbi, thou art the Son of God; thou art the **KING** of Israel.'

Isa. 6:5. 'Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for I have seen the **KING**, the Lord of Hosts.'

Ps. 2:6. 'Yet have I set my **KING** upon my holy hill of Zion.'

Luke 23:2. 'And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar, saying that he himself is Christ a **KING**.'

John 18:37. 'Pilate therefore said unto him, Art thou a **KING** then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a **KING**. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice.'

1 Tim. 1:17. 'Now unto the **KING** eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory forever and ever. Amen.'

1 Tim. 6:15. 'Which in his times he shall shew, who is the blessed and only Potentate, the **KING** of kings, and Lord of lords.'

2. He is the Creator of mankind.

John 1:2. 'All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made.'

3. He is the Redeemer.

1 Cor. 1:30. 'But of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and **REDEMPTION**.

Eph. 1:7. 'In whom we have **REDEMPTION** through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace.'

Heb. 9:12. 'Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal **REDEMPTION** for us.'

Revelation 5:9. 'And they sang a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain, and hast **REDEEMED US** to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and nation.'

4. He is the Sanctifier of mankind.

1 Corinthians 1:30. (As quoted above.)

5. He is the Judge of mankind.

Acts 17:31. 'Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will **JUDGE** the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead.'

Acts 10:42. 'And he commanded us to preach unto the people, and to testify that it is he which was ordained of God, to be the **JUDGE** of quick and dead.'

Rom. 2:16. 'In the day when God shall **JUDGE** the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, according to my gospel.'

Acts 14:10. 'But why dost thou judge thy brother? or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? for we shall all stand before the **JUDGMENT- SEAT** of Christ.'

To the above I will add several other proofs.

1. The fullness of the God-head is ascribed to him.

Col. 2:9. 'For in him dwelleth all the **FULLNESS** of the Godhead bodily.'

All the divine perfections are in him.

2. He is the express image of God.

Heb. 1:3. 'Who, being the brightness of his glory, and the **EXPRESS IMAGE** of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high.'

3. He thought it not robbery to be equal with God.

Phil. 2:6. 'Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God.'

4. He is the image of the invisible God.

1 Cor. 11:7. 'For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the **IMAGE** and glory of God.'

2 Cor. 4:4. 'In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the **IMAGE** of God, should shine unto them.'

Col. 1:15. 'Who is the **IMAGE** of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature.'

5. He is the Jehovah which Moses saw in the burning bush.

Ex. 3:2-6. 'And the Angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush; and he looked, and, behold, the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed. And Moses said, I will now turn aside and see this great sight, why the bush is not burned. And when the Lord saw that he turned aside to see, God called unto him out of the midst of the bush, and said, Moses, Moses. And he said, Here am I. And he said, Draw not nigh hither; put off thy shoes from off thy feet; for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground. Moreover he said, I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look upon God.' Compared with---

Ex. 33:20. 'And he said, Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me, and live.' And---

John 1:18. 'No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.' And---

John 6:46. 'Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father.'

6. He claimed, and received divine honors.

John 5:23. 'That all men should **HONOR** the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father which hath sent him.'

Matt. 2:11. 'And when they were come into the house, they saw the young child with Mary his mother, and fell down and **WORSHIPPED** him.

Matt. 8:2. 'And, behold, there came a leper, and **WORSHIPPED** him, saying, Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.'

Matt. 14:13. 'When Jesus heard of it, he departed thence by ship into a desert place apart; and when the people had heard thereof, they followed on foot out of the cities.'

7. He is worshipped in heaven.

Rev. 5:12, 14. 'Saying with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing.' 'And the four beasts said, Amen, And the four and twenty elders fell down and **WORSHIPPED** him that liveth forever and ever.'

Isa. 6:1-5. 'In the year that king Uzziah died, I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne, high, and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphim; each one had six wings; with twain he did fly. And one cried unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of Hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory. And the posts of the door moved at the voice of him that cried,

and the house was filled with smoke. Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts.'

8. The Father commanded angels to worship him.

Heb. 1:6. 'And again, when he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God **WORSHIP** him.'

9. He was understood by the Jews to assert his own absolute divinity.

10. He wrought miracles in his own name, and by his own power.

11. He claimed power to raise himself from the dead.

John 10:18. 'No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself; I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. 'This commandment have I received of my Father.'

12. If not God, he was an impostor, and a blasphemer; and according to the Jewish law, was justly put to death.'

13. If not God, he has made no Atonement, but only suffered as a martyr.

14. Set aside the doctrine of Christ's divinity, and you destroy the moral power of the gospel.

15. If not God, the Christian Church are, and always have been idolaters.

16. It is incredible that the Church should have been so greatly blessed by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit in the very act of worshipping Christ as God, unless he is the true God.

17. Those Churches who deny the divinity of Christ are not blessed with the effusions of the Holy Spirit as are those Churches that maintain his divinity, and worship him as God.

18. If Christ is not God, God the Father has deceived us by giving Christ the power to work miracles in confirmation of his assertion that he is God.

19. If he is not God, the Prophets and Apostles have been deceived, and have led the Church into idolatry.

20. It is a fact which cannot be denied that the Churches planted by the Apostles held the proper divinity of Christ.

21. If he is not God, it does not appear that there is any God revealed in the Bible.

22. If he is not God, the Bible is the most blasphemous book in the world.

23. If Christ is not God, it is truly unaccountable that the Bible should speak of him in a manner so entirely different from that in which it speaks of any created being.

24. Christians are led by the Holy Spirit to commune with Christ as God.

25. The saints naturally pray to him as God.

Acts 9:13,14. 'Then Ananias answered, Lord, I have heard by many of this man, how much evil he hath done to thy saints at Jerusalem; and here he hath authority from the chief priests to bind all that call on thy name.'

26. If Christ is not God, we have no means of being undeceived. As the Bible stands, we are bound to receive the doctrine of his divinity.

27. If he is not God, the more diligent, honest, and studious we are in biblical research, the more certain are we to be deceived.

28. If not God, none have held the truth upon this subject, but the mutilators of the Bible, and those who have held very loose notions of its divine inspiration and authority.

29. Those who have rejected the divinity of Christ have exhibited the loosest morality that has been seen in the Christian world.

30. If this doctrine is not true, then the preaching and belief of this heresy have occasioned a purer morality, and have exerted altogether a better influence than has ever resulted from preaching the truth, or from a denial of this doctrine.

31. But this is impossible. Falsehood cannot promote a pure morality. If a belief in the divinity of Christ naturally results in the purest and the most perfect virtue, it must be true.

Third. *Answer objections.*

Obj. I. To the proper divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ, it is objected that he often and in many ways acknowledged his inferiority to, and dependence upon God. He prayed to God, and affirmed that God was greater than he.

Ans. 1. It has been common for those who deny the divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ, to quote that class of passages that prove his humanity, dependence, and inferiority to the Father, and there stop, taking it for granted that they have proved that he is not God.

2. This is unfair and absurd, for it is admitted and maintained by Trinitarians, as well as by themselves, that he was a man, and as such, dependent on and inferior to his Father. But it is also maintained that he is likewise God, independent, omnipotent, and eternal.

3. There is, to say the least, as large a class of scriptures to prove his divinity as his humanity. They seem as explicit, full, and unequivocal as could be expressed in words.

4. To get rid of the mystery of the union of two natures in one person, some explain away his humanity, and others his divinity. The same rule of criticism, resorted to in the one case, is equally effectual and conclusive in the other. And were the application made, it would be equally efficient in destroying the testimony of both these classes of passages, and rendering it uncertain whether he was either God, or man, or anything else.

5. As Mediator, Christ was both inferior to, and dependent upon the Father.

Obj. II. It is objected that the union of the divine and human natures is utterly inconceivable.

Ans. It is true that we can have no conception of the *quo modo* of this union. Nor can we have any conception of the manner in which our soul and body are united. In the one case we can believe the fact on the testimony of God, and in the other, on the testimony of our own consciousness.

Obj. III. It is objected that the union of the divine and human natures should not be made an article of faith, because it cannot possibly be believed, inasmuch as it cannot be understood.

Ans. The thing to be believed can be understood. We are not called upon to believe anything about the mode or manner of the union. It is not a question of philosophy, but of fact, that we are called upon to believe. The fact we can understand and believe.

LECTURE XIX.

HUMANITY OF CHRIST

FIRST. Notice the various opinions that have prevailed upon this subject.

SECOND. Show what is intended by the Humanity of Christ.

THIRD. Prove the doctrine.

First. Notice the various opinions that have prevailed upon this subject.

1. The Docetae and Gnostics admitted the proper divinity of Christ, but denied that he possessed a human body. They held that he had a body and suffered only in appearance. This opinion originated in the philosophy of physical depravity, or the philosophy which teaches that moral evil has its seat in matter. They of course felt it necessary to deny that Christ had a material body.

2. The Sabellians admitted the divinity of Christ, and that he possessed a real human body; also that he suffered for the sins of men. But they deny his having a human soul.

Second. *What is intended By the Humanity of Christ.*

The common doctrine of the Church upon this subject, is that Christ was in all respects a perfect human being, possessing both a human body and human soul, with all the attributes of a perfect man.

Third. *Prove the Humanity of Christ.*

That he had a real body is evident.

1. From the fact that he was conceived by, and born of a woman.

Isa. 7:14. "Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel," Compared with---

Matt. 1:23. "Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel, which being interpreted, is, God with us." And---

Luke 1:31, "And, behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name Jesus."

Luke 2:11,12, "For unto you is born this day, in the city of David, a Savior, which is Christ the Lord. And this shall be a sign unto you; Ye shall find the babe wrapped in swaddling-clothes, lying in a manger."

2. He was circumcised according to the law of Moses.

Luke 2:21: "And when eight days were accomplished for the circumcising of the child, his name was called

Jesus, which was so named of the angel before he was conceived in the womb."

3. He grew.

Luke 2:40: "And the child **GREW**, and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom; and the grace of God was upon him."

4. He was hungry.

Matt. 4:2: "And when he had fasted forty days and forty nights, he was afterwards an **HUNGERED**."

Luke 4:2: "Being forty days tempted of the devil, and in those days he did eat nothing; and when they were ended, he afterward **HUNGERED**."

5. He was thirsty.

John 19:28: "After this, Jesus knowing that all things were now accomplished, that the scripture might be fulfilled, saith, **I THIRST**,"

6. He ate and drank.

Mark 2:16: "And when the scribes and Pharisees saw him **EAT** with publicans and sinners, they said unto his disciples, How is it that he **EATETH** and **DRINKETH** with publicans and sinners?"

7. He walked, labored, rested, slept, was weary, lived, and died, like other men. He sweat, bled, was buried, like other men.

8. He declared himself to have a body of flesh and bones.

Luke 24:39: "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not **FLESH** and **BONES**, as ye see **ME HAVE**."

John 20:20, 27: "And when he had so said, he shewed unto them his **HANDS** and his **SIDE**. Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord." "Then said he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my **HANDS**; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my **SIDE**: and be not faithless, but believing."

Heb. 10:5: "Wherefore, when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a **BODY** hast thou prepared me."

9. It is repeatedly asserted of him that he had a body.

John 2:21: "But he spake of the temple of his **BODY**."

Luke 23:55: "And the women also, which came with him from Galilee, followed after, and beheld the sepulchre, and how his **BODY** was laid."

Luke 24:3, 23: "And they entered in, and found not the **BODY** of the Lord Jesus." "And when they found not his **BODY**, they came, saying, that they had also seen a vision of angels, which said that he was alive."

Heb. 10:10: "By the which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the **BODY** of Jesus Christ once for all."

John 20:12: "And seeth two angels in white sitting, the one at the head, and the other at the feet, where the **BODY** of Jesus had lain."

Mark 14:8: "She hath done what she could: she is come aforehand to anoint my **BODY** to the burying."

Also, Mark 14:45-47; Heb. 2:14; John 1:14; Acts 2:3, 30, 31; Rom. 1:3; 1 Pet. 2:24; which need not be quoted.

10. Those that knew him had the testimony of their senses that he had a body.

11. There is the same evidence that he had a real body, as there is that the Apostles had bodies, or that any man has a body.

12. The denial of his having a human body is regarded by the Apostles as fatal heresy.

I John 1:1: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life."

1 John 4:3: "And every spirit that confesses not that Jesus Christ is come in the **FLESH** is not of God: and this is that spirit of anti-Christ, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now already is it in the world."

13. Any rule of biblical interpretation that would set aside the evidence of this truth, would, if carried out, blot out every fundamental doctrine of the Bible.

That he had a human soul, I remark:

1. It is the soul, and not the body that constitutes a man.
2. A human body without a soul, is not a human being.
3. If Christ had no human soul, but was merely God dwelling in a human body, he was infinitely far from being a man.
4. He is often called a man in the Bible.

John 1:30: "This is he of whom I have said, After me cometh a **MAN** which is preferred before me; for he was before me."

John 8:40: "But now ye seek to kill me, a **MAN** that hath told you the truth, which I have heard of God: this did not Abraham."

Acts 2:22: "Ye men of Israel, hear these words; Jesus of Nazareth, a **MAN** approved of God among you by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know."

Acts 17:31: "Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by

that **MAN** whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead."

1 Tim. 2:5: "For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the **MAN** Christ Jesus."

Isa. 53:3: "He is despised and rejected of men; a **MAN** of sorrows, and acquainted with grief; and we hid as it were our faces from him; he was despised, and we esteemed him not."

5. He is called the Son of man seventy-one times in the Bible.

6. He is often spoken of in the Bible as having a soul.

Isa. 53:10, 11, 12: "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his **SOUL** an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see the travail of his **SOUL**, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he hath poured out his **SOUL** unto death; and he was numbered with the transgressors; and he bare the sins of many, and made intercession for the transgressors."

Ps. 16:10: "For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption."

Acts 2:27: "Because thou wilt not leave my **SOUL** in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption."

Matt. 26:38: "Then saith he unto them, My **SOUL** is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death: tarry ye here, and watch with me."

John 12:27: "Now is my **SOUL** troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour."

7. The sympathies and feelings of a human being are ascribed to him."

Isa. 53:3, 4, 7, 10, 11: "He is despised and rejected of men; a man of **SORROWS**, and acquainted with **GRIEF**; and we hid as it were our faces from him: he was despised and we esteemed him not; Surely he hath borne our **GRIEFS**, and carried our **SORROWS**; ye we did esteem him **STRICKEN**, **SMITTEN** of God, and **AFFLICTED**." "He was **OPPRESSED**, and he was **AFFLICTED**." "Yet it pleased the Lord to **BRUISE** him; he hath put him to **GRIEF**." "He shall see of the **TRAVAIL** of his soul, and shall be satisfied:

by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall **BEAR** their iniquities."

John 12:27: "Now is my soul **TROUBLED**: and what shall I say? Father save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour."

John 13:21: "When Jesus had thus said, he was **TROUBLED** in spirit, and testified, and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, That one of you shall betray me."

Matt. 26:38: "Then saith he unto them, My soul is exceeding **SORROWFUL**, even unto death."

Luke 22:44: "And being in an **AGONY**, he prayed more earnestly: and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground."

8. He was in all things made like unto his brethren.

Heb. 2:17: "Wherefore in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people."

9. He was tempted in all respects as we are.

Heb 4:15: "For we have not a high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points **TEMPTED** like as we are, yet without sin."

But if he had no human soul, he was infinitely unlike his brethren.

10. He suffered under temptation.

Heb. 2:18: "For in that he himself hath **SUFFERED**, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted."

11. He was at first an infant in knowledge.

12. He grew in wisdom.

Luke 2:52: "And Jesus **INCREASED** in **WISDOM** and stature, and in favor with God and man."

13. He was until the day of his death ignorant of some, and probably of many things.

Mark 13:32: "But of that day and that hour **KNOWETH NO MAN**, no, not the angels which are in heaven, **NEITHER** the **Son**, but the Father."

Matt. 26:38-42: "Then saith he unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death: tarry ye here, and watch with me. And he went a little farther, and fell on his face, and prayed, saying, O my Father, **IF** it is **POSSIBLE**, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt. And he cometh unto his disciples, and findeth them asleep, and saith unto Peter, What! could ye not watch with me one hour? Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak. He went away again the second time, and prayed, saying, O my Father, **IF** this

cup **MAY** not pass away from me, except I drink it, thy will be done."

To all this proof it is objected, by those who deny that he had a human soul, that all that is said of his ignorance, suffering, being tempted, increasing in wisdom, etc., might result from the connection of the divine mind with the human body; that if the divine nature was dependent on a human body for its developments, it might be attended with all the circumstances ascribed to Christ.

To this I answer:

(1.) This objection seems to be a begging of the question, or taking for granted the thing that needs to be, but never can be proved.

(2.) The supposition is absurd, because it assumes that infinite knowledge, and the other infinite attributes of God can become finite, and even infantile.

13. There appears to be the same evidence that Christ had a human soul, as there is that any man has a soul.

14. Any rule of interpretation that would set aside this doctrine as not taught in the Bible, would, if carried out in its application, blot out every doctrine of the Bible.

REMARKS.

1. Christ unites the sympathies of a man with the attributes of God.

2. He still possesses human nature in union with the divine nature.

3. He will greatly exalt human beings as his brethren; as sustaining a nearer relation to him than any other order of creatures.

LECTURE XX.

PERSONALITY AND DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

FIRST. Show what is not intended by the Divinity of the Holy Spirit.

SECOND. That he is truly God.

THIRD. What is intended by the Personality of the Holy Spirit.

FOURTH. Prove that he is a Divine Person.

First. *What is not intended by the Divinity of the Holy Spirit.*

1. By the Divinity of the Holy Spirit is not intended, that he is a mere attribute of God.

2. Nor by his Divinity is it intended that he is a mere Divine operation or influence.

Second. *By the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, is intended that he is truly and properly God.*

PROOF.

I. The *names* of God are ascribed to him:

2 Cor. 3:17. "Now the **LORD** is that Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty."

1 Cor. 2:16. "For who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ." Compared with---

Isaiah 40:13. "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or being his counselor hath taught him?"

Acts 5:3, 4. "But Peter said, Ananias, why hath Satan filled thy heart to lie to the Holy Ghost, and to keep back part of the price of the land? While it remained was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? why hast thou conceived this thing in thy heart? thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God."

Acts 4:24-26. "They lifted up their voice to God, with one accord, and said Lord, thou art God, which hast made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all that in them is; who, by the mouth of thy servant David, hast said, Why did the heathen rage, and the people imagine vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers were gathered together, against the Lord, and against his Christ." Compared with---

Acts 1:16. "Men and brethren, this scripture must needs have been fulfilled, which the **HOLY GHOST** by the mouth of David spake before concerning Judas, which was guide to them that took Jesus."

Acts 28:25. 'And when they agreed not among themselves, they departed, after that Paul had spoken one word, 'Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias [Isaiah] the prophet unto our fathers,' etc. Compared with---

Isa. 6:8. 'I heard the voice of the **LORD** saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?'

Heb. 3:7-9. 'Wherefore, as the Holy Ghost saith, To-day, if ye will hear his voice harden not your hearts as in the provocation, in the day of temptation in the wilderness, when your fathers tempted me, proved me, and saw my works forty years.' Compared with---

Ps. 95:7. 'For he is our God; and we are the people of his pasture, and the sheep of his hand. To-day, if ye will hear his voice,' etc.

Heb. 10:15, 16. 'Whereof the Holy Ghost also is a witness to us; for after that he had said before, This is the covenant that I will make with them after those days,

saith the **LORD**; I will put my laws into their hearts, and in their minds will I write them.' Compared with---

Jer. 31:33, 34. 'But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; after those days, saith the **LORD**, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more.'

II. The *attributes* of God are ascribed to him.

1. Eternity. Hebrews 9:14. 'How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the Eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God!'

2. Omnipresence. Ps. 139:7. 'Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?'

3. Omniscience. 1 Cor. 2:10, 11. 'For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of a man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.'

4. Power. Romans 15:13, 19. 'Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Ghost.' 'By the power of the Spirit of God.'

5. The possession of Divine Attributes is implied in the works ascribed to him, as we shall presently see.

III. To these passages I will add several other proofs of his Divinity.

1. He is joined with the Father and the Son in the ordinance of baptism.

2. Also in the Apostolic Benediction.

3. Blaspheming against him is represented as an unpardonable sin.

4. If the Holy Spirit is not God, the Church are deceived.

5. If not, the Bible is exactly calculated to deceive mankind.

6. If not, it is God's own fault that we are deceived, as the Bible is written in such a manner, that no rational rules of interpretation can bring us to any other conclusions than that the Holy Spirit is truly God. Therefore,

7. If the Holy Spirit is not truly God, we have no means of being undeceived.

8. Suppose you substitute *power*, for the Holy Ghost, in Baptism and in the Apostolic Benediction, and read---'I baptize you in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Power;' and, 'May the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, with the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Power, be with you.'

Third. *The Personality of the Holy Spirit.*

By the Personality of the Holy Spirit, it is intended:

1. That he is a moral agent.
2. That as an agent he is distinct from the Father and the Son, though not separate in the substratum of his existence.
3. That he is in such a sense a distinct person as to render the application of the personal pronouns I, thou, he, to him strictly proper.

Fourth. *Prove that the Holy Ghost is a Divine Person.*

I. The attributes of a personal agent are ascribed to the Holy Spirit.

1. Knowledge. 1 Cor. 2:10, 11. 'God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.' And---

Isa. 11:2. 'And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord.'

2. Wisdom. Isa. 11:2; (as quoted above.) Acts 6:3. 'Wherefore, brethren, look ye out seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business.' And---

Eph. 1:17. 'That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give unto you the Spirit of Wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him.'

3. Power. Rom. 15:13, 19. 'Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Ghost.' 'Through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God.'

4. Goodness. Ps. 143:10. 'Teach me to do thy will; for thou art my God; thy Spirit is **GOOD**.' And---

Neh. 9:20. 'Thou gavest also thy **GOOD** Spirit to instruct them.'

5. Holiness, often.

II. The works of a personal agent are ascribed to him.

1. Creation. Job 33:4. 'The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life.' And--

Ps. 104:30. 'Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created.'

2. He is said to *search*. 1 Cor. 2:10, 11: (as cited above.)

3. To *strive*. Gen. 6:3. 'My Spirit shall not always strive with man.'

4. To be *sent forth*. Gal. 4:6. 'And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba, Father.' And---

John 15:26. 'But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me.'

5. To *move*. Gen. 1:2. 'And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.'

6. To *know*. 1 Cor. 2:10, 11: (as above cited.)

7. To *speak*. John 16:13. 'Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak; and he will show you things to come.' And---

Acts 10:19. 'While Peter thought on the vision, the Spirit said unto him, Behold, three men seek thee.' And---

Acts 11:12. 'And the Spirit bade me go with them, nothing doubting.' And---

1 Tim. 4:1. 'Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils.' And---

Rev. 14:13. 'And I heard a voice from heaven, saying unto me, Write, Blessed are the dead, which die in the Lord from henceforth, Yea,' saith the Spirit, 'that they rest from their labors, and their works do follow them.'

8. To *guide*. John 16:13. (Quoted above.)

9. To *lead*. Rom. 8:14. 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.' And---

Galatians 5:18. 'But if ye be led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law.'

10. To *help*. Rom. 8:26. 'For we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.'

11. To *testify*. Rom. 8:16. 'The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.' And---

John 15:26. 'The Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me.'

12. To *reveal*. Eph. 3:5. 'Now revealed unto his holy Apostles and prophets by the Spirit.'

13. To *prophesy*. John 16:13. 1 Tim. 4:1. (Both quoted above.)

14. To *intercede*. Rom. 8:26. (Quoted above.)

15. To *give gifts*. 1 Cor. 12:4, 8-11. 'Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit.' 'For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another, the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; to another, faith by the same Spirit; to another the gift of healing by the same Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, discerning of spirits; to another, divers kinds of tongues; to another, the interpretation of tongues. But all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will.'

16. To *work miracles*. Rom. 15:19. 'Through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God; so that from Jerusalem and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully preached the gospel of Christ.'

17. To *sanctify*. 1 Cor. 6:11. 'And such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.' And---

2 Thess. 2:13. 'But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit.' And---

1 Pet. 1:2. 'Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ.'

18. To *quicken or give life*. John 6:63. 'It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.' And---

1 Pet. 3:18. 'For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit.'

19. To *send teachers* to the Church. Acts 13:2, 4. 'As they ministered to the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the works whereunto I have called them.' 'So they being sent forth by the Holy Ghost, departed unto Seleucia.' And---

Acts 20:28. 'Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the Church of God.'

20. Teachers are said to *receive their knowledge* from the Holy Spirit. Luke 2:26. 'And it was revealed unto him by the Holy Ghost, that he should not see death, before he had seen the **LORD'S CHRIST**.' And---

John 16:13. 'When he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth.' 'He will show you things to come.' And---

John 14:26. 'But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you.'

21. He is said to *speak by them*. Mark 13:11. 'When they shall lead you, and deliver you up, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, neither do ye premeditate; but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye; for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost.' And---

2 Pet. 1:21. 'The prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.'

22. He is said to *dwell in his people*. John 14:17. 'Even the Spirit of truth; whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him; but ye know him; for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you.' And---

Rom. 8:11. 'If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.' And---

1 Cor. 6:19. 'What! know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? And---

1 Cor. 3:16. 'Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?'

23. He *raises the dead*. 1 Pet. 3:18. 'Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit.'

24. He *reproves or convinces of sin*. John 16:7, 8. 'It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you. And when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment.'

25. He is represented as having *the will and feelings of a personal agent*. Rom. 8:27. 'He that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints, according to the will of God.'

26. He is *pleased*. Acts 15:28. 'For it seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things.'

27. To be *grieved*. Eph. 4:30. 'Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption.'

28. To be *vexed*. Isa. 63:10. 'They rebelled and vexed his Holy Spirit; therefore he was turned to be their enemy, and he fought against them.'

29. To be *resisted*. Acts 7:51. 'Ye stiff-necked! and uncircumcised in heart and ears! ye do always resist the Holy Ghost; as your fathers did, so do ye.'

30. To be *blasphemed*. Matt. 12:31. 'All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men.'

To suppose the Holy Spirit to be the attribute of power would make nonsense of the Bible. Acts 10:38. 'God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power.' If the Holy Ghost is the attribute of power, this passage means that God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the holy power and with power.

Romans 15:13. 'Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Ghost!' That is---through the power of the holy power. And---Verse 19. 'By the power of the Spirit of God.' By the power of the power of God. And---

1 Cor. 2:4. 'My speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power.' That is---In demonstration of the power and of power. Who can believe that the Bible utters such nonsense as this would be, if the Holy Spirit is but the attribute of power.

Objection. To all the passages that establish the personality of the Holy Spirit, it is objected, that in the Book of Proverbs, Wisdom is personified and spoken of as a personal agent, and it may be, that all these passages are nothing more than a personification of the attribute of power.

Ans. Personification is admissible in poetic language; but not in prose, and the plain language of narrative. The book of Proverbs is written in poetic language; but these attributes, words, works, feelings, and ways, are ascribed to the Holy Spirit in plain prose and in the simple language of narrative, and in such connections as to forbid the idea of his being an attribute personified.

1. It is unnecessary to attempt the proof of the Divinity of the Father, as this is not questioned.

2. The denial of the Divinity of the Son, and of the Divinity and personality of the Holy Spirit, is necessary, to get rid of the doctrine of the Trinity.

3. Although the doctrine of the Trinity is in different ways taught in the Bible; yet the most satisfactory method is by establishing the personality and Divinity of the three persons, especially of the Son and Holy Spirit; as neither the personality or Divinity of the Father is questioned.

4. The appeal of the Unitarians to the Bible is absurd, inasmuch as their business with the Bible upon this point, is to explain it away.

5. The same rules of interpretation, that would expunge the doctrine of the personality and Divinity of the Holy Spirit from the Bible, would do the same with the personality and Divinity of the Father and of the Son.

LECTURE XXI.

PROVIDENCE OF GOD

FIRST. Show what is intended by the providence of God.

SECOND. Prove that God administers over the universe a providential government.

THIRD. Notice the different theories that have prevailed respecting the Providence of God, with the principal arguments by which they have been supported, and show what seems to be the truth upon the subject.

First. *Which is intended by the Providence of God.*

1. All believers in Revelation have maintained that God administers a providential government, but have differed widely in respect to the *manner* in which he administers it.

2. It has been common for the different schools, or those who maintain different views upon the subject, to give such a definition of the providence of God, as to take for granted the truth of their own theory.

3. As the *quo modo* of divine Providence, has always been a subject of debate, it seems important, if possible, to give such a definition of Providence as shall not take for granted the truth of any theory in respect to the *quo modo*.

4. So to define Providence as to take the truth of either theory for granted, is to maintain by implication at least, that those who reject this particular theory, are altogether infidels in respect to the Providence of God, which is far from being true.

5. The true idea of Providence is, **PROVISION**. The Providence of God is an adequate provision on his part for the fulfillment of all his designs. In other words, it consists in a sufficient provision for securing the highest practicable well being of the universe. This definition is sufficiently general to cover the whole ground, and yet takes nothing for granted in respect to the *quo modo*.

Second. *Prove that God administers a Providential Government.*

Some of the principal arguments in support of the doctrine of divine providence are,

1. Creation could not have been an *end* but must have been a *means* to some end.

2. That end, whatever it was, could not be accomplished without a provision for it, either in creation itself, or by exercising a subsequent superintendence and control, or both of these together.

3. The structure of the universe clearly indicates that the end of its creation was to glorify God in the promotion and diffusion of happiness.

4. 'This is manifest from the everywhere abounding proofs of benevolent design, the manifold contrivances for the promotion of happiness.

5. The proof is conclusive that there is a provision in the structure and movements of the universe for the promotion of happiness.

6. As happiness is a good in itself, it is self-evident that the promotion of happiness must have been an end in the creation of the universe. In this remark I include of course the happiness and glory of God.

7. The doctrine of a divine Providence then is a just inference from the fact of creation.

8. The necessities of the universe demand that God should administer over it a providential government.

9. Since God has created the universe, he is under an obligation to administer over it a providential government.

10 All nations have believed that God exercises over the universe a providential control. This is abundantly manifest in their public religious rites.

11. The Bible fully declares that God administers over the universe a providential government, that "He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will."

Ps. 103:19. 'The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens: and his kingdom ruleth over all.'

Dan. 4:17, 25.; This matter is by the decree of the watchers, and the demand by the word of the holy ones; to the intent that the living may know that the most High

ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.' 'That they shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field, and they shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and they shall wet thee with the dew of heaven, and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will.' 'And all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing: and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?'

12. A great part of the Bible is little less than a history of the Providence of God.

Third. *Notice the different theories of divine Providence, with the principal arguments by which they have been supported, and show what seems to be the truth upon the subject.*

I. The first theory that prevailed was that of **OCCASIONALISM**. The occasionalists maintained that all motion or action whether of mind or matter, was the result of a direct, divine, irresistible efficiency. They denied that any creature could be a cause, but that all creatures and things were only occasions of the divine conduct, and that God was properly the only active agent in the universe. This was a philosophic theory, and inclined strongly to Pantheism. It denied the efficiency of the inherent properties and laws of both matter and mind. Some of its advocates went so far as to maintain that the moral character of every act was to be ascribed to God. They maintained that what are generally termed the laws of nature are only the mode of divine operation.

The arguments in support of this theory are:

1. The Bible declares the universal agency of God.

Ans. The Bible does indeed teach that 'God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will;' but it teaches nothing in respect to *thomodus operandi*, which is the very point in question. It is admitted on all hands, that God is in some way concerned in every event of the universe; that he is either actively or permissively in such a sense concerned as that, in an important sense, all events may be ascribed to him. But the question at issue is, in what manner and by what agency does God work everything after the counsel of his own will? Of this the Bible teaches nothing, in respect at least to myriads of events.

2. They allege that God cannot create a system, that shall have the powers of operation in itself.

Ans. It may be true that God cannot create a universe that shall act independently of his sustaining agency; but that he cannot create a universe, that can have the power of operation lodged in its own properties and laws, so that nothing but a sustaining agency is necessary to produce a given result, has not been, and it is presumed cannot be shown.

3. They affirm that the laws of nature can be nothing else than the *modus operandi Dei*.

Ans. This is a mere begging of the question.

4. They allege that we can conceive of no other way in which God can fulfill his purposes and prophecies.

Ans. 1. If we could not, it would be no proof of this theory. Is it to be supposed, that God does not possess resources of which we have no conception?

Ans. 2. But we can conceive how God can influence moral agents, so as to produce a certain result without subjecting them to the law of necessity.

5. They affirm that this theory exalts God as a sovereign.

Ans. Yes; as an arbitrary and unrighteous one.

6. It is said that this theory impresses the mind with awe, as it brings us to regard God as the efficient agent and actor in every event.

Ans. It does impress the mind with abhorrence, as it ascribes all the wickedness in earth and hell to God, as its efficient cause.

Some of the objections to this theory are the following:

1. It is manifestly inconsistent with any rational idea of moral agency and accountability.

2. It is manifestly inconsistent with our own consciousness. We are as conscious of the freedom of our own actions, and of being the efficient cause of our own volitions, as we are of our own existence.

3. It makes God the only agent in the universe. This I have said is admitted by some, though denied by most of the advocates of this system. But if the theory be true, it is a palpable matter of fact, that God is the only agent, and that all creatures are but instruments. This seems to be implied in the very name of the theory. Occasionalism, or that God is the cause, and creatures the occasion of all action of mind and matter, seems to put the question, that God is regarded as the only agent, beyond a doubt.

4. Another objection to this theory is, that it is wholly inconsistent with any rational idea of moral government, of moral character, and of moral influence.

5. It excludes the idea of infernal agency from the universe, or makes God an accomplice with Satan. According to this theory, Satan could not tempt, without being caused to do so by a direct Divine efficiency. Nor could any creature yield to temptation and sin in view of it, without a direct Divine efficiency, to produce his yielding and sinning.

6. It makes God the author of sin in the worst sense.

7. It impeaches his sincerity and blackens his whole character.

II. A second theory that prevailed, was the **MECHANICAL THEORY**, or the theory that in creation itself, God had made provision for securing the occurrence of all events, physical and moral, as they actually take place, without any superintendence or controlling exercised over the universe---that in creating both mind and matter, they were constituted with such inherent properties and placed in such circumstances, and impressed with such laws as to secure the final and desired result, without any subsequent interference or control on the part of God. Thus making the universe a vast machine; working out its results by the force of its own inherent properties and laws. This is the direct opposite of the first theory.

The principal arguments in support of this theory are the following:

1. God was able to create such a universe.

Ans. This is taking for granted what needs to be proved. It is by no means self-evident, that it was naturally possible to create a universe like this, containing myriads of free moral agents, whose moral agency implies the power of resisting every degree of moral influence, in such a manner as that a given result would inevitably be secured without superintendence and control.

2. Another argument in support of this theory is that such a creation of the universe as would avoid the necessity of subsequent superintendence and control, is a higher manifestation of the wisdom of God, than could otherwise have been made.

Ans. This also is begging the question. It assumes that a universe so created as to leave God in idleness, without the necessity of superintending and controlling it, would have been the perfection of wisdom. But this is by no means self-evident.

3. Another argument is, that unless this theory be true, the creation of the universe was imperfect.

Ans. This again is begging the question. Because it assumes that the most perfect universe, would be that which should leave God in idleness, without at all

concerning himself about its government and control. But this is not self-evident, for it should be remembered that the happiness of God, was infinitely the most important item in the *end* of creation. If God found a happiness in creating the universe it is not unreasonable to suppose that he takes a great pleasure in superintending and controlling its movements.

If to this it be objected, that God must have been infinitely happy, previously to the work of creation; I answer, that as all eternity is present to God, he always enjoyed the work of creation and providence, and his happiness eternally consisted in the excellence of his character. And the excellence of his character is made up of the aggregate influences which have been and ever will be exerted by him for the promotion of virtue and happiness.

When it has been objected to this theory, as it justly may be, that it excludes the influence of prayer, and sets aside the idea that God interferes with the movements of the universe, in granting answers to prayer, it has been stated, that prayer is a necessary link in the chain of events, as originally established in the constitution of the universe.

To this it may be replied, that the answer either admits what the theory denies, or it is nonsense. The theory denies that God ever interferes in any case whatever, with the movements of the universe. What then can be intended by prayer's being a necessary link in the great chain of events? Is it meant that prayer is necessary to induce God to interfere with the movements of the universe, and so control things as to bring about an answer? If it means this, it admits what the theory denies. Or does it mean that prayer is a necessary link in the great chain of events, sustaining the relation of cause to its effect? If this be its meaning it is utter nonsense; for how can prayer sustain the relation of a cause to a storm of rain, or the stilling of a tempest, or of a fruitful season, or of any physical event whatever?

4. Another argument is, that to say the least it is consistent with the representations of scripture upon the subject of divine providence.

Ans. No. The representations of the Bible manifestly are, that God exercises a superintendence and control of all things. And not merely that he has so constructed the universe as that it needs no superintendence and control.

5. Again, it is asserted in support of this theory, that the Bible virtually asserts it, in saying that "God rested from all his works that he had created and made."

Ans. The Bible only affirms that he rested from the work of creation, and in no case intimates that he sat down in

a state of inaction, without exercising any superintending control of the universe which he had made.

To this *theory* it may be objected:

1. That the laws of matter are uniform, and so far as we can see or conceive, cannot be so accommodated to the government of mind as to produce certain results, without superintendence. 'Therefore, if this theory might be true, were the universe all matter, it cannot be admitted when we take into consideration the fact, that so great a part of the universe is made up of moral agents.

2. It may be farther objected, that it is the doctrine of fate.

3. It is inconsistent with the holiness and happiness of moral beings, as it excludes God from any agency in the government and control of the universe, it annihilates their sense of dependence, and has a manifestly injurious tendency.

4. It is inconsistent with the Bible, which as I have already said, everywhere inculcates the doctrine of a divine universal superintendence and control.

5. It contradicts the general belief of all nations. The expiatory sacrifices, prayers, and multitudes of other public manifestations of belief, demonstrate that all nations have had the conviction that God continually interferes in the affairs of men, and exercises a universally superintending agency in the universe.

6. Another objection to this theory is, that it manifestly sets aside the use and influence of prayer, as a means of procuring blessings from God.

7. This theory is contrary to the experience of all saints.

8. It is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Spirit's influence and agency, in the conversion and sanctification of sinners.

9. It is inconsistent with the Atonement and all divine interference, for the salvation of the world.

10. Its manifestly demoralizing tendency gave birth to the next theory, which seems to take a middle ground between the first two.

III. This theory regards Providence as general and particular.

GENERAL PROVIDENCE is the general provision made in the properties and laws of both matter and mind, for the accomplishment of his designs. It regards both matter and mind, not only as real existences, but as possessing inherent properties and laws, which, however, are not self-existent, and self-efficient, but require the upholding or sustaining power of God.

PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE is that divine interference and control which is required by the exigencies of moral government. This theory maintains that God is directly or indirectly, actively or permissively concerned in every event.

Before adducing the arguments in proof of this theory, I will notice the objections to it.

Obj. I. It is objected, that it is inconsistent with the wisdom of God, to suppose that he has so created the universe as that it will need superintendence and control.

This has been sufficiently answered, in the examination of the second theory.

Obj. II. Another objection is, that it lays God under the necessity of constant exertion.

Ans. 1. This is not a weariness but a pleasure.

2. It is just what the Bible teaches.

3. This objection also has been sufficiently answered, in the examination of the second theory.

Obj. III. Another objection to this theory is, that it represents God as violating his own laws, and by a divine interference, setting aside their regular action.

Ans. 1. He has an undoubted right to violate or suspend the operation of physical law, for wise and benevolent ends.

2. It is not necessary to suppose that he violates or at all sets aside the action of physical law, but simply so interferes as to modify the results of the action of those laws.

Some of the arguments in support of this theory are the following:

1. It better accords with the representations of the Bible.

2. It better accords with the common sense of mankind.

3. It better accords with the general experience of mankind, so far as experience can be brought to bear upon this point.

4. It is more in accordance with the general belief of mankind.

5. Its moral influence is decidedly better.

6. It accords with the facts in the kingdom of grace.

7. It encourages prayer.

8. It seems satisfactory to the human mind.

9. It keeps up an intercourse and sympathy between God and moral beings.

10. It begets faith and encourages dependence upon God.

11. It begets affection for God.

12. It makes us realize his presence and agency.

LECTURE XXII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT

FIRST. Define Moral Government.

SECOND. Show what is implied in it.

First. Define Moral Government.

1. *Moral Government*, when opposed to physical, is the government of mind in opposition to the government of matter.

2. It is a government of motive or moral suasion, in opposition to a government of force.

3. Moral Government is the influence of moral considerations over the minds of moral agents.

4. *Moral Government*, in its most extensive sense, includes the whole influence of God's character as revealed in his works, providence, and word, over the universe of moral beings. It includes whatever influence God exerts to control the minds of moral agents, in conformity with the eternal principles of righteousness.

Second. *Show what is implied in Moral Government.*

1. Moral Government cannot be an end, but a means; and therefore implies an end, to which it sustains the relation of a means.

2. All rightful Moral Government implies that the end to which it sustains the relation of a means is good.

3. Rightful Moral Government implies the mutual dependence of both the ruler and the subject upon this means for the promotion of the desired end.

4. Moral Government, therefore, implies a necessity for its existence.

5. It implies that both the ruler and the ruled are moral agents.

6. It implies the existence of moral law.

7. It implies that both the ruler and the ruled are under a moral obligation, to obey the law, so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of each.

8. It implies the existence of a ruler who has a right to enforce moral obligation.

9. It implies that the ruler is under moral obligation to do this.

LECTURE XXIII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 2.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION

FIRST. Inquire what Moral Obligation is.

SECOND. State the conditions of Moral Obligation.

THIRD. What is the foundation of Moral Obligation.

Under this head I shall show:

I. The different answers that have been given to the inquiry, What is the foundation of Moral Obligation?

II. Show wherein they agree.

III. Wherein they differ.

IV. What the real question is not.

V. What it is.

VI. Answer the question, or show what the foundation of Moral Obligation is.

To avoid confusion in discussing this subject, I will premise the following things:

1. There is a difference between the *foundation* or *fundamental* reason of Moral Obligation, and other reasons that may exist.

2. The foundation of Moral Obligation must be the *ultimate* reason upon which the obligation rests.

3. An ultimate reason is a first truth, in support of which there can be no proof, and of which no more can be or need be said than that so it is.

4. There is a plain and important distinction between willing or preferring the *existence* of a thing, as that which is desirable in itself, and on its own account, and willing to *create*, *do*, or *give existence* to that thing. I may prefer or will the *existence* of what I cannot do; but I cannot will to do what I know I cannot do. For example, were a moral being so perfectly isolated that neither God nor any other being knew of his existence, and were he at the same time acquainted with the existence of God and the universe, universal benevolence would be his duty, although his benevolence would remain forever unknown to every being but himself, and no one but himself could ever be effected by it. Nor could the fundamental reason of this obligation be, that benevolence would make *himself* happy, but that the good of God and the universe is infinitely valuable and desirable in itself, and for its own sake, and on this account he would be under obligation to will it. In this case it is plain that the obligation would be to will the good of the universe, but not to will *to do* them good, as this were impossible; that is, it would be impossible to do them good, or to will to do it.

5. It may be my duty to be benevolent toward, or to will the happiness of a being, as a good in itself, whose happiness I am not at *liberty to promote*. For example, God and all beings are under obligation to exercise benevolence towards Satan and yet *may not will to make him happy*. This shows,

6. That to will the good of others for its own sake is benevolence, but to will to *do them good*, may or may not be an expression of benevolence, according to the circumstances of the case.

7. Benevolence is always right, because benevolence is good willing, or willing the good of the universe; and the good of the universe is desirable on its own account, and for its own sake.

8. Good willing is right, not merely because it is right, but because good is good, and to be willed on its own account.

9. Benevolence is right, not merely because it is useful, but because the thing which benevolence wills or the object willed is a good in itself, and to be willed for its own sake.

10. There is a difference between a law's being a *rule* of duty and the reasons for conforming to that rule. 'The *rule* is one thing, and *thereasons* for that rule are another thing.

First. *Inquire what moral obligation is.*

Obligation is that which binds. Moral Obligation is the binding force of moral law, upon moral agents,

Second. *Conditions of moral obligation.*

1. Moral agency. I have given in the first of this course of lectures an outline of what constitutes a moral agent, and need not repeat it here.

2. Moral law, or a rule of right, is another condition of Moral Obligation.

3. Some degree of knowledge of this law or rule of right, and of its application to the point in question.

Third. *What is the foundation of Moral Obligation?*

Under this head I am to show,

I. The different answers that are given to this question.

1. Some affirm that the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation; and that moral beings are under obligation to conform themselves to the law of God, simply and only because such is his will.

2. Others affirm that *right* is the foundation of Moral Obligation; that moral agents are bound to do right, simply and only because it is right.

3. Others affirm that *utility* is the foundation of Moral Obligation; that the tendency of virtue to promote

happiness is the fundamental reason why moral agents should be virtuous, and of course the foundation of moral obligation.

4. Others affirm that the nature and relations of moral agents is the foundation of Moral Obligation.

5. Others affirm that the foundation of Moral Obligation lies partly in the nature and relations of moral beings, partly in the nature or intrinsic value of virtue, and partly in the nature and intrinsic value of happiness.

6. Others affirm that the foundation of Moral Obligation lies in the nature or intrinsic value of virtue and happiness; that they are an ultimate good, and therefore to be chosen for their own sake.

7. Others still deny that right or virtue is an *ultimate* good; and affirm that the foundation of Moral Obligation is in the nature and intrinsic value of happiness alone. They affirm that that cannot be an *ultimate* good which naturally and necessarily results in some other good beyond itself, of which it is not only a condition, but a cause. They affirm that consciousness testifies that right or virtue naturally, and so far as we can perceive necessarily results in happiness; and that therefore it is not in itself an *ultimate* good, but only a condition or cause of happiness, which is the only ultimate good; and that for this reason, *right* or virtue cannot be the foundation of Moral Obligation. They maintain that right or virtue are only the condition or cause of happiness, and not happiness itself; and that abstracted from the happiness in which it results, it is of no more intrinsic value than the motion of the planets. To this it is replied that right, or virtue is the ultimate good, and that happiness is only its reward, or an added blessing. To this it is answered, that happiness is a natural and necessary consequence of virtue, and not merely something given as a compensation, or as the reward of virtue; and if this is not so, it is inquired, who bestows the rewards of virtue upon God?

II. I am to show wherein they who maintain these different theories agree.

1. They agree in respect to what constitutes moral agency.

2. They agree that moral agency is an indispensable condition of Moral Obligation.

3. They agree in respect to all the conditions of Moral Obligation, as above specified.

4. They agree that all moral agents are under Moral Obligation.

5. They agree that God is a moral agent, and the subject of Moral Obligation; and that he could not be virtuous if he were not.

6. They agree that God, and all moral agents are under a moral and immutable obligation to will and act in perfect conformity with their nature and relations.

7. They agree that universal benevolence, or good willing is in precise conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings; and that it is therefore the substance and the whole of virtue.

8. They agree that right consists in volition, or right willing, and always resolves itself into benevolence, and that *right*, and *benevolence*, and *willing*, and *acting in conformity with the nature and relation of moral beings are incidental*.

9. They agree that right, benevolence, or acting in conformity with their nature and relations is universally obligatory on moral beings.

10. They agree that God does invariably will and act in conformity with his nature and relations, and the relations of all beings.

11. That his will is therefore always right or benevolent, and is therefore the *rule* of duty to all moral agents.

12. They agree that virtue is an indispensable condition of the happiness of moral beings.

13. They agree that virtue or benevolence naturally and necessarily results in the happiness of him who exercises it.

14. They agree that happiness is a *good* in itself, that it is an *ultimate good*, and to be chosen for its own sake.

15. They agree that misery is an evil in itself, and to be dreaded and rejected for its own sake.

16. They agree that moral agents are under Moral Obligation to will the happiness of all beings in proportion to their capacity for happiness.

17. They agree that right and utility are always at one; that what is upon the whole useful, is right; and that what is right, is upon the whole useful.

18. They agree in their definition of moral agency, and in their definition of Moral Obligation. They agree as to who are subjects of Moral Obligation. They agree as to the conditions of Moral Obligation; that right, and benevolence, and acting in conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings *are identical*; and that this course of willing and acting is universally obligatory on moral agents. But,

III. They differ in respect to the *why*, or in the fundamental reason of this obligation.

IV. But this leads me to show what the real point of inquiry is not.

1. It is not whether the will of God is obligatory upon all created moral agents. For this is on all hands admitted.
2. The inquiry is not what constitutes moral agency.
3. Nor whether moral agency is a condition of Moral Obligation.
4. Nor whether moral agents are bound to do right.
5. Nor whether moral agents are under obligation to act in conformity with their nature and relations.
6. Nor whether the utility of an act may not be one reason why it is obligatory.
7. Nor is the inquiry why *moral agents* are under obligation to do right, or act in conformity with their nature and relations any more than a *beast* is under Moral Obligation to do so; for in this case the plain and only answer would be, that they are under Moral Obligation, because they are moral agents; and that beasts are not, because they are not moral agents. 'This conducts to the real point of inquiry.

V. The true and only question is, why are moral agents under Moral Obligation to do *right* rather than *wrong*; to be benevolent, rather than malevolent; to act in conformity with their nature and relations, rather than to act contrary to them? As right, benevolence, and acting in conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings are the same thing, the question is *one*, and may be stated thus: What is the fundamental reason why moral agents should be benevolent, or will the good of being? Suppose we consider this inquiry as respecting God, and ask: Why is God under obligation to be benevolent, or to will good?

VI. Answer the question, or show what the foundation of Moral Obligation is,

1. It is not the will of God.
 - (1.) It is plain that his obligation could not arise from, or be founded in his own will.
 - (2.) The will of God cannot be the foundation of Moral Obligation in created moral agents. It is admitted that God is himself the subject of Moral Obligation. If so, there is some reason, independent of his own will, why he wills as he does, some reason that imposes obligation upon him to will as he does will. His will, then, respecting the conduct of moral agents, is not the foundation reason of their obligation; but the foundation of their obligation must be that reason which induces God, or makes it obligatory on him to will in respect to the conduct of moral agents, just what he does.
 - (3.) If the will of God were the foundation of Moral Obligation, he could, by willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice.

(4.) If the will of God were the foundation of Moral Obligation, he not only can change the nature of virtue and vice, but has a right to do so; for if there is nothing back of his will that is as binding upon him as upon his creatures, he could at any time, by willing it, make malevolence a virtue, and benevolence a vice.

(5.) If the will of God be the foundation of Moral Obligation, we have no standard by which to judge of the moral character of his actions, and cannot know whether he is worthy of praise or blame.

(6.) If the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, he has no standard by which to judge of his own character, as he has no rule with which to compare his own actions.

(7.) If the will of God is the foundation of Moral Obligation, he is not himself a subject of Moral Obligation. But,

(8.) If God is not a subject of Moral Obligation, he has no moral character; for virtue and vice are nothing else but conformity or non-conformity to Moral Obligation. 'The will of God, as expressed in his law, is the rule of duty to moral agents. It defines and marks out the path of duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents ought to act in conformity to the will of God, is plainly not the will of God itself.

2. **RIGHT** is not the foundation of Moral Obligation.

Let it be remembered, that right, benevolence, and acting in conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings are the same thing.

It the fundamental reason for doing right, being benevolent, or acting in conformity with our nature and relations, is simply because, and only because it is right, it must be that right, benevolence, or acting in conformity with our nature and relations, is the ultimate good, or a good in itself, entirely independent of any good that results from it. But this contradicts consciousness, and cannot therefore be true. If right be valuable in itself, it may so far be chosen for its own sake, and be a reason of Moral Obligation. Yet as it naturally and certainly results in a good beyond itself, it certainly is not the *ultimate* good, and therefore is not the *foundation* or *fundamental* reason of Moral Obligation. But we are not inquiring for all the reasons that may render virtue obligatory, but we are inquiring after the fundamental or ultimate reason, that which is at the bottom or foundation of all other reasons. This cannot be *right*; for right certainly is not the ultimate reason, as it naturally results in a good beyond itself. For this we have the testimony of consciousness. To this it is objected, as has been already shown, that right

is the ultimate good, and that happiness is a reward or added blessing.

To this it has already been answered, that happiness is a natural and necessary consequence or result of virtue; and that although it is a reward of virtue, it is that in which virtue necessarily results, and if this were not so, it is inquired, who would bestow on God the rewards of virtue?

But to this view of the subject it is again objected, that moral agents affirm the *rightness* of any course of conduct as the reason for that course of conduct; and this must be the true reason, or it would not be virtuous.

To this it may be replied, that they may, and often do assign a *true* reason and a *good* reason for their conduct, when they do not assign the *fundamental* reason. They often assign the will of God as a reason; they often assign utility as a reason; they often assign the dictates of conscience as a reason. Each and all of these may, in some cases, be reasons, and good reasons, while neither of them if the fundamental reason.

Again it is asserted, that no other reason can be assigned for acting right, than that it is right, and that this runs us up to our first principle, and is a first or ultimate truth. But from the testimony of our consciousness we know this to be false. For although its being right may be a reason of Moral Obligation, it certainly is not the *only* reason, nor is it the *fundamental* reason, for we certainly know from consciousness that right naturally and necessarily results in happiness, which is a good beyond itself, and consequently that happiness is the fundamental or foundation reason of the obligation. This brings me to say,

3. That **UTILITY** is not the foundation of Moral Obligation. That benevolence will produce happiness, is not the foundation upon which the obligation to benevolence rests. For as happiness is a good in itself, to will its existence would be obligatory, if the willing it did not and could not produce it. Were a moral being completely insulated in his existence, universal benevolence would be his duty, did he know that other beings existed, although his benevolence could make no being in the universe happy. But if the foundation of the obligation to benevolence lay in the tendency of benevolence to promote the happiness of its object, if it were certain that his benevolence could do no one any good, the obligation would cease.

If to this it be replied, that in such circumstances he would be under obligation to be benevolent, because of its tendency to promote his own happiness; to this it

may be answered, that it is impossible to be benevolent for that reason. Benevolence is good willing. Benevolence to others is willing good to others. But to will good to others for the sake of my own happiness, is a contradiction; for it is willing good to myself as an end, and willing good to others only as a means. This is not benevolence, but selfishness. In this case the supposition is that I am to be benevolent or to will the happiness of others, not because it is a good in itself, and therefore to be desired for its own sake, not because it will promote the happiness of its object, but simply and only because it will promote my own happiness.

Now it is not only impossible for me to be benevolent for this reason, as it contradicts the very nature of benevolence, but such an exercise, could it be put forth, could not promote my own happiness. It could promote my own happiness only as it was in accordance with the laws of my being; but my consciousness testifies and my reason affirms that happiness is a good in itself, that it is an ultimate good, and ought to be chosen for its own sake. If, therefore, I could will the happiness of other beings mainly for the sake of making myself happy, or as the means of my own happiness, this would not be acting in accordance with the laws of my being, and consequently could not make me happy. Therefore it is impossible that utility should be the foundation Of Moral Obligation.

We have already seen that there is a difference between willing the *existence* of the happiness of all beings, in itself considered, and as a good in itself, and willing to *make* all beings or a particular being happy. 'The former is benevolence, and always, and universally obligatory. The latter is an expression or carrying out of benevolence, but its obligation is not universal, because the universal good demands that some wicked beings should be miserable and not happy.

Again. It is impossible to will to *do* what we know to be impossible. We may will the *existence* of what we know we cannot effect, but we cannot will to *do* what we know we cannot do. Hence we may and ought to will the happiness of all beings, as a good in itself, but we cannot will to make all beings happy.

4. The foundation of Moral Obligation does not lie in the nature and relations of moral beings. The affirmation that it does is founded in a mistaken apprehension of the real question in debate. As has been already said, the true question is not, why are moral agents under obligation to do right, to be benevolent, to act in conformity with their nature and relations, any more than brutes are under such obligation? If this were the

inquiry, the true answer would doubtless be, because they are moral agents, and not brutes; because their nature and relations are what they are.

It should be remembered that the true inquiry is, why are moral agents under obligation to do right rather than wrong; to be benevolent, rather than malevolent; to act in conformity with their nature and relations, rather than contrary to them? If, then, to the question, why are moral agents under Moral Obligation to act in conformity with their nature and relations, rather than contrary to them, it be replied, that their nature and relations are the foundation of this obligation, this is only saying they are under obligation to act in conformity with their nature and relations rather than contrary to them, because they are under such obligation. This is only to assert their obligation, but is not assigning the reason. If to this it be replied, that no other reason can be assigned, it may be answered, that another, and a good and sufficient reason can be assigned, and ought to be assigned. Benevolence is willing in exact conformity with the nature and relations of moral beings. But benevolence is willing the existence of universal happiness as a good in itself.

This is a good, and sufficient, and infinitely weighty reason why moral beings should be benevolent, or act in conformity with their nature and relations. Acting contrary to their nature and relations is malevolence, or willing something inconsistent with universal happiness. But misery is an evil in itself, and therefore to be rejected for its own sake. This, then, is a good and sufficient reason why moral beings ought not to act contrary to their natures and relations. The foundation of Moral Obligation, then, does not lie in the nature and relations of moral beings.

5. The foundation does not lie partly in the nature and relations of moral beings, partly in the nature or intrinsic value of virtue, and partly in the nature or intrinsic value of happiness. The affirmation that these are altogether the foundation of Moral Obligation is founded partly in a misapprehension of the real question at issue, and partly in the assumption that virtue or right is an ultimate good in itself, and apart from that happiness in which it results.

We have just seen that the foundation of Moral Obligation cannot be in the nature and relations of moral beings, because the question is not why are moral beings, rather than other beings, under Moral Obligation, but why are moral beings under obligation to do right rather than wrong? To say that the intrinsic value of right or virtue is the fundamental, or even *one* of the *fundamental* reasons of Moral

Obligation, is to assume that right or virtue has an intrinsic value in itself. That its value is not ultimate, but that it results in something beyond itself, has already been shown; and should it be admitted, as perhaps it ought to be, that right or virtue is a good in itself, still it is not an *ultimate* good; and although it may be a reason of Moral Obligation, it is not the *fundamental* reason or foundation of Moral Obligation, as our consciousness testifies that there is another reason still below it. But the *foundation* of Moral Obligation is that after which we are inquiring.

6. The foundation of Moral Obligation does not lie in the nature and intrinsic value of both virtue and happiness. This has just been sufficiently shown. But,

7. The foundation of Moral Obligation does lie in the intrinsic value of happiness as an ultimate good. It has been shown that right always has its foundation in volition, and that right willing is always good willing, or benevolence. The foundation reason, then, why God and all moral beings should be benevolent, or will good, is that good is a good in itself, and to be willed for its own sake. The reason why they are under obligation not to be malevolent, to will evil, or to act contrary to their nature in willing evil to any being is that evil is an evil in itself, to be universally dreaded and rejected for its own sake. In other words, all Moral Obligation resolves itself into an obligation to will the universal good of being. The question is, why are moral agents under obligation to will the good of being? The answer is, because *good is good*. Happiness is an ultimate good, to be chosen for its own sake, and therefore the fundamental reason of Moral Obligation is, that good is good, and to be willed or chosen by all moral beings as a good, and an ultimate good in itself.

This, then, is the sum of the whole matter. Moral *right* consists in willing and acting in precise conformity with the nature and relations of moral agents.

Moral *Obligation* is the binding force of right upon moral agents.

The *foundation* of Moral Obligation to do right and not wrong, is not,

1. In the *nature* and *relations* of moral agents.
2. Not in *right*. These are reasons, but not the foundation.

Right is benevolence or right willing. Right willing is good willing, or willing good.

Moral agents are bound to will good, plainly, not because good willing will produce good, but because **GOOD is GOOD**.

REMARK.

This shows why the gospel offers a reward to virtue, and yet insists that that is not virtue in which reward is the motive to action.

LECTURE XXIV.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 3.

WHOSE RIGHT IS IT TO GOVERN

1. Moral beings exist.
2. They must of necessity be happy or miserable.
3. Happiness is a good in itself, and therefore desirable for its, own sake.
4. Misery is an evil in itself and therefore to be dreaded for its own sake.
5. Moral law is that mode of moral action that exactly accords with the nature and relations of moral beings.
6. Conformity to this law is virtue.
7. Virtue is the cause of happiness.
8. Happiness is an ultimate good.
9. Happiness is the ultimate end of government.
10. Upon moral government as a means of promoting this end, both ruler and ruled are dependent.
11. He has a right to govern, who possesses such attributes, such a character, is so circumstanced, and sustains such relations as to be both able and willing to secure the highest good of the whole.
12. Upon him all eyes are, or ought to be turned, to sustain this office. It is both his right and his duty to govern; for upon him all are naturally dependent, for securing the highest interests of the whole.
13. It is therefore the right and the duty of God to administer the moral government of the universe. In showing which I observe:

I. *That God is a moral being.*

A moral being is one who possesses understanding, reason, conscience and free will. That God is such a being has been already shown, is discussing his moral attributes. But in addition to what was there said, I remark:

1. That many of our notions of God are derived from our knowledge of ourselves. We are conscious of possessing the powers of moral agency. And because the works and providence of God exhibit phenomena corresponding to those of which we are conscious, we

naturally and necessarily infer that he is a moral being like ourselves.

2. The whole argument for the *existence* of God, as fully establishes the truth that he is a *moral being* as that he *exists*. That the Maker of the universe must possess understanding, reason, conscience, and will, there can be no doubt.

3. We are conscious that all power to produce any effect without ourselves, consists in the will or power of volition. Understanding, reason, and conscience, might exist without any power to produce any effect without ourselves.

4. We conceive of the physical power of God as consisting in his will or volitions.

5. We are moral beings, and God is our Creator. God, therefore, must have had the *idea* of a moral being. He must have possessed the knowledge of what constitutes a moral being, or he could not have created one. But if he possessed sufficient knowledge of what constitutes a moral being, to enable him to create moral beings, with all the circumstances that render them responsible, he must be himself a moral being, *if his will is free*.

6. That the will of God is free, must be---

(1.) Because volition is nothing else but the will acting in view of motive.

(2.) It cannot but be free, if it has the power and liberty of choice, in view of motives.

(3.) Choice and necessity are terms of opposition.

(4.) It is as absurd to say that volition can be produced by physical force or necessity, as to say that the planets can be influenced by motives.

(5.) If God is not free he has no moral character.

(6.) But from the laws of our being, we must and do conceive of God as possessing moral character.

(7.) All nations have ascribed moral character to God.

(8.) The Bible everywhere represents God as a moral being, and as possessing the perfection of moral character.

II. *God is a Moral Governor.*

A moral governor is one who does or *has a right* to exercise a supreme moral control over moral beings. Under this head I remark:

1. That it is impossible that government should not exist.
2. Everything must be governed by laws suited to its nature.
3. Matter must be governed by physical laws.

4. Mind must be governed by motives. And moral agents must be governed by moral considerations.

5. We are conscious of moral agency, and can be governed only by a moral government.

6. Our nature and circumstances demand that we should be under a moral government; because---

(1.) Moral happiness depends upon moral order.

(2.) Moral order depends upon the harmonious action of all our powers, as individuals and as members of society.

(3.) No community can perfectly harmonize in all their views and feelings, without perfect knowledge, or, to say the least, the same degree of knowledge on all subjects on which they are called to act.

(4.) But no community ever existed or will exist, in which every individual possesses exactly the same amount of knowledge, and where they are, therefore, entirely agreed in all their thoughts, views and opinions.

(5.) But if they are not agreed in opinion, or have not exactly the same amount of knowledge, they will not in everything harmonize, as it respects their courses of conduct.

(6.) There must therefore be in every community some standard or rule of duty, to which all the subjects of the community are to conform themselves.

(7.) There must be some head or controlling mind, whose will shall be law, and whose decisions shall be regarded as infallible by all the subjects of the government.

(8.) However diverse their intellectual attainments are, in this they must all agree, that the will of the lawgiver is right, and universally the rule of duty.

(9.) This will must be authoritative and not merely advisory.

(10.) There must of necessity be a penalty attached to and incurred by every act of disobedience to this will.

(11.) If disobedience be persisted in, exclusion from the privileges of the government is the lowest penalty that can consistently be inflicted.

(12.) The good then of the universe imperiously requires, that there should be a moral government and a moral governor.

That God is a Moral Governor, we infer -

1. From our own consciousness. From the very laws of our being we naturally feel ourselves responsible to him for our conduct. In the last lecture it was shown, that God is himself the subject of moral obligation, or under

a moral obligation, to be benevolent. As God is our Creator, we are naturally responsible to him for the right exercise of our moral powers. And as our good and his glory depend upon our conformity to the same rule, to which he conforms his whole being, he is under a moral obligation to require us to be holy as he is holy.

2. His natural attributes qualify him to sustain the relation of a moral governor to the universe.

3. His moral character, also, qualifies him to sustain this relation.

4. His relation to the universe as Creator and Preserver, when considered in connection with his nature and attributes, confers on him the right of universal government.

5. His relation to the universe, and our relations to him and to each other, render it obligatory upon him to establish and administer a moral government over the universe.

6. The honor of God demands that he should administer such a government.

7. His conscience must demand it. He must know that it would be wrong for him to create a universe of moral beings, and then refuse or neglect to administer over them a moral government.

8. His happiness must demand it, as he could not be happy unless he acted in accordance with his conscience.

9. If God is not a moral governor, he is not wise. Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and in the use of the most appropriate means to accomplish those ends. If God is not a moral governor, it is inconceivable that he should have had any important end in view in the creation of moral beings, or that he should have chosen the best or any suitable means for the accomplishment of the most desirable ends.

10. The conduct or providence of God plainly indicates a design to exert a moral influence over moral agents.

11. His providence plainly indicates that the universe of mind is governed by moral laws, or by laws suited to the nature of moral agents.

12. Consciousness proves the existence of an inward law, or knowledge of the moral quality of actions.

13. This inward moral consciousness or conscience implies the existence of a rule of duty which is obligatory upon us. This rule implies a ruler, and this ruler must be God.

14. If God is not a moral governor, our very nature deceives us,

15. If God is not a moral governor, the whole universe, so far as we have the means of knowing it, is calculated to mislead mankind in respect to this fundamental truth.

16. If there is no such thing as moral government, there is, in reality, no such thing as moral character.

17. All nations have believed that God is a moral governor.

18. Our nature is such, that we must believe it. The conviction of our moral accountability to God, is in such a sense the dictate of our moral nature, that we cannot escape from it.

19. We must abhor God, if we ever come to a knowledge of the fact that he created moral agents and then exercised over them no moral government.

20. The connection between moral delinquency and suffering is such as to render it certain that moral government does, as a matter of fact, exist.

21. The Bible, which has been proved to be a revelation from God, contains a most simple and yet comprehensive system of moral government.

22. If we are deceived in respect to our being subjects of moral government, we are sure of nothing.

REMARKS.

1. If God's government is moral, it is easy to see how sin came to exist. That a want of experience in the universe, in regard to the nature and natural tendencies and results of sin, prevented the due influence of motive.

2. If God's government is moral, we see that all the developments of sin are enlarging the experience of the universe in regard to its nature and tendencies, and thus confirm the influence of moral government over virtuous minds.

3. If God's government is moral, we can understand the design and tendency of the Atonement.

4. If God's government is moral, we can understand the philosophy of the Spirit's influences in convicting and sanctifying the soul.

5. If the government of God is moral, we can understand the influence and necessity of faith.

6. If God's government is moral, faith will produce obedience, with the same certainty as if it acted by force.

7. If God's government is moral, we can see the necessity and power of Christian example.

8. If God's government is moral, his natural or physical omnipotence is no proof that all men will be saved.

9. If God's government is moral, we see the importance of watchfulness, and girding up the loins of our minds.

10. If God's government is moral, we see the necessity of a well instructed ministry, able to wield the motives necessary to sway mind.

11. If God's government is moral, we see the philosophical bearings, tendencies, and power of the providence, law, and gospel of God, in the great work of man's salvation.

LECTURE XXV.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 4.

WHAT IS IMPLIED IN THE RIGHT TO GOVERN

1. The right to govern does not imply, that the will of the ruler can make law.

2. Nor the right to pass or enforce any arbitrary law. But--

3. It implies the right to declare and define the law of nature.

4. It implies the right to enforce obedience, with sanctions equivalent to its importance.

5. The *right* to govern implies the *duty* to govern.

6. The right of government implies, the obligations of obedience on the part of the governed.

7. It implies, that it is both the right and the duty, to execute penal sanctions, when the interests of the government demand the execution of them.

RECIPROCAL DUTIES OF THE RULER AND RULED.

1. They are under mutual obligation to aim, with single eye, at promoting the great end of government.

2. The ruler is under obligation to keep in view the foundation of his right to govern, and never assume or exercise authority that is not essential to the promotion of the highest good.

3. He is under obligation to regard and treat every interest according to its relative value.

4. He is never, in any case, to depart from the true spirit and principles of government.

5. He is invariably to reward virtue.

6. He is always to inflict penal evil upon transgressors, unless the highest good can as well, or better be secured in another way.

7. He is under obligation to pursue that course that will, upon the whole, result in the least evil, and promote the highest good.

8. The ruled are bound to co-operate with the ruler in this, with all their powers, with all they are and have.

9. They are under obligation to be obedient in all things, so far as, and no farther than the laws are in accordance with and promotive of the highest good of the whole.

10. They are bound to be disinterested; that is--to discard all selfishness, and to regard and treat every interest according to its relative value.

11. Both ruler and ruled are under obligation to exercise all that self denial that is essential to the promotion of the highest good.

12. As it is the ruler's duty to inflict, so it is the subject's duty to submit to any penal inflictions that are deserved, and important to the highest interests of the government.

5. It is that rule which, under the same circumstances, would be equally binding on all moral beings. Its essential elements are---

(1.) A declaratory, but authoritative precept, as distinguished from counsel or compact.

(2.) The precept should forbid all that is naturally wrong, or in any degree inconsistent with the nature, relations and highest happiness of moral beings.

(3.) It should define and require all that is according to the nature, and relations, and essential to the highest happiness of moral beings.

(4.) Another essential element of law is, requisite sanctions. Sanctions are the motives to obedience. They should be remuneratory and vindicatory.

(5.) Moral law naturally and necessarily connects happiness with obedience, and misery with disobedience; and thus far the sanctions of moral law belong to its own nature. But---

(6.) In addition to this, there should be superadded, to obedience, the favor of the ruler, and to disobedience his displeasure.

(7.) The sanctions should be equivalent to the value of the precept.

(8.) Prescription, or publication, is essential to the binding obligation of law.

Third. *Law is a unit.*

1. The *nature* of moral agents is one.

2. The laws of their being are precisely similar.

3. That which will secure the highest good of one, will secure the highest good of all.

4. Perfect conformity of heart and life to the nature and relations of moral beings, will promote the highest good of all.

5. This course of conduct is universally obligatory.

6. It is, therefore, universal law.

7. It is and must be the only law.

8. It is the common law of the universe.

9. No enactment or statute of God or man, is morally obligatory, only as it is declaratory, and an application of this only law.

Fourth. *No being can make law.*

1. God's existence and nature are necessary.

2. Moral law is that course of action which is in conformity with the laws of his being.

3. It is, therefore, obligatory upon him.

LECTURE XXVI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 5

MORAL LAW

In discussing this part of the subject, I shall show:

FIRST. What law is.

SECOND. Define moral law.

THIRD. That all moral law is a unit.

FOURTH. That no being can make law.

FIFTH. That the will of the ruler can be obligatory only as it is declaratory of what the law is.

First. *What law is.*

Law is a rule of action, and in its most extensive sense, it is applicable to all actions, whether of matter or mind.

Second. *Define Moral Law.*

1. Moral law is a rule of moral action.

2. It is the law of motive, and not of force.

3. Moral law is a rule, to which moral beings are under obligation to conform all their actions.

4. Moral law is the law of nature; that is---it is that rule of action that is founded in the nature and relations of moral beings.

4. God could make moral *agents*, but not moral *law*; for when they exist, this rule is law to them, and would be, whether God willed it or not.

5. Law is that course of action demanded by the nature and relations of moral beings. Therefore---

Fifth. *Neither the will of God, nor of any other being, can make law, or be obligatory any farther than it is declaratory of what the law of nature is.*

1. The true idea of government is that kind and degree of control, the object and tendency of which is, to promote the highest good.

2. The rule, conformity to which is essential to the promotion of the highest good, is founded in the nature, and relations, and circumstances of all the parties concerned, entirely independent of the will of any being.

3. The business of the ruler, is to declare and enforce this rule.

4. Thus far his will is obligatory, and no farther.

5. All legislation, human or divine, not declaratory of and in accordance with the law of nature, or with the nature and relations of moral beings, would be utterly null and void.

6. All positive legislation, except that which is declaratory of natural law is arbitrary and tyrannical, and therefore nugatory.

LECTURE XXVII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 6

LAW OF GOD

FIRST. Show what is intended by the Law of God.

SECOND. That all the commandments, or specific requirements of God, are declaratory, and are but the spirit, meaning, and application of the one only law of love.

THIRD. That the ten commandments, or decalogue, are proofs and illustrations of this truth.

FOURTH. Consider the sanctions of the Law of God.

First. *What is intended by the Law of God.*

1. We are not to understand that the arbitrary will of God is law.

2. Nor that anything is law, merely because it is his will.

3. Nor that he in any case creates or makes moral law. But---

4. By the Law of God is intended that rule of universal benevolence, which is obligatory upon him as being in accordance with the laws of his own being.

5. The Law of God is that rule, to which he invariably conforms all his actions, or that law of his being which he himself obeys.

6. The Law of God is that rule of universal, perfect benevolence, which it is both his right and his duty to declare and enforce upon all moral agents for their good and his glory.

7. By the Law of God is intended that rule of universal benevolence to which himself and all moral beings are under immutable obligations, to conform their whole being.

8. The Law of God then is a unit. It is one, and only one principle. It is the one grand rule that every moral being shall regard and treat every being, interest, and thing, according to its relative value.

Second. *All the commandments are declaratory, etc.*

1. All God's moral attributes are modifications of one principle; that is---benevolence. This we have already seen in a former lecture.

2. Benevolence expresses his whole character, including his affections and acts.

3. All virtue in moral beings is only different modifications of benevolence.

4. Perfect, perpetual, and universal benevolence, modified by the relations and circumstances of moral beings, is their whole duty.

5. Complacency in right character, is only a modification of benevolence.

6. If benevolence, in its various modifications, is the whole of virtue, then all God's requirements must be in spirit one. Love expresses and comprehends the whole.

7. The command to love God with all the heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, is identical in spirit and meaning with the command, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

8. These two commands might both be united in one precept: Thou shalt regard and treat all interests, beings and things according to their relative value.

9. Thus it appears, that what are called the two great principles of the law are really one in essence though two in form. They are identical in spirit, yet two in their letter.

Third. *The ten commandments are proofs and illustrations of this truth.*

FIRST COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:3. 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me.'

I. Reasons for this commandment:

1. God's happiness is infinitely the greatest good in the universe, and therefore, thus to regard and treat it is right in itself.
2. God's virtue is infinitely greater than that of all other beings. Therefore, to love him with all possible complacency is right in itself.
3. We have infinitely greater cause of gratitude to God, than to any other and all other beings. Therefore, the highest degree of the love of gratitude is right in itself.
4. To render to God the highest degree of benevolence, gratitude, and complacent love, is demanded by the very laws of our being.
5. No moral being can be truly happy without it.
6. Nor can any moral being fail of being happy, if he exercises the perfection of these modifications of love to God.
7. The one universal law of benevolence requires it. It is, therefore, God's duty to require it.
8. He can neither abrogate nor relax the obligation.

II. The true meaning and spirit of this command:

1. Every law has its letter and its spirit. Its letter is its general statement in words. Its spirit is its real meaning as applied to specific cases, and circumstances.
2. To the letter of the law there may be exceptions. To the spirit and meaning of the law never.
3. As no will can create law, so no will can make exceptions to the spirit of law.
4. This command prohibits the love of any being or thing more than God.
5. It prohibits the loving of any being or thing in comparison with God.
6. It requires the highest degree of benevolence or good will to God, of which we are capable.
7. It requires that this benevolence be real; that is---good will to God, or willing his good and happiness for its own sake, as infinitely valuable and desirable in itself, irrespective of its resulting in or being promotive of our own happiness.
8. It requires that this benevolence be uninterrupted.
9. That in all possible ways, the most perfect regard to the feelings, happiness, and glory of God be expressed.
10. It requires the highest degree of complacency in him of which we are capable.
11. That this complacency be expressed in all possible acts of obedience.

12. That this love of complacency be perpetual and perpetually expressed, in every appropriate way.

13. It requires the highest degree of the love of gratitude, of which we are capable.

14. That this love of gratitude be perpetual and perpetually expressed in every appropriate way.

15. This command requires the most perfect confidence.

16. That this confidence be perpetual and perpetually expressed, as above.

17. It requires the deepest repentance on the part of sinners, of which they are naturally capable, and that this repentance be as perpetual and as perpetually and fully expressed, in every appropriate way, as is consistent with their natural ability.

18. It requires the most perfect self-aborrence and self-abasement, perpetual and perpetually expressed, of which the sinner is capable.

19. It requires the most perfect and perpetual subjection of our will to his, in all things.

20. It requires the most perfect and perpetual consecration of our whole being, time, talent, possessions, and all we have and are, to God.

21. All this must be implied in the command, 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me.'

22. It is plainly only a declaratory precept or a specific and authoritative application of the only law of love, universally obligatory on all moral agents, as will readily be seen, by comparing the expositions of it which have been given with the reasons for its enactment.

SECOND COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:4-6. 'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.'

I. Reasons for this commandment:

1. God is a Spirit.
2. All sensible representations of God, by pictures, images, or other means, are utterly deceptive, and utterly gross, false, abominable, and ruinous ideas of God.
3. Therefore, all such attempts to convey to our own minds, or the minds of others, any apprehensions of the true God, by any image, picture, resemblance, or

sensible manifestations whatever, are inconsistent with the great and only law of benevolence, or good-willing.

II. This shows the true meaning and spirit of the law to prohibit any attempt to give human beings the knowledge of God, by pictures, images, visible or tangible representations of any kind whatever.

THIRD COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:7. 'Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.'

I. The true spirit of this requirement:

1. It does not imply that the word expressing the name of God, is more sacred than any other word.
2. It prohibits all unnecessary mention of the name of God.
3. It prohibits every light and irreverent use of it.
4. It prohibits every feeling that might lead to this.
5. It requires a feeling of the utmost holy awe, reverence, love, and respect for God.
6. It requires a constant and perfect recognition of what he is, of what we are, of his relations to us, and ours to him, so far as our circumstances and natural capabilities will allow.
7. It admits the use of the name of God, only when necessary, and then only in accordance with a perfect state of heart.

II. Reasons for this commandment:

1. God's infinite greatness and excellence.
2. His relation to the universe as Supreme Ruler.
3. The strength, stability, and influence of his government, depend upon the estimation in which he is held by his subjects.
4. Every light and irreverent mention of his name, tends to diminish awe, veneration, confidence, and respect, and of course to weaken his influence, and the power of his government.
5. The happiness of the universe depends on their virtue. Their virtue consists in obedience to God; and their obedience to God depends upon the light in which they regard him.
6. Therefore, the highest good of the universe demands that God should respect his own name, and never suffer it to be trifled with.
7. The highest good of the universe also demands that all moral beings should treat the name of God with the utmost awe, veneration, and respect.

8. Therefore, this command as above explained, is only a declaratory precept, and an application of the one great and only law of love, equally obligatory upon God, and upon all moral beings.

LECTURE XXVIII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 7

FOURTH COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:9-11. 'Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work: but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and hallowed it.'

As several questions of importance upon which there has been much discussion, are connected with this commandment, I shall go a little more at length into its examination, embracing the question of its change from the seventh to the first day of the week.

FIRST. When the Sabbath was instituted.

SECOND. Its design.

THIRD. Its necessity.

FOURTH. Its perpetual and universal obligation.

FIFTH. The manner in which it should be observed.

SIXTH. Its change from the seventh to the first day of the week.

First. *When the Sabbath was instituted.*

1. At the close of the six days' work of creation; or the first day after the work was done.

Gen. 2:2, 3. 'And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God had created and made.'

That the Sabbath here mentioned was observed by mankind, at least some of them, before the law was given at Mount Sinai, I argue,

1. From the fact that time was divided into weeks before the giving of the law at Sinai.

Gen. 8:10--12. 'And he stayed yet other **SEVEN DAYS**, and again he sent forth the dove out of the ark: and the dove came in to him in the evening, and, lo, in her mouth was an olive leaf plucked off. So Noah knew that the waters were abated from off the earth. And he stayed yet another **SEVEN DAYS**, and sent forth the dove, which returned not again unto him any more.'

2. The Sabbath was actually observed by the Israelites before the giving of the law at Sinai, and before we have any account of their having received any commandment concerning it.

Ex. 16:22-26. 'And it came to pass, that on the sixth day they gathered twice as much bread, two omers for one man: and all the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses. And he said unto them, This is that which the Lord hath said, Tomorrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord: bake that which ye will bake today, and seethe that ye will seethe; and that which remaineth over lay up for you, to be kept until the morning. And they laid it up till the morning, as Moses bade; and it did not stink, neither was there any worm therein. And Moses said, Eat that today; for today is a Sabbath unto the Lord: today ye shall not find it in the field. Six days shalt thou gather it; but on the seventh day, which is the Sabbath, in it there shall be none.'

Gen. 29:27. 28. 'Fulfill her **WEEK**, and we will give thee this also' 'And Jacob did so, and fulfilled her **WEEK**.'

All this took place before the law was given at Sinai.

3. The Sabbath is spoken of in the decalogue as an institution already existing. "*Remember the Sabbath,*" etc.

Obj. If the Sabbath existed from the creation of the world, why is it not mentioned for so long a time after what is said of its first institution.

Ans. 1. Because the history of those times is so very brief.

2. It might as well be asked why the Sabbath is not mentioned from Joshua to the reign of David.

3. Or why is not circumcision mentioned from Joshua to Jeremiah?

Can it be that the Prophets and pious Judges and Jews did not observe the Sabbath or circumcision during those periods? and yet they are not once named.

4. Many ancient writers bear testimony to the existence and observance of the Sabbath in various nations. A few only are subjoined from Humphrey on the Sabbath.

a. Homer and Hesiod both speak of the seventh day as holy.

b. Porphyry says: "The Phoenicians consecrated one day in seven as holy."

c. Philo says: "The Sabbath is not a festival peculiar to any one people or country, but is common to all the world, and that it may be named the general and public feast, or the feast of the nativity of the world." That is, a celebration of the world's birthday.

d. Josephus affirms: "That there is no city either of Greeks or barbarians, or any other nation, where the religion of the Sabbath is not known."

e. Lampadius tells us that Alexander Severus, the Roman Emperor, usually went on the seventh day into the temple of the Gods, there to offer sacrifice to the Gods.

f. Grotius says: "That the memory of the creation being performed in seven days, was preserved not only among the Greeks and Italians, but among the Celts and Indians, all of whom divided their time into weeks."

Humphrey adds: "The same is affirmed of the Assyrians, Egyptians, Romans, Gauls, Britons, and Germans.

5. These facts show that the Sabbath was not a Jewish institution, but was known and acknowledged by various nations.

Second. *Its design.*

1. To commemorate the work of creation.

Gen. 2:2, 3. 'And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made.'

Ex. 20:11. 'For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it.'

Ex. 31:17. 'It is a sign between me and the children of Israel forever: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed.'

2. It was designed as a day of rest from ordinary employments or labors.

Gen. 2:2, 3. (As above quoted.)

Ex. 20:10, 11. 'But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested

the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day, and hallowed it.'

Ex. 31:13, 17. 'Speak thou also unto the children of Israel, saying, Verily my Sabbaths ye shall keep: for it is a sign between me and you throughout your generations; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth sanctify you.' 'It is a sign between me and the children of Israel for ever: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he Rested, and was refreshed.'

Deut. 5:13, 14. 'Six days thou shalt labor, and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates; that thy man-servant and thy maid servant may rest as well as thou.'

3. It was designed as a means of spiritual knowledge. This is implied in its being both blessed and sanctified; that is, set apart to the service God.

Genesis 2:3. (as quoted above.)

4. It was designed as a means of increasing holiness in holy beings. N. B. It was instituted before the fall.

5. It was designed to afford the means of grace for sinners. It must have had respect to the foreseen fall of man.

Third. *Its necessity.*

1. It is a well established fact that man and all laboring animals need to rest, at least one day in seven, from their ordinary employments.

2. That they will not only live longer, but actually perform more labor in a given time, by resting one day in seven.

3. That this is true, whether the labor be intellectual or corporeal.

4. Its necessity may be inferred from its existence.

5. Both the physical and moral wants of mankind demand it.

6. Mankind, as an ignorant fallen race, cannot possibly be sanctified and saved without it.

7. Men must have religious instruction.

8. This instruction must be public, as it cannot be given in private, inasmuch as it would require too great a number of religious teachers.

9. If the instruction be public, it must be upon a day when there is a general agreement among mankind to attend to it.

10. Upon such a day men would never agree among themselves, therefore it was necessary that God should authoritatively appoint such a day.

11. No government can be permanent without it.

Fourth. *Its universal and perpetual obligation.*

I. It is universally obligatory.

1. It was made for *man as a race.*

Mark 2:27. 'And he said unto them, The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.'

2. If Adam needed it when holy, how much more do all men now need its moral influence.

3. All men need both its moral and physical influence.

4. It is like marriage founded in the moral and physical necessities of our race.

5. It is a command of the decalogue, and therefore a moral, and not a ceremonial or civil institution.

Obj. 1. A moral precept is one of universal obligation wherever moral beings exist; but the law of the Sabbath will not be binding in heaven, therefore it is not a *moral* but a *civil* precept.

Ans. 1. The true idea of a *moral* precept, is that it is universally binding on moral beings whose circumstances are similar.

Ans. 2. Men are universally in similar circumstances in this world, in respect to the design and necessity of the Sabbath. To them it is a moral precept and universally obligatory.

Ans. 3. All the reasons for its *existence* hold equally in favor of its *universal obligation*.

II. It is perpetually obligatory.

1. All the reasons for its institution are reasons for its perpetual observance.

2. All the reasons for its *universal* obligation are equally good reasons for its *perpetual* obligation.

3. True religion would soon cease from the earth, but for the Sabbath.

4. Its perpetuity as a matter of fact is taught in the Bible.

Isa. 56:6-8. 'Also the sons of the stranger, that join themselves to the Lord to serve him, and to love the name of the Lord, to be his servants, every one that keepeth the Sabbath from polluting it, and taketh hold of my covenant; even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and make them joyful in my house of prayer: their burnt offerings and their sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar; for mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people. The Lord God, which gathereth the outcasts of Israel, saith, Yet will I

gather others to him, besides those that are gathered unto him.'

This passage refers to the gospel day, and to the time of Zion's great prosperity. Then there will be a Sabbath.

5. As the law of the Sabbath is founded in the nature and relations of moral beings, as they exist in this world, it is *common law*, and ofcourse universally and perpetually obligatory.

Fifth. *The manner in which it is to be observed.*

I. Every law has its letter and its spirit.

1. To the letter of a moral law there may be exceptions. To its *spirit never*.

2. The spirit of a law is its real meaning, or the real intention of the lawgiver, as applicable to any and every set of circumstances.

For example: "The Priests," says Christ, "profane the Sabbath, and are blameless." That is, their labor in the Temple service, under the circumstances, is not a breach of the *spirit*, although it is of the letter of the law.

So David ate of the shew-bread, which was lawful only for the Priests, and was yet blameless, because under his circumstances of necessity his eating of that bread was not a violation of the *spirit*, although it was of the letter of the law.

The disciples rubbing the ears of corn, and Christ healing the sick are examples of the same kind.

II. The Sabbath is to be sanctified, or kept holy.

The inquiry is, what is implied in this?

1. It does not imply that works strictly of necessity and mercy are unlawful upon the Sabbath.

2. It does not imply the unlawfulness of sleep and any needed degree of physical and mental repose on the Sabbath.

3. It does not imply that the necessary labors of ministers or other religious teachers are unlawful upon the Sabbath.

4. It does not imply the necessity of very early rising, and of incessant and intense excitement, and running from one meeting to another all day on the Sabbath, regardless of health.

But it does imply:

1. Holiness of heart and right intentions in all we do on the Sabbath. That love and not legal considerations actuate us.

2. Complete rest from our ordinary labors, whether of body or mind, so far as is consistent with performing labors of strict necessity and mercy.

3. The abstraction of thought from those employments and labors.

4. The abstaining from conversation upon those subjects that constitute our secular employments.

Isa. 58:13. 'If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honorable; and shalt honor him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words,' etc.

5. That neither ourselves nor our beasts, nor any person under our control be either employed or allowed to engage in such labors.

Ex. 20:10. 'But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates.'

6. It implies the spending of that day in devotional exercises, public, private, and social, as opportunity affords, and health allows.

7. It implies the observance of twenty-four hours as a Sabbath, or a seventh part of time.

8. It implies the sacred application of our powers to the acquisition of holiness.

9. Those persons whose weekly labors are *bodily*, should let their bodies rest and employ their minds in devotional exercises, and in the acquisition of religious knowledge on the Sabbath.

10. Persons whose labors are of the *mind*, should rest from their mental application on that day.

11. The sanctification of the Sabbath implies that no unnecessary traveling, either by ministers going to preach, or by persons going to hear, shall be done upon that day.

12. It implies that all cooking, sweeping, cleansing dishes, and every kind of domestic labor shall be dispensed with, as far as is consistent with health and decency, upon that day.

13. It implies abstinence from all amusements.

14. It implies abstinence from walking or riding abroad for exercise.

15. It prohibits all unnecessary use of working animals.

16. That all this be done in the spirit of love to God, and not in a legal and self-righteous temper.

Sixth. *Its change to the first day of the week.*

1. The change of the Sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week, is a question entirely distinct from that of the perpetual obligation of the Sabbath.

2. If the evidence for a change in the day to be observed is found to be insufficient to warrant a belief in such a change, it follows that the seventh day is still the Sabbath, and to be universally observed.

3. Those who are opposed to the Sabbath gain nothing by contending against the change of the day; for if they neglect the first they are bound to keep the seventh.

4. The Sabbath was instituted on the seventh day after creation began, or on the *first* after the work of creation was finished, and was commemorative of that event.

5. There is a plain distinction between the *institution of the Sabbath* and the particular day on which it is to be celebrated.

6. This distinction is plainly recognized by the law, the phraseology of which distinguishes between the *Sabbath as an institution and a day of rest*, and the *seventh day* on which it was then celebrated. "*Remember the Sabbath day to keep it Holy.*" The *Sabbath* then is to be *remembered* as something already existing. The law then proceeds to say, "Six days shalt thou labor," etc., "but the seventh is the Sabbath."

This phraseology plainly intimates that the spirit and meaning of the law was, that a seventh part of the time should be observed as a Sabbath, and that at that time the seventh was the Sabbath. The phraseology seems to lay no stress on the particular day as indispensable to the institution itself.

7. If the particular portion of the seven days was material to the institution, the law would no doubt have specified at what particular hour it should begin and end, whether at sunset, midnight, or sun-rising. The custom of the Jews in this particular could be no law to other nations. Besides, it is naturally impossible that nations inhabiting different latitudes and longitudes should observe the same time as a Sabbath. 'They may observe the same number of hours but not the same hours. The spirit of the law *must* be, that after six days' labor, at whatever punctum of time the six days may commence in different latitudes, longitudes, climates, and nations, the Sabbath shall be celebrated. The fact that the law does not settle the hour at which the Sabbath is to commence, renders it certain that nothing more was intended than a seventh part of time, or every seventh day, was to be observed as a Sabbath. If more than this was intended, it cannot be known whether any part of mankind observe, or ever have, observed the identical hours which really constitute the Sabbath.

8. If the seventh day were essential to the *institution*, the law would or should have said, Thou shalt remember the *seventh* day to keep it holy, beginning and ending at

a certain hour, and no distinction would have been necessary or proper between the Sabbath and the seventh day.

9. Inasmuch as the necessity for a Sabbath lies in the nature and relations of moral beings as they exist in this world God cannot *abrogate the Sabbath as an institution* any more than he can set aside the whole moral law.

10. But while he cannot abrogate the *institution as such*, he can and ought to regulate the observance of it as it respects the particular day and other circumstances, so as to retain the essence and spirit of the institution, and to secure to man, so far as may be, the ends of its institution.

11. Christ claimed to be Lord of the Sabbath, and the connection shows that he claimed the right to regulate its observance.

Mark 2:28. 'Therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath.'

12. It was Christ who performed the six days' labor of creation, and of course it was he who rested on the seventh day, and blessed and sanctified it as a Sabbath.

13. Christ originally instituted the Sabbath, among other reasons, to commemorate his own work of creation.

14. If, when he had toiled, and labored, and bled, and died, and risen, and completed the infinitely greater work of man's redemption, he was disposed so to change the day as to commemorate the latter instead of the former event, as being more worthy of commemoration, he had a right to do so.

15. It was highly proper and important that he should do so.

16. In comparing the work of creation with that of redemption, prophecy points out a time when the former shall, as it were, be forgotten, and be no more remembered in comparison with the latter.

Isa. 65:17, 18. 'For, behold, I create new heavens, and a new earth: and the *former* shall not be remembered, nor come into mind. But be ye glad and rejoice forever in that which I create: for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy.'

17. If the former work is to be forgotten, and come no more into remembrance, in comparison with the latter, it is highly reasonable to suppose that the latter, and not the former, will be commemorated by a change in the day on which the Sabbath is to be observed.

18. The example of Christ, the Lord of the Sabbath, and of his inspired Apostles, whom he had solemnly

promised to guide into all truth, and whom he commissioned to set all things in order, is as good authority for a change of the day as an express command.

19. The Sabbath was originally instituted on the *first* day after his labor of creation was done. So it is natural to look for the change of the day to the first after the greater work of redemption was finished.

20. It is of vastly more importance to mankind to celebrate the first day, as commemorative of the work of redemption, than the seventh, as commemorative of the work of creation.

21. It is also more glorious to God to celebrate the former than the latter.

22. After the resurrection, Christ met repeatedly with his disciples on the first day of the week, but not at all on the seventh.

John 20:19. 'Then the same day at evening, being the first day of the week, when the doors were shut where the disciples were assembled for fear of the Jews, came Jesus and stood in the midst, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you.'

23. He honored and sanctified the first day of the week by anointing his Apostles for their work, by the Holy Ghost, at Pentecost.

24. The Apostles ever after observed the first day of the week as the Sabbath.

1 Cor. 16:2. 'Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him, that there be no gatherings when I come.'

25. The first day of the week was called the Lord's day.

Rev. 1:10. 'I was in the Spirit on the **LORDS' DAY**, and heard behind me a great voice, as of a trumpet.'

26. There seems to be an intimation of this day in,

Psalms 118:22-24. 'The stone which the builders refused is become the head stone of the corner. This is the Lord's doing; it is marvelous in our eyes. This **IS THE DAY** which the Lord hath made; we will rejoice and be glad in it.'

'This passage is applied to Christ.

Matt. 21:42. 'Jesus saith unto them, Did ye never read in the scriptures, The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner: this is the Lord's doing, and it is marvelous in our eyes?'

Mark 12:10. 'And have ye not read this scripture, The stone which the builders rejected is become the head of the corner?'

Luke 20:17. 'And he beheld them, and said, What is this then that is written, The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner?'

Acts 4:11. 'This is the stone which was set at nought of you builders, which is become the head of the corner.'

Eph. 2:20. 'And are built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone.'

1 Pet. 2:4, 7. 'To whom coming, as unto a living stone, disallowed indeed of men, but chosen of God, and precious.' 'Unto you therefore which believe he is precious: but unto them which be disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner.'

27. The early Christian fathers bear testimony that the first day was regarded by the Church as the Lord's day, and as the Sabbath.

Ignatius, a contemporary with the Apostle John, says: "Let every man that loves Christ keep holy the Lord's day; the queen of days; the resurrection day; the highest of all days."

Justin Martyr says: "On the day commonly called Sunday, (by the brethren,) all meet together in the city and country for divine worship."

"No sooner," says Dr. Carr, "was Constantine come over to the Church, but his principal care was about the Lord's day: he commanded it to be solemnly observed, and that by all persons whatsoever: he made it a day of rest, that men might have nothing to do but to worship God and be better instructed in the faith."

Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch: "Both custom and reason challenge from us that we should honor the Lord's day; seeing on that day it was that our Lord Jesus Christ completed his resurrection from the dead."

'The Synod of Laodicea adopted this canon: "That Christians should not *Judaize* and rest from all labor on the Sabbath, (i.e., the seventh day,) but follow their ordinary work: and should not entertain such thoughts of it, but that they should prefer the Lord's day, and on that day rest as Christians." (See Humphrey on the Sabbath.)

28. Christ has greatly blessed the Church in the observance of the first instead of the seventh day.

29. This could not have been if they had, without authority, changed the day, and by so doing set aside what was essential to the institution.

30. It is incredible that Christ should have sanctified a day in commemoration of his work of creation, and neither have changed it nor set apart a new day in

commemoration of the infinitely more arduous, painful, and important work of redemption.

31. Several of the most important reasons for its original institution demand a change in the day.

(1.) The work of redemption should be celebrated in preference to that of creation.

(2.) The moral influence of observing the first day as commemorative of the work of redemption, is far better and greater than would be the observance of the seventh day, as commemorative of the work of creation.

32. There can be no good reason for again observing the seventh instead of the first day of the week.

33. The Apostle cautions the Colossians against observing the Jewish Sabbath.

Col. 2:16: 'Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a holy day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days.'

34. The example of Christ after his resurrection; his promise to lead his disciples into all truth; their anointing to their work on the first day of the week; their actual inspiration; the fact that they observed the first day of the week as the Sabbath; that this custom was universal with the Churches planted by them; and that God has always owned and blessed the keeping of the first day of the week as his Sabbath; these facts, together with the facts and arguments above mentioned, and the Bible upon the subject, both the Old and New Testaments, make out as clear a case, and are as substantial proof that the change is in accordance with the mind and will of God, as can be reasonably expected or desired.

Obj. I. There is no express command requiring the change.

Ans. 1. No such command was needed, as in other ways God sufficiently indicated his will.

2. No such express command was to be expected.

(1.) Because the Gentile Christians would naturally regard the first, and not the seventh day, as the Sabbath.

(2.) Because the Jewish state and polity were soon to come to an end, and their prejudices were so inveterate as to render it inexpedient to introduce this change among them by authority, considering the short period which the Apostles had to labor for their conversion before their dispersion.

(3.) God had compassion on them, and as the particular day was not essential to the institution, he did not shock their prejudices any further than was necessary, but tried to save as many of them as he could, by suffering

them to observe their Sabbath for the time being, while Christians observed the first day of the week.

(4.) In thus leaving this question out of dispute, he no doubt saved many that could not else have been saved.

(5.) He also had compassion on his Apostles, and did not insist upon their immediately and authoritatively abrogating the Jewish Sabbath, as this would have but increased the persecution that raged against them.

(6.) The Apostles could meet with and instruct the Jews on the seventh day, and meet with and instruct the Christians on the first day of the week. Thus having, for the time being, and at this critical and important period, the advantage, as it were, of two Sabbaths in a week for the preaching of the infant kingdom of Christ.

(7.) As God foresaw the immediate destruction of the Jewish Church and polity, he saw that the first day of the week would of course be soon universally observed by his Church without an express command; and as so much present evil might and would result from interposing express authority on the subject at this time, it was like God, and what might have been expected of him, to bring about the change as he did.

(8.) He took the same course, and for the same reasons, in respect to Baptism and Circumcision. The institution of the Sabbath remains in all its force, and is universally and perpetually obligatory; but the first day of the week is now the day on which it is to be celebrated.

Obj. II. The Sabbath was a type of the rest of faith, and not needed by, nor binding upon those who have entered into the rest of faith. Having received the anti-type, they no longer need the type.

Ans. 1. The Sabbath was typical of both gospel rest and heavenly rest; they who have entered into the former need it as a type of the latter.

2. There were other and important reasons for the Sabbath, all of which render it still obligatory on all men.

3. They who make this objection overlook every reason and design of the Sabbath but one, while the reasons are many.

4. Those who have entered into the rest of faith need the Sabbath as a means of preserving them in this rest. This they will surely learn sooner or later.

5. They who have entered the rest of faith are bound to preserve its blessings to those who have not, and for this reason, if there were no other, they ought to, and must observe it.

Obj. III. The observance of the Sabbath leads to formality and self-righteousness, and therefore had better be laid aside.

Ans. This is an abuse of a good thing, and not a necessary result. This same objection is urged against the ordinances, prayer, public and social worship, etc. I might as reasonably reject my daily food on account of the dietetic abuses of mankind, as to reject the Sabbath, or any of the means of communion with God because they are perverted by so many.

LECTURE XXIX.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 8

FIFTH COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:12. 'Honor thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.'

I. Reasons for this commandment.

1. The parents have been instrumental in giving their children existence.
2. Children are naturally dependent upon their parents.
3. Their parents love and protect them, and provide for them.
4. Their parents are their natural instructors and guides.
5. Their own well-being demands that they should honor their parents, because it is in accordance with the laws of their being, and with the great law of gratitude.
6. The virtue, and of course the happiness of society, requires that children honor their parents.
7. The good of the world demands that children honor their parents.
8. The parent is the natural protector, and of course governor of his children while in a state of dependence.
9. The parents cannot protect and govern their children, unless they are respected and honored by them.

II. What is implied in this requirement.

1. This requirement implies that the parent practically recognize his relations to the child; for if he cast the child out helpless in the street, and refuse or neglect to recognize his relation, the true spirit of this command cannot require the child to honor him as a parent, but simply to regard him as a fellow-being, and to treat him according to the universal law of benevolence.
2. It implies, then, that the parent be at least decent in a moral point of view.

3. That he require of the child that only which is consistent with the universal law of benevolence and right, that he do not deny the child liberty of conscience, that he do not attempt to prevent his doing his whole duty to God, himself, and his neighbor.

4. It implies that the parent protect, provide for, and govern the child, upon the principles of right reason, so far as his circumstances and ability will allow. These things being implied and taken for granted, it follows---

III. That the true spirit and meaning of this requirement--

1. Prohibits the least feeling of disrespect.
2. Every kind and degree of ill-manners.
3. All trifling with the feelings of parents.
4. Every species of murmuring, self will, and disobedience.
5. All inattention to their wants and necessities, when they are old or infirm.
6. It requires the most perfect benevolence towards them.
7. Complacency, so far as their characters are right.
8. The love of gratitude, so far as they have been obliged and benefited by their parents.
9. All that obedience of heart and life which is consistent with the highest perfection of family order, love, and happiness.
10. A cheerful and prompt obedience in all things not inconsistent with the will of God.
11. It requires all reasonable efforts to promote the highest temporal and spiritual interests of their parents.
12. It requires reverence and respect for parents.
13. It requires that both parents and children should fulfill to each other all those duties that will, in the highest degree, promote their individual and domestic happiness, holiness, and peace.
14. It requires both parents and children to conduct towards each other in all things, in such a way as to promote the highest well-being of the universe, and the glory of God.

SIXTH COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:13. 'Thou shalt not kill.'

I. What is prohibited by the letter of this precept.

The *letter* of this precept prohibits the unnecessary destruction of life, whether of men or animals.

II. What is the true spirit of this requirement.

1. This must be inferred from the express or implied exceptions to the letter. There can be no exceptions to the spirit of a commandment, but to the letter there may be many.

2. Exceptions with respect to taking the life of animals:

Gen. 9:3. 'Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things.'

Here is a general permission to kill animals for the food of man. Afterward exceptions are made, in regard to the use of certain animals as food.

Gen. 9:5. 'And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man.'

Here general authority is given for the destruction of those beasts that are injurious to men. This must be the spirit of this exception, for if a beast may be slain who has killed a man, certainly it must be lawful to anticipate the ravages of those animals who are known to be destructive to human life, and to slay them before they have committed their depredations. These are the only two exceptions in respect to taking the lives of animals. The true spirit of these exceptions is in precise accordance with the declaration of God to Adam:

Gen. 1:28. 'God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.'

Here upon the first creation of the world, God gave mankind dominion over all animals. This law prohibits taking their lives, except for food, and in cases where they are injurious, and their death is demanded by the interests of human beings. In all other cases, to take the lives of animals is a violation of this commandment.

3. Exceptions in respect to the life of man:

(1.) Ex. 22:2. 'If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him.'

The spirit of this exception plainly justifies taking life, strictly in self-defense. It also plainly justifies strictly defensive war. If a thief might be killed for breaking into our houses at night, or in attempting to rob, or murder, certainly the spirit of this exception justifies the repelling of foreign invasions, and the defense of our families, certainly against the ravages of thieves, pirates, marauders, bandits, and mobs.

(2.) Gen. 9:6. 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.'

This allows and demands taking the life of man, for the crime of murder.

(3.) Ex. 21:12, 14. 'He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall be surely put to death. 'But if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbor, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from mine altar, that he may die.' And---

Lev. 24:17. 'He that killeth any man shall surely be put to death.'

(4.) There are several species of crime, for which the Law of God not only allows the punishment of death, but absolutely makes or did make such punishment obligatory.

(5.) Human life may be taken in offensive wars, when such wars are required by God. 'Taking human life cannot be wrong in itself, under all circumstances; for if it were, God could not authorize it. But he does authorize and command it. Cases in which it may be taken, are expressly or impliedly specified in various parts of the Bible. With these exceptions, and only with these, human life can in no instance be lawfully destroyed.

II. What is and what is not prohibited by the spirit of this requirement.

1. It does not prohibit the sacrifice of our own health and life, for the promotion of a greater good. If it did, Christ had no right to sacrifice his life for the salvation of men.

2. Nor is the spirit of this law different under the gospel, from what it was at first.

3. Nor can any command of the New Testament be at all inconsistent with the spirit of this law. The real spirit and meaning of law, is dependent on the will of no being. It has its foundation in the nature and relations of moral beings.

4. Hence God can never give two commandments, which shall be inconsistent with each other in spirit.

5. It prohibits all unnecessary taking the life of anything that has life.

6. Especially, it prohibits taking human life, without the express or implied authority of God.

7. It prohibits taking human life, for any selfish reason whatever.

8. It prohibits taking human life, without a strict conformity to the spirit of a just and righteous government.

9. It prohibits all taking the life of anything that has life, but for benevolent ends.
10. It prohibits all unnecessary violations of the laws of life and health.
11. It prohibits all unnecessary exposure of life and health in any way.
12. It prohibits every kind and degree of intemperance, and all unnecessary expenditure of health and life.
13. It prohibits the use of means to destroy the existence of human beings in embryo.
14. It prohibits all ill-will, and all selfish anger.
15. It prohibits every kind and degree of injurious treatment, that might effect the health and life.

III. What the true spirit and meaning of this command requires.

1. It requires human beings, under suitable circumstances, and at suitable age, to marry.
2. It requires them, within the bonds of lawful marriage, to propagate their species.
3. To encourage and promote the existence and life of sentient beings, so far as is good for the universe.
4. It enjoins entire benevolence to all beings that have life.
5. It enjoins obedience to all the laws of life and health, so far as consists with the general good.
6. It requires us to do what we can, to promote the life, and health, and well-being of others.
7. It requires us to treat our own health and life, and the health and life of all men and animals, according to their relative value in the scale of being.

IV. Reasons on which this command is founded.

1. Happiness is a good in itself.
2. Life is an indispensable condition of happiness.
3. The destruction and waste of life is a destruction and waste of the means of happiness.
4. The greater the amount of life, the greater the means of happiness.
5. The good of the universe demands, that life should be considered and treated as of great value.
6. As perfect and universal benevolence or good-willing, is the duty of all moral beings, so it is their duty to regard and treat life, as an indispensable means of promoting individual and universal happiness.
7. This precept is plainly only declaratory of the one great universal law of love.

V. Some cases to be regarded as violations of this command.

1. All abuse, neglect, or treatment of animals, whereby their life is shortened.
2. All sporting with the life of animals.
3. All such treatment of human beings, as tends to injure their health and destroy their lives.
4. All dueling.
5. Every unnecessary violation of the laws of life and health, either in men or animals.
6. Every unnecessary disregard of the command to multiply the number of human beings.
7. Every selfish disposition to lessen the amount of animal life.
8. Every degree of ill-will or malevolent feeling toward any being.
9. All selfish anger. 'He that hateth his brother is a murderer.'

LECTURE XXX.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 9

SEVENTH COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:14. "Thou shalt not commit adultery."

I. Show what is implied in this command.

1. It implies the pre-existence of the institution of marriage.
2. It implies that marriage is recognized as not only already existing but as a divine institution.

II. Show what its true spirit prohibits.

1. All carnal commerce of married persons, with others than their lawful husband or wife.
2. All carnal commerce between unmarried persons.
3. All lewd and unchaste desires, thoughts, and affections:

Matt. 5:28. 'I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.'

4. All marriages and consequent carnal commerce between persons within those degrees of consanguinity, whose marriage is prohibited by the law of God. This is not only adultery but incest.

5. All marriages, and consequent carnal commerce, between unmarriageable persons, such as persons already having a husband or wife living, from whom they have not been properly divorced. Such as have been put away, or divorced, are considered by the law of God as unmarriageable persons:

Matt. 5:32. 'Whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.'

6. It prohibits sodomy, or the crime against nature:

Lev. 20:13. If a man lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.'

7. It prohibits buggery, or carnal commerce between men and beasts:

Lev. 18:23. 'Neither shalt thou lie with any beast to defile thyself therewith: neither shall any woman stand before a beast to lie down thereto: it is confession.' And--

Lev. 20:15. 'If a man lie with a beast he shall surely be put to death; and ye shall slay the beast.' And---

Deut. 27:21. 'Cursed be he that lieth with any manner of beast.'

8. It prohibits Onanism, or self-pollution.

9. It prohibits every kind and degree of licentiousness, in word, thought, desire, and action.

10. It prohibits all writing, conversation, pictures, modes of dress, and whatever has a natural tendency to beget in any degree a licentious state of mind; for he who provokes to lust is guilty of the crime of which he is the guilty cause.

III. Reasons of this command.

1. Marriage is a necessity of our nature, both moral and physical.

2. The species must be propagated.

3. So propagated as to secure the highest physical and moral perfection of the race.

4. Children must be born within the lawful bonds of marriage, to secure to them parental affection, with that nurture, training, and maintenance that is essential to their highest well-being.

5. Marriage is, therefore, wholly indispensable to the highest well-being of the race.

6. But the benefits of marriage will be entirely excluded, unless licentiousness be prevented. Every kind and degree of licentiousness is inconsistent with the highest well-being of man.

7. This command, therefore, is only declaratory, and an application of the principle of benevolence, to this particular relation.

8. It is therefore universally binding upon all men in all nations and ages.

9. While human beings exist in this world, the law of marriage cannot possibly be abrogated or altered in its spirit by the will of any being.

EIGHTH COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:15. 'Thou shalt not steal.'

I. What is implied in this command.

1. That the persons of human beings are their own, or that every human being has a property in himself, and that he is, so far as his fellow-men are concerned, his own proprietor. This law plainly implies this; for if men do not own themselves, they certainly own nothing else, and of course nothing could be stolen from them.

2. It implies the right of property---that human beings can, with respect to their fellow-men, have a lawful right to their possessions.

3. It implies that self-ownership, and the right of property, are agreeable to the law of nature and of God.

4. It implies that these rights are based in the very nature and relations of human beings, and that while this nature and these relations exist, these rights can never be canceled, or set aside, except by such infamous crimes as forfeit life and liberty.

II. What the true spirit of this command prohibits.

1. All appropriations of the property of another to ourselves, without his knowledge and consent.

2. It prohibits every kind and degree of fraud.

3. It prohibits taking any advantage in business, that is inconsistent with the rule, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.'

4. It prohibits the infliction of any injury upon the person, morals, education, reputation, family, or property of a human being, whereby he has less of good than he would have possessed but for your interference.

5. It prohibits every sinful omission, that naturally tends to the same result.

6. It prohibits every disposition to defraud, overreach, circumvent, or in any way inflict an injury on a human being.

III. Reasons for this commandment.

1. Self-ownership is implied in moral agency.

2. It is indispensable to accountability.

3. Hence self-ownership is indispensable to virtue.

4. It is also indispensable to that happiness which is the result of virtue.

5. The right of property is founded upon, and is necessarily connected with self-ownership.

6. Both these are indispensable to the highest well-being of individuals, and of the race.

7. Hence, the command 'Thou shalt not steal,' is only declaratory of the one great, universal law of benevolence.

IV. When the spirit of this law is violated.

1. Slavery is a flagrant and infamous violation of it.

2. Taking whatever belongs to another, for temporary use only, but without leave. Many think; that nothing is stealing but the taking of property without leave, without any design of returning it; but taking the temporary use of a thing, without leave, is as absolute stealing, as to take the thing without the design of returning it. In the one case the thing itself is stolen, and in the other the use of it is stolen.

3. Every selfish use of your neighbor's property, although with his permission, such as living by borrowing and using your neighbor's things, when you are as able to provide them for yourself as he is to provide them for himself and for you too.

4. Using a borrowed article for a different purpose than that for which the consent was given.

5. Lending that which is not your own, and which you have no right to lend, is also a violation of the spirit of this commandment.

6. All careless, injurious, or improper use of a borrowed article.

7. All neglect to return a borrowed article in due time, whereby the owner's interest is made to suffer.

8. All keeping back the wages due to laborers.

9. All refusal or neglect to pay honest debts.

10. All refusal to bear your full proportion in building churches, supporting ministers, and sustaining all the institutions of religion. To receive these things gratuitously, is to make slaves of your neighbors, to receive their services for nought, and involves the very principle of theft.

11. Every wrong done or intended to a neighbor, is a violation of his rights, and a violation of the spirit of this commandment.

12. Everything that is properly a speculation in business transactions; that is---where full equivalents are not given and received..

LECTURE XXXI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 10

NINTH COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:16. 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.'

I. What this commandment implies.

1. It implies the duty, under certain circumstances, of being true witnesses for or against our neighbor.

2. It implies that all men are to be regarded as our neighbors.

II. What is not properly a violation of this commandment.

1. Testifying to the truth with benevolent intentions, in a court of justice, whether for or against a neighbor, is not a violation of this commandment.

2. Telling the truth under any circumstances, when the great law of benevolence requires it, does not violate it, whatever the bearing may be upon any particular individual.

3. Stating a falsehood through unavoidable mistake, or misunderstanding, or through failure of memory, is not a violation of this commandment.

4. Withholding truth upon any subject, from one who has no right to know it, is not a violation of this commandment.

III. What its true spirit prohibits.

1. It prohibits all designed, or careless, or malicious misrepresentation of the character, conduct, or views of another, in any way whatever.

2. It prohibits every disposition that naturally tends to slander and misrepresentation.

3. It prohibits taking up, or in any way giving the least countenance to an ill or slanderous report of our neighbor.

4. It prohibits all bearing testimony to the truth of such report, from motives of ill-will.

5. Or, giving unnecessary publicity to the faults of anyone.

6. It prohibits every kind and degree of false coloring, in our representations of the character, motives, or conduct of our neighbor, or of whatever concerns him.

7. It prohibits every kind or degree of concealment that tends to the injury of any one.

8. It prohibits all withholding the truth upon any subject, from him who has a right to know it.

9. It prohibits every species of artifice, or designed deception, intended to make any impression contrary to

truth, on any subject, upon one who has a right to know the truth upon that subject.

IV. Reasons for this commandment.

1. Individual and universal good.
2. This commandment is plainly declaratory of the law of universal benevolence.

TENTH COMMANDMENT

Ex. 20:17. 'Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbor's.'

I. What this commandment implies.

1. The right of property---that a thing may lawfully belong to a neighbor.
2. It implies a right to the exclusive possession and enjoyment of our wives and husbands as such.
3. It implies that the exclusive enjoyment and possession of our wives and husbands as such is not selfishness.
4. It implies that every desire to interfere with the exclusive enjoyment of wives by their husbands, or husbands by their wives, as such, is selfishness.
5. It implies that we have a lawful interest in, and a right to the enjoyment of our friends.

II. What is not a breach of this commandment.

1. The desire to possess what belongs to another, by rendering the possessor a full equivalent, is not a breach of this commandment.
2. Neither is it a breach of this commandment to purchase, with a full equivalent, and take possession in a lawful way, of that which did belong to a neighbor.
3. The desire to possess whatever in our just estimation would contribute to our highest well-being, is not a violation of the spirit of this commandment.

III. What the true spirit of this commandment prohibits and enjoins.

1. It prohibits every selfish disposition to possess what is our neighbor's.
2. It prohibits every selfish disposition to possess anything which belongs to God.
3. It prohibits every selfish disposition to possess what is our neighbor's, without a disposition on our part to render a full equivalent.
4. It prohibits any disposition to possess whatever of our neighbor's we may not lawfully possess; for example, his wife.

5. It prohibits any disposition to possess that which our neighbor has, and needs as truly and as much as ourselves.

6. It prohibits every degree of selfishness.

7. It prohibits a disposition to possess anything that is inconsistent with the will of God, and the highest good of the universe.

8. The spirit of this commandment enjoins perfect and universal benevolence.

9. It is plainly a declaratory summing up of the spirit of the law of universal benevolence.

IV. Reasons for this commandment.

1. This commandment is designed to regulate all the moral affections and emotions of the soul.
2. It is designed to show the spirituality of all the other commandments, and that they relate purely to the state of the mind.
3. It is designed to enjoin perfect and universal holiness of heart.

REMARKS.

1. The above commandments are to be regarded only as specimens of the manner of declaring and applying by express statute, the common law of the universe, or the one great, universal and only law of love.
2. Every precept of the Bible is a moral precept, and the usual division of the precepts of the Bible into moral, civil, ceremonial, and positive, is arbitrary, and in many respects incorrect.
3. Neither God nor any being can make that obligatory as law, which enjoins the observance of that which is indifferent in its own nature, and obligatory for no other reason, than that such is the will of the law giver.
4. Neither God nor any other being has a right to require any course of conduct, without some good reason; and therefore, that can never be law, which is wholly indifferent in itself; and for the requiring of which the law giver has no good reason.
5. That may be law, the reasons of which we are unacquainted with; but it is law only because there are good reasons either known or unknown to us, for the requirement.
6. The common definition of moral law has been defective. It has been defined to be that which is universally binding on all moral agents, in all circumstances, and in all worlds. Hence what is called the civil, positive, and commercial institutions or laws of the Jews, have been distinguished from moral laws.

7. This distinction is not only inconvenient, but creates a false impression. If these laws were not moral, the violation of them would have no moral character; that is--it would not be the violation of moral principle.

8. The true definition of moral law, and that which I have given elsewhere, is, a rule of action, that is and would be universally binding upon all moral agents in similar circumstances. Hence---

9. The ceremonial code of the Jews were moral laws, in the sense, that under the circumstances, and for the same reasons, they would be, or would have been universally binding on all moral agents.

10. Any precept of the Bible, or any precept whatever, that is not founded in moral principle, or required by the circumstances of moral beings, is utterly null and void, and can never in any case be law.

11. All the prohibitions in regard to agriculture, and diet, and ever other regulation and precept under the Old Testament dispensation is binding on all mankind, just as far as their circumstances are similar.

12. The idea, that the positive, civil, and ceremonial laws of the Jews were not moral laws, has done and is doing much to undermine the morality of the Church and the world.

13. All the commandments of God were properly summed up by our Savior, and condensed into the two great precepts, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and soul, and mind, and strength; and thy neighbor as thyself." These two precepts are at once a condensation and a declaration of the whole duty of man to God and to his neighbor.

14. The spirit of moral law is one, and unalterable; dependent on the will of no being. And the duty of God is to declare and enforce it, with such sanctions as the importance of the law demands; but it can never be altered or repealed.

15. Antinomianism, under any form, is an utter abomination, both unreasonable, and impossible for God to sanction.

LECTURE XXXII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 11

SANCTIONS OF LAW

FIRST. What constitutes the Sanctions of Law.

SECOND. There can be no law without Sanctions.

THIRD. In what light the Sanctions of Law are to be regarded.

FOURTH. The end to be secured by law and the execution of penal Sanctions.

FIFTH. The rule for graduating the Sanctions of Law.

First. What constitutes the Sanctions of Law.

1. The Sanctions of Law are the motives to obedience, that which is to be the natural and the governmental consequence, or result of obedience.

2. They are *remuneratory*, i.e. they reward obedience.

3. They are *vindictory*, i.e. they indict punishment upon the disobedient.

4. They are natural, i.e.

(1.) All moral law is that rule of action which is in exact accordance with the nature and relations of moral beings.

(2.) Happiness is naturally connected with, and the necessary consequence of obedience to moral law.

(3.) Misery is naturally and necessarily connected with and results from disobedience to moral law, or from acting contrary to the nature and relations of moral beings.

5. Sanctions are governmental. By governmental sanctions are intended,

(1.) The favor of the government as due to obedience.

(2.) A positive reward bestowed upon the obedient by government.

(3.) The displeasure of government towards the disobedient.

(4.) Direct punishment indicted by the government as due to disobedience.

6. All the happiness and misery resulting from obedience or disobedience, either natural or from the favor or frown of government, are to be regarded as constituting the sanctions of law.

Second. There can be no Law without Sanctions.

1. It has been said in a former lecture that precept without Sanction is only counsel or advice, and no law.

2. Nothing is law, but that rule of action which is founded in the nature and relations of moral beings. It is therefore absurd to say, that there should be no natural

sanctions to this rule of action. It is the same absurdity as to say, that conformity with the laws of our being would not produce happiness, and that non-conformity to the laws of our being would not produce misery which is a contradiction, for what do we mean by acting in conformity to the laws of our being, but that course of conduct in which all the powers of our being will sweetly harmonize, and produce happiness. And what do we mean by non-conformity to the laws of our being, but that course of action that creates mutiny among our powers themselves, that produces discord instead of harmony, misery instead of happiness.

3. A precept, to have the nature and the force of law, must be founded in reason, i.e., it must have some reason for its existence. And it were unjust to hold out no motives to obedience where a law is founded in a necessity of our nature.

4. But whatever is unjust is no law. Therefore a precept without a sanction is not law.

5. Necessity is the foundation of all government. There would be and could be no just government, but for the necessities of the universe. But these necessities cannot be met, the great end of government cannot be secured without motives or sanctions. Therefore that is no government, no law, that has no sanctions.

Third. *In what light Sanctions are to be regarded.*

1. Sanctions are to be regarded as an expression of the benevolent regard of the law giver to his subjects: the motives which he exhibits to induce in the subjects the course of conduct that will secure their highest well-being.

2. They are to be regarded as an expression of his estimation of the justice, necessity, and value of the precept.

3. They are to be regarded as an expression of the amount or strength of his desire to secure the happiness of his subjects.

4. They are to be regarded as an expression of his opinion in respect to the desert of disobedience.

5. The natural sanctions are to be regarded as a demonstration of the justice, necessity, and perfection of the precept.

Fourth. *The end to be secured by Law, and the execution of penal Sanctions.*

1. The ultimate end of all government is happiness.

2. This is the ultimate end of the precept and Sanction of Law.

3. Happiness can be secured only by the prevention of sin and the promotion of holiness.

4. Confidence in the government is the *sine qua non* of all virtue.

5. Confidence results from a revelation of the lawgiver to his subjects.

Confidence in God results from a revelation of himself to his creatures.

6. The moral law, in its precepts and sanctions, is a revelation of God.

7. The execution of penal sanctions, is also a revelation of the mind, will, and character of the lawgiver.

8. The highest and most influential sanctions of government are those measures that most fully reveal the true character of God.

Fifth. *The rule for graduating the Sanctions of Law.*

1. God has laid the foundations of the natural sanctions of Law, deep in the constitution of moral beings.

2. Therefore the natural Sanctions of law will always and necessarily be proportioned to the perfection of obedience and disobedience.

3. *Governmental* sanctions should always be graduated by the importance of the precept.

4. Moral law is a unit. Every sin is a violation of the eternal law of love, and its reward should be equal to the value of the precept.

5. Under moral government there can be no small sin, as every sin is a breach of the whole and only law of benevolence, i.e. it is a violation of the principle which constitutes the law of God.

6. The Sanction of moral law should therefore in every case, be equal to the value of the eternal and unalterable law of benevolence, or as near its value as the nature of the case will admit.

LECTURE XXXIII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 12

SANCTIONS OF GODS LAW

FIRST. God's law has Sanctions.

SECOND. What constitutes the remuneratory Sanctions of the law of God.

THIRD. The perfection and duration of the remuneratory Sanctions of the law of God.

FOURTH. What constitutes the vindicatory Sanctions of the law of God.

FIFTH. Their duration.

First. *God's law has Sanctions.*

1. That sin or disobedience to the moral law, is attended with and results in misery, is a matter of consciousness.
2. That virtue or holiness is attended with and results in happiness, is also attested by consciousness.
3. Therefore that God's law has natural sanctions, both remuneratory and vindicatory, is a matter of fact.
4. That there are governmental sanctions added to the natural, must be true, or God in fact has no Government.
5. The Bible expressly and in every variety of form teaches that God will reward the righteous and punish the wicked.

Second. *The remuneratory sanctions of the law of God.*

1. The happiness that is naturally and necessarily connected with and results from holiness or obedience.
2. The merited favor, protection, and blessing of God.
3. All the natural and governmental rewards of virtue.

Third. *The perfection and duration of the remuneratory Sanctions of the Law of God.*

1. The perfection of the natural reward is and must be proportioned to the perfection of virtue.
2. The duration of the remuneratory sanction must be equal to the duration of obedience. This cannot possibly be otherwise.
3. If the existence and virtue of man are immortal his happiness must be endless.
4. The Bible most unequivocally asserts the immortality both of the existence and virtue of the righteous, and also that their happiness shall be endless.
5. The very design and end of government make it necessary that governmental rewards should be as perfect and unending as virtue.

Fourth. *The vindicatory sanctions of the law of God.*

1. The misery naturally and necessarily connected with, and the result of disobedience to moral law. Here again let it be understood that moral law is nothing else than that rule of action which accords with the nature and relations of moral beings. Therefore the natural vindicatory sanction of the law of God is misery resulting from the violation of man's own moral nature.
2. The displeasure of God, the loss of his protection and governmental favor, together with that punishment which it is his duty to inflict upon the disobedient.
3. The rewards of holiness and the punishment of sin, are described in the Bible in figurative language. The rewards of virtue are called eternal life. The punishment

of vice is called death. By life is intended, not only existence, but that happiness which makes life desirable. By death is intended, not annihilation, but that misery which renders existence an evil.

Fifth. *The duration of the penal Sanctions of the Law of God.*

Here the inquiry is, what kind of death is intended where death is denounced against the transgressor as the penalty of the law of God?

I. It is not merely natural death, for

1. This would in reality be no penalty at all. But it would be offering a reward to sin. If natural death is all that is intended, and if persons, as soon as they are naturally dead have suffered the penalty of the law, and their souls go immediately to heaven, the case stands thus: If your obedience is perfect and perpetual, you shall live in this world forever:

but if you sin you shall die and go right to heaven. This would be hire, and salary, and not punishment.

2. If natural death be the penalty of God's law, the righteous who are forgiven, should not die a natural death.

3. If natural death be the penalty of God's law there is no such thing as forgiveness, but all must actually endure the penalty.

4. If natural death be the penalty, then infants and animals suffer this penalty as well as the most abandoned transgressors.

5. If natural death be the penalty it sustains no proportion whatever to the guilt of sin.

6. Natural death would be no adequate expression of the importance of the precept.

II. The penalty of God's law is not spiritual death.

1. Because spiritual death is a state of entire sinfulness.

2. To make a state of entire sinfulness the penalty of the law of God, would be to make the penalty and the breach of the precept identical.

3. It would be making God the author of sin, and would represent him as compelling the sinner to commit one sin as the punishment for another, as forcing him into a state of total depravity as the reward of his first transgression.

III. But the penal sanction of the law of God is *eternal death* or that state of suffering which is the natural and governmental result of sin or spiritual death.

Before I proceed to the proof of this, I will notice an objection which is often urged against the doctrine of eternal punishments. The objection is *one*, but it is

stated in three different forms. This, and every other objection to the doctrine of endless punishment, with which I am acquainted, is leveled against the justice of such a governmental infliction.

1. It is said that endless punishment is unjust because life is so short that men do not live long enough in this world to commit so great a number of sins as to deserve endless punishment. To this I answer,

(1.) That it is founded in a ridiculous ignorance or disregard of a universal principle of government, viz: that one breach of the precept always incurs the penalty of the law, whatever that penalty is.

(2.) The length of time employed in committing a sin, has nothing to do with its blame worthiness or guilt. It is the *design* which constitutes the moral character of the action, and not the length of time required for its accomplishment.

(3.) This objection takes for granted that it is the number of sins and not the intrinsic guilt of sin that constitutes its blameworthiness, whereas it is the intrinsic desert or guilt of sin, as we shall soon see, that renders it deserving of endless punishment.

2. Another form of the objection is, that a finite creature cannot commit an infinite sin. But none but an infinite sin can deserve endless punishment: therefore endless punishments are unjust.

(1.) This objection takes for granted that man is so diminutive a creature, so much less than the creator, that he cannot deserve his endless frown.

(2.) The fact is, the greater the distance between the creature and the creator, the more aggravated is the guilt of insult or rebellion in the creature. Which is the greatest crime, for a child to insult his playfellow or his parent? Which would involve the most guilt for a man to smite his neighbor and his equal, or his lawful sovereign?

(3.) The higher the ruler is exalted above the subject in his nature, character, and rightful authority, the greater is the guilt of transgression in the subject. Therefore the fact that man is so infinitely below his maker but enhances the guilt of his rebellion and renders him worthy of his endless frown.

3. A third form of the objection is, that sin is not an infinite evil, and therefore does not deserve endless punishment.

(1.) This objection may mean either that sin would not produce infinite mischief if unrestrained, or that it does not involve infinite guilt. It cannot mean the first, for it is agreed on all hands that misery must continue as long as sin does, and therefore that sin unrestrained would

produce endless evil. The objection therefore must mean that sin does not involve infinite guilt. Observe then, the point at issue is, what is the intrinsic demerit or guilt of sin? What does all sin in its own nature deserve? They who deny the justice of endless punishment, manifestly consider the guilt of sin as a mere trifle. They who maintain the justice of endless punishment, consider sin as an evil of immeasurable magnitude, and as in its own nature deserving of endless punishment. Proof.

(2.) The guilt or blameworthiness of an action consists in its being the violation of an obligation. E.g.: Should a child refuse obedience to his father who has no natural or acquired claims upon his obedience, he would not be blameworthy. But should he refuse obedience to his parent who has both a natural and acquired claim to his obedience, this conduct would be blameworthy. This shows in what blameworthiness consists.

2. The guilt or blameworthiness of an action is equal to the amount of obligation, to do or omit that thing. We have just seen that the blameworthiness lies in its being the violation of an obligation. Hence the amount of blameworthiness must be equal to the amount of obligation. If a child refuse to obey his fellow, he contracts no guilt. If he refuse to obey his parent, he contracts a degree of guilt equal to the amount of his obligation to obey. Suppose that someone upon whom he is a thousand times as dependent as upon his parent, and who therefore has a thousand times higher claim upon his obedience than his parent has, should command him to do or omit a certain thing. Should he in this case disobey, his guilt would be a thousand times as great as when he disobeyed his parents. Now suppose that God, upon whom every moral being is not only perfectly but endlessly dependent, requires the creature to love him with all his heart; who does not see that his guilt in refusing obedience must be as great as his obligation to obey.

3. The amount of obligation may be estimated in three ways.

(1.) By the claims of the law-giver. God's claims upon the obedience of man are equal.

a. To their dependence upon him.

b. Their obligation to exercise benevolence towards him, is equal to the value of his happiness, which is infinite.

c. Their obligation to exercise complacency in him, is equal to the amount of this virtue. When we say that God is lovely, we mean that he deserves to be loved. When we say that he deserves to be loved, we mean that moral beings are under an obligation to love him.

If they are under an obligation to love him for his loveliness, their obligation to love him is equal to his loveliness. By this it is not intended that they are under an obligation to love him with affections infinitely strong; but they are under infinite obligation to love him with all their powers, whatever they are. When the amount, then, of an obligation to love God is thus estimated, it is seen to be infinite. The guilt of disobedience must therefore be infinite, and punishment, to be equal to our demerit, or as nearly so as the nature of the case admits, must be endless.

(2.) A second method of estimating the amount of obligation to obey a law, is by ascertaining the value of the law, or the amount of interest secured by it. It has been more than once said, that happiness certainly and necessarily results from obedience to moral law. It should here be said that the happiness of God and of all moral beings results from, and is dependent upon their obedience to moral law. Moral law, then, is as valuable as the infinite and eternal happiness of God, and the endless welfare of all moral beings. Who will deny, then, that the importance of the law is infinite? But the amount of guilt involved in a breach of the precept is as great as the value of the precept. Therefore viewed in this light, the guilt of sin is infinite.

(3.) A third method of ascertaining the amount of obligation to obey a law is by ascertaining the natural tendency of disobedience to defeat those interests which the law is intended to protect and secure. Among the tendencies of sin, the following are most manifest:

- a. To destroy the present happiness of the sinner.
- b. To make him perpetually miserable.
- c. Another tendency of sin is to perpetuate and aggravate itself
- d. Sin is contagious. Example is the highest moral influence that can be exerted. Consequently the disobedience of one tends to beget disobedience in others. And sin, if not counteracted, tends as naturally to spread and become universal, as a contagious disease does.
- e. Sin tends to total and universal selfishness.
- f. It tends to universal damnation.
- g. It tends to bring the authority of God into universal contempt.
- h. It tends to overthrow all government, all happiness. And as all rebellion is aimed at the throne and the life of the sovereign, the natural tendency of sin is not only to annihilate the authority, but the very being of God. Thus, in this respect also, sin involves infinite guilt.

Having disposed of these objections leveled at the justice of eternal punishments, and having also established the fact that sin in its very nature, involves infinite blame-worthiness or guilt, when viewed in any just point of light, I proceed to say:

4. That the law is infinitely unjust, if its penal sections are not endless.

Law must be just in two respects.

(1.) The precept must be in accordance with the law of nature.

(2.) The penalty must be equal to the importance of the precept.

That which has not these two peculiarities is not just, and therefore is not and cannot be law. Either, then, God has no law, or its penal sanctions are endless.

5. That the penal sanctions of the law of God are endless, is evident from the fact that a less penalty would not exhibit as high motives as the nature of the case admits, to restrain sin and promote virtue.

6. Natural justice demands that God should exhibit as high motives to secure obedience as the value of the law demands, and the nature of the case admits.

7. The justice, holiness, and benevolence of God demand that the penal sections of his law should be endless; and if they are not, God cannot be just, holy, or benevolent.

8. Unless the penal sanctions of the law of God are endless, they are virtually and really no penalty at all. If a man be threatened with punishment for one thousand, or ten thousand, or ten millions, or ten hundred millions of years, after which he is to come out, as a matter of justice, and go to heaven, there is beyond an absolute eternity of happiness. Now there is no sort of proportion between the longest finite period that can be named, or even conceived, and endless duration. If, therefore, limited punishment, ending in an eternity of heaven, be the penalty of God's law, the case stands thus: Be perfect, and you live here forever. Sin, and receive finite suffering, with an eternity of heaven. This would be, after all, offering reward to sin.

9. Death is eternal in its nature. The fact, therefore, that this figure is used to express the future punishment of the wicked affords a plain inference that it is endless.

10. The tendency of sin to perpetuate and aggravate itself, affords another strong inference that the sinfulness and misery of the wicked will be eternal.

11. The fact that punishment has no tendency to beget disinterested love in a selfish mind towards him who

inflicts the punishment, also affords a strong presumption that future punishment will be eternal.

12. The law makes no provision for terminating future punishment.

13. Sin deserves endless punishment just as fully as it deserves any punishment at all. If, therefore, it is not forgiven, if it be punished at all with penal suffering, the punishment must be endless.

14. To deny the justice of eternal punishments, involves the same principle as a denial of the justice of any degree of punishment.

15. To deny the justice of endless punishment, is virtually to deny the fact of moral evil. But to deny this is to deny moral obligation. To deny moral obligation we must deny moral agency. But of both moral obligation and moral agency, we are absolutely conscious. Therefore it follows to a demonstration, not only that moral evil does exist, but that it deserves endless punishment.

16. The Bible in a great many ways represents the future punishment of the wicked as eternal. It expresses the duration of the future punishment of the wicked by the same terms, and in every way as forcibly as it expresses the duration of the future happiness of the righteous.

Obj. Will all sinners be punished alike in a future world?

Ans. Not in degree, but only in duration.

LECTURE XXXIV.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 13

GOVERNMENTAL PRINCIPLES

1. The precept of the law must be intelligible.

2. That obedience shall be practicable.

3. That it shall be for the highest good of the subjects.

4. That it shall be impartial, and not contrary to the law of nature.

5. That the law-giver shall express in the sanctions the amount of his regard to the precept.

6. That perfect obedience shall be rewarded with the perpetual favor and protection of the law-giver.

7. That one breach of the precept shall incur the penalty of law.

8. That law makes no provision for repentance or forgiveness.

9. That a leading design of penal sanctions is prevention.

10. That disobedience cannot be pardoned unless some equally efficient preventive be substituted for the execution of law.

11. That where this can be done, pardon is in strict accordance with the perfection of government.

12. That in all cases of disobedience the executive is bound to inflict the penalty of the law, or see that some equivalent is rendered to public justice.

13. The only equivalent that can be rendered to public justice is some governmental measure that will as fully illustrate and manifest the righteousness of the government, as the execution of law would do.

14. The execution of law acts as a preventive, by demonstrating the righteousness of the law-giver, and thus begetting confidence and heart obedience.

15. That any act on the part of the government that will upon the whole set the character of the governor in as impressive and influential a light as the execution of the law would do, is a full satisfaction to public justice, and renders pardon not only proper but highly beneficial.

LECTURE XXXV.**ATONEMENT.---No. 1**

In this lecture I shall show:

FIRST. What is intended by the Atonement.

SECOND. That an Atonement was necessary.

First. *What is intended by the Atonement.*

The English word Atonement is synonymous with the Hebrew word *Cofer*. This is a noun from the verb *cofer*, to cover. The *cofer* or cover, was the name of the lid or cover of the ark of the covenant, and constituted what was called the mercy seat. The Greek word rendered Atonement is *katallage*. This means reconciliation, to favor; from *kallasso*, to change, or exchange. The term properly means substitution. An examination of these original words, in the connection in which they stand, will show that the Atonement is the substitution of the sufferings of Christ in the place of the sufferings of sinners. It is a covering of their sins, by his sufferings.

Second. *Its necessity.*

1. All nations have felt the necessity of expiatory sacrifices. This is evident from the fact that all nations have offered them. Hence *antipsucha*, or ransom for their souls, have been offered by nearly every nation under heaven. (See Buck's Theo. Dic. p. 539.)

2. The wisest heathen philosophers, who saw the intrinsic inefficacy of animal sacrifices, held that God could not forgive sin. This proves to a demonstration, that they felt the necessity of an atonement or expiatory sacrifice. And having too just views of God and his government, to suppose that either animal, or merely human sacrifices, could be efficacious under the government of God, they were unable to understand upon what principles sin could be forgiven.

3. The whole Jewish scriptures, especially the whole ceremonial dispensation of the Jews attest, most unequivocally, the necessity of an Atonement.

4. The New Testament is just as unequivocal in its testimony to the same point. The Apostle expressly asserts, that "without the shedding of blood, there is no remission of sin."

5. The necessity of an Atonement is fully implied in the fact, that an Atonement has been made.

6. The fact that the execution of the law of God on rebel angels had not and could not arrest the progress of rebellion in the universe, proves that something more needed to be done, in support of the authority of law, than the execution of its penalty upon rebels could do. While the execution of law may have a strong tendency to prevent the beginning of rebellion, and to awe and

restrain rebellion, among the rebels themselves; yet penal inflictions, do not as a matter of fact, subdue the heart, under any government, whether human or divine.

7. As a matter of fact, the law, without Atonement, was only exasperating rebels, without confirming holy beings. Paul affirmed that the action of the law upon his own mind, while in impenitence, was, to beget in him all manner of concupiscence. One grand reason for giving the law was, to develop the nature of sin, and to show that the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. The law was, therefore, given that the offense might abound, that thereby it might be demonstrated, that without an Atonement there could be no salvation for rebels under the government of God.

8. The nature, degree, and execution of the penalty of the law, made the holiness and justice of God so prominent, as to absorb too much of public attention to be safe. Those features of his character were so fully revealed, by the execution of his law upon the rebel angels, that to have pursued the same course with the inhabitants of this world, without the offer of mercy, might have had, and doubtless would have had an injurious influence upon the universe, by creating more of fear than of love to God and his government.

9. Hence, a fuller revelation of the love and compassion of God was necessary, to guard against the influence of slavish fear.

10. Public justice required either that an Atonement should be made, or that the law should be executed upon every offender. By public justice is intended, that due administration of law, that shall secure in the highest manner the nature of the case admits, private and public interests, and establish the order and well-being of the universe. In establishing the government of the universe, God had given the pledge, both impliedly and expressly, that he would regard the public interests and by a due administration of the law, secure and promote, as far as possible, public and individual happiness.

11. Public justice could strictly require only the execution of law; for God had neither expressly or impliedly given a pledge to do anything more for the promotion of virtue and happiness, than to administer due rewards to both the righteous and the wicked. Yet an Atonement, as we shall see, would more fully meet the necessities of the government, and act as a more efficient preventive of sin, and a more powerful persuasive to holiness, than the infliction of the penalty of his law would do.

12. An Atonement was needed, to contradict the slander of Satan. He had seduced our first parents, by the

insinuation that God was selfish, in prohibiting their eating the fruit of a certain tree. Now the execution of the penalty of his law would not so thoroughly refute this abominable slander as would the great self-denial of God exhibited in the Atonement.

13. An Atonement was needed, for the removal of obstacles to the free exercise of benevolence towards our race. Without an Atonement, the race of man after the fall, sustained to the government of God the relation of rebels and outlaws. And before God, as the great executive magistrate of the universe, could suffer his benevolence to flow toward them, an Atonement must be decided upon and made known, as the reason upon which his favorable treatment of them was founded.

14. An Atonement was needed, to promote the glory and influence of God in the universe. But more of this hereafter.

15. An Atonement was needed, to present overpowering motives to repentance.

16. An Atonement was needed, that the offer of pardon might not seem like connivance at sin.

17. An Atonement was needed, to manifest the sincerity of God, in his legal enactments.

18. An Atonement was needed, to make it safe, to present the offer and promise of pardon.

19. An Atonement was needed, to inspire confidence in the offers and promises of pardon, and in all the promises of God to man.

20. An Atonement was needed, as the only means of reclaiming rebels.

21. An Atonement was needed, as the great and only means of sanctifying sinners:

Rom. 8:3, 4. 'For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.'

22. An Atonement was needed, not to render God merciful, but to reconcile pardon with a due administration of justice:

Rom. 3:23-26. 'For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God has set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time, his righteousness: that he

might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.'

LECTURE XXXVI.

ATONEMENT.---No. 2

In this lecture I shall present several farther reasons why an Atonement under the government of God was preferable in the case of the inhabitants of this world, to punishment, or to the execution of the divine law. Several reasons have already been assigned in the last lecture, to which I will add the following, some of which are plainly revealed in the Bible; others are plainly inferred from what the Bible does reveal; and others still are plainly inferable from the very nature of the case:

1. God's great and disinterested love to sinners themselves was a prime reason for the Atonement.

John 3:16. 'For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life.'

2. His great love to the universe at large must have been another reason, in as much as it was impossible that the Atonement should not exert an amazing influence over moral beings, in whatever world they might exist.

3. Another reason for substituting the sufferings of Christ in the place of the eternal damnation of sinners, is that an infinite amount of suffering might be prevented. The relation of Christ to the universe rendered his sufferings so infinitely valuable and influential as an expression of God's abhorrence of sin on the one hand, and great love to his subjects on the other, that an infinitely less amount of suffering in him than must have been inflicted upon sinners, would be equally, and no doubt vastly more influential in supporting the government of God, than the execution of the law upon them would have been.

4. By this substitution an immense good might be gained. The eternal happiness of all that can be reclaimed from sin, together with all the augmented happiness of those who have never sinned that must result from this glorious revelation of God.

5. Another reason for preferring the Atonement to the punishment of sinners, must have been, that sin had afforded an opportunity for the highest exercise of virtue in God: the exercise of forbearance, mercy, self-denial, for enemies, and suffering for enemies that were within

his own power, and for those from whom he could expect no equivalent in return.

6. It is impossible to conceive of a higher order of virtues than are exhibited in the Atonement of Christ.

7. It was vastly desirable that God should take advantage of such an opportunity to exhibit his true character, and show to the universe what was in his heart.

8. Another reason for preferring Atonement was God's desire to lay open his heart to the inspection and imitation of moral beings.

9. Another reason is, because God is love, and prefers mercy when it can be safely exercised. The Bible represents him as delighting in mercy, and affirms that "judgment is his strange work."

10. Because he so much prefers mercy to judgment as to be willing to suffer as their substitute, to afford himself the opportunity to exercise pardon on principles that are consistent with a due administration of justice.

11. In the Atonement God consulted his own happiness and his own glory. To deny himself for the salvation of sinners was a part of his own infinite happiness, always intended by him, and therefore always enjoined.

12. In making the Atonement, God complied with the laws of his own mind, and did just that, all things considered, in the highest degree promotive of the universal good.

13. The self-denial exercised in the Atonement would secure to him the highest kind and degree of happiness.

14. The Atonement would present to creatures the highest possible motives to virtue.

15. It would beget among creatures the highest kind and degree of happiness, by leading them to contemplate and imitate his love.

16. The circumstances of his government rendered an Atonement necessary; as the execution of law was not, as a matter of fact, a sufficient preventive of sin. The annihilation of the wicked would not answer the purposes of government. A full revelation of mercy, blended with such an exhibition of justice, was called for by the circumstances of the universe.

17. To confirm holy beings.

18. To confound his enemies.

19. A just and necessary regard to his own reputation made him prefer Atonement to the punishment of sinners.

20. A desire to sustain his own reputation, as the only moral power that could support his own moral

government, must have been a leading reason for the Atonement.

21. The Atonement was preferred as the best and perhaps only way to inspire an affectionate confidence in him.

22. Atonement must have been the most agreeable to God, and the most beneficial to the universe.

23. Atonement would afford him an opportunity to always gratify his love in his kindness to sinners in using means for their salvation, in forgiving and saving them when they repent, without the danger of its being inferred in the universe that he had not a sufficient abhorrence of their sins.

24. The Atonement demonstrates the superior efficacy of love, as a moral influence, over penal inflictions.

25. Another reason for the Atonement was to counteract the influence of the Devil, whose whole influence is exerted in this world for the promotion of selfishness.

26. The Atonement would enable God to make the best use of the Devil which the nature of the case admitted.

27. To make the final punishment of the wicked more impressive in the light of the infinite love manifest in the Atonement.

28. The Atonement is the highest testimony that God can bear against selfishness. It is the testimony of his own example.

29. The Atonement is a higher expression of his regard for the public interests than the execution of law. It is therefore a fuller satisfaction to public justice.

30. The Atonement so reveals all the attributes of God as to complete the whole circle of motives needed to influence the minds of moral beings.

31. By dying in human nature, Christ exhibited his heart to both worlds.

LECTURE XXXVII.

ATONEMENT.---No. 3.

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE ATONEMENT

In this lecture I will show:

FIRST. Not Christ's obedience to law as a covenant of works.

SECOND. That his sufferings, and especially his death, constitutes the Atonement.

THIRD. That his taking human nature and obeying unto death, under such circumstances, constituted a good reason for our being treated as righteous.

FOURTH. The nature and kind of his sufferings.

FIFTH. The amount of his sufferings.

SIXTH. That the Atonement is not a commercial transaction.

SEVENTH. That the Atonement is to be regarded as a satisfaction of public justice.

First. *Christ's obedience to the moral law, as a covenant of works, did not constitute the Atonement.*

1. Christ owed obedience to the moral law both as God and man. He was under as much obligation to be perfectly benevolent as any moral creature is. It was therefore impossible for him to perform any works of supererogation; that is, so far as obedience to law was concerned, he could, neither as God, nor as man, do anything more than his duty.

2. Had he *obeyed* for us, he would not have suffered for us. If his obedience was to be substituted for our obedience, he need not certainly have both fulfilled the law for us, as our substitute under a covenant of works, and at the same time have suffered, a substitute for the penalty of the law.

3. If he obeyed the law as our substitute, then why should our own personal obedience be insisted upon as a *sine qua non* of our salvation.

4. The idea that any part of the Atonement consisted in Christ's obeying the law for us, and in our stead and behalf; represents God as requiring:

(1.) *The obedience* of our substitute.

(2.) The same *suffering* as if no obedience had been rendered.

(3.) Our *repentance*.

(4.) Our *personal obedience*.

(5.) And then represents him as, after all, ascribing our salvation to grace. Strange grace this, that requires a debt to be paid several times over before the obligation is discharged!

Second. *The sufferings of Christ, and especially his death, constituted the Atonement.*

1. His sufferings were no part of them deserved by him. They must, therefore, have been vicarious or unjust. If they were vicarious, that is, voluntarily suffered by him as our substitute no injustice was done. But if they were not vicarious he could not have suffered at all under the government of God, without injustice having been done him.

2. That his sufferings were vicarious, is manifest from the fact that they were *all* occasioned by the sins of men.

3. The Bible represents *all* his sufferings as for us.

Isa. 53: 'Who hath believed our report? and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed? For he shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground: he hath no form nor comeliness; and when we shall see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him. He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; and we hid as it were our faces from him; he was despised, and we esteemed him not. Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was oppressed, and he was afflicted; yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before his shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth. He was taken from prison and from judgment: and who shall declare his generation? for he was cut off out of the land of the living: for the transgression of my people was he stricken. And he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death; because he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth. Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong because he hath poured out his soul unto death: and he was numbered with the transgressors; and he bare the sins of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.'

Heb. 2:10. 'For it became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings.'

4. The Bible especially, and almost everywhere represents his death, or the shedding of his blood, as a vicarious offering for our sins. The texts which prove this are too numerous to be quoted in a skeleton.

5. Perhaps his other sufferings are to be regarded as incidental to the work he had undertaken, and fitted to prepare him to sympathize with us, rather than as strictly vicarious.

Heb. 2:17, 18. 'Wherefore in all things it behooved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people: For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted.'

Heb. 4:15. 'For we have not a high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.'

Third. *His taking Human nature, and obeying unto death, under such circumstances, constituted a good reason for our being treated as righteous.*

1. It is a common practice in human governments, and one that is founded in the nature and laws of mind, to reward distinguished public service by conferring favors on the children of those who had rendered this service, and treating them as if they had rendered it themselves. This is both benevolent and wise. Its governmental importance, its wisdom and excellent influence have been most abundantly attested in the experience of nations.

2. As a governmental transaction, this same principle prevails, and for the same reason, under the government of God. All that are Christ's children and belong to him, are received for his sake, treated with favor, and the rewards of the righteous are bestowed upon them for his sake. And the public service which he has rendered the universe by laying down his life for the support of the divine government, has rendered it eminently wise that all who are united to him by faith should be treated as righteous for his sake.

Fourth. *The nature or kind of his sufferings.*

1. His sufferings were not those of a sinner, neither in kind nor degree. The sufferings of a sinner must consist, in a great measure, in remorse. But Christ could not feel remorse, having never sinned.

2. He could not have endured the literal penalty of the law of God, for this we have seen in a former skeleton was eternal death.

3. He did not endure the displeasure of God. On the contrary, God expressly affirmed that he was his "beloved Son in whom he was well pleased."

4. But a substitute for the curse due to sinners fell on him. In other words, he endured such sufferings, as our substitute, both in kind and degree, as fully to meet the demand of public justice.

Isa. 53:4-12. 'Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray; we have turned everyone his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was oppressed, and he was afflicted; yet he opened not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before his shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth. He was taken from prison and from judgment: and who shall declare his generation? for he was cut off out of the land of the living: for the transgression of my people was he stricken. And he made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death: because he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth. Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul and offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he hath poured out his soul unto death; and he was numbered with the transgressors; and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.'

Rom. 4:25. 'Who was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification.'

2 Cor. 5:21. 'For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.'

Heb. 9:28. 'So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many: and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time; without sin, unto salvation.'

1 Pet. 2:24. 'Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness: by whose stripes ye were healed.'

5. His sufferings were those of a holy mind voluntarily submitted to, in support of law, under a dispensation of mercy.

Fifth. *The amount of his sufferings.*

1. He did not suffer all that was due to sinners on the ground of retributive justice. This was naturally impossible, as each sinner deserved eternal death.

2. Inflicting upon him this amount of suffering would have been unjust, as his sufferings were infinitely more valuable than the sufferings of sinners.

3. Therefore such an amount of suffering was wholly unnecessary in him.

4. Had he suffered the same amount that was due to sinners, nothing would have been gained to the universe by this substitution, and therefore the Atonement would have been unwise.

5. Neither wisdom nor enlightened benevolence could consent that an innocent being should suffer, as a substitute for a guilty one, the same amount that was justly due to the guilty.

6. We are no where informed, nor is it possible for us to know, or perhaps to conceive, the exact amount of Christ's sufferings as a substitute for sinners. It is enough for us to know that his sufferings, both in kind and degree, were so ample a satisfaction to public justice as to render the universal offer of forgiveness to all the penitent consistent with the due administration of justice.

Sixth. *The Atonement was not a commercial transaction.*

Some have regarded the Atonement simply in the light of the payment of a debt; and have represented Christ as purchasing the elect of the Father and paying down the same amount of suffering in his own person that justice would have exacted of them. To this answer:

1. It is naturally impossible, as it would require that satisfaction should be made to retributive justice.

2. But as we have seen in a former lecture, retributive justice must have inflicted on them eternal death. To suppose, therefore, that Christ suffered in amount all that was due to the elect, is to suppose that he suffered an eternal punishment multiplied by the whole number of the elect.

Seventh. *The Atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public justice.*

1. Isa. 53:10-12. 'Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall

prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of His Soul, and shall be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he hath poured out his soul unto death: and he was numbered with the transgressors; and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors.

Rom. 24-26. 'Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.'

2. Public justice requires:

(1.) That penalties shall be annexed to laws that are equal to the importance of the precept.

(2.) That when these penalties are incurred they shall be inflicted for the public good, as an expression of the law giver's regard to the law, of his determination to support public order, and by a due administration of justice to secure the highest well being of the public. As has been seen in a former lecture, a leading design of the sanctions of law is prevention; and the execution of penal sanctions is demanded by public justice. The great design of sanctions, both remuneratory and vindicatory, is to prevent disobedience and secure obedience or universal happiness. This is done by such a revelation of the heart of the law giver, through the precept, sanctions, and execution of his laws, as to beget awe on the one hand, and the most entire confidence and love on the other.

3. Whatever can as effectually reveal God, make known his hatred to sin, his love of order, his determination to support government, and to promote the holiness and happiness of his creatures, as the execution of his law would do, is a full satisfaction of public justice.

4. Atonement is, therefore, a part, and a most influential part of moral government. It is an auxiliary to a strictly legal government. It does not take the place of the execution of law in such a sense as to exclude penal indications from the universe. The execution of law still holds a place and makes up an indispensable part of the great circle of motives essential to the perfection of moral government. Fallen angels and the finally impenitent of this world will receive the full execution of the penalty of the divine law. But Atonement is an expedient above law; not contrary to it, which adds new and vastly influential motives to induce obedience. I

have said it is an auxiliary to law, adding to the precept and sanction of law an overpowering exhibition of love and compassion.

5. The Atonement is an illustrious exhibition of commutative justice, in which the government of God, by an act of infinite grace, commutes or substitutes the sufferings of Christ for the eternal damnation of sinners.

These various positions might be sustained by numerous quotations from scripture, but in this skeleton form they cannot conveniently be given; and besides, it is no part of any design to dispense with the necessity of your searching the Bible for the proof of these positions yourselves.

LECTURE XXXVIII.

ATONEMENT.---No. 4.

ITS VALUE

In discussing the value of the Atonement, I shall---

FIRST. Show in what its value consists.

SECOND. How great its value is.

THIRD. For whose benefit it was intended.

First. *Show in what its value consists.*

1. It is valuable only as it tends to promote the glory of God, and the virtue and happiness of the universe.
2. In order to understand, in what the value of the Atonement consists, we must understand:
 - (1.) That happiness is an ultimate good.
 - (2.) That virtue is indispensable to happiness.
 - (3.) That the knowledge of God is indispensable to virtue.
 - (4.) That Christ, who made the Atonement, is God.
 - (5.) That the work of Atonement was the most interesting and impressive exhibition of God that ever was made in this world and probably in the universe.
 - (6.) That, therefore, the Atonement is the highest means of promoting virtue that exists in this world, and perhaps in the universe. And that it is valuable only, and just so far as it reveals God, and tends to promote virtue and happiness.
 - (7.) That the work of Atonement was a gratification of the infinite benevolence of God.
 - (8.) It was a work eternally designed by him, and therefore eternally enjoyed.

(9.) It has eternally made no small part of the happiness of God.

(10.) The development or carrying out of this design, in the work of Atonement, highly promotes and will forever promote his glory in the universe.

(11.) Its value consists in its adaptedness to promote the virtue and happiness of holy angels, and all moral agents who have never sinned. As it is a new and most stupendous revelation of God, it must of course greatly increase their knowledge of God, and be greatly promotive of their virtue and happiness.

(12.) Its value consists in its adaptedness to prevent farther rebellion against God in every part of the universe. The Atonement exhibits God in such a light, as must greatly strengthen the confidence of holy beings in his character and government. It is therefore calculated in the highest degree, to confirm holy beings in their allegiance to God, and thus prevent the further progress of rebellion.

Second. *Show how great its value is.*

1. Let it be remembered, the value of the Atonement consists in its moral power or tendency to promote virtue and happiness.
2. Moral power is the power of motive.
3. The highest moral power is the influence of example. Advice has moral power. Precept has moral power. Sanction has moral power. But example is the highest moral influence that can be exerted by any being.
4. Moral beings are so created as to be naturally influenced by the example of each other. 'The example of a child, as a moral influence, has power upon other children. The example of an adult, as a moral influence, has power. The example of great men and of angels has great moral power. But the example of God is the highest moral influence in the universe.
5. The word of God has power. His commands, threatenings, promises; but his example is a higher moral influence than his precepts or his threatenings.
6. Virtue consists in benevolence. God requires benevolence, threatens all his subjects with punishment, if they are not benevolent, and promises them eternal life if they are. All this has power. But his example, his own benevolence, his own disinterested love, as expressed in the Atonement, is a vastly higher moral influence than his word, or any other of his ways.
7. Christ is God. In the Atonement God has given us the influence of his own example, has exhibited his own love, his own compassion, his own self-denial, his own patience, his own long-suffering, under abuse from

enemies. In the Atonement he has exhibited all the highest and most perfect virtues, has united himself with human nature, has exhibited these virtues to the inspection of our senses, and labored, wept, suffered, bled, and died for man. 'This is not only the highest revelation of God, that could be given to man; but is giving the whole weight of his own example in favor of all the virtues which he requires of man.

8. This is the highest possible moral influence. It is properly moral omnipotence; that is--- the influence of the Atonement, when apprehended by the mind, will accomplish whatever is an objet of moral power. It cannot compel a moral agent, and set aside his freedom, for this is not an objet of moral power; but it will do all that motive can, in the nature of the case accomplish. It is the highest and most weighty motive that the mind of a moral being can conceive. It is the most moving, impressive, and influential consideration in the universe.

9. The value of the Atonement may be estimated then:

(1.) By the consideration, that it has from eternity made up no inconsiderable part of the happiness of God. We are not aware, and cannot know, that God has ever exercised a higher class of virtues, that were exercised and exhibited in the Atonement. His happiness arises out of, and is founded in, his virtue.

(2.) God has always been in that state of mind, so far as his will and design were concerned, in which he made the Atonement.

(3.) He has, therefore, always exercised those virtues, and always enjoyed the happiness resulting from them. And those virtues are certainly among the highest kind that can possibly be exercised by God, and as his happiness is in proportion to the perfection and strength of his virtue, we have good reason for believing, that the work of Atonement, or the miracles exercised or exhibited in it, have ever constituted a great share of the happiness of God.

(4.) Its value may be estimated, by its moral influence in the promotion of holiness among all holy beings:

a. Their love to God must depend upon their knowledge of him.

b. As he is infinite, and all creatures are finite, finite beings know him only as he is pleased to reveal himself.

c. The Atonement has disclosed or revealed to the universe of holy beings, a class and an order of virtues, as resident in the divine mind, which, but for the Atonement, would probably have forever remained unknown.

d. As the Atonement is the most impressive revelation of God, of which we have any knowledge, or can form any conception, we have reason to believe that it has greatly increased the holiness and happiness of all holy creatures, that it has done more than any other and perhaps every other revelation of God, to exalt his character, strengthen his government, enlighten the universe, and increase its happiness.

e. The value of the Atonement may be estimated by the amount of good it has done and will do in this world. The Atonement is an exhibition of God suffering as a substitute for his rebellious subjects. His relation to the law and to the universe, is that which gives his sufferings such infinite value. I have said, in a former lecture, that the utility of executing penal sanctions consists in the exhibition it makes of the true character and designs of the lawgiver. It creates public confidence, makes a public impression, and thus strengthens the influence of government, and is in this way promotive of order and happiness. The Atonement is the highest testimony that God could give of his holy abhorrence of sin; of his regard to his law; of his determination to support it; and, also, of his great love for his subjects; his great compassion for sinners; and his willingness to suffer himself in their stead; rather, on the one hand, than to punish them, and on the other, than to set aside the penalty without satisfaction being made to public justice.

f. The Atonement may be viewed in either of two points of light.

(a.) Christ may be considered as the law-giver, and attesting his sincerity, love of holiness, approbation of the law, and compassion for his subjects, by laying down his life as their substitute.

(b.) Or, Christ may be considered as the Son of the Supreme Ruler; and then we have the spectacle of a sovereign, giving his only begotten and well beloved Son, his greatest treasure, to die a shameful and agonizing death, in testimony of his great compassion for his rebellious subjects, and of his high regard for public justice.

g. The value of the Atonement may be estimated, by considering the fact that it provides for the pardon of sin, in a way that forbids the hope of impunity in any other case. This, the good of the universe imperiously demanded. If sin is to be forgiven at all, under the government of God, it should be known to be forgiven upon principles that will by no means encourage rebellion, or hold out the least hope of impunity, should rebellion break out in any other part of the universe.

h. The Atonement has settled the question, that sin can never be forgiven, under the government of God, simply on account of the repentance of any being. It has demonstrated, that sin can never be forgiven without full satisfaction being made to public justice, and that public justice can never be satisfied with anything less than an Atonement made by God himself. Now, as it can never be expected, that the Atonement will be repeated, it is forever settled, that rebellion in any other world than this, can have no hope of impunity. This answers the question so often asked by infidels, "If God was disposed to be merciful, why could he not forgive without an Atonement?" The answer is plain; he could not forgive sin, but upon such principles as would forever preclude the hope of impunity, should rebellion ever break out in any other part of the universe.

i. From these considerations, it is manifest that the value of the Atonement is infinite. We have reason to believe, that Christ, by his Atonement, is not only the Savior of this world, but the Savior of the universe in an important sense. Rebellion once broke out in Heaven, and upon the rebel angels God executed his law, and sent them down to hell. It next broke out in this world; and as the execution of law was found by experience not to be a sufficient preventive against rebellion, there was no certainty that rebellion would not have spread until it had ruined the universe, but for that revelation of God which Christ has made in the Atonement. This exhibition of God has proved itself, not merely able to prevent rebellion among holy beings, but to reclaim and reform rebels. Millions of rebels have been reclaimed and reformed. This world is to be turned back to its allegiance to God, and the blessed Atonement of Christ has so unbosomed God before the universe, as, no doubt, not only to save other worlds from going into rebellion, but to save myriads of our already rebellious race from the depths of an eternal hell.

Third. *For whose benefit the Atonement was intended.*

1. God does all things for himself; that is---he consults his own glory and happiness, as the supreme and most influential reason for all his conduct. This is wise and right in him, because his own glory and happiness are infinitely the greatest good in the universe. He does what he does, because he loves to do it. He made the Atonement to gratify himself; that is---because he loved to do it. "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." God himself, then, was greatly benefited by the Atonement. In other words, his happiness, in a great measure, consisted in it.

2. He made the Atonement for the benefit of the universe. All holy beings are and must be benefited by it, from its very nature. As it gives them a higher knowledge of God, than they ever had benefited, or ever could have gained in any other way. The Atonement is the greatest work that he could have wrought for them, the most blessed, and excellent, and benevolent thing he could have done for them. For this reason, angels are described as desiring to look into the Atonement. The inhabitants of Heaven are represented as being deeply interested in the work of Atonement, and those displays of the character of God that are made in it. The Atonement is then, no doubt, one of the greatest blessings that ever God conferred upon the universe of holy beings.

3. The Atonement was made for the benefit particularly of the inhabitants of this world. From its very nature, it is calculated to benefit all the inhabitants of this world; as it is a most stupendous revelation of God to man. Its nature is adapted to benefit all mankind.

All mankind can be pardoned, if they will be rightly affected and brought to repentance by it, as well as any part of mankind can.

4. The Bible declares that Christ tasted death for every man.

5. All do certainly receive many blessings on account of it. There is reason to believe, that but for the Atonement, none of our race, except the first human pair, would ever have had an existence.

6. But for the Atonement, no man could have been treated with any more lenity and forbearance than Satan can.

7. The lives, and all the blessings which all mankind enjoy, are conferred on them on account of the Atonement of Christ; that is---God could not consistently confer these blessings, were it not that Christ has made such a satisfaction to public justice, that God can consistently wait on sinners, and bless, and do all that the nature of the case admits to save them.

8. That it was made for all mankind, is evident, from the fact that it is offered to all, indiscriminately.

9. Sinners are universally condemned, for not receiving it.

10. If the Atonement is not intended for all mankind, God is insincere in making them the offer of salvation through the Atonement.

11. If the Atonement is not for all mankind, then God is partial.

12. If not, sinners in hell will see and know, that their salvation was never possible; that no Atonement was made for them; and that God was insincere, in offering them salvation.

13. If the Atonement is not for all men, no one can know for whom, in particular, it was intended, without direct revelation.

14. If the Atonement is for none but the elect, no man can know whether he has a right to embrace it, until by a direct revelation, God has made known to him that he is one of the elect.

15. If the Atonement was made but for the elect, no man can by any possibility embrace it without such a revelation. Why cannot Satan believe in, embrace, and be saved, by the Atonement? Simply because it was not made for him. If it was not made for the non-elect, they can no more embrace and be saved by it, than Satan can. If, therefore, the Atonement was made but for a part of mankind, it is entirely nugatory, unless a further revelation make known for whom in particular it was made.

16. If it was not made for all men, ministers do not know to whom they should offer it.

17. If ministers do not believe that it was made for all men, they cannot heartily and honestly press its acceptance upon any individual, or congregation in the world; for they cannot assure any individual, or congregation, that there is any Atonement for him or them, any more than there is for Satan.

LECTURE XXXIX.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 18.

ATONEMENT.---No. 5.

ITS INFLUENCE

I have already anticipated many things that might be said under this head, some of which I shall glance at again, and to which several other considerations may be added.

1. The Atonement renders pardon consistent with the perfect administration of justice.

2. The Atonement, as it was made by the lawgiver, magnifies the law, and renders it infinitely more honorable and influential than the execution of the penalty upon sinners would have done.

3. It is the highest and most glorious expedient of moral government. It is adding to the influence of law the whole weight of the most moving manifestation of God, that men or angels ever saw or will see.

4. It completes the circle of governmental motives. It is a filling up of the revelation of God. It is a revealing of a department of his character, with which it would seem that nothing else could have made his creatures acquainted. It is, therefore, the highest possible support of moral government.

5. It greatly glorifies God, far above all his other works and ways.

6. It must be to him a source of the purest, most exalted, and eternal happiness.

7. It opens the channels of divine benevolence to state criminals.

8. It has united God with human nature.

9. It has opened a way of access to God, never opened to any creatures before.

10. It has abolished natural death, by procuring universal resurrection:

1 Cor. 15:22. 'For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.'

11. It restores the life of God to the soul, by restoring to man the influence of the Holy Spirit.

12. It has introduced a new method of salvation, and made Christ the head of the New Covenant.

13. It has made Christ our surety:

Heb. 7:22. 'By so much was Jesus made a surety of a better testament.'

14. It has arrayed such a public sentiment against rebellion, as to crush it whenever the Atonement is fairly understood and applied by the Holy Spirit.

15. It has procured the offer of pardon to all sinners of our race.

16. It has been the occasion of a new and most aggravated kind of sin.

17. It has, no doubt, added to the happiness of heaven.

18. It has more fully developed the nature and importance of the government of God.

19. It has more fully developed the nature of sin.

20. It has more fully developed the strength of sin.

21. It has more fully developed the total depravity and utter madness of sinners.

22. It has given scope to the long-suffering and forbearance of God.

23. It has formed a more intimate union between God and man, than between him and any other order of creatures.

24. It has elevated human nature, and the saints of God, into the stations of kings and priests to God.

25. It has opened new fields of usefulness, in which the benevolence of God, angels, and men may luxuriate in doing good.

26. It has developed and fully revealed the doctrine of the Trinity.

27. It has revealed the most influential and only efficacious method of government.

28. It has more fully developed those laws of our being upon which the strength of moral government depends.

29. It has given a standing illustration of the true interest, meaning, and excellency of the law of God. In the Atonement God has illustrated the meaning of his law by his own example.

30. The Atonement has fully illustrated the nature of virtue, and demonstrated that it consists in disinterested benevolence.

31. It has forever condemned all selfishness, as entirely inconsistent with virtue.

32. It has established all the great principles and completed the power of moral government.

LECTURE XL.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 19.

ATONEMENT.---No. 6.

OBJECTIONS

I. To the *fact* of Atonement. It is said that the doctrine of Atonement represents God as unmerciful.

Ans. 1. This objection supposes that the Atonement was demanded to satisfy retributive instead of public justice.

2. The Atonement was the exhibition of a merciful disposition. It was because God desired to pardon that he consented to give his own Son to die as the substitute of sinners.

3. The Atonement is infinitely the most illustrious exhibition of mercy ever made in the universe. The mere pardon of sin, as an act of mercy, cannot compare with the mercy displayed in the Atonement itself.

II. It is objected that the Atonement is unnecessary.

Ans. 1. The testimony of the world and of the consciences of all men is against this objection. This is universally attested by their expiatory sacrifices.

2. The Bible is against it.

3. A heathen philosopher can answer this.

III. It is objected that the doctrine of Atonement is inconsistent with the idea of mercy and forgiveness.

Ans. 1. This takes for granted that the Atonement was the literal payment of a debt, and that Christ suffered all that was due to all the sinners for whom he died. So that their discharge or pardon is an act of justice and not of mercy. But this was by no means the nature of the Atonement. The Atonement, as we have seen, had respect simply to *public*, and not at all to *retributive* justice. Christ suffered what was necessary to illustrate the feelings of God towards sin and towards his law. But the amount of his sufferings had no respect to the amount of punishment that might have justly been inflicted on the wicked.

2. The punishment of sinners is just as much deserved by them as if Christ had not suffered at all.

3. Their forgiveness, therefore, is just as much an act of mercy as if there had been no Atonement.

IV. It is objected that it is unjust to punish an innocent being instead of the guilty.

Ans. 1. Yes, it would not only be unjust, but it is impossible to *punish* an innocent individual at all. Punishment implies guilt. An innocent being may suffer, but he cannot be punished. Christ voluntarily "suffered, the just for the unjust." He had a right to exercise this self-denial; and as it was by his own voluntary consent, no injustice was done to anyone.

2. If he had no right to make an Atonement, he had no right to consult and promote his own happiness; for it is said that "for the joy that was set before him he endured the cross, despising the shame."

V. It is objected that the doctrine of Atonement is utterly incredible.

To this I have replied in a former lecture; but will here again state, that it is utterly incredible upon any other supposition than that God is love. But if God is love, as the Bible expressly affirms that he is, the work of Atonement is just what might be expected of him under the circumstances; and the doctrine of Atonement is the most reasonable doctrine in the universe.

VI. It is objected to the doctrine of Atonement, that it is of a demoralizing tendency.

Ans. 1. There is a broad distinction between the natural tendency of a thing and such an abuse of a good thing as to make it the instrument of evil. The best things and doctrines may be, and often are, abused, and their natural tendency perverted.

2. The natural tendency of the Atonement is the direct opposite of demoralizing. Is the manifestation of deep disinterested love naturally calculated to beget enmity? Who does not know that the natural tendency of manifested love is to beget love in return?

3. Those who have the most fully believed in the Atonement, have exhibited the purest morality that has ever been exhibited in this world; while the rejecters of the Atonement, almost without exception, exhibit a loose morality. This is as might be expected from the very nature of Atonement.

VII. To a *general* Atonement it is objected, that the Bible represents Christ as laying down his life for his sheep, or for the elect only, and not for all mankind.

Ans. 1. It does indeed represent Christ as laying down his life for his sheep, and also for all mankind.

1 John 2:2. 'And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the **WHOLE WORLD.**'

John 3:17. 'For God sent not his Son into the **WORLD** to condemn the world; but that the **WORLD** through him might be saved.'

Heb. 2:9. 'But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor; that he by the grace of God should taste death for **EVERY MAN.**'

2. Those who object to the general Atonement take substantially the same course to evade this doctrine that Unitarians do to set aside the doctrine of the trinity, and divinity of Christ. They quote those passages that prove the unity of God and the humanity of Christ, and then take it for granted that they have disproved the doctrine of the trinity and Christ's divinity. The asserters of limited Atonement in like manner quote those passages that prove that Christ died for the elect and for his saints, and then take it for granted that he died for none else. To the Unitarian we reply, we admit the unity of God, and the humanity of Christ, and the full meaning of those passages of scripture which you quote in proof of these doctrines; but we insist that this is not the whole truth, but there are still other classes of passages which prove the doctrine of the trinity and of the divinity of Christ. Just so to the asserters of limited Atonement we reply, we believe that Christ laid down his life for his

sheep, as well as you; but we also believe that he tasted death for every man.

John 3:16. 'For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life.'

VIII. To the doctrine of general Atonement it is objected, that it would be folly in God to provide what he knew would be rejected; and that to suffer Christ to die for those whom he foresaw would not repent, would be a useless expenditure of blood and suffering.

Ans. 1. This objection assumes that the Atonement was a literal payment of a debt, which we have seen is not the nature of the Atonement.

2. If sinners do not accept it, no particle of the Atonement can be useless, as the great compassion of God in providing and offering them mercy will forever exalt his character in the estimation of holy beings, greatly strengthen his government, and therefore benefit the whole universe.

3. If all men rejected the Atonement it would nevertheless be of infinite value to the universe, as it is the most glorious revelation of God that was ever made.

IX. To the general Atonement it is objected, that it implies universal salvation.

Ans. 1. It does indeed imply this, upon the supposition that the Atonement is the literal payment of a debt. It was upon this view of the Atonement that Universalism first took its stand. Universalists taking it for granted that Christ had paid the debt of those for whom he died, and finding it fully revealed in the Bible that he died for all mankind, naturally, and if this were correct, properly inferred the doctrine of universal salvation. But we have seen that this is not the nature of the Atonement. Therefore this inference falls to the ground.

X. It is objected that if the Atonement was not a payment of the debt of sinners, but general in its nature, as we have mentioned, it secures the salvation of no one.

Ans. It is true that the Atonement itself does not secure the salvation of anyone; but the promise and oath of God that Christ shall have a seed to serve him does.

REMARKS ON THE ATONEMENT

1. The execution of the law of God on rebel angels must have created great awe in heaven.

2. Its action may have tended too much to fear.

3. The forbearance of God toward men previously to the Atonement of Christ may have been designed to counteract the superabundant tendency to fear, as it was the beginning of a revelation of compassion.

4. Sinners will not give up their enmity against God, nor believe that his is disinterested love, until they realize that he actually died as their substitute.

5. In this can be seen the exceeding strength of unbelief and prejudice against God.

6. But faith in the Atonement of Christ rolls a mountain weight of crushing considerations upon the heart of the sinner.

7. Thus the blood of Christ when apprehended and believed in, cleanses from all sin.

8. God's forbearance toward sinners must increase the wonder, admiration, love, and happiness of the universe.

9. The means which he uses to save mankind must produce the same effect.

10. Beyond certain limits, forbearance is no virtue, but would be manifestly injurious, and therefore wrong. A degree of forbearance that might justly create the impression that God was not infinitely holy and opposed to sin, would work infinite mischief in the universe.

11. When the forbearance of God has fully demonstrated his great love, and done all it can to sustain the moral government of God, without a fresh display of holiness and justice, God will no doubt come forth to execution, and make parallel displays of justice and mercy forever, by setting heaven and hell in eternal contrast.

12. Then the law and gospel will be seen to be one harmonious system of moral government, developing in the fullest manner the glorious character of God.

13. From this you can see the indispensable necessity of faith in the Atonement of Christ, and why it is that the gospel is the power of God unto salvation only to every one that believeth. If the Atonement is not believed, it is to that mind no revelation of God at all, and with such a mind the gospel has no moral power.

14. But the Atonement tends in the highest manner to beget in the believer the spirit of entire and universal consecration to God.

15. The Atonement shows how solid a foundation the saints have for unbroken and eternal repose and confidence in God. If God could make an Atonement for men, surely it is infinitely unreasonable to suppose that he will withhold from those that believe anything which could be to them a real good.

16. We see that selfishness is the great hindrance to the exercise of faith. A selfish mind finds it exceedingly difficult to understand the Atonement, inasmuch as it is an exhibition of a state of mind which is the direct

opposite of all that the sinner has ever experienced. His experience being wholly selfish renders it difficult for him to conceive aright what true religion is, and heartily to believe in the infinitely great and disinterested love of God.

LECTURE XLI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 20

HUMAN GOVERNMENTS ARE A PART OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD

In this I shall show:

FIRST. That Human Governments are a necessity of human nature.

SECOND. That this necessity will continue as long as men exist in the present world.

THIRD. That Human Governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part of the government of God.

FOURTH. Whose right and duty it is to govern.

FIFTH. In what cases human legislation imposes moral obligation.

SIXTH. That it is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of Human Government.

SEVENTH. It is a ridiculous and absurd dream, to suppose that Human Government can ever be dispensed with in this world.

First. *Human Governments are a necessity of Human nature.*

1. There is a material universe.

2. The bodies of men are material.

3. All action wastes these material bodies, and consequently they need continual sustenance.

4. Hence, we have many bodily wants.

5. Hence, the necessity of worldly goods and possessions.

6. There must be real estate.

7. It must belong to somebody.

8. There must, therefore, be all the forms of conveyancing, registry, and in short, all the forms of legal government, to settle and manage the real estate affairs of men.

9. Men have minds residing in a material body, and depending upon the organization and perfection of this body for mental development.

10. The mind receives its ideas of external objects, and the elements of all its knowledge through the bodily senses. It therefore needs books and other means of knowledge.

11. Hence, for this reason also men need property.

12. Moral beings will not agree in opinions on any subject without similar degrees of knowledge.

13. Hence, no human community exists or ever will exist, who on all subjects will agree in opinion.

14. This creates a necessity for human legislation and adjudication, to apply the great principle of moral law to all human affairs.

15. There are multitudes of human wants and necessities that cannot properly be met, except through the instrumentality of human governments.

Second. *This necessity will continue as long as human beings exist in this world.*

1. This is as certain as that the human body will always need sustenance, clothing, etc.

2. It is as certain as that the human soul will always need instruction, and that the means of instruction will not grow spontaneously, without expense or labor.

3 It is as certain as that men of all ages and circumstances will never possess equal degrees of information on all subjects.

4. If all men were perfectly holy and disposed to do right, the necessity of human governments would not be set aside, because this necessity is founded in the ignorance of mankind.

5. The decisions of legislators and judges must be authoritative, so as to settle questions of disagreement in opinion, bind and protect all parties.

6. The Bible represents human governments not only as existing, but as giving their authority and power to the support of the Church in its most prosperous state, or in the Millennium. It proves that human government will not be dispensed with when the world is holy:

Isa. 49:22, 23. 'Thus saith the Lord God, Behold, I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people: and they shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders. And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee with their faces toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord: for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me.'

Third. *Human Governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part of the moral government of God.*

1. Dan. 2:21. 'He changeth the times and the seasons: he removeth kings, and setteth up kings: he giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding.'

Dan. 4:17, 25, 32. 'This matter is by the decree of the watchers, and the demand by the word of the holy ones; to the intent that the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.' 'They shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field, and they shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and they shall wet thee with the dew of heaven, and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the Most high ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will.' 'And they shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field: they shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and seven times shall pass over thee, until thou know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will.'

Dan. 5:21. 'He was driven from the sons of men; and his heart was made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses: they fed him with grass like oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, till he knew that the Most High God ruleth in the kingdom of men, and that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will.'

Rom. 13:1-7. 'Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath but also for conscience sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.'

Titus 3:1. 'Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work.'

1 Peter 2:13, 14. 'Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well.'

These passages prove conclusively, that God establishes human governments, as parts of moral government.

2. It is a matter of fact, that God does exert moral influences through the instrumentality of human governments.

3. It is a matter of fact, that he often executes his law, punishes vice, and rewards virtue, through the instrumentality of human governments.

4. Under the Jewish Theocracy, where God was King, it was found indispensable to have the forms of the executive department of government.

Fourth. *Whose right and duty it is to govern.*

1. I have said that government is a necessity. Human beings are, under God, dependent on human government to promote their highest well-being.

2. It is his right and duty to govern, who is both able and willing, in the highest and most effectual manner, to secure and promote individual and public virtue and happiness.

3. Upon him all eyes are or ought to be turned, as one whose right and whose duty it is, to sustain to them the relation of ruler.

Fifth. *In what cases human legislation imposes moral obligation.*

1. Not when it requires what is inconsistent with moral law.

2. Not when it is arbitrary, or not founded in right reason.

3. But it always imposes moral obligation when it is in accordance with Moral law, or the law of nature.

Sixth. *It is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of Human Governments.*

1. Because human governments are founded in the necessities of Human beings.

2. As all men are in some way dependent upon them, it is the duty of every man to aid in their establishment and support.

3. As the great law of benevolence, or universal good-willing, demands the existence of human governments, all men are under a perpetual and unalterable moral obligation to aid in their establishment and support.

4. In popular or elective governments, every man having a right to vote, and every human being who has moral

influence, is bound to exert that influence, in the promotion of virtue and happiness. And as human governments are plainly indispensable to the highest good of man, they are bound to exert their influence to secure a legislation that is in accordance with the law of God.

5. The obligation of human beings to support and obey human governments, while they legislate upon the principles of the moral law is as unalterable as the moral law itself.

Seventh. *It is a ridiculous and absurd dream to suppose that Human Governments can ever be dispensed with in the present world.*

1. Because such a supposition is entirely inconsistent with the nature of human beings.

2. It is equally inconsistent with their relations and circumstances.

3. Because it assumes that the necessity of government is founded alone in Human depravity; whereas the foundation of this necessity is human ignorance, and human depravity is only an additional reason for the existence of human governments. The primary idea of law is to teach; hence law has a *precept*. It is authoritative, and therefore has a penalty.

4. Because it assumes that men would always agree in judgment, if their hearts were right, irrespective of their degrees of information.

5. Because it sets aside one of the plainest and most unequivocal doctrines of revelation.

Obj. I. The kingdom of God is represented in the Bible as subverting all other kingdoms.

Ans. This is true, and all that can be meant by this is, that the time shall come when God shall be regarded as the supreme and universal sovereign of the universe; when his law shall be regarded as universally obligatory; when all kings, legislators, and judges shall act as his servants, declaring, applying, and administering the great principle of his law to all the affairs of human beings. Thus God will be the supreme sovereign, and earthly rulers will be governors, kings, and judges under him, and acting by his authority, as revealed in the Bible.

Obj. II. It is objected that God only providentially establishes human governments, and that he does not approve of their selfish and wicked administration; that he only uses them providentially, as he does Satan for the promotion of his own designs.

Ans. 1. God nowhere commands mankind to obey Satan, but he does command them to obey magistrates and rulers.

Rom. 13:1. 'Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers: for there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.'

1 Pet. 2:13, 14. 'Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well.'

2. He nowhere recognizes Satan as his servant, sent and set by him to administer justice and execute wrath upon the wicked; but he does this in respect to human governments.

Rom. 13:2-6. 'Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid: for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the **MINISTER OF GOD**, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing.'

3. It is true indeed that God approves of nothing that is ungodly and selfish in human governments. Neither did he approve of what was ungodly and selfish in the Scribes and Pharisees; and yet Christ said to his disciples, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat. Therefore whatsoever things they command you, that observe and do; but go ye not after their works, for they say, and do not." Here the plain common sense principle is recognized, that we are to obey when the requirement is not inconsistent with the moral law, whatever may be the character or the motive of the ruler. We are always to obey heartily as unto the Lord, and not unto men, and render obedience to magistrates for the honor and glory of God, and as doing service to him.

Obj. III. It is objected that Christians should leave human governments to the management of the ungodly, and not be diverted from the work of saving souls to intermeddle with human governments.

Ans. 1. This is not being diverted from the work of saving souls. The promotion of public and private order

and happiness is one of the indispensable means of saving souls.

2. It is nonsense to admit that Christians are under an obligation to obey human government, and still have nothing to do with the choice of those who shall govern.

Obj. IV. It is objected that we are commanded not to avenge ourselves, that "Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord." It is said, that if I may not avenge or redress my own wrongs in my own person, I may not do it through the instrumentality of human government.

Ans. 1. It does not follow that because you may not take it upon you to redress your own wrongs by a summary and personal infliction of punishment upon the transgressor, that human governments may not punish them.

2. Because all *private* wrongs are a *public* injury; and irrespective of any particular regard to your personal interest, magistrates are bound to punish crime for the public good.

3. It does not follow, because that while God has expressly forbidden you to redress your own wrongs by administering personal and private chastisement, he has expressly recognized the right and made it the duty of the public magistrate to punish crimes.

Obj. V. It is objected that love is so much better than law as that where love reigns in the heart, law can be universally dispensed with.

Ans. 1. This supposes that if there is only love there need be no rule of duty.

2. This objection overlooks the fact that law is in all worlds the rule of duty, and that legal sanctions make up an indispensable part of that circle of motives that are suited to the nature, relations, and government of moral beings.

3. The law requires love; and nothing is law, either human or divine, that is inconsistent with universal benevolence. And to suppose that love is better than law, is to suppose that obedience to law sets aside the necessity of law.

Obj. VI. It is objected that Christians have something else to do besides meddle with politics.

Ans. 1. In a popular government politics are an indispensable part of religion. No man can possibly be benevolent or religious without concerning himself to a greater or less extent with the affairs of human government.

2. It is true that Christians have something else to do than to go with a party to do evil, or to meddle with politics in a selfish or ungodly manner. But they are

bound to meddle with politics in popular governments, for the same reason that they are bound to seek the universal good of all men.

Obj. VII. It is said that human governments are nowhere expressly authorized in the Bible.

Ans. 1. This is a mistake. Both their existence and lawfulness are as expressly recognized in the above quoted scriptures as they can be.

2. If God did not expressly authorize them, it would still be both the right and the duty of mankind to institute human governments, because they are plainly demanded by the necessities of human nature. It is a first truth, that whatever is essential to the highest good of moral beings in any world, they have a right and are bound to do. So far, therefore, are men from needing any express authority to establish human governments, that no possible prohibition could render their establishment unlawful. It has been shown, in these lectures on moral government, that moral law is a unit---that it is that rule of action which is in accordance with the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings---that whatever is in accordance with, and demanded by the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings, is obligatory on them. It is moral law, and no power in the universe can set it aside: Therefore, were the scriptures entirely silent on the subject of human governments, and on the subject of family government, as it actually is on a great many important subjects, this would be no objection to the lawfulness, and expediency; necessity, and duty of establishing human governments.

Obj. VIII. It is said that human governments are founded in and sustained by force, and that this is inconsistent with the spirit of the gospel.

Ans. 1. There cannot be a difference between the *spirit* of the Old and New Testaments, or between the *spirit* of the law and the gospel, unless God has changed, and unless Christ has undertaken to make void the law, through faith, which cannot be.

Rom. 3:31. 'Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.'

2. Just human governments, and such governments only are contended for, will not exercise force unless it is demanded to promote the highest public good. If it be necessary to this end, it can never be wrong. Nay, it must be the duty of human governments to inflict penalties, when their infliction is demanded by the public interest.

Obj. IX. It is said that there should be no laws with penalties.

Ans. This is the same as to say there should be no law at all for that is no law which has no penalty, but only advice.

Obj. X. It is said that church government is sufficient to meet the necessities of the world, without secular or state governments.

Ans. 1. What! Church governments regulate commerce, make internal improvements, and undertake to manage all the business affairs of the world!

2. Church government was never established for any such end but simply to regulate the spiritual, in distinction from the secular concerns of men---to try offenders and inflict spiritual chastisement and never to perplex and embarrass itself with managing the business and commercial operations of the world.

Obj. XI. It is said that were all the world holy, legal penalties would not be needed.

Ans. Were all men perfectly holy, the *execution* of penalties would not be needed; but still, if there were law, there would be penalties; and it would be both the right and the duty of magistrates to inflict them, should their execution be called for.

Obj. XII. It is asserted that family government is the only form of government approved of God.

Ans. This is a ridiculous assertion:

1. Because God as expressly commands obedience to magistrates as to parents.

2. He makes it as absolutely the duty of magistrates to punish crime, as of parents to punish their own disobedient children.

3. The right of family government is not formed in the arbitrary will of God, but in the necessities of human beings; so that family government would be both allowable and obligatory, had God said nothing about it.

4. So, the right of human government has not its foundation in the arbitrary will of God, but in the necessities of human beings. 'The larger the community the more absolute the necessity of government. If, in the small circle of the family, laws and penalties are needed, how much more in the larger communities of states and nations. Now, neither the ruler of a family, nor of any other form of human government, has a right to legislate arbitrarily, or enact, or enforce any other laws, than those that are in accordance with the nature, relations, and circumstances of human beings. Nothing can be law in heaven--- nothing can be law on earth--- nothing can be obligatory on moral beings, but that which is founded in the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings. But human beings are

bound to establish family governments, state governments, national governments, and, in short, whatever government may be requisite for the universal instruction, government, virtue, and happiness of the world.

5. All the reasons, therefore, for family government, hold equally in favor of state and national governments.

6. There are vastly higher and weightier reasons for governments over states and nations, than in the small communities of families.

7. Therefore, neither family nor state governments need the express sanction of God, to render them obligatory; for both the right and duty of establishing and maintaining these governments would remain, had the Bible been entirely silent on the subject. But on this, as on many other subjects, God has spoken and declared, what is the common and universal law, plainly recognizing both the right and duty of family and human governments.

8. Christians, therefore, have something else to do, than to confound the right of government with the abuse of this right by the ungodly. Instead of destroying human governments, Christians are bound to reform them.

9. To attempt to destroy, instead of reform human governments, is the same in principle as is often plead by those who are attempting to destroy, rather than reform the Church. There are those, who, disgusted with the abuses of Christianity practiced in the Church, seem bent on destroying the Church altogether, as the means of saving the world. But what mad policy is this!

10. It is admitted that selfish men need and must have the restraints of law; but that Christians should have no part in restraining them by law. But suppose the wicked should agree among themselves to have no law, and therefore should not attempt to restrain themselves nor each other by law; would it be neither the right nor the duty of Christians to attempt their restraint, through the influence of wholesome government?

11. It is strange that selfish men should need the restraints of law, and yet that Christians have no right to meet this necessity, by supporting governments that will restrain them. What is this but admitting, that the world really needs the restraints of governments---that the highest good of the universe demands their existence; and yet, that it is wicked for Christians to seek the highest good of the world, by meeting this necessity in the establishment and support of Human governments! It is right and best that there should be law. It is necessary that there should be. Therefore, universal benevolence demands it; but it is wicked in Christians, to have anything to do with it! This is singular logic.

LECTURE XLII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.---No. 21.

HUMAN GOVERNMENTS ARE A PART OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.---No.2.

In this lecture I shall show:

FIRST. The reasons why God has made no particular form of Church or State Governments universally obligatory.

SECOND. The particular forms of Church and State Government must and will depend upon the intelligence and virtue of the people.

THIRD. The true basis on which the right of Human Legislation rests.

FOURTH. That form of Government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet the necessities of the people.

FIFTH. Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue and intelligence, or the vice and ignorance of the people demand them.

SIXTH. In what cases Human Legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null and void.

SEVENTH. In what cases we are bound to disobey Human Governments.

First. *The reasons why God has made no form of Church or State Government universally obligatory.*

1. That God has nowhere in the Bible given directions in regard to any particular form of church or secular government, is a matter of fact.

2. That he did not consider the then existing forms, either of church or state government, as of perpetual obligation, is also certain.

3. He did not give directions in regard to particular forms of government, either church or state:

(1.) Because no such directions could be given, without producing great revolutions and governmental opposition to Christianity. The governments of the world are and always have been exceedingly various in form. To attempt, therefore, to insist upon any particular form, as being universally obligatory, would be calling out great national opposition to religion.

(2.) Because, that no particular form, of church or state government, either now is, or ever has been, suited to all degrees of intelligence, and states of society.

(3.) Because the forms of both church and state governments, need to be changed, with any great elevations or depressions of society in regard to their intelligence and virtue.

Second. The particular forms of Church and State Government, must and will depend upon the virtue and intelligence of the people.

1. Democracy is self-government, and can never be safe or useful, only so far as there is sufficient intelligence and virtue in the community to impose, by mutual consent, salutary self-restraints, and to enforce by the power of public sentiment, and by the fear and love of God, the practice of those virtues which are indispensable to the highest good of any community.

2. Republics are another and less perfect form of self-government.

3. When there are not sufficient intelligence and virtue among the people, to legislate in accordance with the highest good of the state or nation, then both democracies and republics are improper and impracticable, as forms of government.

4. When there is too little intelligence and virtue in the mass of the people, to legislate on correct principles, monarchies are better calculated to restrain vice and promote virtue.

5. In the worst states of society, despotisms, either civil or military, are the only proper and efficient forms of government.

6. When virtue and intelligence are nearly universal, democratic forms of government are well suited to promote the public good.

7. In such a state of society, democracy is greatly conducive to the general diffusion of knowledge on governmental subjects.

8. Although in some respects less convenient and more expensive, yet in a suitable state of society, a democracy is in many respects the most desirable form, either of church or state government:

(1.) It is conducive, as has been already said, to general intelligence.

(2.) Under a democracy, the people are more generally acquainted with the laws.

(3.) They are more interested in them.

(4.) This form of government creates a more general feeling of individual responsibility.

(5.) Governmental questions are more apt to be thoroughly discussed and understood before they are adopted.

(6.) As the diffusion of knowledge is favorable to individual and public virtue, democracy is highly conducive to virtue and happiness.

9. God has always providentially given to mankind those forms of government that were suited to the degrees of virtue and intelligence among them.

10. If they have been extremely ignorant and vicious, he has restrained them by the iron rod of human despotism.

11. If more intelligent and virtuous, he has given them the milder forms of limited monarchies.

12. If still more intelligent and virtuous, he has given them still more liberty, and providentially established republics for their government.

13. Whenever the general state of intelligence has permitted it, he has put them to the test of self government and self-restraint, by establishing democracies.

14. If the world ever becomes perfectly virtuous both church and state governments will be proportionally modified, and employed in expounding and applying the great principles of moral law, to the spiritual and secular concerns of men.

15. The above principles are equally applicable to church and state governments. Episcopacy is well suited to a state of general ignorance among the people. Presbyterianism, or Church Republicanism is better suited to a more advanced state of intelligence and the prevalence of Christian principle. Which Congregationalism, or spiritual Democracy, is best suited and only suited to a state of general intelligence, and the prevalence of Christian principle.

16. God's providence has always modified both church and state governments, so as to suit the intelligence and virtue of the people. As churches and nations rise and fall in the scale of virtue and intelligence, these various forms of government naturally and necessarily give place to each other. So that ecclesiastical and state despotism, or liberty, depends naturally, providentially, and necessarily upon the virtue and intelligence of the people.

17. God is infinitely benevolent, and from time to time, gives the people as much liberty as they can bear.

Third. The true basis on which the right of Human Legislation rests.

Under this head, I need only to repeat what has already been said in substance in these lectures, that the right of human legislation is founded in the necessities of mankind. The nature and ignorance of mankind lie at the foundation of this necessity. Their wickedness, the multiplicity and variety of their wants, are additional reasons, demanding the existence of human governments. Let it be understood, then, that the

foundation of the right of human governments lies not in the arbitrary will of God; but in the nature, relations, and circumstances of human beings.

Fourth. *That form of Government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet the necessities of the people.*

1. This follows as a self-evident truth, from the consideration, that it is necessity alone that creates the right of human government. To meet these necessities, is the object of government; and that government is obligatory and best, which is demanded by the circumstances, intelligence, and morals of the people.

2. Consequently, in certain states of society, it would be a Christian's duty to pray for and sustain even a military despotism; in a certain other state of society, to pray for and sustain a monarchy. And in other states, to pray for and sustain a republic; and in a still more advanced stage of virtue and intelligence, to pray for and sustain a democracy; if indeed a democracy is the most wholesome form of self-government, which may admit a doubt.

Fifth. *Revolutions become necessarily and obligatory, when the virtue and intelligence or the vice and ignorance of the people demand them.*

1. This is a thing of course. When one form of government fails to meet any longer the necessities of the people, it is the duty of the people to revolutionize.

2. In such cases, it is in vain to oppose revolution; for in some way the benevolence of God will bring it about. Upon this principle alone, can what is generally termed the American Revolution be justified. The intelligence and virtue of our Puritan fore-fathers rendered a monarchy an unnecessary burden, and a republican firm of government both appropriate and necessary. And God always allows his children as much liberty as they are prepared to enjoy.

3. The stability of our republican institutions must depend upon the progress of general intelligence and virtue. If in these respects the nation falls, if general intelligence, public and private virtue sink to that point below which self control becomes impossible, we must fall back into monarchy, limited or absolute; or into a civil or military despotism; just according to the national standard of intelligence and virtue. This is just as certain as that God governs the world, or that causes produce their effects.

4. Therefore, it is the maddest conceivable policy, for Christians to attempt to uproot human governments, while they ought to be engaged in sustaining them, upon the great principles of the moral law. It is certainly stark nonsense, if not abominable wickedness, to

overlook, either in theory or practice, these plain, common sense, and universal truths.

Sixth. *In what cases Human Legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null and void.*

1. Human legislation is valid, when called for by the necessities---that is---by the nature, relations and circumstances of the people.

2. Just that kind and degree of human legislation which are demanded by the necessities of the people are obligatory.

3. Human legislation is utterly null and void in all other cases whatsoever; and I may add, that divine legislation would be equally null and void; unless demanded by the nature, relations, and necessities of human beings. Consequently human beings can never legislate in opposition to the moral law. Whatever is inconsistent with supreme love to God and equal love to our neighbor, can by no possibility be obligatory.

Seventh. *In what cases we are bound to disobey Human Governments.*

1. We may yield obedience, when the thing required does not involve a violation of moral obligation.

2. We are bound to yield obedience, when legislation is in accordance with the law of nature.

3. We are bound to obey when the thing required has no moral character in itself; upon the principle, that obedience, in this case, is a less evil than revolution or misrule. But---

4. We are bound in all cases to disobey, when human legislation contravenes moral law, or invades the rights of conscience.

**VARIOUS CLASSES OF TRUTHS,
AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE HUMAN MIND
ATTAINS TO A KNOWLEDGE OF THEM.**

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 1847 – LECTURE XLV.

Before we proceed further in these investigations, I must call your attention to a subject that properly belongs at the beginning of this course of study, and which will be found there, should these lectures ever be published in their proper order: I allude to the various classes of truths to come under consideration in this course of instruction, with the manner in which we arrive at a knowledge or belief of them. All human investigations proceed upon the assumption of the existence and validity of our faculties, and that their unequivocal testimony may be relied upon. To deny this, is to set aside at once the possibility of knowledge or rational belief, and to give up the mind to universal skepticism. The classes of truths to which we shall be called upon to attend in our investigations, may be divided with sufficient accuracy for our purpose, into truths that need no proof, and truths that need proof. The human mind is so constituted that by virtue of its own laws, it necessarily perceives, recognizes, or knows some truths without testimony from without. It takes direct cognizance of them, and can not but do so.

The first class, that is, truths that need no proof, may be subdivided into truths of the pure reason, and truths of sensation. These two classes are in some sense self-evident, but not in the same sense. Truths of the pure reason are intuitions of that faculty, and truths of sensation are intuitions of the senses. I shall therefore speak of self-evident truths of reason, and self-evident truths of sensation. I must assume that you possess some knowledge of psychology, and take it for granted that you understand the difference between the intuitions of reason, and the intuitions of sense.

By self-evident truths of reason, then, I mean that class of truths that are directly intuited and affirmed by that faculty, in the light of their own evidence, and by virtue of its own laws, whenever they are so stated that the terms of the proposition in which they are conveyed are understood. They are not arrived at by reasoning, or by evidence of any kind except what they have in themselves. As soon as the terms of the propositions in which they are stated, are understood, the reason instantly and positively affirms their truth. It is unnecessary and preposterous to attempt any other proof of this class of truths than to frame a perspicuous statement of them. Nay, it is positively injurious, because absurd, to attempt to prove--in the common

acceptation of the term prove--a self-evident truth of reason. All attempts to prove such truths by reasoning, involve an absurdity, and are as much a work of supererogation, as it would be to attempt to prove that you see an object with your eyes fully open and set upon it.

The mathematical axioms belong to this class.

The self-evident truths of reason are truths of certain knowledge. When once so stated, or in any way presented to the mind as to be understood, the mind does not merely believe them, it knows them to be absolutely true. That is, it perceives them to be absolute truths, and knows that it is impossible that they should not be true. Although this class of truths are never arrived at by reasoning, yet much use is made of them in reasoning, since the major premise of a syllogism is often a self-evident truth of reason.

This class of truths are affirmed by a faculty entirely distinct from the understanding, or that power that gains all its knowledges from sense. It takes cognizance of a class of truths that from their nature, forever lie concealed from the senses, and consequently from the understanding. Sensation can never give us the abstract truths of mathematics. It can never give us the absolute, or the infinite. It can not give moral law, or law at all. Sensation can give facts, but not laws and principles.

That God, and space, and duration, are infinite; that all God's attributes must be infinite, are self-evident truths of reason; that is, they are truths of a priori, affirmation and assumption. They are never arrived at by reasoning, or by induction, and never can be. The mind only knows them by virtue of its own laws, and directly assumes and intuits them, whenever they are suggested. The eye of reason sees them as distinctly as the mind sees objects of vision presented to the fleshly organ of vision. The mind is so constructed that it sees some things with the natural fleshly eye, and some truths it sees directly with its own eye without the use of an eye of flesh. All the self-evident truths of reason belong to this class; that is, they are truths which the mind sees and knows, and does not merely believe. In reasoning, the bare statement of a self-evident truth is enough, provided, as has been said, that it is so perspicuously stated that the terms of the proposition are understood. It should be borne in mind, in reasoning, that all men have minds, and that the laws of knowledge are physical, and, of course, fixed, and common to all men. The conditions of knowledge are in all men the same. We are therefore always to assume that self-evident truths can not but be known, so soon as they are stated with such perspicuity as that the

terms in which they are expressed are understood. Our future inquiries will present many illustrations of the truth of these remarks.

It should be also remarked that universality is an attribute of the self-evident truths of reason. That is, they are universal in the sense,

(1.) That all men affirm them to be true when they understand them; and,

(2.) They all affirm them to be true in the same way; that is, by direct intuition, or they perceive them in their own light, and not through the medium of reasoning, demonstration, or sense; and,

(3.) Self-evident truths of reason are true without exception, and in this sense also universal.

(4.) Necessity is also an attribute of self-evident truths. That is, they are necessarily true, and cannot but be so regarded. And when the conditions which have been named are fulfilled, they can not but be so known to every moral agent.

Self-evident truths of reason may be again divided into truths merely self-evident, and first-truths of reason. This class of truths possess all the characteristics of self-evident truths, to wit: they are universal truths; they are necessary truths; they are truths of direct intuition; they are truths of certain knowledge.

Their peculiarity is this: they are truths that are necessarily and universally known by moral agents. That is, they are not distinguished from mere self-evident truths of reason, except by the fact that from the laws of moral agency they are known universally, and all moral agents do and must possess certain knowledge of them.

They are truths of necessary and universal assumption. Whether they are, at all times, or at any time, directly thought of, or made the particular object of the mind's attention or not, they are nevertheless at all times assumed by a law of universal necessity. Suppose, for example, that the law of causality should not be, at all times or at any time, a subject of distinct thought and attention. Suppose that the proposition in words, should never be in the mind, "that every event must have a cause." Still the truth is there, in the form of absolute knowledge, a necessary assumption, an a priori affirmation, and the mind has so firm a hold of it as to be utterly unable to overlook, or forget, or practically deny it. Every mind has it as a certain knowledge, long before it can understand the language in which it is expressed, and no statement or evidence whatever can give the mind any firmer conviction of its truth, than it had from necessity at first. This is true of all the truths of this

class. They are always and necessarily assumed by all moral agents, whether distinctly thought of or not. And for the most part this class of truths are assumed without being frequently, or at least, without being generally the object of thought or direct attention. The mind assumes them without a direct consciousness of the assumption.

For example, we act every moment, and judge, and reason, and believe, upon the assumption that every event must have a cause, and yet we are not conscious of thinking of this truth, nor that we assume it until something calls the attention to it. First-truths of reason, then, let it be distinctly remembered, are always and necessarily assumed, though they may be seldom thought of. They are universally known before the words are understood by which they may be expressed, and although they may never be expressed in a formal proposition, yet the mind has as certain a knowledge of them as it has of its own existence.

But it is proper to inquire whether there are any conditions of this assumption, and if so, what they are? Does the intelligence make this assumption upon certain conditions, or independent of all or any conditions? The true answer to this inquiry is, that the mind makes the assumption only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. These conditions being fulfilled, the intelligence instantly and necessarily makes the assumption by a law of its own nature, and makes it whether the assumption be a distinct object of consciousness or not.

The only condition of this assumption that needs to be mentioned, is the perception of that by the mind to which the first truth sustains the relation of a logical antecedent or of a logical condition. For example, to develop and necessitate the assumption that every event must have a cause, the mind only needs to perceive or to have the conception of an event, whereupon the assumption in question instantly follows by a law of the intelligence. This assumption is not a logical deduction from any premise whatever, but upon the perception of an event, or upon the mind's having the idea or notion of an event, the intelligence irresistably, by virtue of its own laws, assumes the first-truth of causality as the logical and necessary condition of the event: that is, it assumes that an event and every event must have a cause.

The condition upon which the first-truths of reason are assumed or developed, is called the chronological condition of their development, because it is prior in time and in the order of nature to their development. The mind perceives an event. It thereupon assumes the first-

truth of causality. It perceives body, and thereupon assumes the first-truth. space is, and must be. It perceives succession, and necessarily assumes that time is, and must be. These first-truths, let it be repeated, are not assumed in the form of a proposition, thought of or expressed in words, nor is the mind at the time always, or perhaps ever, at first, distinctly conscious of the assumption, yet the truth is from that moment within the mind's inalienable possession, and must forever after be recognized in all the practical judgments of the mind.

Thus, it should be distinctly said, do the first-truths of reason lie so deep in the mind as perhaps seldom to appear directly on the field of conscious thought, and yet so absolutely does the mind know them, that it can no more forget, or overlook, or practically deny them, than it can forget, or overlook, or in practice deny its own existence.

I have said that all reasoning proceeds upon the assumption of these truths. It must do so of necessity. It is preposterous to attempt to prove first-truths to a moral agent: for if a moral agent, he must absolutely know them already, and if he did not, in no possible way could he be put in possession of them except by presenting to his perception the chronological condition of their development, and in no case could any thing else be needed, for upon the occurrence of this perception, the assumption or development follows by a law of absolute and universal necessity. And until these truths are actually developed, no being can be a moral agent.

There is no reasoning with one who calls in question the first-truths of reason, and demands proof of them. All reasoning must, from the nature of mind and the laws of reasoning, assume the first-truths of reason as certain, and admitted, and as the a priori condition of all logical deductions and demonstrations. Some one of these must be assumed as true, directly or indirectly, in every syllogism and in every demonstration.

In all our future investigations in the line of truth we shall pursue, we shall have abundant occasions for the application and illustration of what has now been said of first-truths of reason. If, at any stage of our progress, we light upon a truth of this class, let it be borne in mind that the nature of the truth is the preclusion, or as lawyers would express it, the estoppel of all controversy.

To deny the reality of this class of truths, is to deny the validity of our most perfect knowledge and of course it is a denial of the validity of our faculties. The only question to be settled in respect to this class of truths, is, does the truth in question belong to this class? There are many of this class that have not been generally

recognized as belonging to it. Of this we shall have abundant instances fall in our way as we proceed in our investigations. There are many truths which men, all sane men, certainly know, of which they not only seldom think, but which, in theory, they strenuously deny.

Before I dismiss this branch of our subject, I will mention some of the many truths that undeniably belong to this class, leaving others to be mentioned as we proceed and fall in with them in future investigations.

I have already noticed three of this class, to wit; the truth of causality--the existence of space and of time. That the whole of any thing is equal to all its parts, is also a truth of this class, universally and necessarily known and assumed by every moral agent. Also, that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time.

A third class of self-evident truths are particular truths of reason. The reason directly intuits and affirms them. They are truths of certain knowledge, but have not the attributes of universality or infinity. To this class belong the truths of our own existence, of personal identity, and individuality. These are not truths of sensation, nor are they first or self-evident truths according to the common use of those terms. Yet they are truths of rational intuition, and are seen to be true in the light of their own evidence, and as such are given to us as undoubtable verities by consciousness.

All the truths that come within the pale of our own experience, that is, all our mental exercises and states are truths self-evident to us. We need no proof of them. Whether they are phenomena or states of the Intellect, of the Will, or of the Sensibility. When thus spoken of, in mass, they can not be called self-evident truths, except in the sense that to ourselves they appear on the field of consciousness as facts or realities, and we know or affirm them with undoubting certainty.

Truths of sensation I have said, are in a certain sense, self-evident truths. That is, they are facts of which the mind has direct knowledge through the medium of the senses. In speaking of truths of sensation as in some sense self-evident, I mean of course truths or facts of our own senses, or those revealed directly to us by our own senses. I know it is not common to speak of this class of truths as self-evident; and they are not so in the sense in which simple rational intuitions are. Yet they are facts or truths which need no proof to establish them to us. The fact that I hold this pen in my hand is as really self-evident to me, as that three and two are five. I as really know or perceive the one as the other, and neither the one nor the other needs any proof. It is not my design to exhaust this subject, nor to enter upon nice and highly metaphysical distinctions, but only to give

hints and make suggestions that will call your attention to the subject, and meet our necessities during our present course of study, leaving it to your convenience to enter upon a more critical analysis of this subject.

Of truths that require proof, the first class to which I must call attention, is the truths of demonstration. This class of truths admit of so high a degree of proof, that when the demonstration is complete, the intelligence affirms that it is impossible that they should not be true. This class when truly demonstrated, are known to be true with no less certainty than self-evident truths; but the mind arrives not at the perception and knowledge of them in the same way. That class is arrived at universally, directly and a priori, that is, by direct intuition without reasoning. This class is arrived at universally by reasoning. The former are obtained without any logical processes, while this last class is always and necessarily obtained as a result of a logical process. We often get these truths by a process strictly logical without being at all aware of the way in which we came to be possessed of them. This class, then, unlike the other, are not to be communicated and established without reasoning, but by reasoning. In this class of truths the mind from its own laws will not rest, unless they be demonstrated. They admit of demonstration, and from their nature and the nature of the intelligence, they must be demonstrated before they can be known and rested in as certain knowledge. Many of them may be received in the sense of being believed without an absolute demonstration. But the mind cannot properly be said to know them until it has gone through with the demonstration, and then it can not but know them.

To possess the mind of a first-truth of reason you need only to present the chronological condition of its development. To reveal a self-evident truth of reason, you need only to state it in terms of sufficient perspicuity. But to prove a truth belonging to the class now under consideration you must fulfill the logical conditions of the intellect's affirming it. That is, you must demonstrate it.

The next class to be considered are truths of revelation. I mean truths revealed by Divine Inspiration. All truths are in some way revealed to the mind, but not all by the Inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Some of this class are known and some only believed by the mind. That is, some of these truths are objects or truths of knowledge or of intuition, when brought by the Holy Spirit within the field of vision or of intuition. Others of them are only truths of faith or truths to be believed. The divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ is a truth of revelation of the first class, that is, a truth of intuition or of certain knowledge when revealed to the mind by the Holy Spirit. This truth

when thus revealed, the pure reason directly intuits. It knows that Jesus is the true God, and eternal life by the same law by which it knows the first truths of reason. The only account the soul can give of this truth is, that it knows it to be true. It sees or perceives it to be true. But this perception or intuition is conditioned upon the revelation of the Holy Spirit. "He shall take of mine," said Jesus, "and show it unto you." More on this topic in its proper place. The facts and truths connected with the humanity of the Lord Jesus are of the second class of truths of revelation, that is, they are only truths of belief or of faith, as distinct from truths of the pure reason or of intuition.

This class of truths from their nature are not susceptible of intuition. They may be so revealed that the soul will have no doubt of them, and hardly distinguish them from truths of certain knowledge, nevertheless they are only believed and not certainly known as truths of intuition are.

The Bible is not of itself, strictly and properly a revelation to man. It is, properly speaking, rather a history of revelations formerly made to certain men. To be a revelation to us, its truths must be brought by the Holy Spirit within the field of spiritual vision. This is, past question, the condition of our either knowing or properly believing the truths of revelation. "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Spirit." "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me, draw him." "They shall all be taught of God." "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." "He that is spiritual, [has the Spirit,] judgeth all things."

But I must not in this place dwell longer upon this subject. I would only add now that those who call in question the divinity of Christ exhibit conclusive evidence that Christ has never been revealed to them by the Holy Spirit. Those who hold his divinity as a theory or opinion, are not at all benefitted by it, for Christ is not savingly known to any except by the revelation of the Holy Spirit.

To the classes of truths already considered might be added several others, such as Probable Truths, Possible Truths, &c. But I have carried this discussion far enough to answer the purposes of this course of instruction, and I trust far enough to impress your minds with a sense of the importance of attending to the classifying of truths and of ascertaining the particular class to which a truth belongs as the condition of successfully attempting to gain the possession of it yourself, or of possessing the minds of others with it. As

religious teachers you can not be too deeply impressed with the importance of attending to this classification. I am fully convinced that much of the inefficiency of religious teachers is owing to the fact that they do not sufficiently study and comply with the laws of knowledge and belief to carry conviction to the minds of their hearers. They seem not to have considered different classes of truths, and how the mind comes to possess a knowledge or belief of them. Consequently they either spend time in worse than useless efforts to prove first or self-evident truths, or expect truths susceptible of demonstration to be received and rested in, without such demonstration. They often make little or no distinction between the different classes of truths, and seldom or never call the attention of their hearers to this distinction. Consequently they confuse and often confound their hearers by gross violations of all the laws of logic, knowledge, and belief. I have often been pained and even agonized at the faultiness of religious teachers in this respect. Study to show yourself approved, workmen that need not to be ashamed, and able to commend yourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.

HOW WE ATTAIN TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN TRUTHS.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 1851 – LECTURE I.

ALL teaching and reasoning take certain truths as granted. That the unequivocal, *à priori* affirmations of the reason are valid, for all the truths and principles thus affirmed, must be assumed and admitted, or every attempt to construct a *science*, of any kind, or to attain to certain knowledge upon any subject, is vain and even preposterous. As I must commence my lectures on moral government by laying down certain moral postulates, or axioms, which are, *à priori*, affirmed by the reason, and therefore self-evident to all men, when so stated as to be understood, I will spend a few moments in stating certain facts belonging more appropriately to the department of psychology. Theology is so related to psychology, that the successful study of the former without a knowledge of the latter, is impossible. Every theological system, and every theological opinion, assumes something as true in psychology. Theology is, to a great extent, the science of mind in its relations to moral law. God is a mind or spirit: all moral agents are in his image. Theology is the doctrine of God, comprehending his existence, attributes, relations, character, works, word, government providential and moral, and, of course, it must embrace

the facts of human nature, and the science of moral agency. All theologians do and must assume the truth of some system of psychology and mental philosophy, and those who exclaim most loudly against metaphysics, no less than others.

There is a distinction between the mind's knowing a truth, and knowing that it knows it. Hence I begin by defining self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is the mind's recognition of itself. It is the noticing of, or act of knowing itself. Its existence, attributes, acts, and states, with the attributes of liberty or necessity which characterize those acts and states. Of this, I shall frequently speak hereafter.

THE REVELATIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Self-consciousness reveals to us three primary faculties of mind, which we call *intellect*, *sensibility*, and *will*. The intellect is the faculty of knowledge; the sensibility is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling; the will is the *executive* faculty, or the faculty of doing or acting. All thinking, perceiving, intuiting, reasoning, opining, forming notions or ideas, belong to the intellect.

Consciousness reveals the various functions of the intellect, and also of the sensibility and will. In this place, we shall attend only to the functions of the intellect, as our present business is to ascertain the methods by which the intellect arrives at its knowledges, which are given to us in self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is, itself, of course, one of the functions of the intellect; and here it is in place to say, that a revelation in consciousness is *science*, or *knowledge*. What consciousness gives us we know. Its testimony is infallible and conclusive, upon all subjects upon which it testifies.

Among other functions of the intellect, which I need not name, self-consciousness reveals the three-fold, fundamental distinction of the *sense*, the *reason*, and the *understanding*.

OF THE SENSE.

The sense is the power that perceives sensation and brings it within the field of consciousness. Sensation is an impression made upon the sensibility by some object without or some thought within the mind. The sense takes up, or perceives the sensation, and this perceived sensation is revealed in consciousness. If the sensation is from some object without the mind, as sound or colour, the perception of it belongs to the outer sense. If from some thought, or mental exercise, the perception is of the inner sense. I have said that the testimony of consciousness is conclusive, for all the facts given by its unequivocal testimony. We neither need, nor can we

have, any higher evidence of the existence of a sensation, than is given by consciousness.

Our first impressions, thoughts, and knowledges, are derived from sense. But knowledge derived purely from this source would, of necessity, be very limited.

OF THE REASON.

Self-consciousness also reveals to us the reason or the *à priori* function of the intellect. The reason is that function of the intellect which immediately beholds or intuits a class of truths which, from their nature, are not cognizable either by the understanding or the sense. Such, for example, as the mathematical, philosophical, and moral axioms, and postulates. The reason gives *laws* and *first principles*. It gives the *abstract*, the *necessary*, the *absolute*, the *infinite*. It gives all its affirmations by a direct beholding or intuition, and not by induction or reasoning. The classes of truths given by this function of the intellect are self-evident. That is, the reason intuits, or directly beholds them, as the faculty of sense intuits, or directly beholds, a sensation. Sense gives to consciousness the direct vision of sensation, and therefore the existence of the sensation is certainly known to us. The reason gives to consciousness the direct vision of the class of truths of which it takes cognizance; and of the existence and validity of these truths we can no more doubt, than of the existence of our sensations.

Between knowledge derived from sense and from reason there is a difference: in one case, consciousness gives us the *sensation*: it may be questioned whether the perceptions of the sense are a direct beholding of the object of the sensation, and consequently whether the object really exists, and is the real archetype of the sensation. That the sensation exists we are certain, but whether that exists which we suppose to be the object and the cause of the sensation, admits of doubt. The question is, does the sense immediately intuit or behold the object of the sensation. The fact that the report of sense cannot always be relied upon, seems to show that the perception of sense is not an immediate beholding of the object of the sensation; sensation exists, this we know, that it has a cause we know; but that we rightly know the cause or object of the sensation, we may not know.

But in regard to the intuitions of the reason, this faculty directly beholds the truths which it affirms. These truths are the objects of its intuitions. They are not received at second hand. They are not inferences nor inductions, they are not opinions, nor conjectures, nor beliefs, but they are direct knowings. The truths given by this faculty are so directly seen and known, that to doubt

them is impossible. The reason, by virtue of its own laws, beholds them with open face, in the light of their own evidence.

OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

The understanding is that function of the intellect that takes up, classifies and arranges the objects and truths of sensation, under a law of classification and arrangement given by the reason, and thus forms notions and opinions, and theories. The notions, opinions, and theories of the understanding, may be erroneous, but there can be no error in the *à priori* intuitions of the reason. The knowledges of the understanding are so often the result of induction or reasoning, and fall so entirely short of a direct beholding, that they are often knowledges only in a modified and restricted sense.

Of the imagination, and the memory, &c., I need not speak in this place.

What has been said has, I trust, prepared the way for saying that the truths of theology arrange themselves under two heads.

I. *Truths which need proof.*

II. *Truths which need no proof.*

I. *Truths which need proof.*

First. Of this class it may be said, in general, that to it belong all truths which are not directly intuited by some function of the intellect in the light of their own evidence.

Every truth that must be arrived at by reasoning or induction, every truth that is attained to by other testimony than that of direct beholding, perceiving, intuiting, or cognizing, is a truth belonging to the class that needs proof.

Second. Truths of demonstration belong to the class that needs proof. When truths of demonstration are truly demonstrated by any mind, it certainly knows them to be true, and affirms that the contrary cannot possibly be true. To possess the mind of others with those truths, we must lead them through the process of demonstration. When we have done so, they cannot but see the truth demonstrated. The human mind will not ordinarily receive, and rest in, a truth of demonstration, until it has demonstrated it. This it often does without recognizing the process of demonstration. The laws of knowledge are physical. The laws of logic are inherent in every mind; but in various states of development in different minds. If a truth which needs demonstration, and which is capable of demonstration, is barely announced, and not demonstrated, the mind feels a dissatisfaction, and does not rest short of the demonstration of which it feels the necessity. It is

therefore of little use to dogmatize, when we ought to reason, demonstrate, and explain. In all cases of truths, not self-evident, or of truths needing proof, religious teachers should understand and comply with the logical conditions of knowledge and rational belief; they tempt God when they merely dogmatize, where they ought to reason, and explain, and prove, throwing the responsibility of producing conviction and faith upon the sovereignty of God. God convinces and produces faith, not by the overthrow of, but in accordance with, the fixed laws of mind. It is therefore absurd and ridiculous to dogmatize and assert, when explanation, illustration, and proof are possible, and demanded by the laws of the intellect. To do this, and then leave it with God to make the people understand and believe, may be at present convenient for us, but if it be not death to our auditors, no thanks are due to us. We are bound to inquire to what class a truth belongs, whether it be a truth which, from its nature and the laws of mind, needs to be illustrated, or proved. If it does, we have no right merely to assert it, when it has not been proved. Let us comply with the necessary conditions of a rational conviction, and then leave the event with God.

To the class of truths that need proof belong those of *divine revelation*.

All truths known to man are divinely revealed to him in some sense, but I here speak of truths revealed to man by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The Bible announces many self-evident truths, and many truths of demonstration. These may, or might be known, at least many of them, irrespective of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But the class of truths of which I here speak, rest wholly upon the testimony of God, and are truths of pure inspiration. Some of these truths are above reason, in the sense that the reason can, *à priori*, neither affirm nor deny them.

When it is ascertained that God has asserted them, the mind needs no other evidence of their truth, because by a necessary law of the intellect, all men affirm the veracity of God. But for this necessary law of the intellect, men could not rest upon the simple testimony of God, but would ask for evidence that God is to be believed. But such is the nature of mind, as constituted by the Creator, that no moral agent needs proof that God's testimony ought to be received. Let it be once settled that God has declared a fact, or a truth, and this is, with every moral agent, all the evidence he needs. The reason, from its own laws, affirms the perfect veracity of God, and although the truth announced may be such that the reason, *à priori*, can neither affirm, or deny it, yet when asserted by God, the

reason irresistibly affirms that God's testimony ought to be received.

These truths need proof in the sense that it needs to be shown that they were given by a divine inspiration. This fact demonstrated, the truths themselves need only to be understood, and the mind necessarily affirms its obligation to believe them.

Under this head I might notice the probable or possible truths; that is, those that are supported by such evidence as only shows them to be probable or possible, but I forbear.

My present object more particularly is to notice--

II. *Truths which need no proof.*

These are *à priori* truths of reason, and truths of sense; that is, they are truths that need no proof, because they are directly intuited or beheld by one of these faculties.

The *à priori* truths of reason may be classed under the heads of *first truths: self-evident truths which are necessary and universal: and self-evident truths not necessary and universal.*

1. First truths have the following attributes.

(1.) They are *absolute* or *necessary truths*, in the sense that the reason affirms that they must be true. Every event must have an adequate cause. Space must be. It is impossible that it should not be, whether any thing else were or not. Time must be, whether there were any events to succeed each other in time or not. Thus necessity is an attribute of this class.

(2.) *Universality* is an attribute of a first truth. That is, to truths of this class there can be no exception. Every event must have a cause, there can be no event without a cause.

(3.) *First truths are truths of necessary and universal knowledge.* That is, they are not merely knowable, but they are known to all moral agents, by a necessary law of their intellect.

That space and time are, and must be, that every event has and must have a cause, and such like truths, are universally known and assumed by every moral agent, whether the terms in which they are stated have ever been so much as heard by him, or not. This last is the characteristic that distinguishes first truths from others merely self-evident, of which we shall soon speak.

(4.) First truths are, of course, *self-evident*. That is, they are universally directly beheld, in the light of their own evidence.

(5.) First truths are truths of the *pure reason*, and of course truths of certain knowledge. They are universally known with such certainty as to render it impossible for any moral agent to deny, forget, or practically overlook them. Although they may be denied in theory, they are always, and necessarily, recognized in practice. No moral agent, for example, can, by any possibility, practically deny, or forget, or overlook the first truths that time and space exist and must exist, that every event has and must have a cause.

It is, therefore, always to be remembered that first truths are universally assumed and known, and in all our teachings, and in all our inquiries we are to take the first truths of reason for granted. It is preposterous to attempt to prove them, for the reason that we necessarily assume them as the basis and condition of all reasoning.

The mind arrives at a knowledge of these truths by directly and necessarily beholding them, upon condition of its first perceiving their logical condition. The mind beholds, or attains to the conception of, an *event*. Upon this conception it instantly assumes, whether it thinks of the assumption or not, that this event had, and that every event must have, a cause.

The mind perceives, or has the notion of body. This conception necessarily develops the first truth, *space is and must be*.

The mind beholds or conceives of succession; and this beholding, or conception, necessarily develops the first truth, *time is, and must be*.

As we proceed we shall notice divers truths which belong to this class, some of which, in theory, have been denied. Nevertheless, in their practical judgments, all men have admitted them and given as high evidence of their knowing them, as they do of knowing their own existence.

Suppose, for example, that the law of causality should not be, at all times or at any time, a subject of distinct thought and attention. Suppose that the proposition in words, should never be in the mind, that "every event must have a cause," or that this proposition should be denied. Still the truth is there, in the form of absolute knowledge, a necessary assumption, an *à priori* affirmation, and the mind has so firm a hold of it, as to be utterly unable to overlook, or forget, or practically deny it. Every mind has it as a certain knowledge, long before it can understand the language in which it is expressed, and no statement or evidence whatever can give the mind any firmer conviction of its truth, than it had from necessity at first. This is true of all the truths of this class. They are always, and

necessarily, assumed by all moral agents, whether distinctly thought of or not. And for the most part this class of truths are assumed, without being frequently, or at least without being generally, the object of thought or direct attention. The mind assumes them, without a distinct consciousness of the assumption. For example, we act every moment, and judge, and reason, and believe, upon the assumption that every event must have a cause, and yet we are not conscious of thinking of this truth, nor that we assume it, until something calls the attention to it.

First truths of reason, then, let it be distinctly remembered, are always and necessarily assumed, though they may be seldom thought of. They are universally known, before the words are understood, by which they may be expressed; and although they may never be expressed in a formal proposition, yet the mind has as certain a knowledge of them as it has of its own existence.

All reasoning proceeds upon the assumption of these truths. It must do so, of necessity. It is preposterous to attempt to prove first truths to a moral agent; for, being a moral agent, he must absolutely know them already, and if he did not, in no possible way could he be put in possession of them, except by presenting to his perception the chronological condition of their development, and in no case could any thing else be needed, for upon the occurrence of this perception, the assumption, or development, follows by a law of absolute and universal necessity. And until these truths are actually developed, no being can be a moral agent.

There is no reasoning with one who calls in question the first truths of reason, and demands proof of them. All reasoning must, from the nature of mind and the laws of reasoning, assume the first-truths of reason as certain, and admitted, and as the *à priori* condition of all logical deduction and demonstration. Some one of these must be assumed as true, directly or indirectly, in every syllogism and in every demonstration.

In all our future investigations we shall have abundant occasion for the application and illustration of what has now been said of first truths of reason. If, at any stage of our progress, we light upon a truth of this class, let it be borne in mind that the nature of the truth is the preclusion, or, as lawyers would express it, the *estopple* of all controversy.

To deny the reality of this class of truths, is to deny the validity of our most perfect knowledge. The only question to be settled is, does the truth in question belong to this class? There are many truths which men, all sane men, certainly know, of which they not only

seldom think, but which, in theory, they strenuously deny.

2. The second class of truths that need no proof are *self-evident truths*, possessing the attributes of *necessity* and *universality*.

Of these truths, I remark--

(1.) That they, like first truths, are affirmed by the pure reason, and not by the understanding, nor the sense.

(2.) They are affirmed, like first truths, *à priori*; that is, they are directly beheld or intuited, and not attained to by evidence or induction.

(3.) They are truths of universal and necessary affirmation, when so stated as to be understood. By a law of the reason, all sane men must admit and affirm them, in the light of their own evidence, whenever they are understood.

This class, although self-evident, when presented to the mind, are not, like first truths, universally and necessarily known to all moral agents.

The mathematical axioms, and first principles, the *à priori* grounds and principles of all *science*, belong to this class.

(4.) They are, like first truths, *universal* in the sense that there is no exception to them.

(5.) They are *necessary truths*. That is, the reason affirms, not merely that they are, but that they must be, true; that these truths cannot but be. The abstract, the infinite, belong to this class.

To compel other minds to admit this class of truths, we need only to frame so perspicuous a statement of them as to cause them to be distinctly perceived or understood. This being done, all sound minds irresistibly affirm them, whether the heart is, or is not, honest enough to admit the conviction.

3. A third class of truths that need no proof, are truths of *rational intuition*, but possess not the attributes of *universality* and *necessity*.

Our own existence, personality, personal identity, &c., belong to this class. These truths are intuited by the reason, are self-evident, and given, as such, in consciousness; they are known to self, without proof, and cannot be doubted. They are at first developed by sensation, but not inferred from it. Suppose a sensation to be perceived by the sense, all that could be logically inferred from this is, that there is some subject of this sensation, but that *I* exist, and am the subject of this sensation, does not logically appear. Sensation first awakes the mind to self-consciousness; that is, a

sensation of some kind first arouses the attention of mind to the facts of its own existence and personal identity. These truths are directly beheld and affirmed. The mind does not say, *I feel*, or *I think*, and therefore *I am*, for this is a mere sophism; it is to assume the existence of the *I* as the subject of feeling, and afterwards to infer the existence of the *I* from the feeling or sensation.

4. A fourth class of truths that need no proof are *sensations*. It has been already remarked, that all sensations given by consciousness, are self-evident to the subject of them. Whether I ascribe my sensations to their real cause may admit of doubt, but that the sensation is real there can be no doubt. The testimony of the sense is valid, for that which it immediately beholds or intuits, that is, for the reality of the sensation. The judgment may err by ascribing the sensation to the wrong cause.

But I must not proceed further with this statement; my design has been, not to enter too minutely into nice metaphysical distinctions, nor by any means to exhaust the subject of this lecture, but only to fix attention upon the distinctions upon which I have insisted, for the purpose of precluding all irrelevant and preposterous discussions about the validity of first and self-evident truths. I must assume that you possess some knowledge of psychology, and of mental philosophy, and leave to your convenience a more thorough and extended examination of the subject but hinted at in this lecture.

Enough, I trust, has been said to prepare your minds for the introduction of the great and fundamental axioms which lie at the foundation of all our ideas of morality and religion. Our next lecture will present the nature and attributes of *moral law*. We shall proceed in the light of the *à priori* affirmations of the reason, in postulating its nature and its attributes. Having attained to a firm footing upon these points, we shall be naturally conducted by reason and revelation to our ultimate conclusions.

